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47 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
wucke13
63ff75b93c remove anyhow
This is the first of a couple of commits aiming to completely remove anyhow in favor of using a mixture of `log` and a `thiserror` based enum. Partially fixes #93.
2023-06-17 22:43:45 +02:00
wucke13
5bebdd9284 fix broken devShell
The use of a fakecmake in the main step of the Rosenpass build removed real CMake from the devShell, essentially breaking cargo build from within it. This commit fixes that, by explicitly placing the real CMake in the devShell's nativeBuildInputs.
2023-06-17 22:41:56 +02:00
wucke13
b0332971df Merge pull request #89 from rosenpass/dev/update-flake
update flake.lock
2023-06-14 20:33:58 +02:00
wucke13
be508b486a refine CI further
- include default jobs
- clean up generator script
- fix wrong dependency estimation for release-package
2023-06-14 19:12:44 +02:00
wucke13
4314a0915a fix tex build after update 2023-06-14 18:56:12 +02:00
wucke13
0d2ca37bbb flake.lock: Update
Flake lock file updates:

• Updated input 'fenix':
    'github:nix-community/fenix/d8067f4d1d3d30732703209bec5ca7d62aaececc' (2023-01-20)
  → 'github:nix-community/fenix/6e6a94c4d0cac4821b6452fbae46609b89a8ddcf' (2023-06-09)
• Updated input 'fenix/rust-analyzer-src':
    'github:rust-lang/rust-analyzer/6e52c64031825920983515b9e975e93232739f7f' (2023-01-19)
  → 'github:rust-lang/rust-analyzer/9c03aa1ac2e67051db83a85baf3cfee902e4dd84' (2023-06-08)
• Updated input 'flake-utils':
    'github:numtide/flake-utils/5aed5285a952e0b949eb3ba02c12fa4fcfef535f' (2022-11-02)
  → 'github:numtide/flake-utils/a1720a10a6cfe8234c0e93907ffe81be440f4cef' (2023-05-31)
• Added input 'flake-utils/systems':
    'github:nix-systems/default/da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e' (2023-04-09)
• Updated input 'nixpkgs':
    'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/2dea8991d89b9f1e78d874945f78ca15f6954289' (2023-01-06)
  → 'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/81ed90058a851eb73be835c770e062c6938c8a9e' (2023-06-08)
• Updated input 'nixpkgs-unstable':
    'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/1bddde315297c092712b0ef03d9def7a474b28ae' (2023-02-15)
  → 'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/ba0f52d80375147840b83f1511599fbe333be3ad' (2023-06-09)
2023-06-14 18:56:12 +02:00
wucke13
7b69afabbc Merge pull request #90 from rosenpass/dev/overhaul-ci
CLI improvements and CI refinery
2023-06-14 18:18:01 +02:00
wucke13
e24172d9b5 move if on upload pdf job in CI 2023-06-10 23:10:59 +02:00
wucke13
d01c96c1de add i686 system
This still excludes static builds due to a bug in oqs-sys.
Once oqs-sys is bumped to use liboqs 0.8, full 32 bit x86 support is viable.
2023-06-10 16:00:12 +02:00
wucke13
4a3b59fd15 refine cli of exchange command
This implements feedback from #87 on ambiguities of the CLI
2023-06-10 04:03:55 +02:00
wucke13
11d60bcced add GH-Actions based CI with cachix 2023-06-10 03:44:02 +02:00
wucke13
73a8489232 add private-key argument to cli parser
- fixes #72
2023-06-09 22:20:24 +02:00
Karolin Varner
2ac2c84c71 Trigger Website upload CI 2023-06-02 09:28:33 +02:00
Karolin Varner
a0f79478cc Trigger upload-doc CI job 2023-06-02 09:28:33 +02:00
Karolin Varner
7e6985fdc6 fix: Revert spell correction zeroized -> zeroed
This is an established term.
2023-06-01 11:51:27 +02:00
Steffen Vogel
b958eacaae fix: Typos in Rust code, readme and man pages 2023-06-01 11:51:27 +02:00
Karolin Varner
397a776c55 fix: Race condition due to concurrent handshake
After establishing a session in responder role, the peer
should abort ongoing handshakes in initiator role.

Also adds an extra wait period before creating an
initiation if peer had been the initiator in the previous
handshake. This makes sure that unless there are huge latencies,
there are no concurrent handshakes in the first place.

Fixes: #43
2023-05-26 11:46:00 +02:00
Karolin Varner
19fe7360d2 fix: Git directory detection should not print an error if we are not in a git repo 2023-05-26 11:46:00 +02:00
Karolin Varner
b29720b0c6 fix: Formatting 2023-05-23 22:26:56 +02:00
Karolin Varner
78e32a6f14 fix: Show cargo fmt errors 2023-05-23 22:26:56 +02:00
Karolin Varner
5f78857ff5 fix: Show warnings from git directory detection 2023-05-23 11:36:20 +02:00
Karolin Varner
69f62673a5 fix: Reintroduce ability to actually supply wireguard with keys
Regression introduced in b99d072879
due to forgetfullness
2023-05-23 11:26:01 +02:00
Karolin Varner
097fd0332d chore: Upgrade crate dependencies 2023-05-23 11:24:39 +02:00
Mullana
303c5a569c "key chaining..." to "chaining key..." (fixed) 2023-05-23 08:58:24 +02:00
Karolin Varner
7aa48b95af fix: Escape uses of angle brackets and pointy brackets in documentation
This was a regression introduced in b99d072879
which went unnoticed because of the broken CI

https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
2023-05-23 08:54:53 +02:00
Karolin Varner
229224d078 fix: Restore QC/doc CI job to operation
https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/108378
2023-05-23 08:54:53 +02:00
Karolin Varner
e12cd18a42 fix: Disable broken CI jobs
These are cross compilation static build jobs
which are nice to have but non-essential.

https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
2023-05-23 08:54:53 +02:00
Mullana
0b1a00a32e key chaining..." to "chaining key... (svg) 2023-05-23 00:30:00 +02:00
Mullana
7c3cd1acf6 "key chaining..." to "chaining key..." 2023-05-23 00:23:29 +02:00
Karolin Varner
3856d774ff chore: Move slides into their own repo 2023-05-22 11:43:31 +02:00
Karolin Varner
62fab066d4 feat: Restart host discovery on connection loss
This will retry other sockets and the host-name given on the
command-line when a connection loss is detected.
2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
9469b62f58 fix: Host-path discovery
When rosenpass is started, we either know no peer address or we know a
hostname. How to contact this hostname may not be entirely clear because
we now have multiple sockets we could send on and DNS may return
multiple addresses.

To robustly handle host path discovery, we try each
socket-ip-combination in a round robin fashion; the struct stores the
offset of the last used combination internally and and will continue
with the next combination on every call.
2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
f8bea94330 fix: Always send messages to a peer using the socket they contacted us with
To implement this it was necessary to introduce an `Endpoint` abstraction
over SocketAddr's that includes the information which socket was used.
2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
f3c343c472 fix: Handle the various possible dual-stack configurations reliably 2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
7154af52f9 chore: Indicate that the listen parameter can be given multiple times in the help 2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
e03fed404f chore: Cleanup unneccesary debug output 2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
Karolin Varner
42798699e4 fix: Adjust the rp(1) script to support the new rosenpass(1) command line parameters
The previous commit still introduces breaking changes;
this means we are now developing a 1.x.x version instead
of a 0.x.x version. We will create a 0.x.x development branch
where we might backport some of the features we are introducing now
2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
wucke13
b99d072879 major rewrite of application server & frontend
- adds TOML based configuation files
  - with example configuratios in config-examples
- reimplments arcane CLI argument parser as automaton
- adds a new CLI focused arround configuration files
- moves all file utility stuff from `main.rs` to `util.rs`
- moves all AppServer stuff to dedicated `app_server.rs`
- add mio for multi-listen-socket support (should fix #27)
- consistency: rename private to secret
2023-05-22 11:42:51 +02:00
wucke13
d5b2a9414f Merge pull request #53 from emilengler/invoke-man
invoke `man(1)` when requesting help
2023-04-27 09:32:43 +02:00
Emil Engler
13cc7e05ed invoke man(1) when requesting help
This commit invokes `man(1)` when requesting help and emits the built-in
manual, if the manual page is not found on the system.
2023-04-25 14:54:30 +02:00
wucke13
096c811491 Merge pull request #58 from AliceOrunitia/alice/doc-upload
Alice/doc upload
2023-04-24 11:47:29 +02:00
wucke13
cefe9ce762 Merge pull request #59 from rosenpass/dev/use-naersk
move to naersk + fenix
2023-04-23 22:05:05 +02:00
wucke13
378fddb645 fix or exclude failing CI actions
Due to https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs-rust/issues/202 it is not
yet possible to build the static Rosenpass version for `i686`. The CI actions
which fail for this reason have been excluded for now. Further on, some
the workflow names have been shortened for better overview.
2023-04-23 17:19:31 +02:00
wucke13
695ef6a769 replace pkgs.rustPlatform with naersk + fenix
Now that fenix + naersk are used, we don't have the problem of hour-long
builds of a `pkgsStatic.rustc` running in qemu-aarch64. Thus, we can now
finally add these without a big penalty in CI runtime. In addition to
that, the i686 target is added as well.
2023-04-23 00:03:31 +02:00
Alice Bowman
b4d74d64f7 feat(website): upload man pages to website 2023-04-22 15:32:49 +02:00
Emil Engler
0456ded6b9 doc: add a manual page for rp(1) 2023-04-15 18:05:23 +02:00
wucke13
838fd19694 Merge pull request #52 from rosenpass/dev/new-release
chore: Release rosenpass version 0.1.2-rc.4
2023-04-14 09:40:33 +02:00
38 changed files with 3368 additions and 2222 deletions

200
.ci/gen-workflow-files.nu Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
#!/usr/bin/env nu
use log *
# cd to git root
cd (git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
# check if a subject depends on a potential dependency
def depends [
subject:string # package to examine
maybe_dep:string # maybe a dependency of subject
] {
not ( nix why-depends --quiet --derivation $subject $maybe_dep | is-empty )
}
# get attribute names of the attribute set
def get-attr-names [
expr: # nix expression to get attrNames of
] {
nix eval --json $expr --apply builtins.attrNames | from json
}
def job-id [
system:string,
derivation:string,
] {
$"($system)---($derivation)"
}
# map from nixos system to github runner type
let systems_map = {
# aarch64-darwin
# aarch64-linux
i686-linux: ubuntu-latest,
x86_64-darwin: macos-latest,
x86_64-linux: ubuntu-latest
}
let targets = (get-attr-names ".#packages"
| par-each {|system| { $system : (get-attr-names $".#packages.($system)") } }
| reduce {|it, acc| $acc | merge $it }
)
mut cachix_workflow = {
name: "Nix",
permissions: {contents: write},
on: {
pull_request: null,
push: {branches: [main]}
},
jobs: {},
}
mut release_workflow = {
name: "Release",
permissions: {contents: write},
on: { push: {tags: ["v*"]} },
jobs: {},
}
let runner_setup = [
{
uses: "actions/checkout@v3"
}
{
uses: "cachix/install-nix-action@v21",
with: { nix_path: "nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable" }
}
{
uses: "cachix/cachix-action@v12",
with: {
name: rosenpass,
authToken: "${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}"
}
}
]
for system in ($targets | columns) {
if ($systems_map | get -i $system | is-empty) {
log info $"skipping ($system), since there are no GH-Actions runners for it"
continue
}
# lookup the correct runner for $system
let runs_on = [ ($systems_map | get $system) ]
# add jobs for all derivations
let derivations = ($targets | get $system)
for derivation in $derivations {
if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "static") {
log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
continue
}
if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "release-package") {
log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
continue
}
# job_id for GH-Actions
let id = ( job-id $system $derivation )
# name displayed
let name = $"($system).($derivation)"
# collection of dependencies
# TODO currently only considers dependencies on the same $system
let needs = ($derivations
| filter {|it| $it != $derivation and $it != "default" } # filter out self and default
| par-each {|it| {
name: $it, # the other derivation
# does self depend on $it?
needed: (depends $".#packages.($system).($derivation)" $".#packages.($system).($it)")
} }
| filter {|it| $it.needed}
| each {|it| job-id $system $it.name}
)
mut new_job = {
name: $"Build ($name)",
"runs-on": $runs_on,
needs: $needs,
steps: ($runner_setup | append [
{
name: Build,
run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).($derivation) --print-build-logs"
}
])
}
$cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $id $new_job )
}
# add check job
$cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---check" {
name: $"Run Nix checks on ($system)",
"runs-on": $runs_on,
steps: ($runner_setup | append {
name: Check,
run: "nix flake check . --print-build-logs"
})
})
# add release job
$release_workflow.jobs = ($release_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---release" {
name: $"Build release artifacts for ($system)",
"runs-on": $runs_on,
steps: ($runner_setup | append [
{
name: "Build release",
run: "nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs"
}
{
name: Release,
uses: "softprops/action-gh-release@v1",
with: {
draft: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}",
prerelease: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}",
files: "result/*"
}
}
])
})
}
# add whitepaper job with upload
let system = "x86_64-linux"
$cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---whitepaper-upload" {
name: $"Upload whitepaper ($system)",
"runs-on": ($systems_map | get $system),
"if": "${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}",
steps: ($runner_setup | append [
{
name: "Git add git sha and commit",
run: "cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin"
}
{
name: Build,
run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).whitepaper --print-build-logs"
}
{
name: "Deploy PDF artifacts",
uses: "peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3",
with: {
github_token: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}",
publish_dir: result/,
publish_branch: papers-pdf,
force_orphan: true
}
}
])
})
log info "saving nix-cachix workflow"
$cachix_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/nix.yaml
$release_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/release.yaml
log info "prettify generated yaml"
prettier -w .github/workflows/

49
.github/workflows/doc-upload.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
name: Update website docs
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- "doc/**"
jobs:
update-website:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Clone rosenpass-website repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
repository: rosenpass/rosenpass-website
ref: main
path: rosenpass-website
token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }}
- name: Copy docs to website repo
run: |
cp -R doc/* rosenpass-website/static/docs/
- name: Install mandoc
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y mandoc
- name: Compile man pages to HTML
run: |
cd rosenpass-website/static/docs/
for file in *.1; do
mandoc -Thtml "$file" > "${file%.*}.html"
done
- name: Commit changes to website repo
uses: EndBug/add-and-commit@v9
with:
author_name: GitHub Actions
author_email: actions@github.com
message: Update docs
cwd: rosenpass-website/static/docs
github_token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }

View File

@@ -1,74 +1,346 @@
name: Nix Related Actions
name: Nix
permissions:
contents: write
on:
pull_request:
pull_request: null
push:
branches: [main]
branches:
- main
jobs:
build:
name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }} on ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
i686-linux---default:
name: Build i686-linux.default
runs-on:
- nix
- ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
nix-system:
- x86_64-linux
# - aarch64-linux
derivation:
- rosenpass
- rosenpass-static
- rosenpass-oci-image
- rosenpass-static-oci-image
- proof-proverif
- whitepaper
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- i686-linux---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Generate gitHeadInfo.gin for the whitepaper
if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' }}
run: ( cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin )
- name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }}@${{ matrix.nix-system }}
run: |
# build the package
nix build .#packages.${{ matrix.nix-system }}.${{ matrix.derivation }} --print-build-logs
# copy over the results
if [[ -f $(readlink --canonicalize result ) ]]; then
mkdir -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
fi
cp --recursive -- $(readlink --canonicalize result) ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
chmod --recursive ug+rw -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
# add version information
git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-version
git rev-parse HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-sha
# override the `rp` script to keep compatible with non-nix systems
if [[ -f ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/rp ]]; then
cp --force -- rp ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/
fi
- name: Upload build results
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
name: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
path: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.default --print-build-logs
i686-linux---rosenpass:
name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
i686-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- i686-linux---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
i686-linux---check:
name: Run Nix checks on i686-linux
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Check
run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
x86_64-darwin---default:
name: Build x86_64-darwin.default
runs-on:
- macos-latest
needs:
- x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.default --print-build-logs
x86_64-darwin---release-package:
name: Build x86_64-darwin.release-package
runs-on:
- macos-latest
needs:
- x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
- x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.release-package --print-build-logs
x86_64-darwin---rosenpass:
name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass
runs-on:
- macos-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass --print-build-logs
x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image:
name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image
runs-on:
- macos-latest
needs:
- x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
x86_64-darwin---check:
name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-darwin
runs-on:
- macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Check
run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---default:
name: Build x86_64-linux.default
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- x86_64-linux---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.default --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---proof-proverif:
name: Build x86_64-linux.proof-proverif
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- x86_64-linux---proverif-patched
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proof-proverif --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---proverif-patched:
name: Build x86_64-linux.proverif-patched
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proverif-patched --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---release-package:
name: Build x86_64-linux.release-package
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
- x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.release-package --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---rosenpass:
name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- x86_64-linux---rosenpass
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static:
name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image:
name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs:
- x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---whitepaper:
name: Build x86_64-linux.whitepaper
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
needs: []
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---check:
name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-linux
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Check
run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
x86_64-linux---whitepaper-upload:
name: Upload whitepaper x86_64-linux
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Git add git sha and commit
run: cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin
- name: Build
run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
- name: Deploy PDF artifacts
if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3
with:
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
publish_dir: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
publish_dir: result/
publish_branch: papers-pdf
force_orphan: true
checks:
name: Run Nix checks
runs-on: nixos
needs: build
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Run Checks
run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
name: Quality Control
name: QC
on:
pull_request:
push:
@@ -62,4 +62,7 @@ jobs:
- run: rustup component add clippy
- name: Install libsodium
run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
- run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --document-private-items
# `--no-deps` used as a workaround for a rust compiler bug. See:
# - https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
# - https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/108378
- run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --no-deps --document-private-items

View File

@@ -3,28 +3,69 @@ permissions:
contents: write
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
tags:
- v*
jobs:
release:
name: Release for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
i686-linux---release:
name: Build release artifacts for i686-linux
runs-on:
- nix
- ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
nix-system:
- x86_64-linux
# - aarch64-linux
- ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build release-package for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build release
run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
- name: Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
files: |
result/*
files: result/*
x86_64-darwin---release:
name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-darwin
runs-on:
- macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build release
run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
- name: Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
files: result/*
x86_64-linux---release:
name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-linux
runs-on:
- ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
with:
nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
- uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
with:
name: rosenpass
authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
- name: Build release
run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
- name: Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
files: result/*

703
Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -14,21 +14,26 @@ name = "handshake"
harness = false
[dependencies]
anyhow = { version = "1.0.52", features = ["backtrace"] }
base64 = "0.13.0"
clap = { version = "3.0.0", features = ["yaml"] }
base64 = "0.21.1"
static_assertions = "1.1.0"
memoffset = "0.6.5"
libsodium-sys-stable = { version = "1.19.26", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
oqs-sys = { version = "0.7.1", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber'] }
memoffset = "0.9.0"
libsodium-sys-stable = { version = "1.19.28", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
oqs-sys = { version = "0.7.2", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber'] }
lazy_static = "1.4.0"
thiserror = "1.0.38"
paste = "1.0.11"
thiserror = "1.0.40"
paste = "1.0.12"
log = { version = "0.4.17", optional = true }
env_logger = { version = "0.10.0", optional = true }
serde = { version = "1.0.163", features = ["derive"] }
toml = "0.7.4"
clap = { version = "4.3.0", features = ["derive"] }
mio = { version = "0.8.6", features = ["net", "os-poll"] }
[build-dependencies]
anyhow = "1.0.71"
[dev-dependencies]
criterion = "0.3.5"
criterion = "0.4.0"
test_bin = "0.4.0"
[features]

53
build.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
use anyhow::bail;
use anyhow::Result;
use std::env;
use std::fs::File;
use std::io::Write;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
/// Invokes a troff compiler to compile a manual page
fn render_man(compiler: &str, man: &str) -> Result<String> {
let out = Command::new(compiler).args(["-Tascii", man]).output()?;
if !out.status.success() {
bail!("{} returned an error", compiler);
}
Ok(String::from_utf8(out.stdout)?)
}
/// Generates the manual page
fn generate_man() -> String {
// This function is purposely stupid and redundant
let man = render_man("mandoc", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
if man.is_ok() {
return man.unwrap();
}
let man = render_man("groff", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
if man.is_ok() {
return man.unwrap();
}
// TODO: Link to online manual here
"Cannot render manual page\n".into()
}
fn man() {
let out_dir = PathBuf::from(env::var("OUT_DIR").unwrap());
let man = generate_man();
let path = out_dir.join("rosenpass.1.ascii");
let mut file = File::create(&path).unwrap();
file.write_all(man.as_bytes()).unwrap();
println!("cargo:rustc-env=ROSENPASS_MAN={}", path.display());
}
fn main() {
// For now, rerun the build script on every time, as the build script
// is not very expensive right now.
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=./");
man();
}

2
config-examples/.gitignore vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
peer-*-*-key
peer-*-out

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
secret_key = "peer-a-secret-key"
listen = ["[::]:10001"]
verbosity = "Quiet"
[[peers]]
public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
endpoint = "localhost:10002"
key_out = "peer-a-rp-out-key"
# exchange_command = [
# "wg",
# "set",
# "wg0",
# "peer",
# "<PEER_ID>",
# "preshared-key",
# "/dev/stdin",
# ]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
secret_key = "peer-b-secret-key"
listen = ["[::]:10002"]
verbosity = "Quiet"
[[peers]]
public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
endpoint = "localhost:10001"
key_out = "peer-b-rp-out-key"
# exchange_command = [
# "wg",
# "set",
# "wg0",
# "peer",
# "<PEER_ID>",
# "preshared-key",
# "/dev/stdin",
# ]

115
doc/rp.1 Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
.Dd $Mdocdate$
.Dt RP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm rp
.Nd high-level interface to rosenpass
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Ar explain
.Op Ar verbose
.Ar genkey Ar ... | Ar pubkey ... | Ar exchange ...
.Nm
.Op ...
.Ar genkey PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
.Nm
.Op ...
.Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
.Nm
.Op ...
.\" Splitting this across several lines
.Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
.Op dev <device>
.Op listen <ip>:<port>
.\" Because the peer argument is complicated, it would be heel to represent it
.\" in mdoc... Using an ugly hack instead, thereby losing semantic.
[peer PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR [endpoint <ip>:<port>] [persistent-keepalive <interval>]
[allowed-ips <ip1>/<cidr1>[,<ip2>/<cidr2>] ...]] ...
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
program
is used to build a VPN with WireGuard and Rosenpass.
.Pp
The optional
.Op explain
and
.Op verbose
options can be used to obtain further help or to enable a detailed view on the
operations, respectively.
.Ss COMMANDS
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ar genkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
Creates a new directory with appropriate permissions and generates all the
necessary private keys required for a peer to participate in a rosenpass
connection.
.It Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
Creates a fresh directory at
.Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR ,
which contains the extracted public keys from the private keys generated by
.Ar genkey
and located inside
.Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR .
.It Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR [dev <device>] [listen <ip>:<port>] [PEERS]
Starts the VPN on interface
.Ar device ,
listening on the provided IP and port combination, allowing connections from
.Ar PEERS .
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std
.Sh EXAMPLES
To create a VPN connection, start by generating secret keys on both hosts.
.Bd -literal -offset indent
rp genkey server.rosenpass-secret
rp genkey client.rosenpass-secret
.Ed
.Pp
Extract the public keys:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
rp pubkey server.rosenpass-secret server.rosenpass-public
rp pubkey client.rosenpass-secret client.rosenpass-public
.Ed
.Pp
Copy the
.Qq -public
directories to the other peers and then start the VPN.
On the server:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
sudo rp exchange server.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass0 listen 192.168.0.1:9999 \\
peer client.rosenpass-public allowed-ips fe80::/64
.Ed
.Pp
On the client:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
sudo rp exchange client.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass 0 \\
peer server.rosenpass-public endpoint 192.168.0.1:9999 allowed-ips fe80::/64
.Ed
.Pp
Assign IP addresses:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
sudo ip a add fe80::1/64 dev rosenpass0 # Server
sudo ip a add fe80::2/64 dev rosenpass0 # Client
.Ed
.Pp
Test the connection by pinging the server on the client machine:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
ping fe80::1%rosenpass0 # Client
.Ed
.Pp
You can watch how rosenpass replaces the WireGuard PSK with the following:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
watch -n 0.2 'wg show all; wg show all preshared-keys'
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr rosenpass 1 ,
.Xr wg 1
.Sh AUTHORS
Rosenpass was created by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske,
Marei Peischl, Stephan Ajuvo, and Lisa Schmidt.
.Pp
This manual page was written by
.An Emil Engler
.Sh BUGS
The bugs are tracked at
.Lk https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues .

81
flake.lock generated
View File

@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
"rust-analyzer-src": "rust-analyzer-src"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1674240251,
"narHash": "sha256-AVMmf/CtcGensTZmMicToDpOwySEGNKYgRPC7lu3m8w=",
"lastModified": 1686291735,
"narHash": "sha256-mpq2m6TN3ImqqUqA4u93NvkZu5vH//3spqjmPRbRlvA=",
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "fenix",
"rev": "d8067f4d1d3d30732703209bec5ca7d62aaececc",
"rev": "6e6a94c4d0cac4821b6452fbae46609b89a8ddcf",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -22,12 +22,15 @@
}
},
"flake-utils": {
"inputs": {
"systems": "systems"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1667395993,
"narHash": "sha256-nuEHfE/LcWyuSWnS8t12N1wc105Qtau+/OdUAjtQ0rA=",
"lastModified": 1685518550,
"narHash": "sha256-o2d0KcvaXzTrPRIo0kOLV0/QXHhDQ5DTi+OxcjO8xqY=",
"owner": "numtide",
"repo": "flake-utils",
"rev": "5aed5285a952e0b949eb3ba02c12fa4fcfef535f",
"rev": "a1720a10a6cfe8234c0e93907ffe81be440f4cef",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -36,13 +39,33 @@
"type": "github"
}
},
"naersk": {
"inputs": {
"nixpkgs": [
"nixpkgs"
]
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1679567394,
"narHash": "sha256-ZvLuzPeARDLiQUt6zSZFGOs+HZmE+3g4QURc8mkBsfM=",
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "naersk",
"rev": "88cd22380154a2c36799fe8098888f0f59861a15",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "naersk",
"type": "github"
}
},
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1672968032,
"narHash": "sha256-26Jns3GmHem44a06UN5Rj/KOD9qNJThyQrom02Ijur8=",
"lastModified": 1686237827,
"narHash": "sha256-fAZB+Zkcmc+qlauiFnIH9+2qgwM0NO/ru5pWEw3tDow=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "2dea8991d89b9f1e78d874945f78ca15f6954289",
"rev": "81ed90058a851eb73be835c770e062c6938c8a9e",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -50,37 +73,22 @@
"type": "indirect"
}
},
"nixpkgs-unstable": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1676496762,
"narHash": "sha256-GFAxjaTgh8KJ8q7BYaI4EVGI5K98ooW70fG/83rSb08=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "1bddde315297c092712b0ef03d9def7a474b28ae",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"type": "github"
}
},
"root": {
"inputs": {
"fenix": "fenix",
"flake-utils": "flake-utils",
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs",
"nixpkgs-unstable": "nixpkgs-unstable"
"naersk": "naersk",
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
}
},
"rust-analyzer-src": {
"flake": false,
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1674162026,
"narHash": "sha256-iY0bxoVE7zAZmp0BB/m5hZW5pWHUfgntDvc1m2zyt/U=",
"lastModified": 1686239338,
"narHash": "sha256-c6Mm7UnDf3j3akY3YB3rELFA76QRbB8ttSBsh00LWi0=",
"owner": "rust-lang",
"repo": "rust-analyzer",
"rev": "6e52c64031825920983515b9e975e93232739f7f",
"rev": "9c03aa1ac2e67051db83a85baf3cfee902e4dd84",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -89,6 +97,21 @@
"repo": "rust-analyzer",
"type": "github"
}
},
"systems": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1681028828,
"narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
"owner": "nix-systems",
"repo": "default",
"rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "nix-systems",
"repo": "default",
"type": "github"
}
}
},
"root": "root",

173
flake.nix
View File

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
{
inputs = {
nixpkgs-unstable.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs";
flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
# for quicker rust builds
naersk.url = "github:nix-community/naersk";
naersk.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
# for rust nightly with llvm-tools-preview
fenix.url = "github:nix-community/fenix";
fenix.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
@@ -19,12 +22,15 @@
"aarch64-linux"
# unsuported best-effort
"i686-linux"
"x86_64-darwin"
"aarch64-darwin"
# "x86_64-windows"
]
(system:
let
lib = nixpkgs.lib;
# normal nixpkgs
pkgs = import nixpkgs {
inherit system;
@@ -47,14 +53,18 @@
)
];
};
# parsed Cargo.toml
cargoToml = builtins.fromTOML (builtins.readFile ./Cargo.toml);
# source files relevant for rust
src = pkgs.lib.sourceByRegex ./. [
"Cargo\\.(toml|lock)"
"build.rs"
"(src|benches)(/.*\\.(rs|md))?"
"rp"
];
# builds a bin path for all dependencies for the `rp` shellscript
rpBinPath = p: with p; lib.makeBinPath [
coreutils
@@ -67,61 +77,116 @@
# given set of nixpkgs
rpDerivation = p:
let
isStatic = p.stdenv.hostPlatform.isStatic;
in
p.rustPlatform.buildRustPackage {
# metadata and source
pname = cargoToml.package.name;
version = cargoToml.package.version;
inherit src;
cargoLock = {
lockFile = src + "/Cargo.lock";
# whether we want to build a statically linked binary
isStatic = p.targetPlatform.isStatic;
# the rust target of `p`
target = p.rust.toRustTargetSpec p.targetPlatform;
# convert a string to shout case
shout = string: builtins.replaceStrings [ "-" ] [ "_" ] (pkgs.lib.toUpper string);
# suitable Rust toolchain
toolchain = with inputs.fenix.packages.${system}; combine [
stable.cargo
stable.rustc
targets.${target}.stable.rust-std
];
# naersk with a custom toolchain
naersk = pkgs.callPackage inputs.naersk {
cargo = toolchain;
rustc = toolchain;
};
nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
cmake # for oqs build in the oqs-sys crate
makeWrapper # for the rp shellscript
pkg-config # let libsodium-sys-stable find libsodium
removeReferencesTo
rustPlatform.bindgenHook # for C-bindings in the crypto libs
];
buildInputs = with p; [ bash libsodium ];
# used to trick the build.rs into believing that CMake was ran **again**
fakecmake = pkgs.writeScriptBin "cmake" ''
#! ${pkgs.stdenv.shell} -e
true
'';
in
naersk.buildPackage
{
# metadata and source
name = cargoToml.package.name;
version = cargoToml.package.version;
inherit src;
doCheck = true;
nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
p.stdenv.cc
cmake # for oqs build in the oqs-sys crate
mandoc # for the built-in manual
makeWrapper # for the rp shellscript
pkg-config # let libsodium-sys-stable find libsodium
removeReferencesTo
rustPlatform.bindgenHook # for C-bindings in the crypto libs
];
buildInputs = with p; [ bash libsodium ];
override = x: {
preBuild =
# nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a crypto
# extensions, but liboqs depens on these
(lib.optionalString (system == "aarch64-linux") ''
NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -march=armv8-a+crypto"
''
);
# fortify is only compatible with dynamic linking
hardeningDisable = lib.optional isStatic "fortify";
};
overrideMain = x: {
# CMake detects that it was served a _foreign_ target dir, and CMake
# would be executed again upon the second build step of naersk.
# By adding our specially optimized CMake version, we reduce the cost
# of recompilation by 99 % while, while avoiding any CMake errors.
nativeBuildInputs = [ (lib.hiPrio fakecmake) ] ++ x.nativeBuildInputs;
# make sure that libc is linked, under musl this is not the case per
# default
preBuild = (lib.optionalString isStatic ''
NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -lc"
'');
preInstall = ''
install -D ${./rp} $out/bin/rp
wrapProgram $out/bin/rp --prefix PATH : "${ rpBinPath p }"
'';
};
# liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
# the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
# by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_
RUST_MIN_STACK = 8 * 1024 * 1024; # 8 MiB
# We want to build for a specific target...
CARGO_BUILD_TARGET = target;
# ... which might require a non-default linker:
"CARGO_TARGET_${shout target}_LINKER" =
let
inherit (p.stdenv) cc;
in
"${cc}/bin/${cc.targetPrefix}cc";
meta = with pkgs.lib;
{
inherit (cargoToml.package) description homepage;
license = with licenses; [ mit asl20 ];
maintainers = [ maintainers.wucke13 ];
platforms = platforms.all;
};
} // (lib.mkIf isStatic {
# otherwise pkg-config tries to link non-existent dynamic libs
# documented here: https://docs.rs/pkg-config/latest/pkg_config/
PKG_CONFIG_ALL_STATIC = true;
# liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
# the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
# by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_
RUST_MIN_STACK = 8 * 1024 * 1024; # 8 MiB
# nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a
# crypto extensions, but liboqs depens on these
preBuild =
if system == "aarch64-linux" then ''
NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -march=armv8-a+crypto"
'' else "";
preInstall = ''
install -D rp $out/bin/rp
wrapProgram $out/bin/rp --prefix PATH : "${ rpBinPath p }"
'';
# nix progated the *.dev outputs of buildInputs for static
# builds, but that is non-sense for an executables only package
postFixup =
if isStatic then ''
remove-references-to -t ${p.bash.dev} -t ${p.libsodium.dev} \
$out/nix-support/propagated-build-inputs
'' else "";
meta = with pkgs.lib; {
inherit (cargoToml.package) description homepage;
license = with licenses; [ mit asl20 ];
maintainers = [ maintainers.wucke13 ];
platforms = platforms.all;
};
};
# tell rust to build everything statically linked
CARGO_BUILD_RUSTFLAGS = "-C target-feature=+crt-static";
});
# a function to generate a docker image based of rosenpass
rosenpassOCI = name: pkgs.dockerTools.buildImage rec {
inherit name;
@@ -184,14 +249,11 @@
#
packages.whitepaper =
let
pkgs = import inputs.nixpkgs-unstable {
inherit system;
};
tlsetup = (pkgs.texlive.combine {
inherit (pkgs.texlive) scheme-basic acmart amsfonts ccicons
csquotes csvsimple doclicense fancyvrb fontspec gobble
koma-script ifmtarg latexmk lm markdown mathtools minted noto
nunito pgf soul soulutf8 unicode-math lualatex-math
nunito pgf soul unicode-math lualatex-math paralist
gitinfo2 eso-pic biblatex biblatex-trad biblatex-software
xkeyval xurl xifthen biber;
});
@@ -250,6 +312,7 @@
inherit (packages.rosenpass) RUST_MIN_STACK;
inputsFrom = [ packages.default ];
nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
cmake # override the fakecmake from the main step above
cargo-release
clippy
nodePackages.prettier
@@ -267,7 +330,7 @@
checks = {
cargo-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-cargo-fmt"
{ inherit (self.devShells.${system}.default) nativeBuildInputs buildInputs; } ''
cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check > $out
cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check && touch $out
'';
nixpkgs-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-nixpkgs-fmt"
{ nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.nixpkgs-fmt ]; } ''

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
---
template: rosenpass
title: Running a financially \\& institutionally independent post-quantum cryptography research project conference: CrossFyre 2023 submission abstract
author:
- Karolin Varner = Independent Researcher
abstract: |
Rosenpass is a post-quantum-secure key exchange protocol with security against state\\babelhyphen{hard}disruption attacks, whose reference implementation provides post-quantum security to WireGuard deployments. The project's aim is not just to put out a research paper, but to solve the problem of providing a post-quantum VPN top to bottom: from defining a provably secure protocol to educating potential users about how to use it. To achieve this, the project team is composed of an interdisciplinary group of experts in fields inside and outside of cryptography. As such, it is quite different from many purely scientific cryptography projects.
In this presentation, I would like to share some of the learnings from running the project: how including team-members who are not researchers in the research process led us to better cryptography and how disability inclusion led to a more effective working environment. How feminist organizations shaped our communication style and finally, what funding sources we found to support this project.
Not all aspects of this project are favorable though; in particular, the extra, unpaid workload needed to coordinate this project has been enormous and the emotional drain from navigating conflicts, uncertain funding, and risk-taking is ever present.
I still think the community built in the process, the personal growth, the educational benefits and the scientific freedom are well worth the downsides; therefore I would like to exemplify the value in starting collaborations with enthusiastic colleagues from a variety of fields outside cryptographers to the CrossFyre attendees and to encourage other cryptographers to build independent projects for themselves.
tableofcontents: false
---

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<g transform="matrix(1,0,0,1,420.66,-1031.32)">
<g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1431.32,1459.33)">
</g>
<text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1207.79px 1224.25px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining init&quot;</text>
<text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1334px 1350.47px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> init&quot;</text>
</g>
</g>
<g transform="matrix(0.389246,0,0,0.136584,299.374,1166.87)">
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@
<g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-597.124,-172.692)">
<g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1492.94,1459.33)">
</g>
<text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1215.32px 1231.79px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
<text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1341.54px 1358px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
</g>
<g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-380.054,-779.158)">
<g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1463.54,1459.33)">

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@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
%
\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
\begin{itemize}
\item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs
\item Contribution: State Disruption Attacks \& cookies as a defense
\item Contribution: Symbolic analysis of the Rosenpass protocol
\item Contribution: Noise-like specification
\item Contribution: New hashing \& domain separation scheme
\item Contribution: Reference implementation Securing WireGuard in practice
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Post-quantum WireGuard: Three encapsulations}
\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Responder Auth
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
\draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Initiator Auth
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Forward secrecy
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
\draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send \enquote{(ack)}.
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{The Rosenpass protocol}
\includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 DOS against WireGuard through NTP}
\begin{itemize}
\item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
\item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
\item This generates a kill packet that abuses replay protection and renders the initiator's key-pair useless
\item Attack is possible in the real world!
\item Similar attack in post-quantum WireGuard is worse since InitHello is unauthenticated
\item Solution: Biscuits
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Security analysis of rosenpass}
\begin{itemize}
\item CryptoVerif in progress
\item Symbolic analysis using ProVerif
\item Code is part of the software repository \& build system
\item Symbolic analysis is fast (about five minutes), runs in parallel and is
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Proverif in technicolor}
\includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-symbolic-analysis-screenshot.png}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Noise-like specification (easier for engineers)}
\includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-handling-code.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{New Hashing/Domain separation scheme}
\includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-hashing-tree.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Reference implementation in rust, deploying post-quantum-secure WireGuard}
\includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-rg-tutorial-screenshot.png}
\end{frame}

View File

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
{metropolis}
\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
\usepackage{verbatim}
% strikethrough
% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
% bold math
\usepackage{bm}
\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
\sethlcolor{lightblue}
\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
\tikzset{
>=Latex[round]
}
\urlstyle{same}
% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
\makeatletter
\newcommand\SoulColor{%
\let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
\let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
\makeatother
\SoulColor
\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
% `title separator` is the one on the title page
% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
\usepackage{fontawesome}
\usepackage{pgfplots}
\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
%% tikzit
%\usepackage{tikzit}
%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
\usepackage{xspace}
\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
\usepackage{stackengine}
\usepackage{amsmath}
\usepackage{amsfonts}
\usepackage{amssymb}
\usepackage{amsthm}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{environ}
\usepackage{array}
\usepackage[
n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
probability,
notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
%keys
]{cryptocode}
\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
\usepackage{mathtools}
\usepackage{comment}
\excludecomment{commentEnv}
\usepackage{array}
\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
\def\makeuppercase#1{
\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
}
\def\makelowercase#1{
\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
}
\newcounter{char}
\setcounter{char}{1}
\loop
\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
\stepcounter{char}
\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
\repeat
\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
%\usepackage{pgfpages}
%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right}
\usepackage{multicol}
\usepackage{qrcode}
%% msc message diagrams
%\usepackage{msc5}
%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
\begin{frame}{#1}
\vfill
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
\end{center}
\vfill
\end{frame}
}
\usepackage{listings}
\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
table, time, type},
otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
sensitive=true,
morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
morestring=[b]",
}
\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
{morekeywords={},
otherkeywords={},
sensitive=true,
morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
morestring=[b]",
}
\lstset{
language=cvoutput,
basicstyle=\ttfamily,
commentstyle=\color{black!55},
keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
}
\lstset{
language=cryptoverif,
basicstyle=\ttfamily,
commentstyle=\color{black!55},
keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
}
\usepackage{bbding}
\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
\title{%
Rosenpass
}
\subtitle{%
Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
}
\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
\institute{RWPQC23 | \url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
\usepackage[autostyle]{csquotes}
\begin{document}
\maketitle
\input{rwpqc23-slides-content}
\end{document}

View File

@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
\begin{itemize}
\item Problem statement: Post-quantum WireGuard % 4m
\item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs % 8m
\item Attack we found: State Disruption Attacks %12m
\item Real-World Concerns % 3m
\item Biscuits as a defense against State Disruption Attacks
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{What needs to be done to deploy Post-Quantum WireGuard}
\begin{itemize}
\item Updating the WireGuard protocol to support post-quantum security
\item Updating the (post quantum) WireGuard protocol to be secure against state disruption attacks
\item Reference implementation of the Rosenpass protocol in Rust
\item A way to create hybrid post-quantum secure WireGuard VPNs
\item Stand-alone key exchange app
\item A Sci-Comm project teaching people about post-quantum security
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{WireGuard\footnote{Jason A. Donenfeld. “WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel”. In: 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017, San Diego, California, USA, February 26 - March 1, 2017. Whitepaper: https: //www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf.}}
\begin{itemize}
\item VPN protocol in the linux kernel
\item Based on Noise IKpsk1 from the Noise Protocol Framework\footnote{Trevor Perrin. The Noise Protocol Framework. 2016. url: http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf}
\item Small, fast, open source crypto
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{WireGuard/Noise IKpsk security properties}
\begin{itemize}
\itemtick Session-key secrecy
\itemtick Forward-secrecy
\itemtick Mutual authentication
\itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
\itemtick Identity Hiding
\itemtick (DoS Mitigation First packet is authenticated\footnote{Based on the unrealistic assumption of a monotonic counter We found a practical attack})
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Security of Rosenpass}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
WireGuard
\begin{itemize}
\itemtick Session-key secrecy
\itemtick Forward-secrecy
\itemtick Mutual authentication
\itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
\itemtick Identity Hiding
\itemtick (DoS Mitigation)
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
Post-Quantum WireGuard
\begin{itemize}
\itemfail Identity Hiding \footnote{Based on a Identity Hiding/ANON-CCA security of McEliece; unclear whether that holds.}
\itemfail DoS Mitigation \footnote{PQWG provides DoS mitigation under the assumption of a secret PSK, which quite frankly is cheating.}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
Rosenpass
\begin{itemize}
\itemtick DoS Mitigation
\itemtick Hybrid Post-Quantum security\footnote{In deployments using WireGuard + Rosenpass; Rosenpass on its own provides post-quantum security.}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Building post-quantum WireGuard: NIKE vs KEM}
NIKE:
$(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_1) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
$(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_2) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
$\texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_2) = \texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_1)$
KEM:
$(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{pk}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.KeyGen}$ \\
$(\texttt{shk}, \texttt{ct}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.Encaps}(\texttt{pk})$ \\
$\texttt{shk} = \texttt{KEM.Decaps}(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{ct})$
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Minimal key exchange using KEMs}
\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](pk-y) coordinate[pos=.6](ct-y)coordinate[pos=.8](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[<-](pk-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{pk} (pk-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ct-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {ct} (ct-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Three encapsulations: Achieving mutual authentication \& forward secrecy}
\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
\begin{columns}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Responder Auth
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
\draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Initiator Auth
\end{column}
\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Forward secrecy
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
\draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
\draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
\draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
\draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
\end{tikzpicture}
Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send `(ack)`.
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
\includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
\includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks}
\begin{itemize}
\item Use the fact that the initiator is not authenticated until their last message
\item Send faux initiations, overwriting and thus erasing the responder's handshake state
\item Erasing the state aborts protocol execution
\item PQWG argues: The first package is authenticated using the PSK, therefor sending faux initiations works
\item Attacker could replay a legitimate message, but…
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks on authenticated initial package}
\begin{itemize}
\item In Classic WireGuard the initial message (InitHello) is authenticated through static-static Diffie-Hellman
\item Replay protection uses monotonic counter
\item WireGuard stores the time of the last initiator $t_i$
\item When WireGuard receives legitimate initiaton with timestamp $t$, it stores that time $t_i \leftarrow t$a
\item All InitHello messages with a stale timestamp ($t \le t_i$) get rejected
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 Attacking WireGuard through NTP}
\begin{itemize}
\item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
\item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
\item This generates a kill packet that can be used to render WireGuard keys useless
\item Attack is possible in the real world!
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{State disruption in Post-Quantum WireGuard}
\begin{itemize}
\item This mechanism needs an authenticated InitHello message
\item Post-Quantum WireGuard relies on the $\texttt{psk}$ to provide InitHello authentication
\item PQWG sets $\texttt{psk} = H(\texttt{spki} \oplus \texttt{spkr})$ to achieve a secret psk.a
\item Relying on private public keys is absurd
\item[$\Rightarrow$] With InitHello effectively unauthenticated, attacker can just generate their own kill packet
\end{itemize}
Solution: Store the responder state in a biscuit (cookie), so there is no state to override.
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the protocol flow}
\includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the messages}
\includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Biscuits}
\begin{itemize}
\item Assumptions such as a monotonic counter are perilous in the real world
\item Giving the adversary access to state is dangerous
\item In noise protocols the handshake state is very small (32-64 bytes)
\item Sending the state to the protocol peer is a viable course of action!
\item Formalization of State Disruption Attacks covers many attacks of this style
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Security proof of rosenpass}
\begin{itemize}
\item CryptoVerif in progress (Benjamin Lipp)
\item Really fast symbolic analysis using ProVerif
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Deployment}
\begin{itemize}
\item Rust implementation in userspace
\item Integrates with WireGuard through the PSK feature to provide Hybrid security
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{Final statements}
\begin{itemize}
\item Post-quantum crypto can be deployed now
\item There are real complexities in protocol design
\item DoS-Resistance needs formalization work
\item Availability needs love and attention from cryptographers
\item Try it out! \url{https://rosenpass.eu/}
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
%* Problem introduction
% * Post-quantum-secure authenticated key exchange
% * Interactive key exchange
% * No DH
% * But with KEMs
% * KEM is non interactive
% * Gives you secrecy
% * One-sided auth
%* PQWG
% * Doing one key encapsulation in both directions
% * Adding an ephemeral one for forward secrecy
%* State interruption attack
% * Assumption of monotonic counter is not realistic/broken/…
% * static keys become essentially useless
% * Leads to state disruption
% * Case: WG ohne replay protection (motivation for monotonic counter)
% * Case: WG mit replay protection
%* Biscuits
% * No state
% * Provably avoids state disruption
% * State machine WG/PQWG: ini
%*

View File

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
{metropolis}
\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
\usepackage{verbatim}
% strikethrough
% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
% bold math
\usepackage{bm}
\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
\sethlcolor{lightblue}
\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
\tikzset{
>=Latex[round]
}
\urlstyle{same}
% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
\makeatletter
\newcommand\SoulColor{%
\let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
\let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
\makeatother
\SoulColor
\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
% `title separator` is the one on the title page
% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
\usepackage{fontawesome}
\usepackage{pgfplots}
\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
%% tikzit
%\usepackage{tikzit}
%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
\usepackage{xspace}
\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
\usepackage{stackengine}
\usepackage{amsmath}
\usepackage{amsfonts}
\usepackage{amssymb}
\usepackage{amsthm}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{environ}
\usepackage{array}
\usepackage[
n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
probability,
notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
%keys
]{cryptocode}
\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
\usepackage{mathtools}
\usepackage{comment}
\excludecomment{commentEnv}
\usepackage{array}
\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
\def\makeuppercase#1{
\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
}
\def\makelowercase#1{
\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
}
\newcounter{char}
\setcounter{char}{1}
\loop
\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
\stepcounter{char}
\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
\repeat
\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
%\usepackage{pgfpages}
%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right}
\usepackage{multicol}
\usepackage{qrcode}
%% msc message diagrams
%\usepackage{msc5}
%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
\begin{frame}{#1}
\vfill
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
\end{center}
\vfill
\end{frame}
}
\usepackage{listings}
\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
table, time, type},
otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
sensitive=true,
morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
morestring=[b]",
}
\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
{morekeywords={},
otherkeywords={},
sensitive=true,
morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
morestring=[b]",
}
\lstset{
language=cvoutput,
basicstyle=\ttfamily,
commentstyle=\color{black!55},
keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
}
\lstset{
language=cryptoverif,
basicstyle=\ttfamily,
commentstyle=\color{black!55},
keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
}
\usepackage{bbding}
\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
\title{%
Rosenpass
}
\subtitle{%
Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
}
\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
\institute{\url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
\begin{document}
\maketitle
\input{yrcs-talk-content}
\end{document}

View File

@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ This repository contains
## Getting started
First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help funtions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help functions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
```sh
rp help
rosenpass help
```
Follow [quickstart instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
Follow [quick start instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
## Software architecture
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ We are working on a cryptographic proof of security, but we already provide a sy
(manual) $ ./analyze.sh
```
The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some metaprogramming to avoid repetition.
The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some meta programming to avoid repetition.
The code uses a variety of optimizations to speed up analysis such as using secret functions to model trusted/malicious setup. We split the model into two separate entry points which can be analyzed in parallel. Each is much faster than both models combined.
A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expected in color: A red cross if a query fails and a green check if it succeeds.
@@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expect
[^libsodium]: https://doc.libsodium.org/
[^wg]: https://www.wireguard.com/
[^pqwg]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeates the purpose of a key exchange protocol
[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeats the purpose of a key exchange protocol
[^wg-statedis]: https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2021-August/006916.htmlA
# Getting Rosenpass
Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distros, maybe also for the distro of your choice?
Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distributions, maybe also for the distribution of your choice?
[![Packaging status](https://repology.org/badge/vertical-allrepos/rosenpass.svg)](https://repology.org/project/rosenpass/versions)

21
rp
View File

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ dbg() {
echo >&2 "$@"
}
detect_git_dir() {
# https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3618078/pipe-only-stderr-through-a-filter
(
git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&- \
| sed '
/not a git repository/d;
s/^/WARNING: /'
) 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&-
}
# Cleanup subsystem (sigterm)
cleanup_init() {
@@ -141,9 +152,9 @@ genkey() {
umask 077
mkdir -p $(enquote "${skdir}")
wg genkey > $(enquote "${skdir}"/wgsk)
$(enquote "${binary}") keygen \\
private-key $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
public-key $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
$(enquote "${binary}") gen-keys \\
-s $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
-p $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
}
pubkey() {
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ exchange() {
frag_append "verbose"
fi
frag_append_esc " private-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
frag_append_esc " secret-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
frag_append_esc " public-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqpk")"
if test -n "${lport}"; then
@@ -314,7 +325,7 @@ main() {
project_name="rosenpass"
verbose=0
scriptdir="$(dirname "${script}")"
gitdir="$(git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" || true
gitdir="$(detect_git_dir)" || true
nixdir="$(readlink -f result/bin/rp | grep -Pio '^/nix/store/[^/]+(?=/bin/[^/]+)')" || true
binary="$(find_rosenpass_binary)"

712
src/app_server.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
use log::{error, info, warn};
use mio::Interest;
use mio::Token;
use std::cell::Cell;
use std::io::Write;
use std::io::ErrorKind;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::SocketAddrV4;
use std::net::SocketAddrV6;
use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::slice;
use std::time::Duration;
use crate::util::fopen_w;
use crate::RosenpassError;
use crate::{
config::Verbosity,
protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
util::{b64_writer, fmt_b64},
Result,
};
const IPV4_ANY_ADDR: Ipv4Addr = Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0);
const IPV6_ANY_ADDR: Ipv6Addr = Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
fn ipv4_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
// addr, port
SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(IPV4_ANY_ADDR, 0))
}
fn ipv6_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
// addr, port, flowinfo, scope_id
SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(IPV6_ANY_ADDR, 0, 0, 0))
}
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
pub struct AppPeer {
pub outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>, // TODO make this a generic command
pub initial_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
pub current_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
}
impl AppPeer {
pub fn endpoint(&self) -> Option<&Endpoint> {
self.current_endpoint
.as_ref()
.or(self.initial_endpoint.as_ref())
}
}
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
pub struct WireguardOut {
// impl KeyOutput
pub dev: String,
pub pk: String,
pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
}
/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
///
/// Responsible for file IO, network IO
// TODO add user control via unix domain socket and stdin/stdout
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AppServer {
pub crypt: CryptoServer,
pub sockets: Vec<mio::net::UdpSocket>,
pub events: mio::Events,
pub mio_poll: mio::Poll,
pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
pub verbosity: Verbosity,
pub all_sockets_drained: bool,
}
/// A socket pointer is an index assigned to a socket;
/// right now the index is just the sockets index in AppServer::sockets.
///
/// Holding this as a reference instead of an &mut UdpSocket is useful
/// to deal with the borrow checker, because otherwise we could not refer
/// to a socket and another member of AppServer at the same time.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SocketPtr(pub usize);
impl SocketPtr {
pub fn get<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a mio::net::UdpSocket {
&srv.sockets[self.0]
}
pub fn get_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut mio::net::UdpSocket {
&mut srv.sockets[self.0]
}
pub fn send_to(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8], addr: SocketAddr) -> Result<()> {
self.get(srv).send_to(&buf, addr)?;
Ok(())
}
}
/// Index based pointer to a Peer
#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
impl AppPeerPtr {
/// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
Self(p.0)
}
/// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
PeerPtr(self.0)
}
pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
&srv.peers[self.0]
}
pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
&mut srv.peers[self.0]
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum AppPollResult {
DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
ReceivedMessage(usize, Endpoint),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum KeyOutputReason {
Exchanged,
Stale,
}
/// Represents a communication partner rosenpass may be sending packets to
///
/// Generally at the start of Rosenpass either no address or a Hostname is known;
/// later when we actually start to receive RespHello packages, we know the specific Address
/// and socket to use with a peer
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Endpoint {
/// Rosenpass supports multiple sockets, so we include the information
/// which socket an address can be reached on. This probably does not
/// make much of a difference in most setups where two sockets are just
/// used to enable dual stack operation; it does make a difference in
/// more complex use cases.
///
/// For instance it enables using multiple interfaces with overlapping
/// ip spaces, such as listening on a private IP network and a public IP
/// at the same time. It also would reply on the same port RespHello was
/// sent to when listening on multiple ports on the same interface. This
/// may be required for some arcane firewall setups.
SocketBoundAddress {
/// The socket the address can be reached under; this is generally
/// determined when we actually receive an RespHello message
socket: SocketPtr,
/// Just the address
addr: SocketAddr,
},
// A host name or IP address; storing the hostname here instead of an
// ip address makes sure that we look up the host name whenever we try
// to make a connection; this may be beneficial in some setups where a host-name
// at first can not be resolved but becomes resolvable later.
Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint),
}
impl Endpoint {
/// Start discovery from some addresses
pub fn discovery_from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
Endpoint::Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::from_addresses(addresses))
}
/// Start endpoint discovery from a hostname
pub fn discovery_from_hostname(hostname: String) -> Result<Self> {
let host = HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::lookup(hostname)?;
Ok(Endpoint::Discovery(host))
}
// Restart discovery; joining two sources of (potential) addresses
//
// This is used when the connection to an endpoint is lost in order
// to include the addresses specified on the command line and the
// address last used in the discovery process
pub fn discovery_from_multiple_sources(
a: Option<&Endpoint>,
b: Option<&Endpoint>,
) -> Option<Self> {
let sources = match (a, b) {
(Some(e), None) | (None, Some(e)) => e.addresses().iter().chain(&[]),
(Some(e1), Some(e2)) => e1.addresses().iter().chain(e2.addresses()),
(None, None) => return None,
};
let lower_size_bound = sources.size_hint().0;
let mut dedup = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
let mut addrs = Vec::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
for a in sources {
if dedup.insert(a) {
addrs.push(*a);
}
}
Some(Self::discovery_from_addresses(addrs))
}
pub fn send(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
use Endpoint::*;
match self {
SocketBoundAddress { socket, addr } => socket.send_to(srv, buf, *addr),
Discovery(host) => host.send_scouting(srv, buf),
}
}
fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddr] {
use Endpoint::*;
match self {
SocketBoundAddress { addr, .. } => slice::from_ref(addr),
Discovery(host) => host.addresses(),
}
}
}
/// Handles host-path discovery
///
/// When rosenpass is started, we either know no peer address
/// or we know a hostname. How to contact this hostname may not
/// be entirely clear for two reasons:
///
/// 1. We have multiple sockets; only a subset of those may be able to contact the host
/// 2. DNS resolution can return multiple addresses
///
/// We could just use the first working socket and the first address returned, but this
/// may be error prone: Some of the sockets may appear to be able to contact the host,
/// but the packets will be dropped. Some of the addresses may appear to be reachable
/// but the packets could be lost.
///
/// In contrast to TCP, UDP has no mechanism to ensure packets actually arrive.
///
/// To robustly handle host path discovery, we try each socket-ip-combination in a round
/// robin fashion; the struct stores the offset of the last used combination internally and
/// and will continue with the next combination on every call.
///
/// Retransmission handling will continue normally; i.e. increasing the distance between
/// retransmissions on every retransmission, until it is long enough to bore a human. Therefor
/// it is important to avoid having a large number of sockets drop packets not just for efficiency
/// but to avoid latency issues too.
///
// TODO: We might consider adjusting the retransmission handling to account for host-path discovery
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
scouting_state: Cell<(usize, usize)>, // addr_off, sock_off
addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>,
}
impl HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
pub fn from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
let scouting_state = Cell::new((0, 0));
Self {
addresses,
scouting_state,
}
}
/// Lookup a hostname
pub fn lookup(hostname: String) -> Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
addresses: ToSocketAddrs::to_socket_addrs(&hostname)?.collect(),
scouting_state: Cell::new((0, 0)),
})
}
pub fn addresses(&self) -> &Vec<SocketAddr> {
&self.addresses
}
fn insert_next_scout_offset(&self, srv: &AppServer, addr_no: usize, sock_no: usize) {
self.scouting_state.set((
(addr_no + 1) % self.addresses.len(),
(sock_no + 1) % srv.sockets.len(),
));
}
/// Attempt to reach the host
///
/// Will round-robin-try different socket-ip-combinations on each call.
pub fn send_scouting(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let (addr_off, sock_off) = self.scouting_state.get();
let mut addrs = (&self.addresses)
.iter()
.enumerate()
.cycle()
.skip(addr_off)
.take(self.addresses.len());
let mut sockets = (&srv.sockets)
.iter()
.enumerate()
.cycle()
.skip(sock_off)
.take(srv.sockets.len());
for (addr_no, addr) in addrs.by_ref() {
for (sock_no, sock) in sockets.by_ref() {
let res = sock.send_to(buf, *addr);
let err = match res {
Ok(_) => {
self.insert_next_scout_offset(srv, addr_no, sock_no);
return Ok(());
}
Err(e) => e,
};
// TODO: replace this by
// e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable
// once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/86442 lands
let ignore = err
.to_string()
.starts_with("Address family not supported by protocol");
if !ignore {
warn!("Socket #{} refusing to send to {}: ", sock_no, addr);
}
}
}
error!("Unable to send message: All sockets returned errors.");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
}
impl AppServer {
pub fn new(sk: SSk, pk: SPk, addrs: Vec<SocketAddr>, verbosity: Verbosity) -> Result<Self> {
// setup mio
let mio_poll = mio::Poll::new()?;
let events = mio::Events::with_capacity(8);
// bind each SocketAddr to a socket
let maybe_sockets: std::result::Result<Vec<_>, std::io::Error> =
addrs.into_iter().map(mio::net::UdpSocket::bind).collect();
let mut sockets = maybe_sockets?;
// When no socket is specified, rosenpass should open one port on all
// available interfaces best-effort. Here are the cases how this can possibly go:
//
// Some operating systems (such as Linux [^linux] and FreeBSD [^freebsd])
// using IPv6 sockets to handle IPv4 connections; on these systems
// binding to the `[::]:0` address will typically open a dual-stack
// socket. Some other systems such as OpenBSD [^openbsd] do not support this feature.
//
// Dual-stack systems provide a flag to enable or disable this
// behavior the IPV6_V6ONLY flag. OpenBSD supports this flag
// read-only. MIO[^mio] provides a way to read this flag but not
// to write it.
//
// - One dual-stack IPv6 socket, if the operating supports dual-stack sockets and
// correctly reports this
// - One IPv6 socket and one IPv4 socket if the operating does not support dual stack
// sockets or disables them by default assuming this is also correctly reported
// - One IPv6 socket and no IPv4 socket if IPv6 socket is not dual-stack and opening
// the IPv6 socket fails
// - One IPv4 socket and no IPv6 socket if opening the IPv6 socket fails
// - One dual-stack IPv6 socket and a redundant IPv4 socket if dual-stack sockets are
// supported but the operating system does not correctly report this (specifically,
// if the only_v6() call raises an error)
// - Rosenpass exits if no socket could be opened
//
// [^freebsd]: https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=ip6&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+6.0-RELEASE
// [^openbsd]: https://man.openbsd.org/ip6.4
// [^linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/ipv6.7.html
// [^mio]: https://docs.rs/mio/0.8.6/mio/net/struct.UdpSocket.html#method.only_v6
if sockets.is_empty() {
macro_rules! try_register_socket {
($title:expr, $binding:expr) => {{
let r = mio::net::UdpSocket::bind($binding);
match r {
Ok(sock) => {
sockets.push(sock);
Some(sockets.len() - 1)
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Could not bind to {} socket: {}", $title, e);
None
}
}
}};
}
let v6 = try_register_socket!("IPv6", ipv6_any_binding());
let need_v4 = match v6.map(|no| sockets[no].only_v6()) {
Some(Ok(v)) => v,
None => true,
Some(Err(e)) => {
warn!("Unable to detect whether the IPv6 socket supports dual-stack operation: {}", e);
true
}
};
if need_v4 {
try_register_socket!("IPv4", ipv4_any_binding());
}
}
if sockets.is_empty() {
error!("No sockets to listen on!");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
// register all sockets to mio
for (i, socket) in sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
mio_poll
.registry()
.register(socket, Token(i), Interest::READABLE)?;
}
// TODO use mio::net::UnixStream together with std::os::unix::net::UnixStream for Linux
Ok(Self {
crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
peers: Vec::new(),
verbosity,
sockets,
events,
mio_poll,
all_sockets_drained: false,
})
}
pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
}
pub fn add_peer(
&mut self,
psk: Option<SymKey>,
pk: SPk,
outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
hostname: Option<String>,
) -> Result<AppPeerPtr> {
let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
let initial_endpoint = hostname
.map(Endpoint::discovery_from_hostname)
.transpose()?;
let current_endpoint = None;
self.peers.push(AppPeer {
outfile,
outwg,
initial_endpoint,
current_endpoint,
});
Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
}
pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
let mut failure_cnt = 0;
loop {
let msgs_processed = 0usize;
let err = match self.event_loop() {
Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
Err(e) => e,
};
// This should not happen…
failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
0
} else {
failure_cnt + 1
};
let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
error!(
"unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?}",
msgs_processed,
err,
// TODO do we need backtraces?
// err.backtrace()
);
if tries_left > 0 {
error!("re-initializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
continue;
}
error!("too many network failures");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
}
pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
/// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
/// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
/// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
attempt!({
let p = $peer;
if p.get_app(self).endpoint().is_some() {
let len = $fn()?;
let ep: &Endpoint = p.get_app(self).endpoint().unwrap();
ep.send(self, &tx[..len])?;
}
Ok(())
})
};
}
loop {
use crate::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
use AppPollResult::*;
use KeyOutputReason::*;
match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
.crypt
.initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
.crypt
.retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
DeleteKey(peer) => {
self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?;
// There was a loss of connection apparently; restart host discovery
// starting from the last used address but including all the initially
// specified addresses
// TODO: We could do this preemptively, before any connection loss actually occurs.
let p = peer.get_app_mut(self);
p.current_endpoint = Endpoint::discovery_from_multiple_sources(
p.current_endpoint.as_ref(),
p.initial_endpoint.as_ref(),
);
}
ReceivedMessage(len, endpoint) => {
match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
Err(ref e) => {
self.verbose().then(|| {
error!(
"error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?}",
endpoint, e
);
});
}
Ok(HandleMsgResult {
resp,
exchanged_with,
..
}) => {
if let Some(len) = resp {
endpoint.send(self, &tx[0..len])?;
}
if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
ap.get_app_mut(self).current_endpoint = Some(endpoint);
// TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
}
}
}
}
};
}
}
pub fn output_key(&self, peer: AppPeerPtr, why: KeyOutputReason, key: &SymKey) -> Result<()> {
let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
let ap = peer.get_app(self);
if self.verbose() {
let msg = match why {
KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
};
info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
}
if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
// This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
// in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
// will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
// guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
// data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
// implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
// not worth it right now.
b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
let why = match why {
KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
};
// this is intentionally writing to stdout instead of stderr, because
// it is meant to allow external detection of a successful key-exchange
println!(
"output-key peer {} key-file {of:?} {why}",
fmt_b64(&*peerid)
);
}
if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
let child = Command::new("wg")
.arg("set")
.arg(&owg.dev)
.arg("peer")
.arg(&owg.pk)
.arg("preshared-key")
.arg("/dev/stdin")
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.args(&owg.extra_params)
.spawn()?;
b64_writer(child.stdin.unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<AppPollResult> {
use crate::protocol::PollResult as C;
use AppPollResult as A;
loop {
return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
None => continue,
},
});
}
}
/// Tries to receive a new message
///
/// - might wait for an duration up to `timeout`
/// - returns immediately if an error occurs
/// - returns immediately if a new message is received
pub fn try_recv(
&mut self,
buf: &mut [u8],
timeout: Timing,
) -> Result<Option<(usize, Endpoint)>> {
let timeout = Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout);
// if there is no time to wait on IO, well, then, lets not waste any time!
if timeout.is_zero() {
return Ok(None);
}
// NOTE when using mio::Poll, there are some particularities (taken from
// https://docs.rs/mio/latest/mio/struct.Poll.html):
//
// - poll() might return readiness, even if nothing is ready
// - in this case, a WouldBlock error is returned from actual IO operations
// - after receiving readiness for a source, it must be drained until a WouldBlock
// is received
//
// This would usually require us to maintain the drainage status of each socket;
// a socket would only become drained when it returned WouldBlock and only
// non-drained when receiving a readiness event from mio for it. Then, only the
// ready sockets should be worked on, ideally without requiring an O(n) search
// through all sockets for checking their drained status. However, our use-case
// is primarily heaving one or two sockets (if IPv4 and IPv6 IF_ANY listen is
// desired on a non-dual-stack OS), thus just checking every socket after any
// readiness event seems to be good enough™ for now.
// only poll if we drained all sockets before
if self.all_sockets_drained {
self.mio_poll.poll(&mut self.events, Some(timeout))?;
}
let mut would_block_count = 0;
for (sock_no, socket) in self.sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
match socket.recv_from(buf) {
Ok((n, addr)) => {
// at least one socket was not drained...
self.all_sockets_drained = false;
return Ok(Some((
n,
Endpoint::SocketBoundAddress {
socket: SocketPtr(sock_no),
addr,
},
)));
}
Err(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
would_block_count += 1;
}
// TODO if one socket continuously returns an error, then we never poll, thus we never wait for a timeout, thus we have a spin-lock
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
}
// if each socket returned WouldBlock, then we drained them all at least once indeed
self.all_sockets_drained = would_block_count == self.sockets.len();
Ok(None)
}
}

259
src/cli.rs Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
use crate::app_server;
use crate::app_server::AppServer;
use crate::util::{LoadValue, LoadValueB64};
use crate::{
// app_server::{AppServer, LoadValue, LoadValueB64},
coloring::Secret,
pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
protocol::{SPk, SSk, SymKey},
Result,
RosenpassError,
};
use clap::Parser;
use log::error;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use super::config;
#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
#[command(author, version, about, long_about)]
pub enum Cli {
/// Start Rosenpass in server mode and carry on with the key exchange
///
/// This will parse the configuration file and perform the key exchange
/// with the specified peers. If a peer's endpoint is specified, this
/// Rosenpass instance will try to initiate a key exchange with the peer,
/// otherwise only initiation attempts from the peer will be responded to.
ExchangeConfig { config_file: PathBuf },
/// Start in daemon mode, performing key exchanges
///
/// The configuration is read from the command line. The `peer` token
/// always separates multiple peers, e. g. if the token `peer` appears
/// in the WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS it is not put into the WireGuard arguments
/// but instead a new peer is created.
/* Explanation: `first_arg` and `rest_of_args` are combined into one
* `Vec<String>`. They are only used to trick clap into displaying some
* guidance on the CLI usage.
*/
#[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
#[allow(rustdoc::invalid_html_tags)]
Exchange {
/// public-key <PATH> secret-key <PATH> [listen <ADDR>:<PORT>]... [verbose]
#[clap(value_name = "OWN_CONFIG")]
first_arg: String,
/// peer public-key <PATH> [ENDPOINT] [PSK] [OUTFILE] [WG]
///
/// ENDPOINT := endpoint <HOST/IP>:<PORT>
///
/// PSK := preshared-key <PATH>
///
/// OUTFILE := outfile <PATH>
///
/// WG := wireguard <WIREGUARD_DEV> <WIREGUARD_PEER> [WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS]...
#[clap(value_name = "PEERS")]
rest_of_args: Vec<String>,
/// Save the parsed configuration to a file before starting the daemon
#[clap(short, long)]
config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
},
/// Generate a demo config file
GenConfig {
config_file: PathBuf,
/// Forcefully overwrite existing config file
#[clap(short, long)]
force: bool,
},
/// Generate the keys mentioned in a configFile
///
/// Generates secret- & public-key to their destination. If a config file
/// is provided then the key file destination is taken from there.
/// Otherwise the
GenKeys {
config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
/// where to write public-key to
#[clap(short, long)]
public_key: Option<PathBuf>,
/// where to write secret-key to
#[clap(short, long)]
secret_key: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Forcefully overwrite public- & secret-key file
#[clap(short, long)]
force: bool,
},
/// Validate a configuration
Validate { config_files: Vec<PathBuf> },
/// Show the rosenpass manpage
// TODO make this the default, but only after the manpage has been adjusted once the CLI stabilizes
Man,
}
impl Cli {
pub fn run() -> Result<()> {
let cli = Self::parse();
use Cli::*;
match cli {
Man => {
let _man_cmd = std::process::Command::new("man")
.args(["1", "rosenpass"])
.status();
}
GenConfig { config_file, force } => {
if !force && config_file.exists() {
error!("config file {config_file:?} already exists");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
config::Rosenpass::example_config().store(config_file)?;
}
GenKeys {
config_file,
public_key,
secret_key,
force,
} => {
// figure out where the key file is specified, in the config file or directly as flag?
let (pkf, skf) = match (config_file, public_key, secret_key) {
(Some(config_file), _, _) => {
if !config_file.exists() {
error!("config file {config_file:?} does not exist");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
(config.public_key, config.secret_key)
}
(_, Some(pkf), Some(skf)) => (pkf, skf),
_ => return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"either a config-file or both public-key and secret-key file are required"
.into(),
)),
};
// check that we are not overriding something unintentionally
let mut problems = false;
if !force && pkf.is_file() {
problems = true;
error!("public-key file {pkf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it");
}
if !force && skf.is_file() {
problems = true;
error!("secret-key file {skf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it");
}
if problems {
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
// generate the keys and store them in files
let mut ssk = crate::protocol::SSk::random();
let mut spk = crate::protocol::SPk::random();
unsafe {
StaticKEM::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
ssk.store_secret(skf)?;
spk.store_secret(pkf)?;
}
}
ExchangeConfig { config_file } => {
if !config_file.exists() {
error!("config file '{config_file:?}' does not exist");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
config.validate()?;
Self::event_loop(config)?;
}
Exchange {
first_arg,
mut rest_of_args,
config_file,
} => {
rest_of_args.insert(0, first_arg);
let args = rest_of_args;
let mut config = config::Rosenpass::parse_args(args)?;
if let Some(p) = config_file {
config.store(&p)?;
config.config_file_path = p;
}
config.validate()?;
Self::event_loop(config)?;
}
Validate { config_files } => {
for file in config_files {
match config::Rosenpass::load(&file) {
Ok(config) => {
eprintln!("{file:?} is valid TOML and conforms to the expected schema");
match config.validate() {
Ok(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} is passed all logical checks"),
Err(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} contains logical errors"),
}
}
Err(e) => eprintln!("{file:?} is not valid: {e}"),
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn event_loop(config: config::Rosenpass) -> Result<()> {
// load own keys
let sk = SSk::load(&config.secret_key)?;
let pk = SPk::load(&config.public_key)?;
// start an application server
let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
sk,
pk,
config.listen,
config.verbosity,
)?);
for cfg_peer in config.peers {
srv.add_peer(
// psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
cfg_peer.pre_shared_key.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
SPk::load(&cfg_peer.public_key)?,
cfg_peer.key_out,
cfg_peer.wg.map(|cfg| app_server::WireguardOut {
dev: cfg.device,
pk: cfg.peer,
extra_params: cfg.extra_params,
}),
cfg_peer.endpoint.clone(),
)?;
}
srv.event_loop()
}
}
trait StoreSecret {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
}
impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
Ok(())
}
}

478
src/config.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
use std::{
collections::HashSet,
fs,
io::Write,
net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs},
path::{Path, PathBuf},
};
use log::{error, warn};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{util::fopen_w, Result, RosenpassError};
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Rosenpass {
pub public_key: PathBuf,
pub secret_key: PathBuf,
pub listen: Vec<SocketAddr>,
#[serde(default)]
pub verbosity: Verbosity,
pub peers: Vec<RosenpassPeer>,
#[serde(skip)]
pub config_file_path: PathBuf,
}
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum Verbosity {
Quiet,
Verbose,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RosenpassPeer {
pub public_key: PathBuf,
pub endpoint: Option<String>,
pub pre_shared_key: Option<PathBuf>,
#[serde(default)]
pub key_out: Option<PathBuf>,
// TODO make sure failure does not crash but is logged
#[serde(default)]
pub exchange_command: Vec<String>,
// TODO make this field only available on binary builds, not on library builds
#[serde(flatten)]
pub wg: Option<WireGuard>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct WireGuard {
pub device: String,
pub peer: String,
pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
}
impl Rosenpass {
/// Load a config file from a file path
///
/// no validation is conducted
pub fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(p: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut config: Self = toml::from_str(&fs::read_to_string(&p)?)?;
config.config_file_path = p.as_ref().to_owned();
Ok(config)
}
/// Write a config to a file
pub fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, p: P) -> Result<()> {
let serialized_config =
toml::to_string_pretty(&self).expect("unable to serialize the default config");
fs::write(p, serialized_config)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Commit the configuration to where it came from, overwriting the original file
pub fn commit(&self) -> Result<()> {
let mut f = fopen_w(&self.config_file_path)?;
f.write_all(toml::to_string_pretty(&self)?.as_bytes())?;
self.store(&self.config_file_path)
}
/// Validate a configuration
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
// check the public-key file exists
if !(self.public_key.is_file()) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(format!(
"public-key file {:?} does not exist",
self.public_key
)));
}
// check the secret-key file exists
if !(self.secret_key.is_file()) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(format!(
"secret-key file {:?} does not exist",
self.secret_key
)));
}
for (i, peer) in self.peers.iter().enumerate() {
// check peer's public-key file exists
if !(peer.public_key.is_file()) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(format!(
"peer {i} public-key file {:?} does not exist",
peer.public_key
)));
}
// check endpoint is usable
if let Some(addr) = peer.endpoint.as_ref() {
if !(addr.to_socket_addrs().is_ok()) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(format!(
"peer {i} endpoint {} can not be parsed to a socket address",
addr
)));
}
}
// TODO warn if neither out_key nor exchange_command is defined
}
Ok(())
}
/// Creates a new configuration
pub fn new<P1: AsRef<Path>, P2: AsRef<Path>>(public_key: P1, secret_key: P2) -> Self {
Self {
public_key: PathBuf::from(public_key.as_ref()),
secret_key: PathBuf::from(secret_key.as_ref()),
listen: vec![],
verbosity: Verbosity::Quiet,
peers: vec![],
config_file_path: PathBuf::new(),
}
}
/// Add IPv4 __and__ IPv6 IF_ANY address to the listen interfaces
pub fn add_if_any(&mut self, port: u16) {
let ipv4_any = SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0), port));
let ipv6_any = SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(
Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
port,
0,
0,
));
self.listen.push(ipv4_any);
self.listen.push(ipv6_any);
}
/// from chaotic args
/// Quest: the grammar is undecideable, what do we do here?
pub fn parse_args(args: Vec<String>) -> Result<Self> {
let mut config = Self::new("", "");
#[derive(Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum State {
Own,
OwnPublicKey,
OwnSecretKey,
OwnListen,
Peer,
PeerPsk,
PeerPublicKey,
PeerEndpoint,
PeerOutfile,
PeerWireguardDev,
PeerWireguardPeer,
PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
}
let mut already_set = HashSet::new();
// TODO idea: use config.peers.len() to give index of peer with conflicting argument
use State::*;
let mut problem = false;
let mut state = Own;
let mut current_peer = None;
let p_exists = "a peer should exist by now";
let wg_exists = "a peer wireguard should exist by now";
for arg in args {
state = match (state, arg.as_str(), &mut current_peer) {
(Own, "public-key", None) => OwnPublicKey,
(Own, "secret-key", None) => OwnSecretKey,
(Own, "private-key", None) => {
warn!("the private-key argument is deprecated, please use secret-key instead");
OwnSecretKey
}
(Own, "listen", None) => OwnListen,
(Own, "verbose", None) => {
config.verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
Own
}
(Own, "peer", None) => {
if !(already_set.contains(&OwnPublicKey)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"public-key file must be set".into(),
));
}
if !(already_set.contains(&OwnSecretKey)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"secret-key file must be set".into(),
));
}
already_set.clear();
current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
Peer
}
(OwnPublicKey, pk, None) => {
if !(already_set.insert(OwnPublicKey)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"public-key was already set".into(),
));
}
config.public_key = pk.into();
Own
}
(OwnSecretKey, sk, None) => {
if !(already_set.insert(OwnSecretKey)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"secret-key was already set".into(),
));
}
config.secret_key = sk.into();
Own
}
(OwnListen, l, None) => {
already_set.insert(OwnListen); // multiple listen directives are allowed
for socket_addr in l.to_socket_addrs()? {
config.listen.push(socket_addr);
}
Own
}
(Peer | PeerWireguardExtraArgs, "peer", maybe_peer @ Some(_)) => {
// TODO check current peer
// commit current peer, create a new one
config.peers.push(maybe_peer.take().expect(p_exists));
already_set.clear();
current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
Peer
}
(Peer, "public-key", Some(_)) => PeerPublicKey,
(Peer, "endpoint", Some(_)) => PeerEndpoint,
(Peer, "preshared-key", Some(_)) => PeerPsk,
(Peer, "outfile", Some(_)) => PeerOutfile,
(Peer, "wireguard", Some(_)) => PeerWireguardDev,
(PeerPublicKey, pk, Some(peer)) => {
if !(already_set.insert(PeerPublicKey)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"public-key was already set".into(),
));
}
peer.public_key = pk.into();
Peer
}
(PeerEndpoint, e, Some(peer)) => {
if !already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint) {
error!("endpoint was already set");
problem = true;
}
peer.endpoint = Some(e.to_owned());
Peer
}
(PeerPsk, psk, Some(peer)) => {
if !already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint) {
error!("peer psk was already set");
problem = true;
}
peer.pre_shared_key = Some(psk.into());
Peer
}
(PeerOutfile, of, Some(peer)) => {
if !(already_set.insert(PeerOutfile)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"peer outfile was already set".into(),
));
}
peer.key_out = Some(of.into());
Peer
}
(PeerWireguardDev, dev, Some(peer)) => {
if !(already_set.insert(PeerWireguardDev)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"peer wireguard-dev was already set".into(),
));
}
assert!(peer.wg.is_none());
peer.wg = Some(WireGuard {
device: dev.to_string(),
..Default::default()
});
PeerWireguardPeer
}
(PeerWireguardPeer, p, Some(peer)) => {
if !(already_set.insert(PeerWireguardPeer)) {
return Err(RosenpassError::ConfigError(
"peer wireguard-peer was already set".into(),
));
}
peer.wg.as_mut().expect(wg_exists).peer = p.to_string();
PeerWireguardExtraArgs
}
(PeerWireguardExtraArgs, arg, Some(peer)) => {
peer.wg
.as_mut()
.expect(wg_exists)
.extra_params
.push(arg.to_string());
PeerWireguardExtraArgs
}
// error cases
(Own, x, None) => {
error!("unrecognised argument {x}");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
(Own | OwnPublicKey | OwnSecretKey | OwnListen, _, Some(_)) => {
panic!("current_peer is not None while in Own* state, this must never happen")
}
(State::Peer, arg, Some(_)) => {
error!("unrecongnised argument {arg}");
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
(
Peer
| PeerEndpoint
| PeerOutfile
| PeerPublicKey
| PeerPsk
| PeerWireguardDev
| PeerWireguardPeer
| PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
_,
None,
) => {
panic!("got peer options but no peer was created")
}
};
}
if problem {
return Err(RosenpassError::RuntimeError);
}
if let Some(p) = current_peer {
// TODO ensure peer is propagated with sufficient information
config.peers.push(p);
}
Ok(config)
}
}
impl Rosenpass {
/// Generate an example configuration
pub fn example_config() -> Self {
let peer = RosenpassPeer {
public_key: "rp-peer-public-key".into(),
endpoint: Some("my-peer.test:9999".into()),
exchange_command: [
"wg",
"set",
"wg0",
"peer",
"<PEER_ID>",
"preshared-key",
"/dev/stdin",
]
.into_iter()
.map(|x| x.to_string())
.collect(),
key_out: Some("rp-key-out".into()),
pre_shared_key: None,
wg: None,
};
Self {
public_key: "rp-public-key".into(),
secret_key: "rp-secret-key".into(),
peers: vec![peer],
..Self::new("", "")
}
}
}
impl Default for Verbosity {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Quiet
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use std::net::IpAddr;
use super::*;
fn split_str(s: &str) -> Vec<String> {
s.split(" ").map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
}
#[test]
fn test_simple_cli_parse() {
let args = split_str(
"public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
listen 0.0.0.0:9999 peer public-key /peer/public-key endpoint \
peer.test:9999 outfile /peer/rp-out",
);
let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
assert_eq!(
&config.listen,
&vec![SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0)), 9999)]
);
assert_eq!(
config.peers,
vec![RosenpassPeer {
public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer/public-key"),
endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
pre_shared_key: None,
key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer/rp-out")),
..Default::default()
}]
)
}
#[test]
fn test_cli_parse_multiple_peers() {
let args = split_str(
"public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
peer public-key /peer-a/public-key endpoint \
peer.test:9999 outfile /peer-a/rp-out \
peer public-key /peer-b/public-key outfile /peer-b/rp-out",
);
let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
assert!(&config.listen.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
config.peers,
vec![
RosenpassPeer {
public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-a/public-key"),
endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
pre_shared_key: None,
key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-a/rp-out")),
..Default::default()
},
RosenpassPeer {
public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-b/public-key"),
endpoint: None,
pre_shared_key: None,
key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-b/rp-out")),
..Default::default()
}
]
)
}
}

View File

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
//! ensures their uniqueness
use {
crate::Result,
crate::{prftree::PrfTree, sodium::KEY_SIZE},
anyhow::Result,
};
pub fn protocol() -> Result<PrfTree> {
PrfTree::zero().mix("Rosenpass v1 mceliece460896 Kyber512 ChaChaPoly1305 BLAKE2s".as_bytes())
}
// TODO Use labels that can serve as idents
// TODO Use labels that can serve as identifiers
macro_rules! prflabel {
($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
pub fn $name() -> Result<PrfTree> {
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ macro_rules! prflabel {
}
}
prflabel!(protocol, mac, "mac");
prflabel!(protocol, cookie, "cookie");
prflabel!(protocol, peerid, "peer id");
prflabel!(protocol, mac, "mac");
prflabel!(protocol, cookie, "cookie");
prflabel!(protocol, peerid, "peer id");
prflabel!(protocol, biscuit_ad, "biscuit additional data");
prflabel!(protocol, ckinit, "chaining key init");
prflabel!(protocol, _ckextract, "chaining key extract");
prflabel!(protocol, ckinit, "chaining key init");
prflabel!(protocol, _ckextract, "chaining key extract");
macro_rules! prflabel_leaf {
($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ macro_rules! prflabel_leaf {
}
}
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, mix, "mix");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, hs_enc, "handshake encryption");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, ini_enc, "initiator handshake encryption");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, res_enc, "responder handshake encryption");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, mix, "mix");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, hs_enc, "handshake encryption");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, ini_enc, "initiator handshake encryption");
prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, res_enc, "responder handshake encryption");
prflabel!(_ckextract, _user, "user");
prflabel!(_user, _rp, "rosenpass.eu");

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
use protocol::{HandshakeStateMachine, PeerId, PeerPtr, SessionId};
#[macro_use]
pub mod util;
#[macro_use]
@@ -5,6 +7,9 @@ pub mod sodium;
pub mod coloring;
#[rustfmt::skip]
pub mod labeled_prf;
pub mod app_server;
pub mod cli;
pub mod config;
pub mod msgs;
pub mod pqkem;
pub mod prftree;
@@ -14,20 +19,89 @@ pub mod protocol;
pub enum RosenpassError {
#[error("error in OQS")]
Oqs,
#[error("error from external library while calling OQS")]
OqsExternalLib,
#[error("error while calling into libsodium")]
LibsodiumError(&'static str),
#[error("buffer size mismatch, required {required_size} but only found {actual_size}")]
BufferSizeMismatch {
required_size: usize,
actual_size: usize,
},
#[error("invalid message type")]
InvalidMessageType(u8),
#[error("peer id {0:?} already taken")]
PeerIdAlreadyTaken(PeerId),
#[error("session id {0:?} already taken")]
SessionIdAlreadyTaken(SessionId),
#[error("{0}")]
NotImplemented(&'static str),
#[error("{0}")]
ConfigError(String),
#[error("see last log messages")]
RuntimeError,
#[error("{0}")]
IoError(#[from] std::io::Error),
#[error("{0}")]
TomlDeserError(#[from] toml::de::Error),
#[error("{0}")]
TomlSerError(#[from] toml::ser::Error),
#[error("invalid session id {0:?} was used")]
InvalidSessionId(SessionId),
#[error("no session available")]
NoSession,
#[error("the peer {0:?} does not exist")]
NoSuchPeer(PeerPtr),
#[error("the peer id {0:?} does not exist")]
NoSuchPeerId(PeerId),
#[error("the session {0:?} does not exist")]
NoSuchSessionId(SessionId),
#[error("no current handshake with peer {0:?}")]
NoCurrentHs(PeerPtr),
// TODO implement Display for Peer/Session ptr?
#[error("message seal broken")]
SealBroken,
#[error("received empty message")]
EmptyMessage,
#[error("biscuit with invalid number")]
InvalidBiscuitNo,
#[error("got unexpected message")]
UnexpectedMessage {
session: SessionId,
expected: Option<HandshakeStateMachine>,
got: Option<HandshakeStateMachine>,
},
#[error("???")]
StaleNonce,
}
/// Rosenpass Result type
pub type Result<T> = core::result::Result<T, RosenpassError>;
impl RosenpassError {
/// Helper function to check a buffer size
fn check_buffer_size(required_size: usize, actual_size: usize) -> Result<(), Self> {
fn check_buffer_size(required_size: usize, actual_size: usize) -> Result<()> {
if required_size != actual_size {
Err(Self::BufferSizeMismatch {
required_size,
@@ -42,11 +116,11 @@ impl RosenpassError {
/// Extension trait to attach function calls to foreign types.
trait RosenpassMaybeError {
/// Checks whether something is an error or not
fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<()>;
}
impl RosenpassMaybeError for oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS {
fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<()> {
use oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS;
match self {
OQS_STATUS::OQS_SUCCESS => Ok(()),

View File

@@ -1,261 +1,11 @@
use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
use log::{error, info};
use rosenpass::{
attempt,
coloring::{Public, Secret},
pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
sodium::sodium_init,
util::{b64_reader, b64_writer, fmt_b64},
};
use std::{
fs::{File, OpenOptions},
io::{ErrorKind, Read, Write},
net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs, UdpSocket},
path::Path,
process::{exit, Command, Stdio},
time::Duration,
};
/// Open a file writable
pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
Ok(OpenOptions::new()
.read(false)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(true)
.open(path)?)
}
/// Open a file readable
pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
Ok(OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(false)
.create(false)
.truncate(false)
.open(path)?)
}
pub trait ReadExactToEnd {
fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()>;
}
impl<R: Read> ReadExactToEnd for R {
fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
let mut dummy = [0u8; 8];
self.read_exact(buf)?;
ensure!(self.read(&mut dummy)? == 0, "File too long!");
Ok(())
}
}
pub trait LoadValue {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
where
Self: Sized;
}
pub trait LoadValueB64 {
fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
where
Self: Sized;
}
trait StoreValue {
fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
}
trait StoreSecret {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
}
impl<T: StoreValue> StoreSecret for T {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
self.store(path)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
let p = path.as_ref();
fopen_r(p)?
.read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut())
.with_context(|| format!("Could not load file {p:?}"))?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
let p = path.as_ref();
// This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
// in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
// will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
// guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
// data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
// implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
// not worth it right now.
b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
.read_exact(v.secret_mut())
.with_context(|| format!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}"))?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
Ok(())
}
}
macro_rules! bail_usage {
($args:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
error!($($pt),*);
cmd_help()?;
exit(1);
}}
}
macro_rules! ensure_usage {
($args:expr, $ck:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
if !$ck {
bail_usage!($args, $($pt),*);
}
}}
}
macro_rules! mandatory_opt {
($args:expr, $val:expr, $name:expr) => {{
ensure_usage!($args, $val.is_some(), "{0} option is mandatory", $name)
}};
}
pub struct ArgsWalker {
pub argv: Vec<String>,
pub off: usize,
}
impl ArgsWalker {
pub fn get(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.argv.get(self.off).map(|s| s as &str)
}
pub fn prev(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
assert!(self.off > 0);
self.off -= 1;
self.get()
}
#[allow(clippy::should_implement_trait)]
pub fn next(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
assert!(self.todo() > 0);
self.off += 1;
self.get()
}
pub fn opt(&mut self, dst: &mut Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
let cmd = &self.argv[self.off - 1];
ensure_usage!(&self, self.todo() > 0, "Option {} takes a value", cmd);
ensure_usage!(&self, dst.is_none(), "Cannot set {} multiple times.", cmd);
*dst = Some(String::from(self.next().unwrap()));
Ok(())
}
fn todo(&self) -> usize {
self.argv.len() - self.off
}
}
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
pub struct WireguardOut {
// impl KeyOutput
dev: String,
pk: String,
extra_params: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
pub struct AppPeer {
pub outfile: Option<String>,
pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
pub tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum Verbosity {
Quiet,
Verbose,
}
/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AppServer {
pub crypt: CryptoServer,
pub sock: UdpSocket,
pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
pub verbosity: Verbosity,
}
/// Index based pointer to a Peer
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
impl AppPeerPtr {
/// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
Self(p.0)
}
/// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
PeerPtr(self.0)
}
pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
&srv.peers[self.0]
}
pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
&mut srv.peers[self.0]
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum AppPollResult {
DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
ReceivedMessage(usize, SocketAddr),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum KeyOutputReason {
Exchanged,
Stale,
}
use log::error;
use rosenpass::{cli::Cli, sodium::sodium_init};
use std::process::exit;
/// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
pub fn main() {
env_logger::init();
match rosenpass_main() {
match sodium_init().and_then(|()| Cli::run()) {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => {
error!("{e}");
@@ -263,396 +13,3 @@ pub fn main() {
}
}
}
/// Entry point to the whole program
pub fn rosenpass_main() -> Result<()> {
sodium_init()?;
let mut args = ArgsWalker {
argv: std::env::args().collect(),
off: 0, // skipping executable path
};
// Command parsing
match args.next() {
Some("help") | Some("-h") | Some("-help") | Some("--help") => cmd_help()?,
Some("keygen") => cmd_keygen(args)?,
Some("exchange") => cmd_exchange(args)?,
Some(cmd) => bail_usage!(&args, "No such command {}", cmd),
None => bail_usage!(&args, "Expected a command!"),
};
Ok(())
}
/// Print the usage information
pub fn cmd_help() -> Result<()> {
eprint!(include_str!("usage.md"), env!("CARGO_BIN_NAME"));
Ok(())
}
/// Generate a keypair
pub fn cmd_keygen(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
// Arg parsing
loop {
match args.next() {
Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
None => break,
};
}
mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
// Cmd
let (mut ssk, mut spk) = (SSk::random(), SPk::random());
unsafe {
StaticKEM::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
ssk.store_secret(sf.unwrap())?;
spk.store_secret(pf.unwrap())?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn cmd_exchange(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
// Argument parsing
let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
let mut listen: Option<String> = None;
let mut verbosity = Verbosity::Quiet;
// Global parameters
loop {
match args.next() {
Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
Some("listen") => args.opt(&mut listen)?,
Some("verbose") => {
verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
}
Some("peer") => {
args.prev();
break;
}
Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
None => break,
};
}
mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "public-key");
let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
// sk, pk, addr
SSk::load(&sf.unwrap())?,
SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
listen.as_deref().unwrap_or("[0::0]:0"),
verbosity,
)?);
// Peer parameters
'_parseAllPeers: while args.todo() > 0 {
let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
let mut outfile: Option<String> = None;
let mut outwg: Option<WireguardOut> = None;
let mut endpoint: Option<String> = None;
let mut pskf: Option<String> = None;
args.next(); // skip "peer" starter itself
'parseOnePeer: loop {
match args.next() {
// Done with this peer
Some("peer") => {
args.prev();
break 'parseOnePeer;
}
None => break 'parseOnePeer,
// Options
Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
Some("endpoint") => args.opt(&mut endpoint)?,
Some("preshared-key") => args.opt(&mut pskf)?,
Some("outfile") => args.opt(&mut outfile)?,
// Wireguard out
Some("wireguard") => {
ensure_usage!(
&args,
outwg.is_none(),
"Cannot set wireguard output for the same peer multiple times."
);
ensure_usage!(&args, args.todo() >= 2, "Option wireguard takes to values");
let dev = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
let pk = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
let wg = outwg.insert(WireguardOut {
dev,
pk,
extra_params: Vec::new(),
});
'_parseWgOutExtra: loop {
match args.next() {
Some("peer") => {
args.prev();
break 'parseOnePeer;
}
None => break 'parseOnePeer,
Some(xtra) => wg.extra_params.push(xtra.to_string()),
};
}
}
// Invalid
Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown peer option `{}`", opt),
};
}
mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
ensure_usage!(
&args,
outfile.is_some() || outwg.is_some(),
"Either of the outfile or wireguard option is mandatory"
);
let tx_addr = endpoint
.map(|e| {
e.to_socket_addrs()?
.next()
.context("Expected address in endpoint parameter")
})
.transpose()?;
srv.add_peer(
// psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
pskf.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
outfile,
outwg,
tx_addr,
)?;
}
srv.listen_loop()
}
impl AppServer {
pub fn new<A: ToSocketAddrs>(sk: SSk, pk: SPk, addr: A, verbosity: Verbosity) -> Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
sock: UdpSocket::bind(addr)?,
peers: Vec::new(),
verbosity,
})
}
pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
}
pub fn add_peer(
&mut self,
psk: Option<SymKey>,
pk: SPk,
outfile: Option<String>,
outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
) -> Result<AppPeerPtr> {
let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
self.peers.push(AppPeer {
outfile,
outwg,
tx_addr,
});
Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
}
pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
let mut failure_cnt = 0;
loop {
let msgs_processed = 0usize;
let err = match self.event_loop() {
Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
Err(e) => e,
};
// This should not happen…
failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
0
} else {
failure_cnt + 1
};
let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
error!(
"unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?} {}",
msgs_processed,
err,
err.backtrace()
);
if tries_left > 0 {
error!("reinitializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
continue;
}
bail!("too many network failures");
}
}
pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
/// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
/// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
/// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
attempt!({
let p = $peer.get_app(self);
if let Some(addr) = p.tx_addr {
let len = $fn()?;
self.sock.send_to(&tx[..len], addr)?;
}
Ok(())
})
};
}
loop {
use rosenpass::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
use AppPollResult::*;
use KeyOutputReason::*;
match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
.crypt
.initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
.crypt
.retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
DeleteKey(peer) => self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?,
ReceivedMessage(len, addr) => {
match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
Err(ref e) => {
self.verbose().then(|| {
info!(
"error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?} {}",
addr,
e,
e.backtrace()
);
});
}
Ok(HandleMsgResult {
resp,
exchanged_with,
..
}) => {
if let Some(len) = resp {
self.sock.send_to(&tx[0..len], addr)?;
}
if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
ap.get_app_mut(self).tx_addr = Some(addr);
// TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
}
}
}
}
};
}
}
pub fn output_key(&self, peer: AppPeerPtr, why: KeyOutputReason, key: &SymKey) -> Result<()> {
let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
let ap = peer.get_app(self);
if self.verbose() {
let msg = match why {
KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
};
info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
}
if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
// This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
// in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
// will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
// guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
// data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
// implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
// not worth it right now.
b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
let why = match why {
KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
};
println!(
"output-key peer {} key-file {} {}",
fmt_b64(&*peerid),
of,
why
);
}
if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
let child = Command::new("wg")
.arg("set")
.arg(&owg.dev)
.arg("peer")
.arg(&owg.pk)
.arg("preshared-key")
.arg("/dev/stdin")
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.args(&owg.extra_params)
.spawn()?;
b64_writer(child.stdin.unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<AppPollResult> {
use rosenpass::protocol::PollResult as C;
use AppPollResult as A;
loop {
return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
None => continue,
},
});
}
}
pub fn try_recv(&self, buf: &mut [u8], timeout: Timing) -> Result<Option<(usize, SocketAddr)>> {
if timeout == 0.0 {
return Ok(None);
}
self.sock
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout)))?;
match self.sock.recv_from(buf) {
Ok(x) => Ok(Some(x)),
Err(e) => match e.kind() {
ErrorKind::WouldBlock => Ok(None),
ErrorKind::TimedOut => Ok(None),
_ => Err(anyhow::Error::new(e)),
},
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
//! Implementation of the tree-like structure used for the label derivation in [labeled_prf](crate::labeled_prf)
use {
crate::{
coloring::Secret,
sodium::{hmac, hmac_into, KEY_SIZE},
},
anyhow::Result,
use crate::{
coloring::Secret,
sodium::{hmac, hmac_into, KEY_SIZE},
Result,
};
// TODO Use a proper Dec interface

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
//! will eventually yield a [PollResult]. Said [PollResult] contains
//! prescriptive activities to be carried out. [CryptoServer::osk] can than
//! be used to extract the shared key for two peers, once a key-exchange was
//! succesfull.
//! successful.
//!
//! TODO explain briefly the role of epki
//!
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
//! // always init libsodium before anything
//! rosenpass::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
//!
//! // initialize public and private key for peer a ...
//! // initialize secret and public key for peer a ...
//! let (mut peer_a_sk, mut peer_a_pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
//! StaticKEM::keygen(peer_a_sk.secret_mut(), peer_a_pk.secret_mut())?;
//!
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@
//! # }
//! ```
use log::{trace, warn};
use crate::{
coloring::*,
labeled_prf as lprf,
@@ -74,8 +76,8 @@ use crate::{
prftree::{SecretPrfTree, SecretPrfTreeBranch},
sodium::*,
util::*,
Result, RosenpassError,
};
use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
use std::collections::hash_map::{
Entry::{Occupied, Vacant},
HashMap,
@@ -104,7 +106,8 @@ pub const UNENDING: Timing = 3600.0 * 8.0;
// From the wireguard paper; rekey every two minutes,
// discard the key if no rekey is achieved within three
pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 120.0;
pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER: Timing = 120.0;
pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR: Timing = 130.0;
pub const REJECT_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 180.0;
// Seconds until the biscuit key is changed; we issue biscuits
@@ -114,7 +117,7 @@ pub const BISCUIT_EPOCH: Timing = 300.0;
// Retransmission pub constants; will retransmit for up to _ABORT ms; starting with a delay of
// _DELAY_BEG ms and increasing the delay exponentially by a factor of
// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An .secretadditional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An additional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
// is added.
pub const RETRANSMIT_ABORT: Timing = 120.0;
pub const RETRANSMIT_DELAY_GROWTH: Timing = 2.0;
@@ -187,7 +190,7 @@ pub struct CryptoServer {
/// A Biscuit is like a fancy cookie. To avoid state disruption attacks,
/// the responder doesn't store state. Instead the state is stored in a
/// Biscuit, that is encrypted using the [BiscuitKey] which is only known to
/// the Respnder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
/// the Responder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
/// the responder can avoid storing this state.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct BiscuitKey {
@@ -234,7 +237,7 @@ pub struct HandshakeState {
pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
}
#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Copy, Clone)]
pub enum HandshakeRole {
Initiator,
Responder,
@@ -249,18 +252,13 @@ impl HandshakeRole {
}
}
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
pub enum HandshakeStateMachine {
#[default]
RespHello,
RespConf,
}
impl Default for HandshakeStateMachine {
fn default() -> Self {
HandshakeStateMachine::RespHello
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InitiatorHandshake {
pub created_at: Timing,
@@ -286,28 +284,29 @@ pub struct Session {
pub created_at: Timing,
pub sidm: SessionId,
pub sidt: SessionId,
pub handshake_role: HandshakeRole,
// Crypto
pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
/// Key for Transmission ("transmission key mine")
pub txkm: SymKey,
/// Key for Receival ("transmission key theirs")
/// Key for Reception ("transmission key theirs")
pub txkt: SymKey,
/// Nonce for Transmission ("transmission nonce mine")
pub txnm: u64,
/// Nonce for Receival ("transmission nonce theirs")
/// Nonce for Reception ("transmission nonce theirs")
pub txnt: u64,
}
/// Lifecycle of a Secret
///
/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highes/biggest
/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highest/biggest
/// variant ([Lifecycle::Young]) is the most preferable one in a class of
/// equal-role secrets.
#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
enum Lifecycle {
/// Not even generated
Void = 0,
/// Secret must be zeroized, disposal adviced
/// Secret must be zeroized, disposal advised
Dead,
/// Soon to be dead: the secret might be used for receiving
/// data, but must not be used for future sending
@@ -488,22 +487,20 @@ impl CryptoServer {
let peerid = peer.pidt()?;
let peerno = self.peers.len();
match self.index.entry(IndexKey::Peer(peerid)) {
Occupied(_) => bail!(
"Cannot insert peer with id {:?}; peer with this id already registered.",
peerid
),
// TODO improve type handling, use PeerPtr
Occupied(_) => return Err(RosenpassError::PeerIdAlreadyTaken(peerid)),
Vacant(e) => e.insert(peerno),
};
self.peers.push(peer);
Ok(PeerPtr(peerno))
}
/// Register a new session (during a sucesfull handshake, persisting longer
/// Register a new session (during a successful handshake, persisting longer
/// than the handshake). Might return an error on session id collision
pub fn register_session(&mut self, id: SessionId, peer: PeerPtr) -> Result<()> {
match self.index.entry(IndexKey::Sid(id)) {
Occupied(p) if PeerPtr(*p.get()) == peer => {} // Already registered
Occupied(_) => bail!("Cannot insert session with id {:?}; id is in use.", id),
Occupied(_) => return Err(RosenpassError::SessionIdAlreadyTaken(id)),
Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(peer.0);
}
@@ -525,8 +522,11 @@ impl CryptoServer {
};
}
pub fn find_peer(&self, id: PeerId) -> Option<PeerPtr> {
self.index.get(&IndexKey::Peer(id)).map(|no| PeerPtr(*no))
pub fn find_peer(&self, id: PeerId) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
self.index
.get(&IndexKey::Peer(id))
.map(|no| PeerPtr(*no))
.ok_or_else(|| RosenpassError::NoSuchPeerId(id))
}
// lookup_session in whitepaper
@@ -604,6 +604,7 @@ impl Session {
created_at: 0.0,
sidm: SessionId::zero(),
sidt: SessionId::zero(),
handshake_role: HandshakeRole::Initiator,
ck: SecretPrfTree::zero().dup(),
txkm: SymKey::zero(),
txkt: SymKey::zero(),
@@ -616,7 +617,7 @@ impl Session {
// BISCUIT KEY ///////////////////////////////////
/// Biscuit Keys are always randomized, so that even if through a bug some
/// secrete is encrypted with an unitialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
/// secrete is encrypted with an initialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
/// everybody may read the secret.
impl BiscuitKey {
// new creates a random value, that might be counterintuitive for a Default
@@ -662,7 +663,20 @@ impl Mortal for SessionPtr {
}
fn retire_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
self.created_at(srv).map(|t| t + REKEY_AFTER_TIME)
// If we were the initiator, wait an extra ten seconds to avoid
// both parties starting the handshake at the same time. In most situations
// this should provide ample time for the other party to perform a
// complete handshake before this peer starts another handshake.
// This also has the peers going back and forth taking the initiator role
// and responder role.
use HandshakeRole::*;
self.get(srv).as_ref().map(|p| {
let wait = match p.handshake_role {
Initiator => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR,
Responder => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER,
};
p.created_at + wait
})
}
fn die_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
@@ -722,7 +736,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
/// Initiate a new handshake, put it to the `tx_buf` __and__ to the
/// retransmission storage
// NOTE retransmission? yes if initiator, no if responder
// TODO remove unecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
// TODO remove unnecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
// TODO move retransmission storage to io server
pub fn initiate_handshake(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize> {
let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<()>>()?; // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
@@ -747,7 +761,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
///
/// The response is only dependent on the incoming message, thus this
/// function is called regardless of whether the the the calling context is
/// an iniator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
/// an initiator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
///
/// 1. check incoming message for valid [MsgType]
/// 2. check that the seal is intact, e.g. that the message is
@@ -757,11 +771,11 @@ impl CryptoServer {
/// 4. if the protocol foresees a response to this message, generate one
/// 5. seal the response with cryptographic authentication
/// 6. if the response is a ResponseHello, store the sealed response for
/// further retransmision
/// 7. return some peerpointer if the exchange completed with this message
/// further retransmission
/// 7. return some peer pointer if the exchange completed with this message
/// 8. return the length of the response generated
///
/// This is the sequence of a succesful handshake:
/// This is the sequence of a successful handshake:
///
/// | time | Initiator | direction | Responder |
/// | --- | ---: | :---: | :--- |
@@ -770,17 +784,21 @@ impl CryptoServer {
/// | t2 | `InitConf` | -> | |
/// | t3 | | <- | `EmptyData` |
pub fn handle_msg(&mut self, rx_buf: &[u8], tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<HandleMsgResult> {
let seal_broken = "Message seal broken!";
// lengt of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
// length of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
let mut len = 0;
let mut exchanged = false;
ensure!(!rx_buf.is_empty(), "received empty message, ignoring it");
if rx_buf.is_empty() {
trace!("received empty message, ignoring it");
return Err(RosenpassError::EmptyMessage);
}
let peer = match rx_buf[0].try_into() {
Ok(MsgType::InitHello) => {
let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<&[u8]>>()?;
ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
if msg_in.check_seal(self)? {
return Err(RosenpassError::SealBroken);
}
let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
let peer = self.handle_init_hello(
@@ -792,7 +810,9 @@ impl CryptoServer {
}
Ok(MsgType::RespHello) => {
let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&[u8]>>()?;
ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
if msg_in.check_seal(self)? {
return Err(RosenpassError::SealBroken);
}
let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
let peer = self.handle_resp_hello(
@@ -807,7 +827,9 @@ impl CryptoServer {
}
Ok(MsgType::InitConf) => {
let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&[u8]>>()?;
ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
if msg_in.check_seal(self)? {
return Err(RosenpassError::SealBroken);
}
let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
let peer = self.handle_init_conf(
@@ -820,15 +842,23 @@ impl CryptoServer {
}
Ok(MsgType::EmptyData) => {
let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<EmptyData<&[u8]>>()?;
ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
if msg_in.check_seal(self)? {
return Err(RosenpassError::SealBroken);
}
self.handle_resp_conf(msg_in.payload().empty_data()?)?
}
Ok(MsgType::DataMsg) => bail!("DataMsg handling not implemented!"),
Ok(MsgType::CookieReply) => bail!("CookieReply handling not implemented!"),
Err(_) => {
bail!("CookieReply handling not implemented!")
Ok(MsgType::DataMsg) => {
return Err(RosenpassError::NotImplemented(
"DataMsg handling not implemented!",
))
}
Ok(MsgType::CookieReply) => {
return Err(RosenpassError::NotImplemented(
"CookieReply handling not implemented!",
))
}
Err(e) => return Err(e),
};
Ok(HandleMsgResult {
@@ -1107,10 +1137,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
impl IniHsPtr {
pub fn store_msg_for_retransmission(&self, srv: &mut CryptoServer, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let ih = self
.get_mut(srv)
.as_mut()
.with_context(|| format!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer()))?;
let ih = self.get_mut(srv).as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer());
RosenpassError::NoCurrentHs(self.peer())
})?;
cpy_min(msg, &mut *ih.tx_buf);
ih.tx_count = 0;
ih.tx_len = msg.len();
@@ -1119,20 +1149,20 @@ impl IniHsPtr {
}
pub fn apply_retransmission(&self, srv: &mut CryptoServer, tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize> {
let ih = self
.get_mut(srv)
.as_mut()
.with_context(|| format!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer()))?;
let ih = self.get_mut(srv).as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer());
RosenpassError::NoCurrentHs(self.peer())
})?;
cpy_min(&ih.tx_buf[..ih.tx_len], tx_buf);
Ok(ih.tx_len)
}
pub fn register_retransmission(&self, srv: &mut CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
let tb = srv.timebase.clone();
let ih = self
.get_mut(srv)
.as_mut()
.with_context(|| format!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer()))?;
let ih = self.get_mut(srv).as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("No current handshake for peer {:?}", self.peer());
RosenpassError::NoCurrentHs(self.peer())
})?;
// Base delay, exponential increase, ±50% jitter
ih.tx_retry_at = tb.now()
+ RETRANSMIT_DELAY_BEGIN
@@ -1285,7 +1315,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
sodium_bigint_inc(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
// The first bit of the nonce indicates which biscuit key was used
// TODO: This is premature optimiaztion. Remove!
// TODO: This is premature optimization. Remove!
let bk = srv.active_biscuit_key();
let mut n = XAEADNonce::random();
n[0] &= 0b0111_1111;
@@ -1309,7 +1339,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
// The first bit of the biscuit indicates which biscuit key was used
let bk = BiscuitKeyPtr(((biscuit_ct[0] & 0b1000_0000) >> 7) as usize);
// Calculate addtional data fields
// Calculate additional data fields
let ad = lprf::biscuit_ad()?
.mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
.mix(sidi.as_slice())?
@@ -1336,18 +1366,16 @@ impl HandshakeState {
hs.mix(biscuit_ct)?;
// Look up the associated peer
let peer = srv
.find_peer(pid) // TODO: FindPeer should return a Result<()>
.with_context(|| format!("Could not decode biscuit for peer {pid:?}: No such peer."))?;
let peer = srv.find_peer(pid)?;
// Defense against replay attacks; implementations may accept
// the most recent biscuit no again (bn = peer.bn_{prev}) which
// indicates retransmission
// TODO: Handle retransmissions without involving the crypto code
ensure!(
sodium_bigint_cmp(biscuit.biscuit_no(), &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used) >= 0,
"Rejecting biscuit: Outdated biscuit number"
);
if sodium_bigint_cmp(biscuit.biscuit_no(), &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used) >= 0 {
warn!("Rejecting biscuit: Outdated biscuit number");
return Err(RosenpassError::InvalidBiscuitNo);
}
Ok((peer, no, hs))
}
@@ -1366,6 +1394,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
created_at,
sidm: mysid,
sidt: peersid,
handshake_role: role,
ck,
txkm: ktx,
txkt: krx,
@@ -1380,11 +1409,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
///
/// Fail if no session is available with the peer
pub fn osk(&self, peer: PeerPtr) -> Result<SymKey> {
let session = peer
.session()
.get(self)
.as_ref()
.with_context(|| format!("No current session for peer {:?}", peer))?;
let session = peer.session().get(self).as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("No current session for peer {peer:?}");
RosenpassError::NoSuchPeer(peer)
})?;
Ok(session.ck.mix(&lprf::osk()?)?.into_secret())
}
}
@@ -1464,8 +1492,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
let peer = {
let mut peerid = PeerId::zero();
core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut *peerid, ih.pidic())?;
self.find_peer(peerid)
.with_context(|| format!("No such peer {peerid:?}."))?
self.find_peer(peerid)?
};
// IHR7
@@ -1507,13 +1534,12 @@ impl CryptoServer {
mut ic: InitConf<&mut [u8]>,
) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
// RHI2
let sid = SessionId::from_slice(rh.sidi());
let peer = self
.lookup_handshake(SessionId::from_slice(rh.sidi()))
.with_context(|| {
format!(
"Got RespHello packet for non-existent session {:?}",
rh.sidi()
)
.lookup_handshake(sid)
.ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("Got RespHello packet for non-existent session {sid:?}");
RosenpassError::NoSuchSessionId(sid)
})?
.peer();
@@ -1534,13 +1560,14 @@ impl CryptoServer {
let exp = hs!().next;
let got = HandshakeStateMachine::RespHello;
ensure!(
exp == got,
"Unexpected package in session {:?}. Expected {:?}, got {:?}.",
SessionId::from_slice(rh.sidi()),
exp,
got
);
if exp != got {
warn!("Unexpected package in session {sid:?}. Expected {exp:?}, got {got:?}.",);
return Err(RosenpassError::UnexpectedMessage {
session: sid,
expected: Some(exp),
got: Some(got),
});
}
let mut core = hs!().core.clone();
core.sidr.copy_from_slice(rh.sidr());
@@ -1628,19 +1655,39 @@ impl CryptoServer {
// ICR7
peer.session()
.insert(self, core.enter_live(self, HandshakeRole::Responder)?)?;
// TODO: This should be part of the protocol specification.
// Abort any ongoing handshake from initiator role
peer.hs().take(self);
}
// TODO: Implementing RP should be possible without touching the live session stuff
// TODO: I fear that this may lead to race conditions; the acknowledgement may be
// sent on a different session than the incoming packet. This should be mitigated
// by the deliberate back off in SessionPtr::retire_at as in practice only one
// handshake should be going on at a time.
// I think it may not be possible to formulate the protocol in such a way that
// we can be sure that the other party possesses a matching key; maybe we should
// study mathematically whether this even is possible.
// WireGuard solves this by just having multiple sessions so even if there is a
// race condition leading to two concurrent active sessions, data can still be sent.
// It would be nice if Rosenpass could do the same, but in order for that to work,
// WireGuard would have to have support for multiple PSKs (with a timeout) and
// WireGuard; to identify which PSK was used, wireguard would have to do a linear
// search with the responder trying each available PSK.
// In practice, the best thing to do might be to send regular pings to confirm that
// the key is still the same, which adds a bit of overhead.
// Another option would be to monitor WireGuard for failing handshakes and trigger
// a Rosenpass handshake in case a key mismatch due to a race condition is the reason
// for the failing handshake.
// Send ack Implementing sending the empty acknowledgement here
// instead of a generic PeerPtr::send(&Server, Option<&[u8]>) -> Either<EmptyData, Data>
// because data transmission is a stub currently. This software is supposed to be used
// as a key exchange service feeding a PSK into some classical (i.e. non post quantum)
let ses = peer
.session()
.get_mut(self)
.as_mut()
.context("Cannot send acknoledgement. No session.")?;
let ses = peer.session().get_mut(self).as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("Cannot send acknowledgement. No session.");
RosenpassError::NoSession
})?;
rc.sid_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.sidt.value);
rc.ctr_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.txnm.to_le_bytes());
ses.txnm += 1; // Increment nonce before encryption, just in case an error is raised
@@ -1654,30 +1701,39 @@ impl CryptoServer {
pub fn handle_resp_conf(&mut self, rc: EmptyData<&[u8]>) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
let sid = SessionId::from_slice(rc.sid());
let hs = self
.lookup_handshake(sid)
.with_context(|| format!("Got RespConf packet for non-existent session {sid:?}"))?;
let hs = self.lookup_handshake(sid).ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("Got RespConf packet for non-existent session {sid:?}");
RosenpassError::InvalidSessionId(sid)
})?;
let ses = hs.peer().session();
let exp = hs.get(self).as_ref().map(|h| h.next);
let got = Some(HandshakeStateMachine::RespConf);
ensure!(
exp == got,
"Unexpected package in session {:?}. Expected {:?}, got {:?}.",
sid,
exp,
got
);
if exp != got {
warn!("Unexpected package in session {sid:?}. Expected {exp:?}, got {got:?}.",);
return Err(RosenpassError::UnexpectedMessage {
session: sid,
expected: exp,
got,
});
}
// Validate the message
{
let s = ses.get_mut(self).as_mut().with_context(|| {
format!("Cannot validate EmptyData message. Missing encryption session for {sid:?}")
// TODO get rid of as_mut necessity
let s = ses.get_mut(self).as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
warn!("Cannot validate EmptyData message. Missing encryption session for {sid:?}");
RosenpassError::NoSuchSessionId(sid)
})?;
// the unwrap can not fail, because the slice returned by ctr() is
// guaranteed to have the correct size
let n = u64::from_le_bytes(rc.ctr().try_into().unwrap());
ensure!(n >= s.txnt, "Stale nonce");
if n < s.txnt {
trace!("Stale nonce");
return Err(RosenpassError::StaleNonce);
}
s.txnt = n;
aead_dec_into(
// pt, k, n, ad, ct
@@ -1704,7 +1760,7 @@ mod test {
// always init libsodium before anything
crate::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
// initialize public and private key for the crypto server
// initialize secret and public key for the crypto server
let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut()).expect("unable to generate keys");

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
//! Bindings and helpers for accessing libsodium functions
use crate::util::*;
use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
use crate::{util::*, Result, RosenpassError};
use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
use log::trace;
use static_assertions::const_assert_eq;
@@ -26,9 +25,11 @@ const_assert_eq!(KEY_SIZE, libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES as usize);
macro_rules! sodium_call {
($name:ident, $($args:expr),*) => { attempt!({
ensure!(unsafe{libsodium::$name($($args),*)} > -1,
"Error in libsodium's {}.", stringify!($name));
Ok(())
if unsafe{libsodium::$name($($args),*)} > -1 {
Ok(())
}else{
Err(RosenpassError::LibsodiumError(concat!("Error in libsodium's {}.", stringify!($name))))
}
})};
($name:ident) => { sodium_call!($name, ) };
}
@@ -251,7 +252,12 @@ pub fn mac16(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
pub fn hmac_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
// Not bothering with padding; the implementation
// uses appropriately sized keys.
ensure!(key.len() == KEY_SIZE);
if key.len() != KEY_SIZE {
return Err(crate::RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch {
required_size: KEY_SIZE,
actual_size: key.len(),
});
}
const IPAD: [u8; KEY_SIZE] = [0x36u8; KEY_SIZE];
let mut temp_key = [0u8; KEY_SIZE];

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
NAME
{0} Perform post-quantum secure key exchanges for wireguard and other services.
SYNOPSIS
{0} [ COMMAND ] [ OPTIONS ]... [ ARGS ]...
DESCRIPTION
{0} performs cryptographic key exchanges that are secure against quantum-computers and outputs the keys.
These keys can then be passed to various services such as wireguard or other vpn services
as pre-shared-keys to achieve security against attackers with quantum computers.
COMMANDS
keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later. Send the public-key file to your communication partner
and keep the private-key file a secret!
exchange private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path> [ OPTIONS ]... PEER...\n"
Start a process to exchange keys with the specified peers. You should specify at least one peer.
OPTIONS
listen <ip>[:<port>]
Instructs {0} to listen on the specified interface and port. By default {0} will listen on all interfaces and select a random port.
verbose
Extra logging
PEER := peer public-key <file-path> [endpoint <ip>[:<port>]] [preshared-key <file-path>] [outfile <file-path>] [wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>]
Instructs {0} to exchange keys with the given peer and write the resulting PSK into the given output file.
You must either specify the outfile or wireguard output option.
endpoint <ip>[:<port>]
Specifies the address where the peer can be reached. This will be automatically updated after the first successful
key exchange with the peer. If this is unspecified, the peer must initiate the connection.
preshared-key <file-path>
You may specify a pre-shared key which will be mixed into the final secret.
outfile <file-path>
You may specify a file to write the exchanged keys to. If this option is specified, {0} will
write a notification to standard out every time the key is updated.
wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>
This allows you to directly specify a wireguard peer to deploy the pre-shared-key to.
You may specify extra parameters you would pass to `wg set` besides the preshared-key parameter which is used by {0}.
This makes it possible to add peers entirely from {0}.

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
//! Helper functions and macros
use base64::{
display::Base64Display as B64Display, read::DecoderReader as B64Reader,
write::EncoderWriter as B64Writer,
};
use log::error;
use std::{
borrow::{Borrow, BorrowMut},
cmp::min,
fs::{File, OpenOptions},
io::{Read, Write},
path::Path,
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use crate::{
coloring::{Public, Secret},
Result,
};
#[inline]
pub fn xor_into(a: &mut [u8], b: &[u8]) {
assert!(a.len() == b.len());
@@ -54,22 +61,23 @@ pub fn cpy_min<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, d
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! attempt {
($block:expr) => {
(|| -> ::anyhow::Result<_> { $block })()
(|| -> crate::Result<_> { $block })()
};
}
const B64TYPE: base64::Config = base64::STANDARD;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::GeneralPurpose as Base64Engine;
const B64ENGINE: Base64Engine = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
pub fn fmt_b64<'a>(payload: &'a [u8]) -> B64Display<'a> {
B64Display::<'a>::with_config(payload, B64TYPE)
pub fn fmt_b64<'a>(payload: &'a [u8]) -> B64Display<'a, 'static, Base64Engine> {
B64Display::<'a, 'static>::new(payload, &B64ENGINE)
}
pub fn b64_writer<W: Write>(w: W) -> B64Writer<W> {
B64Writer::new(w, B64TYPE)
pub fn b64_writer<W: Write>(w: W) -> B64Writer<'static, Base64Engine, W> {
B64Writer::new(w, &B64ENGINE)
}
pub fn b64_reader<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> B64Reader<'_, R> {
B64Reader::new(r, B64TYPE)
pub fn b64_reader<R: Read>(r: R) -> B64Reader<'static, Base64Engine, R> {
B64Reader::new(r, &B64ENGINE)
}
// TODO remove this once std::cmp::max becomes const
@@ -115,3 +123,122 @@ where
f(&v);
v
}
/// load'n store
/// Open a file writable
pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
Ok(OpenOptions::new()
.read(false)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(true)
.open(path)?)
}
/// Open a file readable
pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
Ok(OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(false)
.create(false)
.truncate(false)
.open(path)?)
}
pub trait ReadExactToEnd {
fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()>;
}
impl<R: Read> ReadExactToEnd for R {
fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
let mut dummy = [0u8; 8];
self.read_exact(buf)?;
if self.read(&mut dummy)? != 0 {
error!("File too long!");
Err(crate::RosenpassError::RuntimeError)
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
}
pub trait LoadValue {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
where
Self: Sized;
}
pub trait LoadValueB64 {
fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
where
Self: Sized;
}
trait StoreValue {
fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
}
trait StoreSecret {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
}
impl<T: StoreValue> StoreSecret for T {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
self.store(path)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
let p = path.as_ref();
fopen_r(p)?.read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut()).map_err(|e| {
error!("Could not load file {p:?}");
e
})?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
let p = path.as_ref();
// This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
// in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
// will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
// guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
// data will linger in the Linux page cache anyways with the current
// implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
// not worth it right now.
b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
.read_exact(v.secret_mut())
.map_err(|e| {
error!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}");
e
})?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
let mut v = Self::random();
fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
Ok(v)
}
}
impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
Ok(())
}
}

View File

@@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ fn generate_keys() {
let tmpdir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR")).join("keygen");
fs::create_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
let priv_key_path = tmpdir.join("private-key");
let pub_key_path = tmpdir.join("public-key");
let secret_key_path = tmpdir.join("secret-key");
let public_key_path = tmpdir.join("public-key");
let output = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
.args(["keygen", "private-key"])
.arg(&priv_key_path)
.arg("public-key")
.arg(&pub_key_path)
.args(["gen-keys", "--secret-key"])
.arg(&secret_key_path)
.arg("--public-key")
.arg(&public_key_path)
.output()
.expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout), "");
assert!(priv_key_path.is_file());
assert!(pub_key_path.is_file());
assert!(secret_key_path.is_file());
assert!(public_key_path.is_file());
// cleanup
fs::remove_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
@@ -46,22 +46,22 @@ fn check_exchange() {
let tmpdir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR")).join("exchange");
fs::create_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
let priv_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("private-key-0"), tmpdir.join("private-key-1")];
let pub_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("public-key-0"), tmpdir.join("public-key-1")];
let secret_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("secret-key-0"), tmpdir.join("secret-key-1")];
let public_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("public-key-0"), tmpdir.join("public-key-1")];
let shared_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("shared-key-0"), tmpdir.join("shared-key-1")];
// generate key pairs
for (priv_key_path, pub_key_path) in priv_key_paths.iter().zip(pub_key_paths.iter()) {
for (secret_key_path, pub_key_path) in secret_key_paths.iter().zip(public_key_paths.iter()) {
let output = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
.args(["keygen", "private-key"])
.arg(&priv_key_path)
.arg("public-key")
.args(["gen-keys", "--secret-key"])
.arg(&secret_key_path)
.arg("--public-key")
.arg(&pub_key_path)
.output()
.expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout), "");
assert!(priv_key_path.is_file());
assert!(secret_key_path.is_file());
assert!(pub_key_path.is_file());
}
@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ fn check_exchange() {
let port = find_udp_socket();
let listen_addr = format!("localhost:{port}");
let mut server = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
.args(["exchange", "private-key"])
.arg(&priv_key_paths[0])
.args(["exchange", "secret-key"])
.arg(&secret_key_paths[0])
.arg("public-key")
.arg(&pub_key_paths[0])
.arg(&public_key_paths[0])
.args(["listen", &listen_addr, "verbose", "peer", "public-key"])
.arg(&pub_key_paths[1])
.arg(&public_key_paths[1])
.arg("outfile")
.arg(&shared_key_paths[0])
.stdout(Stdio::null())
@@ -82,14 +82,16 @@ fn check_exchange() {
.spawn()
.expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
// start second process, the client
let mut client = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
.args(["exchange", "private-key"])
.arg(&priv_key_paths[1])
.args(["exchange", "secret-key"])
.arg(&secret_key_paths[1])
.arg("public-key")
.arg(&pub_key_paths[1])
.arg(&public_key_paths[1])
.args(["verbose", "peer", "public-key"])
.arg(&pub_key_paths[0])
.arg(&public_key_paths[0])
.args(["endpoint", &listen_addr])
.arg("outfile")
.arg(&shared_key_paths[1])