stash

Issue: #91 (https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/91)

Add version info to whitepaper

This uses an release candidate of liboqs and a patched version of the
oqs-sys rust crate. We should wait until a proper release is done.

.ci/gen-workflow-files.nu

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env nu
+
+use log *
+
+# cd to git root
+cd (git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
+
+# check if a subject depends on a potential dependency
+def depends [
+    subject:string # package to examine
+    maybe_dep:string # maybe a dependency of subject
+  ] {
+  not ( nix why-depends --quiet --derivation $subject $maybe_dep | is-empty ) 
+}
+
+# get attribute names of the attribute set
+def get-attr-names [
+    expr: # nix expression to get attrNames of 
+  ] {
+  nix eval --json $expr --apply builtins.attrNames | from json
+}
+
+def job-id [
+  system:string,
+  derivation:string,
+  ] {
+  $"($system)---($derivation)"
+}
+
+# map from nixos system to github runner type
+let systems_map = {
+  # aarch64-darwin
+  # aarch64-linux
+  
+  i686-linux: ubuntu-latest,
+  x86_64-darwin: macos-13,
+  x86_64-linux: ubuntu-latest
+}
+
+let targets = (get-attr-names ".#packages"
+  | par-each {|system| { $system : (get-attr-names $".#packages.($system)") } }
+  | reduce {|it, acc| $acc | merge $it }
+)
+
+mut cachix_workflow = {
+  name: "Nix",
+  permissions: {contents: write},
+  on: {
+    pull_request: null,
+    push: {branches: [main]}
+  },
+  jobs: {},
+}
+
+mut release_workflow = {
+  name: "Release",
+  permissions: {contents: write},
+  on: { push: {tags: ["v*"]} },
+  jobs: {},
+}
+
+let runner_setup = [
+  {
+    uses: "actions/checkout@v3"
+  }
+  {
+    uses: "cachix/install-nix-action@v22",
+    with: { nix_path: "nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable" }
+  }
+  {
+    uses: "cachix/cachix-action@v12",
+    with: {
+      name: rosenpass,
+      authToken: "${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}"
+    }
+  }
+]
+
+for system in ($targets | columns) {
+  if ($systems_map | get -i $system | is-empty) {
+    log info $"skipping ($system), since there are no GH-Actions runners for it"
+    continue
+  }
+
+  # lookup the correct runner for $system
+  let runs_on = [ ($systems_map | get $system) ]
+
+  # add jobs for all derivations
+  let derivations = ($targets | get $system)
+  for derivation in $derivations {
+
+    if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "static") {
+      log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
+      continue
+    }
+
+    if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "release-package") {
+      log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
+      continue
+    }
+
+    # job_id for GH-Actions
+    let id = ( job-id $system $derivation )
+
+    # name displayed
+    let name = $"($system).($derivation)"
+
+    # collection of dependencies
+    # TODO currently only considers dependencies on the same $system
+    let needs = ($derivations
+      | filter {|it| $it != $derivation and $it != "default" } # filter out self and default
+      | par-each {|it| {
+        name: $it, # the other derivation
+        # does self depend on $it?
+        needed: (depends $".#packages.($system).($derivation)" $".#packages.($system).($it)")
+      } }
+      | filter {|it| $it.needed}
+      | each {|it| job-id $system $it.name}
+    )
+
+    mut new_job = {
+      name: $"Build ($name)",
+      "runs-on": $runs_on,
+      needs: $needs,
+      steps: ($runner_setup | append [
+        {
+          name: Build,
+          run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).($derivation) --print-build-logs"
+        }
+      ])
+    }
+    $cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $id $new_job )
+  }
+
+  # add check job
+  $cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---check" {
+    name: $"Run Nix checks on ($system)",
+    "runs-on": $runs_on,
+    steps: ($runner_setup | append {
+      name: Check,
+      run: "nix flake check . --print-build-logs"
+    })
+  })
+
+  # add release job
+  $release_workflow.jobs = ($release_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---release" {
+    name: $"Build release artifacts for ($system)",
+    "runs-on": $runs_on,
+    steps: ($runner_setup | append [
+      {
+        name: "Build release",
+        run: "nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs"
+      }
+      {
+        name: Release,
+        uses: "softprops/action-gh-release@v1",
+        with: {
+          draft: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}",
+          prerelease: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}",
+          files: "result/*"
+        }
+      }
+    ])
+  })
+}
+
+# add whitepaper job with upload
+let system = "x86_64-linux"
+$cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---whitepaper-upload" {
+  name: $"Upload whitepaper ($system)",
+  "runs-on": ($systems_map | get $system),
+  "if": "${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}",
+  steps: ($runner_setup | append [
+    {
+      name: "Git add git sha and commit",
+      run: "cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin"
+    }
+    {
+      name: Build,
+      run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).whitepaper --print-build-logs"
+    }
+    {
+      name: "Deploy PDF artifacts",
+      uses: "peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3",
+      with: {
+        github_token: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}",
+        publish_dir: result/,
+        publish_branch: papers-pdf,
+        force_orphan: true
+      }
+    }
+  ])
+})
+
+log info "saving nix-cachix workflow"
+$cachix_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/nix.yaml
+$release_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/release.yaml
+
+log info "prettify generated yaml"
+prettier -w .github/workflows/

.github/workflows/doc-upload.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Update website docs
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+    paths:
+      - "doc/**"
+
+jobs:
+  update-website:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v3
+
+      - name: Clone rosenpass-website repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v3
+        with:
+          repository: rosenpass/rosenpass-website
+          ref: main
+          path: rosenpass-website
+          token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }}
+
+      - name: Copy docs to website repo
+        run: |
+          cp -R doc/* rosenpass-website/static/docs/
+
+      - name: Install mandoc
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update
+          sudo apt-get install -y mandoc
+
+      - name: Compile man pages to HTML
+        run: |
+          cd rosenpass-website/static/docs/
+          for file in *.1; do
+            mandoc -Thtml "$file" > "${file%.*}.html"
+          done
+
+      - name: Commit changes to website repo
+        uses: EndBug/add-and-commit@v9
+        with:
+          author_name: GitHub Actions
+          author_email: actions@github.com
+          message: Update docs
+          cwd: rosenpass-website/static/docs
+          github_token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }

.github/workflows/nix.yaml

@@ -1,74 +1,346 @@
-name: Nix Related Actions
+name: Nix
 permissions:
   contents: write
 on:
-  pull_request:
+  pull_request: null
   push:
-    branches: [main]
-
+    branches:
+      - main
 jobs:
-  build:
-    name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }} on ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+  i686-linux---default:
+    name: Build i686-linux.default
     runs-on:
-      - nix
-      - ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        nix-system:
-          - x86_64-linux
-          # - aarch64-linux
-        derivation:
-          - rosenpass
-          - rosenpass-static
-          - rosenpass-oci-image
-          - rosenpass-static-oci-image
-          - proof-proverif
-          - whitepaper
-
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - i686-linux---rosenpass
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - name: Generate gitHeadInfo.gin for the whitepaper
-        if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' }}
-        run: ( cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin )
-      - name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }}@${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-        run: |
-          # build the package
-          nix build .#packages.${{ matrix.nix-system }}.${{ matrix.derivation }} --print-build-logs
-
-          # copy over the results
-          if [[ -f $(readlink --canonicalize result ) ]]; then
-            mkdir -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-          fi
-          cp --recursive -- $(readlink --canonicalize result) ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-          chmod --recursive ug+rw -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-
-          # add version information
-          git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-version
-          git rev-parse HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-sha
-
-          # override the `rp` script to keep compatible with non-nix systems
-          if [[ -f ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/rp ]]; then
-            cp --force -- rp ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/
-          fi
-      - name: Upload build results
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
         with:
-          name: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-          path: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.default --print-build-logs
+  i686-linux---rosenpass:
+    name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
+  i686-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
+    name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - i686-linux---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
+  i686-linux---check:
+    name: Run Nix checks on i686-linux
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Check
+        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-darwin---default:
+    name: Build x86_64-darwin.default
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.default --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-darwin---release-package:
+    name: Build x86_64-darwin.release-package
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
+      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.release-package --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-darwin---rosenpass:
+    name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image:
+    name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-darwin---check:
+    name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-darwin
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Check
+        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---default:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.default
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.default --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---proof-proverif:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.proof-proverif
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-linux---proverif-patched
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proof-proverif --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---proverif-patched:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.proverif-patched
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proverif-patched --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---release-package:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.release-package
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image
+      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.release-package --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---rosenpass:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs:
+      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---whitepaper:
+    name: Build x86_64-linux.whitepaper
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    needs: []
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---check:
+    name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-linux
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Check
+        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
+  x86_64-linux---whitepaper-upload:
+    name: Upload whitepaper x86_64-linux
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Git add git sha and commit
+        run: cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin
+      - name: Build
+        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
       - name: Deploy PDF artifacts
-        if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
         uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3
         with:
           github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          publish_dir: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+          publish_dir: result/
           publish_branch: papers-pdf
           force_orphan: true
-  checks:
-    name: Run Nix checks
-    runs-on: nixos
-    needs: build
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - name: Run Checks
-        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs

.github/workflows/qc.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Quality Control
+name: QC
 on:
   pull_request:
   push:
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@ jobs:
         with:
           args: --check .
 
+  shellcheck:
+    name: Shellcheck
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - name: Run ShellCheck
+        uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
+
   cargo-audit:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
@@ -62,4 +70,50 @@ jobs:
       - run: rustup component add clippy
       - name: Install libsodium
         run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
-      - run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --document-private-items
+      # `--no-deps` used as a workaround for a rust compiler bug. See:
+      # - https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
+      # - https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/108378
+      - run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --no-deps --document-private-items
+
+  cargo-test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: actions/cache@v3
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/bin/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
+            ~/.cargo/git/db/
+            target/
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
+      - name: Install libsodium
+        run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
+        # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
+        # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
+        # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_. Setting it to 8 MiB
+      - run: RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test
+
+  cargo-test-nix-devshell-x86_64-linux:
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: actions/cache@v3
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/bin/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
+            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
+            ~/.cargo/git/db/
+            target/
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - run: nix develop --command cargo test

.github/workflows/release.yaml

@@ -3,28 +3,69 @@ permissions:
   contents: write
 on:
   push:
-    tags: ["v*"]
-
+    tags:
+      - v*
 jobs:
-  release:
-    name: Release for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+  i686-linux---release:
+    name: Build release artifacts for i686-linux
     runs-on:
-      - nix
-      - ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        nix-system:
-          - x86_64-linux
-          # - aarch64-linux
+      - ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - name: Build release-package for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build release
         run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
       - name: Release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
         with:
           draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
           prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
-          files: |
-            result/*
+          files: result/*
+  x86_64-darwin---release:
+    name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-darwin
+    runs-on:
+      - macos-13
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build release
+        run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
+      - name: Release
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
+        with:
+          draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
+          prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
+          files: result/*
+  x86_64-linux---release:
+    name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-linux
+    runs-on:
+      - ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+        with:
+          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
+        with:
+          name: rosenpass
+          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Build release
+        run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
+      - name: Release
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
+        with:
+          draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
+          prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
+          files: result/*

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# TODO use CI_JOB_TOKEN once https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/6310 is fixed
+pull-from-gh:
+  only: ["schedules"]
+  variables:
+    REMOTE: "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass.git"
+    LOCAL: " git@gitlab.com:rosenpass/rosenpass.git"
+    GIT_STRATEGY: none
+  before_script:
+    - mkdir ~/.ssh/
+    - echo "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+    - echo "$REPO_SSH_KEY" > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+    - chmod 600 --recursive ~/.ssh/
+    - git config --global user.email "ci@gitlab.com"
+    - git config --global user.name "CI"
+  script:
+    - git clone --mirror $REMOTE rosenpass
+    - cd rosenpass && git push --mirror $LOCAL

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,35 +1,8 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass"
-version = "0.1.1"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Build post-quantum-secure VPNs with WireGuard!"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
+[workspace]
+resolver = "2"
 
-[[bench]]
-name = "handshake"
-harness = false
+members = [
+    "rosenpass",
+    "kmac-test-vectors",
+]
 
-[dependencies]
-anyhow = { version = "1.0.52", features = ["backtrace"] }
-base64 = "0.13.0"
-clap = { version = "3.0.0", features = ["yaml"] }
-static_assertions = "1.1.0"
-memoffset = "0.6.5"
-libsodium-sys-stable = { version = "1.19.26", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
-oqs-sys = { version = "0.7.1", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber'] }
-lazy_static = "1.4.0"
-thiserror = "1.0.38"
-paste = "1.0.11"
-log = { version = "0.4.17", optional = true }
-env_logger = { version = "0.10.0", optional = true }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-criterion = "0.3.5"
-test_bin = "0.4.0"
-
-[features]
-default = ["log", "env_logger"]

config-examples/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+peer-*-*-key
+peer-*-out

config-examples/peer-a-config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
+secret_key = "peer-a-secret-key"
+listen = ["[::]:10001"]
+verbosity = "Quiet"
+
+[[peers]]
+public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
+endpoint = "localhost:10002"
+key_out = "peer-a-rp-out-key"
+# exchange_command = [
+#     "wg",
+#     "set",
+#     "wg0",
+#     "peer",
+#     "<PEER_ID>",
+#     "preshared-key",
+#     "/dev/stdin",
+# ]

config-examples/peer-b-config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
+secret_key = "peer-b-secret-key"
+listen = ["[::]:10002"]
+verbosity = "Quiet"
+
+[[peers]]
+public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
+endpoint = "localhost:10001"
+key_out = "peer-b-rp-out-key"
+# exchange_command = [
+#     "wg",
+#     "set",
+#     "wg0",
+#     "peer",
+#     "<PEER_ID>",
+#     "preshared-key",
+#     "/dev/stdin",
+# ]

doc/rosenpass.1

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+.Dd $Mdocdate$
+.Dt ROSENPASS 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm rosenpass
+.Nd builds post-quantum-secure VPNs
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op COMMAND
+.Op Ar OPTIONS ...
+.Op Ar ARGS ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+performs cryptographic key exchanges that are secure against quantum-computers
+and then outputs the keys.
+These keys can then be passed to various services, such as wireguard or other
+vpn services, as pre-shared-keys to achieve security against attackers with
+quantum computers.
+.Pp
+This is a research project and quantum computers are not thought to become
+practical in fewer than ten years.
+If you are not specifically tasked with developing post-quantum secure systems,
+you probably do not need this tool.
+.Ss COMMANDS
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ar keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
+Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later.
+Send the public-key file to your communication partner and keep the private-key
+file secret!
+.It Ar exchange private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path> [ OPTIONS ] PEERS
+Start a process to exchange keys with the specified peers.
+You should specify at least one peer.
+.Pp
+Its
+.Ar OPTIONS
+are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ar listen <ip>[:<port>]
+Instructs
+.Nm
+to listen on the specified interface and port.
+By default,
+.Nm
+will listen on all interfaces and select a random port.
+.It Ar verbose
+Extra logging.
+.El
+.El
+.Ss PEER
+Each
+.Ar PEER
+is defined as follows:
+.Qq peer public-key <file-path> [endpoint <ip>[:<port>]] [preshared-key <file-path>] [outfile <file-path>] [wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>]
+.Pp
+Providing a
+.Ar PEER
+instructs
+.Nm
+to exchange keys with the given peer and write the resulting PSK into the given
+output file.
+You must either specify the outfile or wireguard output option.
+.Pp
+The parameters of
+.Ar PEER
+are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ar endpoint <ip>[:<port>]
+Specifies the address where the peer can be reached.
+This will be automatically updated after the first successful key exchange with
+the peer.
+If this is unspecified, the peer must initiate the connection.
+.It Ar preshared-key <file-path>
+You may specify a pre-shared key which will be mixed into the final secret.
+.It Ar outfile <file-path>
+You may specify a file to write the exchanged keys to.
+If this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will write a notification to standard out every time the key is updated.
+.It Ar wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>
+This allows you to directly specify a wireguard peer to deploy the
+pre-shared-key to.
+You may specify extra parameters you would pass to
+.Qq wg set
+besides the preshared-key parameter which is used by
+.Nm .
+This makes it possible to add peers entirely from
+.Nm .
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Ex -std
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr rp 1 ,
+.Xr wg 1
+.Sh STANDARDS
+This tool is the reference implementation of the Rosenpass protocol, written
+by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, and Lisa Schmidt.
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Rosenpass was created by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske,
+Marei Peischl, Stephan Ajuvo, and Lisa Schmidt.
+.Pp
+This manual page was written by
+.An Emil Engler
+.Sh BUGS
+The bugs are tracked at
+.Lk https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues .

doc/rp.1

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+.Dd $Mdocdate$
+.Dt RP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm rp
+.Nd high-level interface to rosenpass
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Ar explain
+.Op Ar verbose
+.Ar genkey Ar ... | Ar pubkey ... | Ar exchange ...
+.Nm
+.Op ...
+.Ar genkey PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
+.Nm
+.Op ...
+.Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
+.Nm
+.Op ...
+.\" Splitting this across several lines
+.Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
+.Op dev <device>
+.Op listen <ip>:<port>
+.\" Because the peer argument is complicated, it would be heel to represent it
+.\" in mdoc... Using an ugly hack instead, thereby losing semantic.
+[peer PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR [endpoint <ip>:<port>] [persistent-keepalive <interval>]
+[allowed-ips <ip1>/<cidr1>[,<ip2>/<cidr2>] ...]] ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Nm
+program
+is used to build a VPN with WireGuard and Rosenpass.
+.Pp
+The optional
+.Op explain
+and
+.Op verbose
+options can be used to obtain further help or to enable a detailed view on the
+operations, respectively.
+.Ss COMMANDS
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ar genkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
+Creates a new directory with appropriate permissions and generates all the
+necessary private keys required for a peer to participate in a rosenpass
+connection.
+.It Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
+Creates a fresh directory at
+.Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR ,
+which contains the extracted public keys from the private keys generated by
+.Ar genkey
+and located inside
+.Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR .
+.It Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR [dev <device>] [listen <ip>:<port>] [PEERS]
+Starts the VPN on interface
+.Ar device ,
+listening on the provided IP and port combination, allowing connections from
+.Ar PEERS .
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Ex -std
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+In this example, we will assume that the server has an interface bound to
+192.168.0.1, that accepts incoming connections on port 9999/UDP for Rosenpass
+and port 10000/UDP for WireGuard.
+.Pp
+To create a VPN connection, start by generating secret keys on both hosts.
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+rp genkey server.rosenpass-secret
+rp genkey client.rosenpass-secret
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Extract the public keys:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+rp pubkey server.rosenpass-secret server.rosenpass-public
+rp pubkey client.rosenpass-secret client.rosenpass-public
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Copy the
+.Qq -public
+directories to the other peers and then start the VPN.
+On the server:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+sudo rp exchange server.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass0 listen 192.168.0.1:9999 \\
+    peer client.rosenpass-public allowed-ips fe80::/64
+.Ed
+.Pp
+On the client:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+sudo rp exchange client.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass 0 \\
+    peer server.rosenpass-public endpoint 192.168.0.1:9999 allowed-ips fe80::/64
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Assign IP addresses:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+sudo ip a add fe80::1/64 dev rosenpass0 # Server
+sudo ip a add fe80::2/64 dev rosenpass0 # Client
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Test the connection by pinging the server on the client machine:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+ping fe80::1%rosenpass0 # Client
+.Ed
+.Pp
+You can watch how rosenpass replaces the WireGuard PSK with the following:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+watch -n 0.2 'wg show all; wg show all preshared-keys'
+.Ed
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr rosenpass 1 ,
+.Xr wg 1
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Rosenpass was created by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske,
+Marei Peischl, Stephan Ajuvo, and Lisa Schmidt.
+.Pp
+This manual page was written by
+.An Emil Engler
+.Sh BUGS
+The bugs are tracked at
+.Lk https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues .

flake.lock

@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
         "rust-analyzer-src": "rust-analyzer-src"
       },
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1674240251,
-        "narHash": "sha256-AVMmf/CtcGensTZmMicToDpOwySEGNKYgRPC7lu3m8w=",
+        "lastModified": 1699770036,
+        "narHash": "sha256-bZmI7ytPAYLpyFNgj5xirDkKuAniOkj1xHdv5aIJ5GM=",
         "owner": "nix-community",
         "repo": "fenix",
-        "rev": "d8067f4d1d3d30732703209bec5ca7d62aaececc",
+        "rev": "81ab0b4f7ae9ebb57daa0edf119c4891806e4d3a",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -22,12 +22,15 @@
       }
     },
     "flake-utils": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "systems": "systems"
+      },
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1667395993,
-        "narHash": "sha256-nuEHfE/LcWyuSWnS8t12N1wc105Qtau+/OdUAjtQ0rA=",
+        "lastModified": 1694529238,
+        "narHash": "sha256-zsNZZGTGnMOf9YpHKJqMSsa0dXbfmxeoJ7xHlrt+xmY=",
         "owner": "numtide",
         "repo": "flake-utils",
-        "rev": "5aed5285a952e0b949eb3ba02c12fa4fcfef535f",
+        "rev": "ff7b65b44d01cf9ba6a71320833626af21126384",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -36,13 +39,33 @@
         "type": "github"
       }
     },
+    "naersk": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "nixpkgs": [
+          "nixpkgs"
+        ]
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1698420672,
+        "narHash": "sha256-/TdeHMPRjjdJub7p7+w55vyABrsJlt5QkznPYy55vKA=",
+        "owner": "nix-community",
+        "repo": "naersk",
+        "rev": "aeb58d5e8faead8980a807c840232697982d47b9",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nix-community",
+        "repo": "naersk",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
     "nixpkgs": {
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1672968032,
-        "narHash": "sha256-26Jns3GmHem44a06UN5Rj/KOD9qNJThyQrom02Ijur8=",
+        "lastModified": 1698846319,
+        "narHash": "sha256-4jyW/dqFBVpWFnhl0nvP6EN4lP7/ZqPxYRjl6var0Oc=",
         "owner": "NixOS",
         "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "2dea8991d89b9f1e78d874945f78ca15f6954289",
+        "rev": "34bdaaf1f0b7fb6d9091472edc968ff10a8c2857",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -50,37 +73,22 @@
         "type": "indirect"
       }
     },
-    "nixpkgs-unstable": {
-      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1676496762,
-        "narHash": "sha256-GFAxjaTgh8KJ8q7BYaI4EVGI5K98ooW70fG/83rSb08=",
-        "owner": "NixOS",
-        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "1bddde315297c092712b0ef03d9def7a474b28ae",
-        "type": "github"
-      },
-      "original": {
-        "owner": "NixOS",
-        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "type": "github"
-      }
-    },
     "root": {
       "inputs": {
         "fenix": "fenix",
         "flake-utils": "flake-utils",
-        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs",
-        "nixpkgs-unstable": "nixpkgs-unstable"
+        "naersk": "naersk",
+        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
       }
     },
     "rust-analyzer-src": {
       "flake": false,
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1674162026,
-        "narHash": "sha256-iY0bxoVE7zAZmp0BB/m5hZW5pWHUfgntDvc1m2zyt/U=",
+        "lastModified": 1699715108,
+        "narHash": "sha256-yPozsobJU55gj+szgo4Lpcg1lHvGQYAT6Y4MrC80mWE=",
         "owner": "rust-lang",
         "repo": "rust-analyzer",
-        "rev": "6e52c64031825920983515b9e975e93232739f7f",
+        "rev": "5fcf5289e726785d20d3aa4d13d90a43ed248e83",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -89,6 +97,21 @@
         "repo": "rust-analyzer",
         "type": "github"
       }
+    },
+    "systems": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1681028828,
+        "narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
     }
   },
   "root": "root",

flake.nix

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 {
   inputs = {
-    nixpkgs-unstable.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs";
     flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
 
+    # for quicker rust builds
+    naersk.url = "github:nix-community/naersk";
+    naersk.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
+
     # for rust nightly with llvm-tools-preview
     fenix.url = "github:nix-community/fenix";
     fenix.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
@@ -19,12 +22,15 @@
         "aarch64-linux"
 
         # unsuported best-effort
+        "i686-linux"
         "x86_64-darwin"
         "aarch64-darwin"
         # "x86_64-windows"
       ]
         (system:
           let
+            lib = nixpkgs.lib;
+
             # normal nixpkgs
             pkgs = import nixpkgs {
               inherit system;
@@ -47,14 +53,17 @@
                 )
               ];
             };
+
             # parsed Cargo.toml
-            cargoToml = builtins.fromTOML (builtins.readFile ./Cargo.toml);
+            cargoToml = builtins.fromTOML (builtins.readFile ./rosenpass/Cargo.toml);
+
             # source files relevant for rust
-            src = pkgs.lib.sourceByRegex ./. [
-              "Cargo\\.(toml|lock)"
-              "(src|benches)(/.*\\.(rs|md))?"
-              "rp"
+            src = pkgs.lib.sources.sourceFilesBySuffices ./. [
+              ".lock"
+              ".rs"
+              ".toml"
             ];
+
             # builds a bin path for all dependencies for the `rp` shellscript
             rpBinPath = p: with p; lib.makeBinPath [
               coreutils
@@ -67,61 +76,114 @@
             # given set of nixpkgs
             rpDerivation = p:
               let
-                isStatic = p.stdenv.hostPlatform.isStatic;
-              in
-              p.rustPlatform.buildRustPackage {
-                # metadata and source
-                pname = cargoToml.package.name;
-                version = cargoToml.package.version;
-                inherit src;
-                cargoLock = {
-                  lockFile = src + "/Cargo.lock";
+                # whether we want to build a statically linked binary
+                isStatic = p.targetPlatform.isStatic;
+
+                # the rust target of `p`
+                target = p.rust.toRustTargetSpec p.targetPlatform;
+
+                # convert a string to shout case
+                shout = string: builtins.replaceStrings [ "-" ] [ "_" ] (pkgs.lib.toUpper string);
+
+                # suitable Rust toolchain
+                toolchain = with inputs.fenix.packages.${system}; combine [
+                  stable.cargo
+                  stable.rustc
+                  targets.${target}.stable.rust-std
+                ];
+
+                # naersk with a custom toolchain
+                naersk = pkgs.callPackage inputs.naersk {
+                  cargo = toolchain;
+                  rustc = toolchain;
                 };
 
-                nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
-                  cmake # for oqs build in the oqs-sys crate
-                  makeWrapper # for the rp shellscript
-                  pkg-config # let libsodium-sys-stable find libsodium
-                  removeReferencesTo
-                  rustPlatform.bindgenHook # for C-bindings in the crypto libs
-                ];
-                buildInputs = with p; [ bash libsodium ];
+                # used to trick the build.rs into believing that CMake was ran **again**
+                fakecmake = pkgs.writeScriptBin "cmake" ''
+                  #! ${pkgs.stdenv.shell} -e
+                  true
+                '';
+              in
+              naersk.buildPackage
+                {
+                  # metadata and source
+                  name = cargoToml.package.name;
+                  version = cargoToml.package.version;
+                  inherit src;
 
+                  cargoBuildOptions = x: x ++ [ "-p" "rosenpass" ];
+                  cargoTestOptions = x: x ++ [ "-p" "rosenpass" ];
+
+                  doCheck = true;
+
+                  nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
+                    p.stdenv.cc
+                    cmake # for oqs build in the oqs-sys crate
+                    mandoc # for the built-in manual
+                    makeWrapper # for the rp shellscript
+                    pkg-config # let libsodium-sys-stable find libsodium
+                    removeReferencesTo
+                    rustPlatform.bindgenHook # for C-bindings in the crypto libs
+                  ];
+                  buildInputs = with p; [ bash libsodium ];
+
+                  override = x: {
+                    preBuild =
+                      # nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a crypto
+                      # extensions, but liboqs depens on these
+                      (lib.optionalString (system == "aarch64-linux") ''
+                        NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -march=armv8-a+crypto"
+                      ''
+                      );
+
+                    # fortify is only compatible with dynamic linking
+                    hardeningDisable = lib.optional isStatic "fortify";
+                  };
+
+                  overrideMain = x: {
+                    # CMake detects that it was served a _foreign_ target dir, and CMake
+                    # would be executed again upon the second build step of naersk.
+                    # By adding our specially optimized CMake version, we reduce the cost
+                    # of recompilation by 99 % while, while avoiding any CMake errors.
+                    nativeBuildInputs = [ (lib.hiPrio fakecmake) ] ++ x.nativeBuildInputs;
+
+                    # make sure that libc is linked, under musl this is not the case per
+                    # default
+                    preBuild = (lib.optionalString isStatic ''
+                      NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -lc"
+                    '');
+
+                    preInstall = ''
+                      install -D ${./rp} $out/bin/rp
+                      wrapProgram $out/bin/rp --prefix PATH : "${ rpBinPath p }"
+                    '';
+                  };
+
+                  # We want to build for a specific target...
+                  CARGO_BUILD_TARGET = target;
+
+                  # ... which might require a non-default linker:
+                  "CARGO_TARGET_${shout target}_LINKER" =
+                    let
+                      inherit (p.stdenv) cc;
+                    in
+                    "${cc}/bin/${cc.targetPrefix}cc";
+
+                  meta = with pkgs.lib;
+                    {
+                      inherit (cargoToml.package) description homepage;
+                      license = with licenses; [ mit asl20 ];
+                      maintainers = [ maintainers.wucke13 ];
+                      platforms = platforms.all;
+                    };
+                } // (lib.mkIf isStatic {
                 # otherwise pkg-config tries to link non-existent dynamic libs
+                # documented here: https://docs.rs/pkg-config/latest/pkg_config/
                 PKG_CONFIG_ALL_STATIC = true;
 
-                # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
-                # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
-                # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_
-                RUST_MIN_STACK = 8 * 1024 * 1024; # 8 MiB
-
-                # nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a
-                # crypto extensions, but liboqs depens on these
-                preBuild =
-                  if system == "aarch64-linux" then ''
-                    NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -march=armv8-a+crypto"
-                  '' else "";
-
-                preInstall = ''
-                  install -D rp $out/bin/rp
-                  wrapProgram $out/bin/rp --prefix PATH : "${ rpBinPath p }"
-                '';
-
-                # nix progated the *.dev outputs of buildInputs for static
-                # builds, but that is non-sense for an executables only package
-                postFixup =
-                  if isStatic then ''
-                    remove-references-to -t ${p.bash.dev} -t ${p.libsodium.dev} \
-                      $out/nix-support/propagated-build-inputs
-                  '' else "";
-
-                meta = with pkgs.lib; {
-                  inherit (cargoToml.package) description homepage;
-                  license = with licenses; [ mit asl20 ];
-                  maintainers = [ maintainers.wucke13 ];
-                  platforms = platforms.all;
-                };
-              };
+                # tell rust to build everything statically linked
+                CARGO_BUILD_RUSTFLAGS = "-C target-feature=+crt-static";
+              });
             # a function to generate a docker image based of rosenpass
             rosenpassOCI = name: pkgs.dockerTools.buildImage rec {
               inherit name;
@@ -184,14 +246,11 @@
           #
           packages.whitepaper =
             let
-              pkgs = import inputs.nixpkgs-unstable {
-                inherit system;
-              };
               tlsetup = (pkgs.texlive.combine {
                 inherit (pkgs.texlive) scheme-basic acmart amsfonts ccicons
                   csquotes csvsimple doclicense fancyvrb fontspec gobble
                   koma-script ifmtarg latexmk lm markdown mathtools minted noto
-                  nunito pgf soul soulutf8 unicode-math lualatex-math
+                  nunito pgf soul unicode-math lualatex-math paralist
                   gitinfo2 eso-pic biblatex biblatex-trad biblatex-software
                   xkeyval xurl xifthen biber;
               });
@@ -228,7 +287,7 @@
           packages.proof-proverif = pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
             name = "rosenpass-proverif-proof";
             version = "unstable";
-            src = pkgs.lib.sourceByRegex ./. [
+            src = pkgs.lib.sources.sourceByRegex ./. [
               "analyze.sh"
               "marzipan(/marzipan.awk)?"
               "analysis(/.*)?"
@@ -247,9 +306,9 @@
           #
           devShells.default = pkgs.mkShell {
             inherit (packages.proof-proverif) CRYPTOVERIF_LIB;
-            inherit (packages.rosenpass) RUST_MIN_STACK;
             inputsFrom = [ packages.default ];
             nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
+              cmake # override the fakecmake from the main step above
               cargo-release
               clippy
               nodePackages.prettier
@@ -259,7 +318,6 @@
           };
           devShells.coverage = pkgs.mkShell {
             inputsFrom = [ packages.default ];
-            inherit (packages.rosenpass) RUST_MIN_STACK;
             nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [ inputs.fenix.packages.${system}.complete.toolchain cargo-llvm-cov ];
           };
 
@@ -267,7 +325,7 @@
           checks = {
             cargo-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-cargo-fmt"
               { inherit (self.devShells.${system}.default) nativeBuildInputs buildInputs; } ''
-              cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check > $out
+              cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check && touch $out
             '';
             nixpkgs-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-nixpkgs-fmt"
               { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.nixpkgs-fmt ]; } ''

kmac-test-vectors/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[package]
+name = "kmac-test-vectors"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
+
+[dependencies]
+xkcp-sys = "0.0.3"

kmac-test-vectors/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+fn main() {
+}

papers/crossfyre23-submission-abstract.md

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
-template: rosenpass
-title: Running a financially \\& institutionally independent post-quantum cryptography research project conference: CrossFyre 2023 submission abstract
-author:
-- Karolin Varner = Independent Researcher
-abstract: |
-       Rosenpass is a post-quantum-secure key exchange protocol with security against state\\babelhyphen{hard}disruption attacks, whose reference implementation provides post-quantum security to WireGuard deployments. The project's aim is not just to put out a research paper, but to solve the problem of providing a post-quantum VPN top to bottom: from defining a provably secure protocol to educating potential users about how to use it. To achieve this, the project team is composed of an interdisciplinary group of experts in fields inside and outside of cryptography. As such, it is quite different from many purely scientific cryptography projects.
-
-       In this presentation, I would like to share some of the learnings from running the project: how including team-members who are not researchers in the research process led us to better cryptography and how disability inclusion led to a more effective working environment. How feminist organizations shaped our communication style and finally, what funding sources we found to support this project.
-
-       Not all aspects of this project are favorable though; in particular, the extra, unpaid workload needed to coordinate this project has been enormous and the emotional drain from navigating conflicts, uncertain funding, and risk-taking is ever present.
-
-       I still think the community built in the process, the personal growth, the educational benefits and the scientific freedom are well worth the downsides; therefore I would like to exemplify the value in starting collaborations with enthusiastic colleagues from a variety of fields outside cryptographers to the CrossFyre attendees and to encourage other cryptographers to build independent projects for themselves.
-tableofcontents: false
----

papers/graphics/rosenpass-wp-hashing-tree.svg

@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@
                 <g transform="matrix(1,0,0,1,420.66,-1031.32)">
                     <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1431.32,1459.33)">
                     </g>
-                    <text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1207.79px 1224.25px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining init&quot;</text>
+                    <text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1334px 1350.47px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> init&quot;</text>
                 </g>
             </g>
             <g transform="matrix(0.389246,0,0,0.136584,299.374,1166.87)">
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@
             <g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-597.124,-172.692)">
                 <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1492.94,1459.33)">
                 </g>
-                <text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1215.32px 1231.79px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
+                <text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1341.54px 1358px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
             </g>
             <g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-380.054,-779.158)">
                 <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1463.54,1459.33)">

papers/references.bib

@@ -177,22 +177,31 @@
 }
 
 @techreport{mceliece,
-    title = {{C}lassic {M}c{E}liece: conservative code-based cryptography},
+    title = {{C}lassic {M}c{E}liece: conservative code-based cryptography (NIST Round 4 Submission)},
     author = {Martin R. Albrecht and Daniel J. Bernstein and Tung Chou and Carlos Cid and Jan Gilcher and Tanja Lange and Varun Maram and Ingo von Maurich and Rafael Misoczki and Ruben Niederhagen and Kenneth G. Paterson and Edoardo Persichetti and Christiane Peters and Peter Schwabe and Nicolas Sendrier and Jakub Szefer and Cen Jung Tjhai and Martin Tomlinson and Wen Wang},
     year = 2022,
     month = 10,
     day = 23,
     type = {NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 4 Submission},
-    url = {https://classic.mceliece.org/}
+    url = {https://classic.mceliece.org/mceliece-spec-20221023.pdf}
 }
 
 @techreport{kyber,
-    title = {CRYSTALS-Kyber},
+    title = {CRYSTALS-Kyber (NIST Round 3 Submission)},
     author = {Roberto Avanzi and Joppe Bos and Léo Ducas and Eike Kiltz and Tancrède Lepoint and
 Vadim Lyubashevsky and John M. Schanck and Peter Schwabe and Gregor Seiler and Damien Stehlé},
     year = 2020,
     month = 10,
     day = 1,
     type = {NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Selected Algorithm},
-    url = {https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/}
+    url = {https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/data/kyber-submission-nist-round3.zip}
+}
+
+@article{sha3,
+  title={SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash},
+  author={Kelsey, John and Chang, Shu-jen and Perlner, Ray},
+  journal={NIST special publication},
+  volume={800},
+  pages={185},
+  year={2016}
 }

papers/rwpqc23-slides-content.tex

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-% 
-
-\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
-	  Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
-	}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs
-  \item Contribution: State Disruption Attacks \& cookies as a defense
-  \item Contribution: Symbolic analysis of the Rosenpass protocol
-  \item Contribution: Noise-like specification
-  \item Contribution: New hashing \& domain separation scheme
-  \item Contribution: Reference implementation – Securing WireGuard in practice
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Post-quantum WireGuard: Three encapsulations}
-\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
-\begin{columns}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	  \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
-
-
-		\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
-		\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
-		\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Responder Auth
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
-
-	  \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
-
-	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Initiator Auth
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Forward secrecy
-\end{column}
-
-\end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
-
-\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
-	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
-	  \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-
-  Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send \enquote{(ack)}.
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{The Rosenpass protocol}
-  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 – DOS against WireGuard through NTP}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
-  \item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
-  \item This generates a kill packet that abuses replay protection and renders the initiator's key-pair useless
-  \item Attack is possible in the real world!
-  \item Similar attack in post-quantum WireGuard is worse since InitHello is unauthenticated
-  \item Solution: Biscuits
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Security analysis of rosenpass}
-  \begin{itemize}
-	\item CryptoVerif in progress
-	\item Symbolic analysis using ProVerif
-  \item Code is part of the software repository \& build system
-  \item Symbolic analysis is fast (about five minutes), runs in parallel and is
-  \end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Proverif in technicolor}
-  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-symbolic-analysis-screenshot.png}
-\end{frame}
-
-
-\begin{frame}{Noise-like specification (easier for engineers)}
-  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-handling-code.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{New Hashing/Domain separation scheme}
-  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-hashing-tree.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Reference implementation in rust, deploying post-quantum-secure WireGuard}
-  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-rg-tutorial-screenshot.png}
-\end{frame}

papers/rwpqc23-slides.tex

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
-\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
-%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
-
-\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
-  {metropolis}
-\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
-
-\usepackage{verbatim}
-
-% strikethrough
-% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
-\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
-
-% bold math
-\usepackage{bm}
-
-\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
-\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
-\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
-\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
-%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
-\sethlcolor{lightblue}
-
-\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
-
-\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
-\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
-
-
-\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
-\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
-\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
-\tikzset{
-	>=Latex[round]
-}
-
-\urlstyle{same}
-
-% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
-\makeatletter
-\newcommand\SoulColor{%
-  \let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
-  \let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
-  \makeatother
-  \SoulColor
-
-\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
-\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
-\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
-
-\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
-% `title separator` is the one on the title page
-% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
-\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
-
-\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
-
-\usepackage{booktabs}
-\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
-\usepackage{fontawesome}
-
-\usepackage{pgfplots}
-\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
-
-%% tikzit
-%\usepackage{tikzit}
-%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
-%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
-%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
-%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
-
-\usepackage{xspace}
-\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
-
-
-\usepackage{stackengine}
-\usepackage{amsmath}
-\usepackage{amsfonts}
-\usepackage{amssymb}
-\usepackage{amsthm}
-\usepackage{tikz}
-\usepackage{xcolor}
-\usepackage{environ}
-\usepackage{array}
-\usepackage[
-  n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
-  probability,
-  notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
-  %keys
-  ]{cryptocode}
-\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
-
-
-\usepackage{mathtools}
-\usepackage{comment}
-\excludecomment{commentEnv}
-\usepackage{array}
-\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
-
-
-\def\makeuppercase#1{
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
-}
-
-
-
-
-\def\makelowercase#1{
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
-}
-
-\newcounter{char}
-\setcounter{char}{1}
-
-\loop
-	\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
-	\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
-	\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
-	\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
-	\stepcounter{char}
-	\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
-\repeat
-
-
-\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
-\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
-\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
-\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
-\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
-
-
-%\usepackage{pgfpages}
-%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right} 
-
-\usepackage{multicol}
-\usepackage{qrcode}
-
-
-
-%% msc message diagrams
-%\usepackage{msc5}
-%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
-%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
-%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
-
-
-\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
-% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
-\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
-\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
-\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
-\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
-%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
-%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
-
-
-\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
-\begin{frame}{#1}
-  \vfill
-  \begin{center}
-    \includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
-  \end{center}
-  \vfill
-\end{frame}
-}
-
-\usepackage{listings}
-\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
-{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
-event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
-if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
-param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
-table, time, type},
-otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
-sensitive=true,
-morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
-morestring=[b]",
-}
-\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
-{morekeywords={},
-otherkeywords={},
-sensitive=true,
-morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
-morestring=[b]",
-}
-\lstset{
-  language=cvoutput,
-  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
-  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
-  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
-}
-\lstset{
-  language=cryptoverif,
-  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
-  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
-  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
-}
-
-\usepackage{bbding}
-\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
-\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
-
-\title{%
-  Rosenpass
-}
-\subtitle{%
-  Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
-}
-\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
-\institute{RWPQC23 | \url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
-\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
-
-\usepackage[autostyle]{csquotes}
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle
-
-\input{rwpqc23-slides-content}
-
-\end{document}

papers/whitepaper.md

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ abstract: |
 Rosenpass inherits most security properties from Post-Quantum WireGuard (PQWG). The security properties mentioned here are covered by the symbolic analysis in the Rosenpass repository. 
 
 ## Secrecy
+
 Three key encapsulations using the keypairs `sski`/`spki`, `sskr`/`spkr`, and `eski`/`epki` provide secrecy (see Section \ref{variables} for an introduction of the variables). Their respective ciphertexts are called `scti`, `sctr`, and `ectr` and the resulting keys are called `spti`, `sptr`, `epti`. A single secure encapsulation is sufficient to provide secrecy. We use two different KEMs (Key Encapsulation Mechanisms; see section \ref{skem}): Kyber and Classic McEliece.
 
 ## Authenticity
@@ -60,12 +61,22 @@ Note that while Rosenpass is secure against state disruption, using it does not
 
 ## Cryptographic Building Blocks
 
-All symmetric keys and hash values used in Rosenpass are 32 bytes long.
+The following cryptographic building blocks are used:
 
+| Use   | Scheme | Version | Purpose |
+| ---   | --- | --- | --- |
+| hash  | KMAC[@sha3] | | SHA-3/Keccak based message authentication code | 
+| AEAD  | ChaCha20-Poly1305[@rfc_chachapoly] | | Encryption with sequential nonce |
+| XAEAD | XChaCha20-Poly1305[@draft_xchachapoly] | | Encryption with random nonce |
+| SKEM  | Classic McEliece 460896[@mceliece] | NIST Round 4 Submission | Key encapsulation with static keys | 
+| EKEM  | Kyber-512[@kyber] | NIST Round 3 Submission (most recent) | Key encapsulation with ephemeral (random) keys |
+
+All symmetric keys and hash values used in Rosenpass are 32 bytes long.
 
 ### Hash
 
-A keyed hash function with one 32-byte input, one variable-size input, and one 32-byte output. As keyed hash function we use the HMAC construction [@rfc_hmac] with BLAKE2s [@rfc_blake2] as the inner hash function.
+A keyed hash function with one 32-byte input, one variable-size input, and one 32-byte output. As keyed hash function we use the KMAC[@sha3] with no (i.e. an empty) customization string.
+
 
 ```pseudorust
 hash(key, data) -> key
@@ -73,7 +84,7 @@ hash(key, data) -> key
 
 ### AEAD
 
-Authenticated encryption with additional data for use with sequential nonces. We use ChaCha20Poly1305 [@rfc_chachapoly] in the implementation.
+Authenticated encryption with additional data for use with sequential nonces. We use ChaCha20-Poly1305 [@rfc_chachapoly] in the implementation.
 
 ```pseudorust
 AEAD::enc(key, nonce, plaintext, additional_data) -> ciphertext
@@ -82,7 +93,7 @@ AEAD::dec(key, nonce, ciphertext, additional_data) -> plaintext
 
 ### XAEAD
 
-Authenticated encryption with additional data for use with random nonces. We use XChaCha20Poly1305 [@draft_xchachapoly] in the implementation, a construction also used by WireGuard.
+Authenticated encryption with additional data for use with random nonces. We use XChaCha20-Poly1305 [@draft_xchachapoly] in the implementation, a construction also used by WireGuard.
 
 
 ```pseudorust
@@ -92,7 +103,7 @@ XAEAD::dec(key, nonce, ciphertext, additional_data) -> plaintext
 
 ### SKEM {#skem}
 
-“Key Encapsulation Mechanism” (KEM) is the name of an interface widely used in post-quantum-secure protocols. KEMs can be seen as asymmetric encryption specifically for symmetric keys. Rosenpass uses two different KEMs. SKEM is the key encapsulation mechanism used with the static keypairs in Rosenpass. The public keys of these keypairs are not transmitted over the wire during the protocol. We use Classic McEliece 460896 [@mceliece] which claims to be as hard to break as 192-bit AES. As one of the oldest post-quantum-secure KEMs, it enjoys wide trust among cryptographers, but it has not been chosen for standardization by NIST. Its ciphertexts and private keys are small (188 bytes and 13568 bytes), and its public keys are large (524160 bytes). This fits our use case: public keys are exchanged out-of-band, and only the small ciphertexts have to be transmitted during the handshake.
+“Key Encapsulation Mechanism” (KEM) is the name of an interface widely used in post-quantum-secure protocols. KEMs can be seen as asymmetric encryption specifically for symmetric keys. Rosenpass uses two different KEMs. SKEM is the key encapsulation mechanism used with the static keypairs in Rosenpass. The public keys of these keypairs are not transmitted over the wire during the protocol. We use Classic McEliece 460896 (NIST Round 4 Submission; [@mceliece] which claims to be as hard to break as 192-bit AES. As one of the oldest post-quantum-secure KEMs, it enjoys wide trust among cryptographers, but it has not been chosen for standardization by NIST. Its ciphertexts and private keys are small (188 bytes and 13568 bytes), and its public keys are large (524160 bytes). This fits our use case: public keys are exchanged out-of-band, and only the small ciphertexts have to be transmitted during the handshake.
 
 ```pseudorust
 SKEM::enc(public_key) -> (ciphertext, shared_key)
@@ -101,7 +112,7 @@ SKEM::dec(secret_key, ciphertext) -> shared_key
 
 ### EKEM
 
-Key encapsulation mechanism used with the ephemeral KEM keypairs in Rosenpass. The public keys of these keypairs need to be transmitted over the wire during the protocol. We use Kyber-512 [@kyber], which has been selected in the NIST post-quantum cryptography competition and claims to be as hard to break as 128-bit AES. Its ciphertexts, public keys, and private keys are 768, 800, and 1632 bytes long, respectively, providing a good balance for our use case as both a public key and a ciphertext have to be transmitted during the handshake.
+Key encapsulation mechanism used with the ephemeral KEM keypairs in Rosenpass. The public keys of these keypairs need to be transmitted over the wire during the protocol. We use Kyber-512 [@kyber] (NIST Round 3 Submission), which has been selected in the NIST post-quantum cryptography competition and claims to be as hard to break as 128-bit AES. Its ciphertexts, public keys, and private keys are 768, 800, and 1632 bytes long, respectively, providing a good balance for our use case as both a public key and a ciphertext have to be transmitted during the handshake.
 
 ```pseudorust
 EKEM::enc(public_key) -> (ciphertext, shared_key)
@@ -208,6 +219,30 @@ hs_enc = hash(hash(hash(0, PROTOCOL), "chaining key extract"), "handshake encryp
        = lhash("chaining key extract", "handshake encryption")
 ```
 
+## Protocol roles
+
+There are two handshake roles:
+
+- The initiator
+- The responder
+
+The initiator acts as a stateful client, directing the handshake process. The responder acts as a stateless server reacting to the initiator's messages while keeping no local state until the handshake is complete. Instead, the responder pushes their variables into an encrypted session cookie.
+
+The number of concurrent responder-role handshakes with another client is unlimited to account for the possibility of an imposter trying to execute a handshake: Before completion of said handshake, there is no way to figure out which peer is an imposter and which peer is a legitimate client; any attempt to do so might lead to to a state-disruption attack -- denial of service on the protocol level.
+
+There is no mechanism to negotiate which of the peers acts as initiator and responder, instead two parties may be processing separate handshakes in client role and in responder role at the same time.
+
+Implementations must account for this possibility by aborting any ongoing initiator-role handshake upon accepting an InitConf package. Implementations should also use different back-off periods depending on whether the handshake was completed in initiator role or in responder role. The following values are used in the rust reference implementation:
+
+- Initiator rekey interval: 130s
+- Responder rekey interval: 120s
+
+In practice these delays cause participants to take turns acting as initiator and acting as responder since the ten seconds difference is usually enough for the handshake with switched roles to complete before the old initiator's rekey timer goes to zero.
+
+## Endianess
+
+All numeric values are in little-endian format unless otherwise noted.
+
 ## Server State
 
 ### Global
@@ -222,7 +257,7 @@ The server needs to store the following variables:
 Not mandated per se, but required in practice:
 
 * `peers` – A lookup table mapping the peer ID to the internal peer structure
-* `index` – A lookup table mapping the session ID to the ongoing initiator handshake or live session
+* `sessions` – A lookup table mapping the session ID to the ongoing initiator handshake or live session
 
 ### Peer
 
@@ -252,7 +287,7 @@ The responder stores no state. While the responder has access to all of the abov
 
 The biscuit is encrypted with the `XAEAD` primitive and a randomly chosen nonce. The values `sidi` and `sidr` are transmitted publicly as part of InitConf, so they do not need to be present in the biscuit, but they are added to the biscuit's additional data to make sure the correct values are transmitted as part of InitConf.
 
-The `biscuit_key` used to encrypt biscuits should be rotated every two minutes. Implementations should keep two biscuit keys in memory at any given time to avoid having to drop packages when `biscuit_key` is rotated.
+The `biscuit_key` used to encrypt biscuits should be rotated frequently. The reference implementation uses a rotation interval of five minutes. Implementations should keep two biscuit keys in memory at any given time to avoid having to drop packages when `biscuit_key` is rotated.
 
 ### Live Session State
 
@@ -382,7 +417,7 @@ fn load_biscuit(nct) {
     let pt : Biscuit = XAEAD::dec(k, n, ct, ad);
     // Find the peer and apply retransmission protection
     lookup_peer(pt.peerid);
-    assert(pt.biscuit_no <= peer.biscuit_used);
+    assert(pt.biscuit_no >= peer.biscuit_used);
 
     // Restore the chaining key
     ck ← pt.ck;
@@ -434,8 +469,77 @@ The initiator deals with packet loss by storing the messages it sends to the res
 
 The responder does not need to do anything special to handle RespHello retransmission – if the RespHello package is lost, the initiator retransmits InitHello and the responder can generate another RespHello package from that. InitConf retransmission needs to be handled specifically in the responder code because accepting an InitConf retransmission would reset the live session including the nonce counter, which would cause nonce reuse. Implementations must detect the case that `biscuit_no = biscuit_used` in ICR5, skip execution of ICR6 and ICR7, and just transmit another EmptyData package to confirm that the initiator can stop transmitting InitConf.
 
-\printbibliography
+## Timers
+
+The Rosenpass protocol uses various timer-triggered events during its operation. This section provides a listing of the timers used and gives the values used in the reference implementation. Other implementations may choose different values.
+
+### Rekeying
+
+Period after which the previous responder starts a new handshake in initiator role; period after which the previous initiator starts a new handshake in initiator role again; period after which a peer rejects an existing shared key.
+
+```pseudorust
+REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER = 120s
+REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR = 130s
+REJECT_AFTER_TIME = 180s
+```
+
+### Biscuits
+
+Period after which the biscuit key is rotated.
+
+```pseudorust
+BISCUIT_EPOCH = 300s
+```
+
+### Retransmission
+
+Delay after which all retransmission attempts are aborted; exponential backoff factor for retransmission delay; initial (minimum) retransmission delay; final (maximum) retransmission delay; retransmission jitter/variance factor.
+
+```pseudorust
+RETRANSMIT_ABORT        = 120s
+RETRANSMIT_DELAY_GROWTH = 2
+RETRANSMIT_DELAY_BEGIN  = 500ms
+RETRANSMIT_DELAY_END    = 10s
+RETRANSMIT_DELAY_JITTER = 0.5
+```
 
 \setupimage{landscape,fullpage,label=img:HandlingCode}
 ![Rosenpass Message Handling Code](graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-handling-code-rgb.svg)
 
+\printbibliography
+
+# Version history
+
+## Protocol version 2 -- XXXX-XX-XX
+
+During the implementation of go-rosenpass, Steffen Vogel found a number of problems ([issue #68](https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/68)) with the whitepaper. Version two of the document primarily addresses these issues:
+
+### Features
+
+- Use NIST Round 4 Submission of Classic McEliece
+
+### Security issues
+
+- Explicitly erase `eski` (forward secrecy). This is a minor security fix: Before this change the specification left erasing the secret key to the implementation. The reference implementation did erase `eski` but only after receiving the responder confirmation package (EmptyData at the time) instructing the initiator to stop retransmission of the InitConf package. With this change, `eski` is erased before transmission of the InitConf package.
+
+### Bug fixes
+
+- Handle race conditions when both peers complete concurrent handshakes in switched roles. Backwards compatible. Initially addressed in [397a776](https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/commit/397a776c55b1feae1e8e5aceef01cf06bf56b6ed) "fix: Race condition due to concurrent handshake".
+
+### Clarifications
+
+- Add detailed information about when in the handshake process security properties are achieved.
+- Extra section with a list of timers used.
+- Rename the session id/session lookup table from `index` to `sessions`
+- Indicate which version of Classic McEliece and Kyber is used
+- Add a chart with the cryptographic building blocks used
+
+### Mistakes/Inconsistencies
+
+- Old `ct1` name was used for `sctr` (the static responder KEM ciphertext)
+- Biscuit number was asserted to be smaller or equal to the peer's biscuit used variable, where it should have been bigger or equal to
+- Fix a typo "key chaining extract" -> "chaining key extract"; "key chaining init" -> "chaining key init"
+
+## Protocol version 1 -- 2023-03-04
+
+Initial release.

papers/yrcs-talk-content.tex

@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item Problem statement: Post-quantum WireGuard % 4m
-  \item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
-	  Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
-	}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs % 8m
-  \item Attack we found: State Disruption Attacks %12m
-  \item Real-World Concerns % 3m
-  \item Biscuits as a defense against State Disruption Attacks
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{What needs to be done to deploy Post-Quantum WireGuard}
-\begin{itemize}
-	\item Updating the WireGuard protocol to support post-quantum security
-	\item Updating the (post quantum) WireGuard protocol to be secure against state disruption attacks
-	\item Reference implementation of the Rosenpass protocol in Rust
-	\item A way to create hybrid post-quantum secure WireGuard VPNs
-	\item Stand-alone key exchange app
-	\item A Sci-Comm project teaching people about post-quantum security
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{WireGuard\footnote{Jason A. Donenfeld. “WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel”. In: 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017, San Diego, California, USA, February 26 - March 1, 2017. Whitepaper: https: //www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf.}}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item VPN protocol in the linux kernel
-  \item Based on Noise IKpsk1 from the Noise Protocol Framework\footnote{Trevor Perrin. The Noise Protocol Framework. 2016. url: http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf}
-  \item Small, fast, open source crypto
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{WireGuard/Noise IKpsk security properties}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \itemtick Session-key secrecy
-  \itemtick Forward-secrecy
-  \itemtick Mutual authentication
-  \itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
-  \itemtick Identity Hiding
-  \itemtick (DoS Mitigation – First packet is authenticated\footnote{Based on the unrealistic assumption of a monotonic counter – We found a practical attack})
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Security of Rosenpass}
-\begin{columns}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-WireGuard
-\begin{itemize}
-  \itemtick Session-key secrecy
-  \itemtick Forward-secrecy
-  \itemtick Mutual authentication
-  \itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
-  \itemtick Identity Hiding
-  \itemtick (DoS Mitigation)
-\end{itemize}
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-Post-Quantum WireGuard
-\begin{itemize}
-  \itemfail Identity Hiding \footnote{Based on a Identity Hiding/ANON-CCA security of McEliece; unclear whether that holds.}
-  \itemfail DoS Mitigation \footnote{PQWG provides DoS mitigation under the assumption of a secret PSK, which quite frankly is cheating.}
-\end{itemize}
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-Rosenpass
-\begin{itemize}
-  \itemtick DoS Mitigation
-  \itemtick Hybrid Post-Quantum security\footnote{In deployments using WireGuard + Rosenpass; Rosenpass on its own provides post-quantum security.}
-\end{itemize}
-\end{column}
-
-\end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Building post-quantum WireGuard: NIKE vs KEM}
-
-
-  NIKE:
-
-$(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_1) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
-$(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_2) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
-$\texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_2) = \texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_1)$
-
-  KEM:
-
-$(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{pk}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.KeyGen}$ \\
-$(\texttt{shk}, \texttt{ct}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.Encaps}(\texttt{pk})$ \\
-$\texttt{shk} = \texttt{KEM.Decaps}(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{ct})$
-
-\end{frame}
-
-
-
-\begin{frame}{Minimal key exchange using KEMs}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
-	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](pk-y) coordinate[pos=.6](ct-y)coordinate[pos=.8](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	\draw[<-](pk-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{pk} (pk-y-|responder);
-	\draw[->](ct-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {ct} (ct-y-|responder);
-	\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Three encapsulations: Achieving mutual authentication \& forward secrecy}
-\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
-\begin{columns}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	  \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
-
-
-		\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
-		\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
-		\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Responder Auth
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
-
-	  \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
-
-	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Initiator Auth
-\end{column}
-
-\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
-\begin{tikzpicture}
-	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
-		coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
-		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-Forward secrecy
-\end{column}
-
-\end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
-
-\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
-	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
-	coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
-	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
-
-	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
-	 \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
-	  \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
-
-\end{tikzpicture}
-
-  Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send `(ack)`.
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
-  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
-  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item Use the fact that the initiator is not authenticated until their last message
-  \item Send faux initiations, overwriting – and thus erasing – the responder's handshake state
-  \item Erasing the state aborts protocol execution
-  \item PQWG argues: The first package is authenticated using the PSK, therefor sending faux initiations works
-  \item Attacker could replay a legitimate message, but…
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks on authenticated initial package}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item In Classic WireGuard the initial message (InitHello) is authenticated through static-static Diffie-Hellman
-  \item Replay protection uses monotonic counter
-  \item WireGuard stores the time of the last initiator $t_i$
-  \item When WireGuard receives legitimate initiaton with timestamp $t$, it stores that time $t_i \leftarrow t$a
-  \item All InitHello messages with a stale timestamp ($t \le t_i$) get rejected
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 – Attacking WireGuard through NTP}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
-  \item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
-  \item This generates a kill packet that can be used to render WireGuard keys useless
-  \item Attack is possible in the real world!
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{State disruption in Post-Quantum WireGuard}
-\begin{itemize}
-  \item This mechanism needs an authenticated InitHello message
-  \item Post-Quantum WireGuard relies on the $\texttt{psk}$ to provide InitHello authentication
-  \item PQWG sets $\texttt{psk} = H(\texttt{spki} \oplus \texttt{spkr})$ to achieve a secret psk.a
-  \item Relying on private public keys is absurd
-  \item[$\Rightarrow$] With InitHello effectively unauthenticated, attacker can just generate their own kill packet
-\end{itemize}
-  Solution: Store the responder state in a biscuit (cookie), so there is no state to override.
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the protocol flow}
-  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the messages}
-  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Biscuits}
-  \begin{itemize}
-	\item Assumptions such as a monotonic counter are perilous in the real world
-	\item Giving the adversary access to state is dangerous
-	\item In noise protocols the handshake state is very small (32-64 bytes)
-	\item Sending the state to the protocol peer is a viable course of action!
-	\item Formalization of State Disruption Attacks covers many attacks of this style
-  \end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Security proof of rosenpass}
-  \begin{itemize}
-	\item CryptoVerif in progress (Benjamin Lipp)
-	\item Really fast symbolic analysis using ProVerif
-  \end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Deployment}
-  \begin{itemize}
-	\item Rust implementation in userspace
-	\item Integrates with WireGuard through the PSK feature to provide Hybrid security
-  \end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}{Final statements}
-  \begin{itemize}
-	\item Post-quantum crypto can be deployed now
-	\item There are real complexities in protocol design
-	\item DoS-Resistance needs formalization work
-	\item Availability needs love and attention from cryptographers
-	\item Try it out! \url{https://rosenpass.eu/}
-  \end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-%* Problem introduction
-%    * Post-quantum-secure authenticated key exchange
-%    * Interactive key exchange
-%    * No DH
-%    * But with KEMs
-%        * KEM is non interactive
-%        * Gives you secrecy
-%        * One-sided auth
-%* PQWG
-%    * Doing one key encapsulation in both directions
-%    * Adding an ephemeral one for forward secrecy
-%* State interruption attack
-%    * Assumption of monotonic counter is not realistic/broken/…
-%    * static keys become essentially useless
-%    * Leads to state disruption
-%    * Case: WG ohne replay protection (motivation for monotonic counter)
-%    * Case: WG mit replay protection
-%* Biscuits
-%    * No state
-%    * Provably avoids state disruption
-%    * State machine WG/PQWG: ini
-%*

papers/yrcs-talk.tex

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
-\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
-%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
-
-\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
-  {metropolis}
-\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
-
-\usepackage{verbatim}
-
-% strikethrough
-% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
-\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
-
-% bold math
-\usepackage{bm}
-
-\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
-\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
-\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
-\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
-%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
-\sethlcolor{lightblue}
-
-\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
-\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
-
-\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
-\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
-
-
-\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
-\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
-\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
-\tikzset{
-	>=Latex[round]
-}
-
-\urlstyle{same}
-
-% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
-\makeatletter
-\newcommand\SoulColor{%
-  \let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
-  \let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
-  \makeatother
-  \SoulColor
-
-\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
-\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
-\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
-\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
-
-\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
-% `title separator` is the one on the title page
-% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
-\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
-
-\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
-
-\usepackage{booktabs}
-\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
-\usepackage{fontawesome}
-
-\usepackage{pgfplots}
-\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
-
-%% tikzit
-%\usepackage{tikzit}
-%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
-%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
-%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
-%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
-
-\usepackage{xspace}
-\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
-
-
-\usepackage{stackengine}
-\usepackage{amsmath}
-\usepackage{amsfonts}
-\usepackage{amssymb}
-\usepackage{amsthm}
-\usepackage{tikz}
-\usepackage{xcolor}
-\usepackage{environ}
-\usepackage{array}
-\usepackage[
-  n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
-  probability,
-  notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
-  %keys
-  ]{cryptocode}
-\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
-
-
-\usepackage{mathtools}
-\usepackage{comment}
-\excludecomment{commentEnv}
-\usepackage{array}
-\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
-
-
-\def\makeuppercase#1{
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
-}
-
-
-
-
-\def\makelowercase#1{
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
-\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
-}
-
-\newcounter{char}
-\setcounter{char}{1}
-
-\loop
-	\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
-	\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
-	\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
-	\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
-	\stepcounter{char}
-	\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
-\repeat
-
-
-\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
-\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
-\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
-\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
-\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
-
-
-%\usepackage{pgfpages}
-%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right} 
-
-\usepackage{multicol}
-\usepackage{qrcode}
-
-
-
-%% msc message diagrams
-%\usepackage{msc5}
-%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
-%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
-%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
-
-
-\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
-% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
-\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
-\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
-\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
-\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
-%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
-%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
-
-
-\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
-\begin{frame}{#1}
-  \vfill
-  \begin{center}
-    \includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
-  \end{center}
-  \vfill
-\end{frame}
-}
-
-\usepackage{listings}
-\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
-{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
-event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
-if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
-param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
-table, time, type},
-otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
-sensitive=true,
-morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
-morestring=[b]",
-}
-\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
-{morekeywords={},
-otherkeywords={},
-sensitive=true,
-morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
-morestring=[b]",
-}
-\lstset{
-  language=cvoutput,
-  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
-  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
-  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
-}
-\lstset{
-  language=cryptoverif,
-  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
-  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
-  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
-}
-
-\usepackage{bbding}
-\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
-\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
-
-\title{%
-  Rosenpass
-}
-\subtitle{%
-  Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
-}
-\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
-\institute{\url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
-\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
-
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle
-
-\input{yrcs-talk-content}
-
-\end{document}

readme.md

@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ This repository contains
 
 ## Getting started
 
-First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help funtions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
+First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help functions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
 
 ```sh
 rp help
 rosenpass help
 ```
 
-Follow [quickstart instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
+Follow [quick start instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
 
 ## Software architecture
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ We are working on a cryptographic proof of security, but we already provide a sy
 (manual) $ ./analyze.sh
 ```
 
-The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some metaprogramming to avoid repetition.
+The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some meta programming to avoid repetition.
 The code uses a variety of optimizations to speed up analysis such as using secret functions to model trusted/malicious setup. We split the model into two separate entry points which can be analyzed in parallel. Each is much faster than both models combined.
 A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expected in color: A red cross if a query fails and a green check if it succeeds.
 
@@ -62,15 +62,22 @@ A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expect
 [^libsodium]: https://doc.libsodium.org/
 [^wg]: https://www.wireguard.com/
 [^pqwg]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
-[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeates the purpose of a key exchange protocol
+[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeats the purpose of a key exchange protocol
 [^wg-statedis]: https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2021-August/006916.htmlA
 
 # Getting Rosenpass
 
-Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distros, maybe also for the distro of your choice?
+Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distributions, maybe also for the distribution of your choice?
 
 [![Packaging status](https://repology.org/badge/vertical-allrepos/rosenpass.svg)](https://repology.org/project/rosenpass/versions)
 
+# Mirrors
+
+Don't want to use GitHub or only have an IPv6 connection? Rosenpass has set up two mirrors for this:
+
+- [NotABug](https://notabug.org/rosenpass/rosenpass)
+- [GitLab](https://gitlab.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/)
+
 # Supported by
 
 Funded through <a href="https://nlnet.nl/">NLNet</a> with financial support for the European Commission's <a href="https://nlnet.nl/assure">NGI Assure</a> program.

rosenpass/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+[package]
+name = "rosenpass"
+version = "0.2.0"
+authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+description = "Build post-quantum-secure VPNs with WireGuard!"
+homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
+repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
+readme = "readme.md"
+
+[[bench]]
+name = "handshake"
+harness = false
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow = { version = "1.0.71", features = ["backtrace"] }
+base64 = "0.21.1"
+static_assertions = "1.1.0"
+memoffset = "0.9.0"
+libsodium-sys-stable = { version = "1.19.28", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
+oqs-sys = { git = "https://github.com/koraa/liboqs-rust.git", branch = "main", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber'] }
+lazy_static = "1.4.0"
+thiserror = "1.0.40"
+paste = "1.0.12"
+log = { version = "0.4.17", optional = true }
+env_logger = { version = "0.10.0", optional = true }
+serde = { version = "1.0.163", features = ["derive"] }
+toml = "0.7.4"
+clap = { version = "4.3.0", features = ["derive"] }
+mio = { version = "0.8.6", features = ["net", "os-poll"] }
+sha3 = "0.10.8"
+num-traits = "0.2.17"
+digest = "0.10.7"
+
+[build-dependencies]
+anyhow = "1.0.71"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+criterion = "0.4.0"
+test_bin = "0.4.0"
+stacker = "0.1.15"
+
+[features]
+default = ["log", "env_logger"]

rosenpass/benches/handshake.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
+use rosenpass::pqkem::KEM;
 use rosenpass::{
-    pqkem::{EphemeralKEM, CCAKEM},
-    protocol::{CcaPk, CcaSk, CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SymKey},
+    pqkem::StaticKEM,
+    protocol::{CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey},
     sodium::sodium_init,
 };
 
@@ -38,9 +39,9 @@ fn hs(ini: &mut CryptoServer, res: &mut CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-fn keygen() -> Result<(CcaSk, CcaPk)> {
-    let (mut sk, mut pk) = (CcaSk::zero(), CcaPk::zero());
-    CCAKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
+fn keygen() -> Result<(SSk, SPk)> {
+    let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
+    StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
     Ok((sk, pk))
 }
 
@@ -61,12 +62,12 @@ fn criterion_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
     let (mut a, mut b) = make_server_pair().unwrap();
     c.bench_function("cca_secret_alloc", |bench| {
         bench.iter(|| {
-            CcaSk::zero();
+            SSk::zero();
         })
     });
     c.bench_function("cca_public_alloc", |bench| {
         bench.iter(|| {
-            CcaPk::zero();
+            SPk::zero();
         })
     });
     c.bench_function("keygen", |bench| {

rosenpass/build.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+use anyhow::bail;
+use anyhow::Result;
+use std::env;
+use std::fs::File;
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::process::Command;
+
+/// Invokes a troff compiler to compile a manual page
+fn render_man(compiler: &str, man: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let out = Command::new(compiler).args(["-Tascii", man]).output()?;
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        bail!("{} returned an error", compiler);
+    }
+
+    Ok(String::from_utf8(out.stdout)?)
+}
+
+/// Generates the manual page
+fn generate_man() -> String {
+    // This function is purposely stupid and redundant
+
+    let man = render_man("mandoc", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
+    if let Ok(man) = man {
+        return man;
+    }
+
+    let man = render_man("groff", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
+    if let Ok(man) = man {
+        return man;
+    }
+
+    // TODO: Link to online manual here
+    "Cannot render manual page\n".into()
+}
+
+fn man() {
+    let out_dir = PathBuf::from(env::var("OUT_DIR").unwrap());
+    let man = generate_man();
+    let path = out_dir.join("rosenpass.1.ascii");
+
+    let mut file = File::create(&path).unwrap();
+    file.write_all(man.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+
+    println!("cargo:rustc-env=ROSENPASS_MAN={}", path.display());
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    // For now, rerun the build script on every time, as the build script
+    // is not very expensive right now.
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=./");
+    man();
+}

rosenpass/src/app_server.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+use anyhow::bail;
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use log::{debug, error, info, warn};
+use mio::Interest;
+use mio::Token;
+
+use std::cell::Cell;
+use std::io::Write;
+
+use std::io::ErrorKind;
+use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
+use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::net::SocketAddrV4;
+use std::net::SocketAddrV6;
+use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::process::Command;
+use std::process::Stdio;
+use std::slice;
+use std::thread;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use crate::util::fopen_w;
+use crate::{
+    config::Verbosity,
+    protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
+    util::{b64_writer, fmt_b64},
+};
+
+const IPV4_ANY_ADDR: Ipv4Addr = Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0);
+const IPV6_ANY_ADDR: Ipv6Addr = Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+fn ipv4_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
+    // addr, port
+    SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(IPV4_ANY_ADDR, 0))
+}
+
+fn ipv6_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
+    // addr, port, flowinfo, scope_id
+    SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(IPV6_ANY_ADDR, 0, 0, 0))
+}
+
+#[derive(Default, Debug)]
+pub struct AppPeer {
+    pub outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
+    pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>, // TODO make this a generic command
+    pub initial_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
+    pub current_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
+}
+
+impl AppPeer {
+    pub fn endpoint(&self) -> Option<&Endpoint> {
+        self.current_endpoint
+            .as_ref()
+            .or(self.initial_endpoint.as_ref())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Default, Debug)]
+pub struct WireguardOut {
+    // impl KeyOutput
+    pub dev: String,
+    pub pk: String,
+    pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
+///
+/// Responsible for file IO, network IO
+// TODO add user control via unix domain socket and stdin/stdout
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct AppServer {
+    pub crypt: CryptoServer,
+    pub sockets: Vec<mio::net::UdpSocket>,
+    pub events: mio::Events,
+    pub mio_poll: mio::Poll,
+    pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
+    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
+    pub all_sockets_drained: bool,
+}
+
+/// A socket pointer is an index assigned to a socket;
+/// right now the index is just the sockets index in AppServer::sockets.
+///
+/// Holding this as a reference instead of an &mut UdpSocket is useful
+/// to deal with the borrow checker, because otherwise we could not refer
+/// to a socket and another member of AppServer at the same time.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct SocketPtr(pub usize);
+
+impl SocketPtr {
+    pub fn get<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a mio::net::UdpSocket {
+        &srv.sockets[self.0]
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut mio::net::UdpSocket {
+        &mut srv.sockets[self.0]
+    }
+
+    pub fn send_to(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8], addr: SocketAddr) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        self.get(srv).send_to(buf, addr)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Index based pointer to a Peer
+#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
+pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
+
+impl AppPeerPtr {
+    /// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
+    pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
+        Self(p.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
+    pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
+        PeerPtr(self.0)
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
+        &srv.peers[self.0]
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
+        &mut srv.peers[self.0]
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum AppPollResult {
+    DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
+    SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
+    SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
+    ReceivedMessage(usize, Endpoint),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum KeyOutputReason {
+    Exchanged,
+    Stale,
+}
+
+/// Represents a communication partner rosenpass may be sending packets to
+///
+/// Generally at the start of Rosenpass either no address or a Hostname is known;
+/// later when we actually start to receive RespHello packages, we know the specific Address
+/// and socket to use with a peer
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum Endpoint {
+    /// Rosenpass supports multiple sockets, so we include the information
+    /// which socket an address can be reached on. This probably does not
+    /// make much of a difference in most setups where two sockets are just
+    /// used to enable dual stack operation; it does make a difference in
+    /// more complex use cases.
+    ///
+    /// For instance it enables using multiple interfaces with overlapping
+    /// ip spaces, such as listening on a private IP network and a public IP
+    /// at the same time. It also would reply on the same port RespHello was
+    /// sent to when listening on multiple ports on the same interface. This
+    /// may be required for some arcane firewall setups.
+    SocketBoundAddress {
+        /// The socket the address can be reached under; this is generally
+        /// determined when we actually receive an RespHello message
+        socket: SocketPtr,
+        /// Just the address
+        addr: SocketAddr,
+    },
+    // A host name or IP address; storing the hostname here instead of an
+    // ip address makes sure that we look up the host name whenever we try
+    // to make a connection; this may be beneficial in some setups where a host-name
+    // at first can not be resolved but becomes resolvable later.
+    Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint),
+}
+
+impl Endpoint {
+    /// Start discovery from some addresses
+    pub fn discovery_from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
+        Endpoint::Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::from_addresses(addresses))
+    }
+
+    /// Start endpoint discovery from a hostname
+    pub fn discovery_from_hostname(hostname: String) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        let host = HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::lookup(hostname)?;
+        Ok(Endpoint::Discovery(host))
+    }
+
+    // Restart discovery; joining two sources of (potential) addresses
+    //
+    // This is used when the connection to an endpoint is lost in order
+    // to include the addresses specified on the command line and the
+    // address last used in the discovery process
+    pub fn discovery_from_multiple_sources(
+        a: Option<&Endpoint>,
+        b: Option<&Endpoint>,
+    ) -> Option<Self> {
+        let sources = match (a, b) {
+            (Some(e), None) | (None, Some(e)) => e.addresses().iter().chain(&[]),
+            (Some(e1), Some(e2)) => e1.addresses().iter().chain(e2.addresses()),
+            (None, None) => return None,
+        };
+        let lower_size_bound = sources.size_hint().0;
+        let mut dedup = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
+        let mut addrs = Vec::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
+        for a in sources {
+            if dedup.insert(a) {
+                addrs.push(*a);
+            }
+        }
+        Some(Self::discovery_from_addresses(addrs))
+    }
+
+    pub fn send(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        use Endpoint::*;
+        match self {
+            SocketBoundAddress { socket, addr } => socket.send_to(srv, buf, *addr),
+            Discovery(host) => host.send_scouting(srv, buf),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddr] {
+        use Endpoint::*;
+        match self {
+            SocketBoundAddress { addr, .. } => slice::from_ref(addr),
+            Discovery(host) => host.addresses(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Handles host-path discovery
+///
+/// When rosenpass is started, we either know no peer address
+/// or we know a hostname. How to contact this hostname may not
+/// be entirely clear for two reasons:
+///
+/// 1. We have multiple sockets; only a subset of those may be able to contact the host
+/// 2. DNS resolution can return multiple addresses
+///
+/// We could just use the first working socket and the first address returned, but this
+/// may be error prone: Some of the sockets may appear to be able to contact the host,
+/// but the packets will be dropped. Some of the addresses may appear to be reachable
+/// but the packets could be lost.
+///
+/// In contrast to TCP, UDP has no mechanism to ensure packets actually arrive.
+///
+/// To robustly handle host path discovery, we try each socket-ip-combination in a round
+/// robin fashion; the struct stores the offset of the last used combination internally and
+/// and will continue with the next combination on every call.
+///
+/// Retransmission handling will continue normally; i.e. increasing the distance between
+/// retransmissions on every retransmission, until it is long enough to bore a human. Therefor
+/// it is important to avoid having a large number of sockets drop packets not just for efficiency
+/// but to avoid latency issues too.
+///
+// TODO: We might consider adjusting the retransmission handling to account for host-path discovery
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
+    scouting_state: Cell<(usize, usize)>, // addr_off, sock_off
+    addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>,
+}
+
+impl HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
+    pub fn from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
+        let scouting_state = Cell::new((0, 0));
+        Self {
+            addresses,
+            scouting_state,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Lookup a hostname
+    pub fn lookup(hostname: String) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            addresses: ToSocketAddrs::to_socket_addrs(&hostname)?.collect(),
+            scouting_state: Cell::new((0, 0)),
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn addresses(&self) -> &Vec<SocketAddr> {
+        &self.addresses
+    }
+
+    fn insert_next_scout_offset(&self, srv: &AppServer, addr_no: usize, sock_no: usize) {
+        self.scouting_state.set((
+            (addr_no + 1) % self.addresses.len(),
+            (sock_no + 1) % srv.sockets.len(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to reach the host
+    ///
+    /// Will round-robin-try different socket-ip-combinations on each call.
+    pub fn send_scouting(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let (addr_off, sock_off) = self.scouting_state.get();
+
+        let mut addrs = (self.addresses)
+            .iter()
+            .enumerate()
+            .cycle()
+            .skip(addr_off)
+            .take(self.addresses.len());
+        let mut sockets = (srv.sockets)
+            .iter()
+            .enumerate()
+            .cycle()
+            .skip(sock_off)
+            .take(srv.sockets.len());
+
+        for (addr_no, addr) in addrs.by_ref() {
+            for (sock_no, sock) in sockets.by_ref() {
+                let res = sock.send_to(buf, *addr);
+                let err = match res {
+                    Ok(_) => {
+                        self.insert_next_scout_offset(srv, addr_no, sock_no);
+                        return Ok(());
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => e,
+                };
+
+                // TODO: replace this by
+                // e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable
+                // once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/86442 lands
+                let ignore = err
+                    .to_string()
+                    .starts_with("Address family not supported by protocol");
+                if !ignore {
+                    warn!("Socket #{} refusing to send to {}: ", sock_no, addr);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        bail!("Unable to send message: All sockets returned errors.")
+    }
+}
+
+impl AppServer {
+    pub fn new(
+        sk: SSk,
+        pk: SPk,
+        addrs: Vec<SocketAddr>,
+        verbosity: Verbosity,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        // setup mio
+        let mio_poll = mio::Poll::new()?;
+        let events = mio::Events::with_capacity(8);
+
+        // bind each SocketAddr to a socket
+        let maybe_sockets: Result<Vec<_>, _> =
+            addrs.into_iter().map(mio::net::UdpSocket::bind).collect();
+        let mut sockets = maybe_sockets?;
+
+        // When no socket is specified, rosenpass should open one port on all
+        // available interfaces best-effort. Here are the cases how this can possibly go:
+        //
+        // Some operating systems (such as Linux [^linux] and FreeBSD [^freebsd])
+        // using IPv6 sockets to handle IPv4 connections; on these systems
+        // binding to the `[::]:0` address will typically open a dual-stack
+        // socket. Some other systems such as OpenBSD [^openbsd] do not support this feature.
+        //
+        // Dual-stack systems provide a flag to enable or disable this
+        // behavior – the IPV6_V6ONLY flag. OpenBSD supports this flag
+        // read-only. MIO[^mio] provides a way to read this flag but not
+        // to write it.
+        //
+        // - One dual-stack IPv6 socket, if the operating supports dual-stack sockets and
+        //   correctly reports this
+        // - One IPv6 socket and one IPv4 socket if the operating does not support dual stack
+        //   sockets or disables them by default assuming this is also correctly reported
+        // - One IPv6 socket and no IPv4 socket if IPv6 socket is not dual-stack and opening
+        //   the IPv6 socket fails
+        // - One IPv4 socket and no IPv6 socket if opening the IPv6 socket fails
+        // - One dual-stack IPv6 socket and a redundant IPv4 socket if dual-stack sockets are
+        //   supported but the operating system does not correctly report this (specifically,
+        //   if the only_v6() call raises an error)
+        // - Rosenpass exits if no socket could be opened
+        //
+        // [^freebsd]: https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=ip6&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+6.0-RELEASE
+        // [^openbsd]: https://man.openbsd.org/ip6.4
+        // [^linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/ipv6.7.html
+        // [^mio]: https://docs.rs/mio/0.8.6/mio/net/struct.UdpSocket.html#method.only_v6
+        if sockets.is_empty() {
+            macro_rules! try_register_socket {
+                ($title:expr, $binding:expr) => {{
+                    let r = mio::net::UdpSocket::bind($binding);
+                    match r {
+                        Ok(sock) => {
+                            sockets.push(sock);
+                            Some(sockets.len() - 1)
+                        }
+                        Err(e) => {
+                            warn!("Could not bind to {} socket: {}", $title, e);
+                            None
+                        }
+                    }
+                }};
+            }
+
+            let v6 = try_register_socket!("IPv6", ipv6_any_binding());
+
+            let need_v4 = match v6.map(|no| sockets[no].only_v6()) {
+                Some(Ok(v)) => v,
+                None => true,
+                Some(Err(e)) => {
+                    warn!("Unable to detect whether the IPv6 socket supports dual-stack operation: {}", e);
+                    true
+                }
+            };
+
+            if need_v4 {
+                try_register_socket!("IPv4", ipv4_any_binding());
+            }
+        }
+
+        if sockets.is_empty() {
+            bail!("No sockets to listen on!")
+        }
+
+        // register all sockets to mio
+        for (i, socket) in sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            mio_poll
+                .registry()
+                .register(socket, Token(i), Interest::READABLE)?;
+        }
+
+        // TODO use mio::net::UnixStream together with std::os::unix::net::UnixStream for Linux
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
+            peers: Vec::new(),
+            verbosity,
+            sockets,
+            events,
+            mio_poll,
+            all_sockets_drained: false,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
+    }
+
+    pub fn add_peer(
+        &mut self,
+        psk: Option<SymKey>,
+        pk: SPk,
+        outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
+        outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
+        hostname: Option<String>,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<AppPeerPtr> {
+        let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
+        assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
+        let initial_endpoint = hostname
+            .map(Endpoint::discovery_from_hostname)
+            .transpose()?;
+        let current_endpoint = None;
+        self.peers.push(AppPeer {
+            outfile,
+            outwg,
+            initial_endpoint,
+            current_endpoint,
+        });
+        Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
+    }
+
+    pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
+        const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
+        let mut failure_cnt = 0;
+
+        loop {
+            let msgs_processed = 0usize;
+            let err = match self.event_loop() {
+                Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
+                Err(e) => e,
+            };
+
+            // This should not happen…
+            failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
+                0
+            } else {
+                failure_cnt + 1
+            };
+            let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
+            let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
+            error!(
+                "unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?} {}",
+                msgs_processed,
+                err,
+                err.backtrace()
+            );
+            if tries_left > 0 {
+                error!("re-initializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
+                std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            bail!("too many network failures");
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
+
+        /// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
+        /// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
+        /// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
+        macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
+            ($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
+                attempt!({
+                    let p = $peer;
+                    if p.get_app(self).endpoint().is_some() {
+                        let len = $fn()?;
+                        let ep: &Endpoint = p.get_app(self).endpoint().unwrap();
+                        ep.send(self, &tx[..len])?;
+                    }
+                    Ok(())
+                })
+            };
+        }
+
+        loop {
+            use crate::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
+            use AppPollResult::*;
+            use KeyOutputReason::*;
+            match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
+                #[allow(clippy::redundant_closure_call)]
+                SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
+                    .crypt
+                    .initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
+                #[allow(clippy::redundant_closure_call)]
+                SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
+                    .crypt
+                    .retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
+                DeleteKey(peer) => {
+                    self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?;
+
+                    // There was a loss of connection apparently; restart host discovery
+                    // starting from the last used address but including all the initially
+                    // specified addresses
+                    // TODO: We could do this preemptively, before any connection loss actually occurs.
+                    let p = peer.get_app_mut(self);
+                    p.current_endpoint = Endpoint::discovery_from_multiple_sources(
+                        p.current_endpoint.as_ref(),
+                        p.initial_endpoint.as_ref(),
+                    );
+                }
+
+                ReceivedMessage(len, endpoint) => {
+                    match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
+                        Err(ref e) => {
+                            self.verbose().then(|| {
+                                info!(
+                                    "error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?} {}",
+                                    endpoint,
+                                    e,
+                                    e.backtrace()
+                                );
+                            });
+                        }
+
+                        Ok(HandleMsgResult {
+                            resp,
+                            exchanged_with,
+                            ..
+                        }) => {
+                            if let Some(len) = resp {
+                                endpoint.send(self, &tx[0..len])?;
+                            }
+
+                            if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
+                                let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
+                                ap.get_app_mut(self).current_endpoint = Some(endpoint);
+
+                                // TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
+                                self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            };
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn output_key(
+        &self,
+        peer: AppPeerPtr,
+        why: KeyOutputReason,
+        key: &SymKey,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
+        let ap = peer.get_app(self);
+
+        if self.verbose() {
+            let msg = match why {
+                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
+                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
+            };
+            info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
+        }
+
+        if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
+            // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
+            // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
+            // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
+            // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
+            // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
+            // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
+            // not worth it right now.
+            b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
+            let why = match why {
+                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
+                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
+            };
+
+            // this is intentionally writing to stdout instead of stderr, because
+            // it is meant to allow external detection of a successful key-exchange
+            println!(
+                "output-key peer {} key-file {of:?} {why}",
+                fmt_b64(&*peerid)
+            );
+        }
+
+        if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
+            let mut child = Command::new("wg")
+                .arg("set")
+                .arg(&owg.dev)
+                .arg("peer")
+                .arg(&owg.pk)
+                .arg("preshared-key")
+                .arg("/dev/stdin")
+                .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+                .args(&owg.extra_params)
+                .spawn()?;
+            b64_writer(child.stdin.take().unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
+
+            thread::spawn(move || {
+                let status = child.wait();
+
+                if let Ok(status) = status {
+                    if status.success() {
+                        debug!("successfully passed psk to wg")
+                    } else {
+                        error!("could not pass psk to wg {:?}", status)
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    error!("wait failed: {:?}", status)
+                }
+            });
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> anyhow::Result<AppPollResult> {
+        use crate::protocol::PollResult as C;
+        use AppPollResult as A;
+        loop {
+            return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
+                C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
+                    Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
+                    None => continue,
+                },
+            });
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Tries to receive a new message
+    ///
+    /// - might wait for an duration up to `timeout`
+    /// - returns immediately if an error occurs
+    /// - returns immediately if a new message is received
+    pub fn try_recv(
+        &mut self,
+        buf: &mut [u8],
+        timeout: Timing,
+    ) -> anyhow::Result<Option<(usize, Endpoint)>> {
+        let timeout = Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout);
+
+        // if there is no time to wait on IO, well, then, lets not waste any time!
+        if timeout.is_zero() {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+
+        // NOTE when using mio::Poll, there are some particularities (taken from
+        // https://docs.rs/mio/latest/mio/struct.Poll.html):
+        //
+        // - poll() might return readiness, even if nothing is ready
+        // - in this case, a WouldBlock error is returned from actual IO operations
+        // - after receiving readiness for a source, it must be drained until a WouldBlock
+        //   is received
+        //
+        // This would usually require us to maintain the drainage status of each socket;
+        // a socket would only become drained when it returned WouldBlock and only
+        // non-drained when receiving a readiness event from mio for it. Then, only the
+        // ready sockets should be worked on, ideally without requiring an O(n) search
+        // through all sockets for checking their drained status. However, our use-case
+        // is primarily heaving one or two sockets (if IPv4 and IPv6 IF_ANY listen is
+        // desired on a non-dual-stack OS), thus just checking every socket after any
+        // readiness event seems to be good enough™ for now.
+
+        // only poll if we drained all sockets before
+        if self.all_sockets_drained {
+            self.mio_poll.poll(&mut self.events, Some(timeout))?;
+        }
+
+        let mut would_block_count = 0;
+        for (sock_no, socket) in self.sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            match socket.recv_from(buf) {
+                Ok((n, addr)) => {
+                    // at least one socket was not drained...
+                    self.all_sockets_drained = false;
+                    return Ok(Some((
+                        n,
+                        Endpoint::SocketBoundAddress {
+                            socket: SocketPtr(sock_no),
+                            addr,
+                        },
+                    )));
+                }
+                Err(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
+                    would_block_count += 1;
+                }
+                // TODO if one socket continuously returns an error, then we never poll, thus we never wait for a timeout, thus we have a spin-lock
+                Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+            }
+        }
+
+        // if each socket returned WouldBlock, then we drained them all at least once indeed
+        self.all_sockets_drained = would_block_count == self.sockets.len();
+
+        Ok(None)
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/cli.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure};
+use clap::Parser;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use crate::app_server;
+use crate::app_server::AppServer;
+use crate::util::{LoadValue, LoadValueB64};
+use crate::{
+    // app_server::{AppServer, LoadValue, LoadValueB64},
+    coloring::Secret,
+    pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
+    protocol::{SPk, SSk, SymKey},
+};
+
+use super::config;
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about)]
+pub enum Cli {
+    /// Start Rosenpass in server mode and carry on with the key exchange
+    ///
+    /// This will parse the configuration file and perform the key exchange
+    /// with the specified peers. If a peer's endpoint is specified, this
+    /// Rosenpass instance will try to initiate a key exchange with the peer,
+    /// otherwise only initiation attempts from the peer will be responded to.
+    ExchangeConfig { config_file: PathBuf },
+
+    /// Start in daemon mode, performing key exchanges
+    ///
+    /// The configuration is read from the command line. The `peer` token
+    /// always separates multiple peers, e. g. if the token `peer` appears
+    /// in the WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS it is not put into the WireGuard arguments
+    /// but instead a new peer is created.
+    /* Explanation: `first_arg` and `rest_of_args` are combined into one
+     * `Vec<String>`. They are only used to trick clap into displaying some
+     * guidance on the CLI usage.
+     */
+    #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
+    #[allow(rustdoc::invalid_html_tags)]
+    Exchange {
+        /// public-key <PATH> secret-key <PATH> [listen <ADDR>:<PORT>]... [verbose]
+        #[clap(value_name = "OWN_CONFIG")]
+        first_arg: String,
+
+        /// peer public-key <PATH> [ENDPOINT] [PSK] [OUTFILE] [WG]
+        ///
+        /// ENDPOINT := endpoint <HOST/IP>:<PORT>
+        ///
+        /// PSK := preshared-key <PATH>
+        ///
+        /// OUTFILE := outfile <PATH>
+        ///
+        /// WG := wireguard <WIREGUARD_DEV> <WIREGUARD_PEER> [WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS]...
+        #[clap(value_name = "PEERS")]
+        rest_of_args: Vec<String>,
+
+        /// Save the parsed configuration to a file before starting the daemon
+        #[clap(short, long)]
+        config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
+    },
+
+    /// Generate a demo config file
+    GenConfig {
+        config_file: PathBuf,
+
+        /// Forcefully overwrite existing config file
+        #[clap(short, long)]
+        force: bool,
+    },
+
+    /// Generate the keys mentioned in a configFile
+    ///
+    /// Generates secret- & public-key to their destination. If a config file
+    /// is provided then the key file destination is taken from there.
+    /// Otherwise the
+    GenKeys {
+        config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+        /// where to write public-key to
+        #[clap(short, long)]
+        public_key: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+        /// where to write secret-key to
+        #[clap(short, long)]
+        secret_key: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+        /// Forcefully overwrite public- & secret-key file
+        #[clap(short, long)]
+        force: bool,
+    },
+
+    /// Validate a configuration
+    Validate { config_files: Vec<PathBuf> },
+
+    /// Show the rosenpass manpage
+    // TODO make this the default, but only after the manpage has been adjusted once the CLI stabilizes
+    Man,
+}
+
+impl Cli {
+    pub fn run() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let cli = Self::parse();
+
+        use Cli::*;
+        match cli {
+            Man => {
+                let man_cmd = std::process::Command::new("man")
+                    .args(["1", "rosenpass"])
+                    .status();
+
+                if !(man_cmd.is_ok() && man_cmd.unwrap().success()) {
+                    println!(include_str!(env!("ROSENPASS_MAN")));
+                }
+            }
+            GenConfig { config_file, force } => {
+                ensure!(
+                    force || !config_file.exists(),
+                    "config file {config_file:?} already exists"
+                );
+
+                config::Rosenpass::example_config().store(config_file)?;
+            }
+
+            GenKeys {
+                config_file,
+                public_key,
+                secret_key,
+                force,
+            } => {
+                // figure out where the key file is specified, in the config file or directly as flag?
+                let (pkf, skf) = match (config_file, public_key, secret_key) {
+                    (Some(config_file), _, _) => {
+                        ensure!(
+                            config_file.exists(),
+                            "config file {config_file:?} does not exist"
+                        );
+
+                        let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
+
+                        (config.public_key, config.secret_key)
+                    }
+                    (_, Some(pkf), Some(skf)) => (pkf, skf),
+                    _ => {
+                        bail!("either a config-file or both public-key and secret-key file are required")
+                    }
+                };
+
+                // check that we are not overriding something unintentionally
+                let mut problems = vec![];
+                if !force && pkf.is_file() {
+                    problems.push(format!(
+                        "public-key file {pkf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it"
+                    ));
+                }
+                if !force && skf.is_file() {
+                    problems.push(format!(
+                        "secret-key file {skf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it"
+                    ));
+                }
+                if !problems.is_empty() {
+                    bail!(problems.join("\n"));
+                }
+
+                // generate the keys and store them in files
+                let mut ssk = crate::protocol::SSk::random();
+                let mut spk = crate::protocol::SPk::random();
+                StaticKEM::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
+
+                ssk.store_secret(skf)?;
+                spk.store_secret(pkf)?;
+            }
+
+            ExchangeConfig { config_file } => {
+                ensure!(
+                    config_file.exists(),
+                    "config file '{config_file:?}' does not exist"
+                );
+
+                let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
+                config.validate()?;
+                Self::event_loop(config)?;
+            }
+
+            Exchange {
+                first_arg,
+                mut rest_of_args,
+                config_file,
+            } => {
+                rest_of_args.insert(0, first_arg);
+                let args = rest_of_args;
+                let mut config = config::Rosenpass::parse_args(args)?;
+
+                if let Some(p) = config_file {
+                    config.store(&p)?;
+                    config.config_file_path = p;
+                }
+                config.validate()?;
+                Self::event_loop(config)?;
+            }
+
+            Validate { config_files } => {
+                for file in config_files {
+                    match config::Rosenpass::load(&file) {
+                        Ok(config) => {
+                            eprintln!("{file:?} is valid TOML and conforms to the expected schema");
+                            match config.validate() {
+                                Ok(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} is passed all logical checks"),
+                                Err(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} contains logical errors"),
+                            }
+                        }
+                        Err(e) => eprintln!("{file:?} is not valid: {e}"),
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn event_loop(config: config::Rosenpass) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        // load own keys
+        let sk = SSk::load(&config.secret_key)?;
+        let pk = SPk::load(&config.public_key)?;
+
+        // start an application server
+        let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
+            sk,
+            pk,
+            config.listen,
+            config.verbosity,
+        )?);
+
+        for cfg_peer in config.peers {
+            srv.add_peer(
+                // psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
+                cfg_peer.pre_shared_key.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
+                SPk::load(&cfg_peer.public_key)?,
+                cfg_peer.key_out,
+                cfg_peer.wg.map(|cfg| app_server::WireguardOut {
+                    dev: cfg.device,
+                    pk: cfg.peer,
+                    extra_params: cfg.extra_params,
+                }),
+                cfg_peer.endpoint.clone(),
+            )?;
+        }
+
+        srv.event_loop()
+    }
+}
+
+trait StoreSecret {
+    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> anyhow::Result<()>;
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
+    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/coloring.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 //! - the memory is mlocked, e.g. it is never swapped
 
 use crate::{
-    sodium::{rng, zeroize},
+    classical_crypto::{rng, zeroize},
     util::{cpy, mutating},
 };
 use lazy_static::lazy_static;

rosenpass/src/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+use std::{
+    collections::HashSet,
+    fs,
+    io::Write,
+    net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs},
+    path::{Path, PathBuf},
+};
+
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::util::fopen_w;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Rosenpass {
+    pub public_key: PathBuf,
+
+    pub secret_key: PathBuf,
+
+    pub listen: Vec<SocketAddr>,
+
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
+    pub peers: Vec<RosenpassPeer>,
+
+    #[serde(skip)]
+    pub config_file_path: PathBuf,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum Verbosity {
+    Quiet,
+    Verbose,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct RosenpassPeer {
+    pub public_key: PathBuf,
+    pub endpoint: Option<String>,
+    pub pre_shared_key: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub key_out: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+    // TODO make sure failure does not crash but is logged
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub exchange_command: Vec<String>,
+
+    // TODO make this field only available on binary builds, not on library builds
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub wg: Option<WireGuard>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct WireGuard {
+    pub device: String,
+    pub peer: String,
+
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+impl Rosenpass {
+    /// Load a config file from a file path
+    ///
+    /// no validation is conducted
+    pub fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(p: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        let mut config: Self = toml::from_str(&fs::read_to_string(&p)?)?;
+
+        config.config_file_path = p.as_ref().to_owned();
+        Ok(config)
+    }
+
+    /// Write a config to a file
+    pub fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, p: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let serialized_config =
+            toml::to_string_pretty(&self).expect("unable to serialize the default config");
+        fs::write(p, serialized_config)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Commit the configuration to where it came from, overwriting the original file
+    pub fn commit(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let mut f = fopen_w(&self.config_file_path)?;
+        f.write_all(toml::to_string_pretty(&self)?.as_bytes())?;
+
+        self.store(&self.config_file_path)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate a configuration
+    pub fn validate(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        // check the public-key file exists
+        ensure!(
+            self.public_key.is_file(),
+            "public-key file {:?} does not exist",
+            self.public_key
+        );
+
+        // check the secret-key file exists
+        ensure!(
+            self.secret_key.is_file(),
+            "secret-key file {:?} does not exist",
+            self.secret_key
+        );
+
+        for (i, peer) in self.peers.iter().enumerate() {
+            // check peer's public-key file exists
+            ensure!(
+                peer.public_key.is_file(),
+                "peer {i} public-key file {:?} does not exist",
+                peer.public_key
+            );
+
+            // check endpoint is usable
+            if let Some(addr) = peer.endpoint.as_ref() {
+                ensure!(
+                    addr.to_socket_addrs().is_ok(),
+                    "peer {i} endpoint {} can not be parsed to a socket address",
+                    addr
+                );
+            }
+
+            // TODO warn if neither out_key nor exchange_command is defined
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a new configuration
+    pub fn new<P1: AsRef<Path>, P2: AsRef<Path>>(public_key: P1, secret_key: P2) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            public_key: PathBuf::from(public_key.as_ref()),
+            secret_key: PathBuf::from(secret_key.as_ref()),
+            listen: vec![],
+            verbosity: Verbosity::Quiet,
+            peers: vec![],
+            config_file_path: PathBuf::new(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Add IPv4 __and__ IPv6 IF_ANY address to the listen interfaces
+    pub fn add_if_any(&mut self, port: u16) {
+        let ipv4_any = SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0), port));
+        let ipv6_any = SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(
+            Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
+            port,
+            0,
+            0,
+        ));
+        self.listen.push(ipv4_any);
+        self.listen.push(ipv6_any);
+    }
+
+    /// from chaotic args
+    /// Quest: the grammar is undecideable, what do we do here?
+    pub fn parse_args(args: Vec<String>) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
+        let mut config = Self::new("", "");
+
+        #[derive(Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+        enum State {
+            Own,
+            OwnPublicKey,
+            OwnSecretKey,
+            OwnListen,
+            Peer,
+            PeerPsk,
+            PeerPublicKey,
+            PeerEndpoint,
+            PeerOutfile,
+            PeerWireguardDev,
+            PeerWireguardPeer,
+            PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
+        }
+
+        let mut already_set = HashSet::new();
+
+        // TODO idea: use config.peers.len() to give index of peer with conflicting argument
+        use State::*;
+        let mut state = Own;
+        let mut current_peer = None;
+        let p_exists = "a peer should exist by now";
+        let wg_exists = "a peer wireguard should exist by now";
+        for arg in args {
+            state = match (state, arg.as_str(), &mut current_peer) {
+                (Own, "public-key", None) => OwnPublicKey,
+                (Own, "secret-key", None) => OwnSecretKey,
+                (Own, "private-key", None) => {
+                    log::warn!(
+                        "the private-key argument is deprecated, please use secret-key instead"
+                    );
+                    OwnSecretKey
+                }
+                (Own, "listen", None) => OwnListen,
+                (Own, "verbose", None) => {
+                    config.verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
+                    Own
+                }
+                (Own, "peer", None) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.contains(&OwnPublicKey),
+                        "public-key file must be set"
+                    );
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.contains(&OwnSecretKey),
+                        "secret-key file must be set"
+                    );
+
+                    already_set.clear();
+                    current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
+
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (OwnPublicKey, pk, None) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(OwnPublicKey),
+                        "public-key was already set"
+                    );
+                    config.public_key = pk.into();
+                    Own
+                }
+                (OwnSecretKey, sk, None) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(OwnSecretKey),
+                        "secret-key was already set"
+                    );
+                    config.secret_key = sk.into();
+                    Own
+                }
+                (OwnListen, l, None) => {
+                    already_set.insert(OwnListen); // multiple listen directives are allowed
+                    for socket_addr in l.to_socket_addrs()? {
+                        config.listen.push(socket_addr);
+                    }
+
+                    Own
+                }
+                (Peer | PeerWireguardExtraArgs, "peer", maybe_peer @ Some(_)) => {
+                    // TODO check current peer
+                    // commit current peer, create a new one
+                    config.peers.push(maybe_peer.take().expect(p_exists));
+
+                    already_set.clear();
+                    current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
+
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (Peer, "public-key", Some(_)) => PeerPublicKey,
+                (Peer, "endpoint", Some(_)) => PeerEndpoint,
+                (Peer, "preshared-key", Some(_)) => PeerPsk,
+                (Peer, "outfile", Some(_)) => PeerOutfile,
+                (Peer, "wireguard", Some(_)) => PeerWireguardDev,
+                (PeerPublicKey, pk, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(PeerPublicKey),
+                        "public-key was already set"
+                    );
+                    peer.public_key = pk.into();
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (PeerEndpoint, e, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint), "endpoint was already set");
+                    peer.endpoint = Some(e.to_owned());
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (PeerPsk, psk, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint), "peer psk was already set");
+                    peer.pre_shared_key = Some(psk.into());
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (PeerOutfile, of, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(PeerOutfile),
+                        "peer outfile was already set"
+                    );
+                    peer.key_out = Some(of.into());
+                    Peer
+                }
+                (PeerWireguardDev, dev, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(PeerWireguardDev),
+                        "peer wireguard-dev was already set"
+                    );
+                    assert!(peer.wg.is_none());
+                    peer.wg = Some(WireGuard {
+                        device: dev.to_string(),
+                        ..Default::default()
+                    });
+
+                    PeerWireguardPeer
+                }
+                (PeerWireguardPeer, p, Some(peer)) => {
+                    ensure!(
+                        already_set.insert(PeerWireguardPeer),
+                        "peer wireguard-peer was already set"
+                    );
+                    peer.wg.as_mut().expect(wg_exists).peer = p.to_string();
+                    PeerWireguardExtraArgs
+                }
+                (PeerWireguardExtraArgs, arg, Some(peer)) => {
+                    peer.wg
+                        .as_mut()
+                        .expect(wg_exists)
+                        .extra_params
+                        .push(arg.to_string());
+                    PeerWireguardExtraArgs
+                }
+
+                // error cases
+                (Own, x, None) => {
+                    bail!("unrecognised argument {x}");
+                }
+                (Own | OwnPublicKey | OwnSecretKey | OwnListen, _, Some(_)) => {
+                    panic!("current_peer is not None while in Own* state, this must never happen")
+                }
+
+                (State::Peer, arg, Some(_)) => {
+                    bail!("unrecongnised argument {arg}");
+                }
+                (
+                    Peer
+                    | PeerEndpoint
+                    | PeerOutfile
+                    | PeerPublicKey
+                    | PeerPsk
+                    | PeerWireguardDev
+                    | PeerWireguardPeer
+                    | PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
+                    _,
+                    None,
+                ) => {
+                    panic!("got peer options but no peer was created")
+                }
+            };
+        }
+
+        if let Some(p) = current_peer {
+            // TODO ensure peer is propagated with sufficient information
+            config.peers.push(p);
+        }
+
+        Ok(config)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Rosenpass {
+    /// Generate an example configuration
+    pub fn example_config() -> Self {
+        let peer = RosenpassPeer {
+            public_key: "rp-peer-public-key".into(),
+            endpoint: Some("my-peer.test:9999".into()),
+            exchange_command: [
+                "wg",
+                "set",
+                "wg0",
+                "peer",
+                "<PEER_ID>",
+                "preshared-key",
+                "/dev/stdin",
+            ]
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|x| x.to_string())
+            .collect(),
+            key_out: Some("rp-key-out".into()),
+            pre_shared_key: None,
+            wg: None,
+        };
+
+        Self {
+            public_key: "rp-public-key".into(),
+            secret_key: "rp-secret-key".into(),
+            peers: vec![peer],
+            ..Self::new("", "")
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for Verbosity {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::Quiet
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use std::net::IpAddr;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn split_str(s: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+        s.split(" ").map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_simple_cli_parse() {
+        let args = split_str(
+            "public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
+                listen 0.0.0.0:9999 peer public-key /peer/public-key endpoint \
+                peer.test:9999 outfile /peer/rp-out",
+        );
+
+        let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
+        assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
+        assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
+        assert_eq!(
+            &config.listen,
+            &vec![SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0)), 9999)]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            config.peers,
+            vec![RosenpassPeer {
+                public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer/public-key"),
+                endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
+                pre_shared_key: None,
+                key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer/rp-out")),
+                ..Default::default()
+            }]
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_cli_parse_multiple_peers() {
+        let args = split_str(
+            "public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
+                peer public-key /peer-a/public-key endpoint \
+                peer.test:9999 outfile /peer-a/rp-out \
+                peer public-key /peer-b/public-key outfile /peer-b/rp-out",
+        );
+
+        let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
+        assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
+        assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
+        assert!(&config.listen.is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(
+            config.peers,
+            vec![
+                RosenpassPeer {
+                    public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-a/public-key"),
+                    endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
+                    pre_shared_key: None,
+                    key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-a/rp-out")),
+                    ..Default::default()
+                },
+                RosenpassPeer {
+                    public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-b/public-key"),
+                    endpoint: None,
+                    pre_shared_key: None,
+                    key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-b/rp-out")),
+                    ..Default::default()
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/labeled_prf.rs

@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ use {
     anyhow::Result,
 };
 
+const PROTOCOL : &str = "rosenpass 1 rosenpass.eu aead=chachapoly1305 hash=blake2s ekem=kyber512 skem=mceliece460896 xaead=xchachapoly1305";
+
 pub fn protocol() -> Result<PrfTree> {
-    PrfTree::zero().mix("Rosenpass v1 mceliece460896 Kyber512 ChaChaPoly1305 BLAKE2s".as_bytes())
+    PrfTree::zero().mix(PROTOCOL.as_bytes())
 }
 
-// TODO Use labels that can serve as idents
+// TODO Use labels that can serve as identifiers
 macro_rules! prflabel {
     ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
         pub fn $name() -> Result<PrfTree> {
@@ -21,12 +23,12 @@ macro_rules! prflabel {
     }
 }
 
-prflabel!(protocol, mac,        "mac");
-prflabel!(protocol, cookie,     "cookie");
-prflabel!(protocol, peerid,     "peer id");
+prflabel!(protocol, mac, "mac");
+prflabel!(protocol, cookie, "cookie");
+prflabel!(protocol, peerid, "peer id");
 prflabel!(protocol, biscuit_ad, "biscuit additional data");
-prflabel!(protocol, ckinit,     "chaining key init");
-prflabel!(protocol, _ckextract,  "chaining key extract");
+prflabel!(protocol, ckinit, "chaining key init");
+prflabel!(protocol, _ckextract, "chaining key extract");
 
 macro_rules! prflabel_leaf {
     ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
@@ -38,10 +40,10 @@ macro_rules! prflabel_leaf {
     }
 }
 
-prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, mix,        "mix");
-prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, hs_enc,     "handshake encryption");
-prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, ini_enc,    "initiator handshake encryption");
-prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, res_enc,    "responder handshake encryption");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, mix, "mix");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, hs_enc, "handshake encryption");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, ini_enc, "initiator session encryption");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, res_enc, "responder session encryption");
 
 prflabel!(_ckextract, _user, "user");
 prflabel!(_user, _rp, "rosenpass.eu");

rosenpass/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
 #[macro_use]
 pub mod util;
 #[macro_use]
-pub mod sodium;
+pub mod symmetric;
 pub mod coloring;
 #[rustfmt::skip]
 pub mod labeled_prf;
+pub mod app_server;
+pub mod cli;
+pub mod config;
 pub mod msgs;
 pub mod pqkem;
 pub mod prftree;
@@ -16,7 +19,7 @@ pub enum RosenpassError {
     Oqs,
     #[error("error from external library while calling OQS")]
     OqsExternalLib,
-    #[error("buffer size mismatch, required {required_size} but only found {actual_size}")]
+    #[error("buffer size mismatch, required {required_size} but found {actual_size}")]
     BufferSizeMismatch {
         required_size: usize,
         actual_size: usize,

rosenpass/src/lprf.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 //! This is a generalization of a PRF operating
 //! on a sequence of inputs instead of a single input.
 //!
-//! Like a Dec function the Iprf features efficient 
+//! Like a Dec function the Iprf features efficient
 //! incrementability.
 //!
 //! You can also think of an Iprf as a Dec function with
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ pub fn prf_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) {
     hmac_into(out, key, data).unwrap()
 }
 
-pub fn prf(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE]{
+pub fn prf(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE] {
     mutating([0u8; KEY_SIZE], |r| prf_into(r, key, data))
 }
 
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ impl Iprf {
         IprfBranch(self.0)
     }
 
-    // TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that 
+    // TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that
     fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Self {
         Self(prf(&self.0, v))
     }
-    
+
     fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
         SecretIprf::prf_invoc(&self.0, v.secret())
     }
@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ impl IprfBranch {
 
 impl SecretIprf {
     fn prf_invoc(k: &[u8], d: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
-        mutating(SecretIprf(Secret::zero()), |r|
-            prf_into(k, d, r.secret_mut()))
+        mutating(SecretIprf(Secret::zero()), |r| {
+            prf_into(k, d, r.secret_mut())
+        })
     }
 
     fn from_key(k: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {

rosenpass/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+use log::error;
+use rosenpass::{cli::Cli, sodium::sodium_init};
+use std::process::exit;
+
+/// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
+pub fn main() {
+    env_logger::init();
+    match sodium_init().and_then(|()| Cli::run()) {
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("{e}");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/msgs.rs

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ macro_rules! data_lense(
             pub fn check_size(len: usize) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>{
                 let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
                 let actual_size = len;
-                if required_size < actual_size {
+                if required_size != actual_size {
                     Err(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch {
                         required_size,
                         actual_size,
@@ -199,23 +199,53 @@ macro_rules! data_lense(
             type __ContainerType;
 
             /// Create a lense to the byte slice
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError>;
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError>;
+
+            /// Create a lense to the byte slice, automatically truncating oversized buffers
+            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError>;
         }
 
         impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a [u8] {
             type __ContainerType = &'a [u8];
 
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
                 Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
             }
+
+            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
+                let actual_size = self.len();
+                if actual_size < required_size {
+                    return Err(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch {
+                        required_size,
+                        actual_size,
+                    });
+                }
+
+                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&self[..required_size])
+            }
         }
 
         impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a mut [u8] {
             type __ContainerType = &'a mut [u8];
-
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
                 Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
             }
+
+            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
+                let actual_size = self.len();
+                if actual_size < required_size {
+                    return Err(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch {
+                        required_size,
+                        actual_size,
+                    });
+                }
+
+                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&mut self[..required_size])
+            }
         }
     });
 );
@@ -261,10 +291,10 @@ data_lense! { RespHello :=
     ecti: EphemeralKEM::CT_LEN,
     /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
     scti: StaticKEM::CT_LEN,
-    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN,
     /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
-    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN
+    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
+    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
+    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN
 }
 
 data_lense! { InitConf :=

rosenpass/src/primitives/kmac.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+use std::result::Result;
+use digest::{Update, XofReader};
+use crate::util::types::Leftright;
+use crate::util::io::{WriteSecret, CountAndWriteSecret};
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+use crate::util::io::assemble_secret;
+
+/// Variable length encoding for unsigned numbers as specified by in
+/// NIST Special Publication 800-185.
+///
+/// This corresponds to left_encode(…) if `lr == Leftright::Left`
+/// and to right_encode(…) if `lr == Leftright::Right`.
+///
+/// # Panics
+///
+/// This will panic if the number `v` is greater than $2^{2040}-1$,
+/// i.e. if more than 255 bits are required to represent the number.
+///
+/// For the natively supported integers (u8…u128 and usize), this will not panic
+/// unless usize is an u256 now.
+///
+/// # Example
+/// 
+/// ```
+/// use crate::util::types::Leftright::*;
+///
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Left, w, 0)), assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Left, w, 1)), assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 1)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Left, w, 0xff)), assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0xff)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Left, w, 0x100)), assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x100)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Left, w, 0x010203)), assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x010203)));
+///
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Right, w, 0)), assemble_secret(|w| right_encode(w, 0)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Right, w, 1)), assemble_secret(|w| right_encode(w, 1)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Right, w, 0xff)), assemble_secret(|w| right_encode(w, 0xff)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Right, w, 0x100)), assemble_secret(|w| right_encode(w, 0x100)));
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| leftright_encode(Right, w, 0x010203)), assemble_secret(|w| right_encode(w, 0x010203)));
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn leftright_encode<W, N>(lr: Leftright, dst: W, v: &N)
+        -> Result<(), W::Error>
+    where
+        W: WriteSecret, 
+        N: ToBytes {
+    use Leftright::*;
+    let be = v.to_be_bytes();
+    let trailing_zeros = be.rev().take_while(|v| v == 0).count();
+    let num_bytes = std::max(1, be.len() - trailing_zeros);
+    assert!(num_bytes < 256);
+    match lr {
+        Left => {
+            dst.write(from_ref(num_bytes.into()))?;
+            dst.write(&be[..num_bytes])?;
+        },
+        Right => {
+            dst.write(&be[..num_bytes])?;
+            dst.write(from_ref(num_bytes.into()))?;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Variable length encoding for unsigned numbers as specified by in
+/// NIST Special Publication 800-185.
+/// 
+/// First writes a single byte indication the width of the
+/// encoded number to `dst` then writes the number in big-endian
+/// format.
+///
+/// # Panics
+///
+/// This will panic if the number `v` is greater than $2^{2040}-1$,
+/// i.e. if more than 255 bits are required to represent the number.
+///
+/// For the natively supported integers (u8…u128 and usize), this will not panic
+/// unless usize is an u256 now.
+///
+/// # Example
+/// 
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0)), b"\1\0");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 1)), b"\1\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0xff)), b"\1\0xff");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x100)), b"\1\0\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x010203)), b"\3\1\2\3");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn left_encode<W, N>(dst: W, v: &N)
+        -> Result<(), W::Error>
+    where
+        W: Write, 
+        N: ToBytes {
+    nist_leftright_encode(Leftright::Left, dst, v)
+}
+
+/// Variable length encoding for unsigned numbers as specified by in
+/// NIST Special Publication 800-185.
+///
+/// This uses the same format as `left_encode` but swaps length tag
+/// and then length of the number itself.
+///
+/// # Panics
+///
+/// This will panic if the number `v` is greater than $2^{2040}-1$,
+/// i.e. if more than 255 bits are required to represent the number.
+///
+/// For the natively supported integers (u8…u128 and usize), this will not panic
+/// unless usize is an u256 now.
+///
+/// # Example
+/// 
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0)), b"\0\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 1)), b"\1\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0xff)), b"\0xff\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x100)), b"\0\1\1");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| left_encode(w, 0x010203)), b"\1\2\3\3");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn right_encode<W, N>(dst: &mut W, v: &N)
+        -> Result<(), W::Error>
+    where
+        W: WriteSecret, 
+        N: ToBytes {
+    nist_leftright_encode(Leftright::Right, dst, v)
+}
+
+/// Serialization for variable length strings as specified by in
+/// NIST Special Publication 800-185.
+///
+/// This first writes the length of the string using `left_encode` to `dst`
+/// then copies the string itself to `dst`.
+/// 
+/// # Example
+/// 
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| encode_string(w, b"")), b"\1\0");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| encode_string(w, b"\0")), b"\1\1\0");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| encode_string(w, b"Hello")), b"\1\5Hello");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| encode_string(w, b"Hello World")), b"\1\x0AHello World");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn encode_string<W>(dst: W, str: &[u8])
+        -> Result<(), W::Error>
+    where
+        W: WriteSecret {
+    /// This will not panic unless `usize` is an u256 now.
+    left_encode(&mut dst, str.len())?;
+    w.write_all(str)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Serialize arbitrary data and then pad the output using zero bytes
+/// as specified NIST Special Publication 800-185.
+///
+/// This first writes the width of the padding unit `pad_to` to `dst`
+/// and then calls `f` to serialize arbitrary data. Finally, this function
+/// writes null bytes until the total number of bytes written is a multiple
+/// of `pad_to`.
+///
+/// # Example
+/// 
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| bytepad(w, 5, |w| )), b"\1\5\0\0\0");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| bytepad(w, 5, |w| w.write_all(b"Hello"))), b"\1\5Hello\0\0\0");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| bytepad(w, 5, |w| w.write_all(b"Hello dearie!"))), b"\1\5Hello dearie!");
+/// assert_eq!(assemble_secret(|w| bytepad(w, 5, |w| w.write_all(b"_"))), b"\1\5_\0\0");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn bytepad<W, Fn>(dst: W, pad_to: u64, f: Fn)
+        -> Result<(), W::Error>
+    where
+        W: WriteSecret,
+        Fn: FnOnce<CountAndWrite> {
+    let w = CountAndWrite::new(dst);
+    nist_left_encode(&mut w, pad_to)?;
+    f(w)?;
+    for _ in ..ceiling_remainder(w2.get_count(), pad_to) {
+        w.write_all(from_ref(0u8.into()))?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+///
+#[inline]
+pub(crate) fn kmac256(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) {
+    // A proper implementation of KMAC is currently not available in the sha3 crate, but they do
+    // provide cSHAKE which can be used to implement KMAC
+    //
+    // Issue:
+    //   https://github.com/RustCrypto/MACs/issues/133
+    //   "kmac: Towards an implementation"
+    //
+    // KMAC Spec:
+    //   https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185
+    //   "SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash"
+    //   Page 10
+    use sha3::{CShake256, CShake256Core};
+
+    let hasher = CShake256::from_core(
+        CShake256Core::new_with_function_name(&"", &"KMAC"));
+
+    bytepad(hasher, 168, |w| encode_string(w, key)).guaranteed();
+    hasher.update(data);
+    right_encode(hasher, out.len()).guaranteed();
+
+    hasher.finalize_xof_into(out);
+}

rosenpass/src/primitives/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+//! Symmetric primitives & Libsodium bindings
+
+pub(crate) mod sodium;
+pub(crate) mod kmac;
+pub(crate) mod kem;
+
+pub(crate) use sodium::*;
+pub(crate) use kmac::kmac256;
+pub(crate) use kem::{KEM, StaticKEM, EphemeralKEM};

rosenpass/src/primitives/sodium.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
-//! Bindings and helpers for accessing libsodium functions
+//! bindings and helpers for accessing libsodium functions
 
 use crate::util::*;
 use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
 use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
 use log::trace;
 use static_assertions::const_assert_eq;
+use std::slice::from_ref;
 use std::os::raw::{c_ulonglong, c_void};
 use std::ptr::{null as nullptr, null_mut as nullptr_mut};
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::cmp::max;
+use num_traits::{Zero, ToBytes};
 
 pub const AEAD_TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_ABYTES as usize;
 pub const AEAD_NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
@@ -187,30 +191,6 @@ pub fn xaead_dec_into(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-#[inline]
-fn blake2b_flexible(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
-    const KEY_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_KEYBYTES_MIN as usize;
-    const KEY_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_KEYBYTES_MAX as usize;
-    const OUT_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES_MIN as usize;
-    const OUT_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES_MAX as usize;
-    assert!(key.is_empty() || (KEY_MIN <= key.len() && key.len() <= KEY_MAX));
-    assert!(OUT_MIN <= out.len() && out.len() <= OUT_MAX);
-    let kptr = match key.len() {
-        // NULL key
-        0 => nullptr(),
-        _ => key.as_ptr(),
-    };
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_generichash_blake2b,
-        out.as_mut_ptr(),
-        out.len(),
-        data.as_ptr(),
-        data.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        kptr,
-        key.len()
-    )
-}
-
 // TODO: Use proper streaming hash; for mix_hash too.
 #[inline]
 pub fn hash_into(out: &mut [u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {

rosenpass/src/protocol.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //! will eventually yield a [PollResult]. Said [PollResult] contains
 //! prescriptive activities to be carried out. [CryptoServer::osk] can than
 //! be used to extract the shared key for two peers, once a key-exchange was
-//! succesfull.
+//! successful.
 //!
 //! TODO explain briefly the role of epki
 //!
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
 //!     pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
 //!     protocol::{SSk, SPk, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, CryptoServer, SymKey},
 //! };
-//! # fn main() -> Result<(), rosenpass::RosenpassError> {
+//! # fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
 //!
 //! // always init libsodium before anything
-//! rosenpass::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
+//! rosenpass::sodium::sodium_init()?;
 //!
-//! // initialize public and private key for peer a ...
+//! // initialize secret and public key for peer a ...
 //! let (mut peer_a_sk, mut peer_a_pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
 //! StaticKEM::keygen(peer_a_sk.secret_mut(), peer_a_pk.secret_mut())?;
 //!
@@ -42,25 +42,26 @@
 //! let mut b = CryptoServer::new(peer_b_sk, peer_b_pk.clone());
 //!
 //! // introduce peers to each other
-//! a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), peer_b_pk).unwrap();
-//! b.add_peer(Some(psk), peer_a_pk).unwrap();
+//! a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), peer_b_pk)?;
+//! b.add_peer(Some(psk), peer_a_pk)?;
 //!
 //! // declare buffers for message exchange
 //! let (mut a_buf, mut b_buf) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
 //!
 //! // let a initiate a handshake
-//! let length = a.initiate_handshake(PeerPtr(0), a_buf.as_mut_slice());
+//! let mut maybe_len = Some(a.initiate_handshake(PeerPtr(0), a_buf.as_mut_slice())?);
 //!
-//! // let b respond to a and a respond to b, in two rounds
-//! for _ in 0..2 {
-//!    b.handle_msg(&a_buf[..], &mut b_buf[..]);
-//!    a.handle_msg(&b_buf[..], &mut a_buf[..]);
+//! // let a and b communicate
+//! while let Some(len) = maybe_len {
+//!    maybe_len = b.handle_msg(&a_buf[..len], &mut b_buf[..])?.resp;
+//!    std::mem::swap(&mut a, &mut b);
+//!    std::mem::swap(&mut a_buf, &mut b_buf);
 //! }
 //!
 //! // all done! Extract the shared keys and ensure they are identical
-//! let a_key = a.osk(PeerPtr(0));
-//! let b_key = b.osk(PeerPtr(0));
-//! assert_eq!(a_key.unwrap().secret(), b_key.unwrap().secret(),
+//! let a_key = a.osk(PeerPtr(0))?;
+//! let b_key = b.osk(PeerPtr(0))?;
+//! assert_eq!(a_key.secret(), b_key.secret(),
 //!     "the key exchanged failed to establish a shared secret");
 //! # Ok(())
 //! # }
@@ -102,9 +103,10 @@ pub const BCE: Timing = -3600.0 * 24.0 * 356.0 * 10_000.0;
 // regarding unexpectedly large numbers in system APIs as this is < i16::MAX
 pub const UNENDING: Timing = 3600.0 * 8.0;
 
-// From the wireguard paper; rekey every two minutes,
+// Rekey every two minutes,
 // discard the key if no rekey is achieved within three
-pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 120.0;
+pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER: Timing = 120.0;
+pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR: Timing = 130.0;
 pub const REJECT_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 180.0;
 
 // Seconds until the biscuit key is changed; we issue biscuits
@@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ pub const BISCUIT_EPOCH: Timing = 300.0;
 
 // Retransmission pub constants; will retransmit for up to _ABORT ms; starting with a delay of
 // _DELAY_BEG ms and increasing the delay exponentially by a factor of
-// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An .secretadditional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
+// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An additional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
 // is added.
 pub const RETRANSMIT_ABORT: Timing = 120.0;
 pub const RETRANSMIT_DELAY_GROWTH: Timing = 2.0;
@@ -187,7 +189,7 @@ pub struct CryptoServer {
 /// A Biscuit is like a fancy cookie. To avoid state disruption attacks,
 /// the responder doesn't store state. Instead the state is stored in a
 /// Biscuit, that is encrypted using the [BiscuitKey] which is only known to
-/// the Respnder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
+/// the Responder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
 /// the responder can avoid storing this state.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct BiscuitKey {
@@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ pub struct HandshakeState {
     pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
 }
 
-#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
+#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Copy, Clone)]
 pub enum HandshakeRole {
     Initiator,
     Responder,
@@ -249,18 +251,13 @@ impl HandshakeRole {
     }
 }
 
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
 pub enum HandshakeStateMachine {
+    #[default]
     RespHello,
     RespConf,
 }
 
-impl Default for HandshakeStateMachine {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        HandshakeStateMachine::RespHello
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct InitiatorHandshake {
     pub created_at: Timing,
@@ -286,28 +283,29 @@ pub struct Session {
     pub created_at: Timing,
     pub sidm: SessionId,
     pub sidt: SessionId,
+    pub handshake_role: HandshakeRole,
     // Crypto
     pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
     /// Key for Transmission ("transmission key mine")
     pub txkm: SymKey,
-    /// Key for Receival ("transmission key theirs")
+    /// Key for Reception ("transmission key theirs")
     pub txkt: SymKey,
     /// Nonce for Transmission ("transmission nonce mine")
     pub txnm: u64,
-    /// Nonce for Receival ("transmission nonce theirs")
+    /// Nonce for Reception ("transmission nonce theirs")
     pub txnt: u64,
 }
 
 /// Lifecycle of a Secret
 ///
-/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highes/biggest
+/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highest/biggest
 /// variant ([Lifecycle::Young]) is the most preferable one in a class of
 /// equal-role secrets.
 #[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
 enum Lifecycle {
     /// Not even generated
     Void = 0,
-    /// Secret must be zeroized, disposal adviced
+    /// Secret must be zeroized, disposal advised
     Dead,
     /// Soon to be dead: the secret might be used for receiving
     /// data, but must not be used for future sending
@@ -498,7 +496,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         Ok(PeerPtr(peerno))
     }
 
-    /// Register a new session (during a sucesfull handshake, persisting longer
+    /// Register a new session (during a successful handshake, persisting longer
     /// than the handshake). Might return an error on session id collision
     pub fn register_session(&mut self, id: SessionId, peer: PeerPtr) -> Result<()> {
         match self.index.entry(IndexKey::Sid(id)) {
@@ -604,6 +602,7 @@ impl Session {
             created_at: 0.0,
             sidm: SessionId::zero(),
             sidt: SessionId::zero(),
+            handshake_role: HandshakeRole::Initiator,
             ck: SecretPrfTree::zero().dup(),
             txkm: SymKey::zero(),
             txkt: SymKey::zero(),
@@ -616,7 +615,7 @@ impl Session {
 // BISCUIT KEY ///////////////////////////////////
 
 /// Biscuit Keys are always randomized, so that even if through a bug some
-/// secrete is encrypted with an unitialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
+/// secrete is encrypted with an initialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
 /// everybody may read the secret.
 impl BiscuitKey {
     // new creates a random value, that might be counterintuitive for a Default
@@ -662,7 +661,20 @@ impl Mortal for SessionPtr {
     }
 
     fn retire_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
-        self.created_at(srv).map(|t| t + REKEY_AFTER_TIME)
+        // If we were the initiator, wait an extra ten seconds to avoid
+        // both parties starting the handshake at the same time. In most situations
+        // this should provide ample time for the other party to perform a
+        // complete handshake before this peer starts another handshake.
+        // This also has the peers going back and forth taking the initiator role
+        // and responder role.
+        use HandshakeRole::*;
+        self.get(srv).as_ref().map(|p| {
+            let wait = match p.handshake_role {
+                Initiator => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR,
+                Responder => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER,
+            };
+            p.created_at + wait
+        })
     }
 
     fn die_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
@@ -722,10 +734,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// Initiate a new handshake, put it to the `tx_buf` __and__ to the
     /// retransmission storage
     // NOTE retransmission? yes if initiator, no if responder
-    // TODO remove unecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
+    // TODO remove unnecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
     // TODO move retransmission storage to io server
     pub fn initiate_handshake(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize> {
-        let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<()>>()?; // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
+        let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitHello<()>>()?; // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
         self.handle_initiation(peer, msg.payload_mut().init_hello()?)?;
         let len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitHello, msg)?;
         peer.hs()
@@ -747,7 +759,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     ///
     /// The response is only dependent on the incoming message, thus this
     /// function is called regardless of whether the the the calling context is
-    /// an iniator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
+    /// an initiator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
     ///
     /// 1. check incoming message for valid [MsgType]
     /// 2. check that the seal is intact, e.g. that the message is
@@ -757,11 +769,11 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// 4. if the protocol foresees a response to this message, generate one
     /// 5. seal the response with cryptographic authentication
     /// 6. if the response is a ResponseHello, store the sealed response for
-    ///    further retransmision
-    /// 7. return some peerpointer if the exchange completed with this message
+    ///    further retransmission
+    /// 7. return some peer pointer if the exchange completed with this message
     /// 8. return the length of the response generated
     ///
-    /// This is the sequence of a succesful handshake:
+    /// This is the sequence of a successful handshake:
     ///
     /// | time | Initiator   | direction | Responder   |
     /// | ---  | ---:        | :---:     | :---        |
@@ -771,7 +783,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// | t3   |             | <-        | `EmptyData` |
     pub fn handle_msg(&mut self, rx_buf: &[u8], tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<HandleMsgResult> {
         let seal_broken = "Message seal broken!";
-        // lengt of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
+        // length of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
         let mut len = 0;
         let mut exchanged = false;
 
@@ -782,7 +794,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_init_hello(
                     msg_in.payload().init_hello()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().resp_hello()?,
@@ -794,7 +806,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_resp_hello(
                     msg_in.payload().resp_hello()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().init_conf()?,
@@ -809,7 +821,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_init_conf(
                     msg_in.payload().init_conf()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().empty_data()?,
@@ -1242,7 +1254,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
     ) -> Result<&mut Self> {
         let mut shk = Secret::<SHK_LEN>::zero();
         T::encaps(shk.secret_mut(), ct, pk)?;
-        self.mix(pk)?.mix(shk.secret())?.mix(ct)
+        self.mix(pk)?.mix(ct)?.mix(shk.secret())
     }
 
     pub fn decaps_and_mix<T: KEM, const SHK_LEN: usize>(
@@ -1253,7 +1265,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
     ) -> Result<&mut Self> {
         let mut shk = Secret::<SHK_LEN>::zero();
         T::decaps(shk.secret_mut(), sk, ct)?;
-        self.mix(pk)?.mix(shk.secret())?.mix(ct)
+        self.mix(pk)?.mix(ct)?.mix(shk.secret())
     }
 
     pub fn store_biscuit(
@@ -1285,7 +1297,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         sodium_bigint_inc(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
 
         // The first bit of the nonce indicates which biscuit key was used
-        // TODO: This is premature optimiaztion. Remove!
+        // TODO: This is premature optimization. Remove!
         let bk = srv.active_biscuit_key();
         let mut n = XAEADNonce::random();
         n[0] &= 0b0111_1111;
@@ -1309,7 +1321,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         // The first bit of the biscuit indicates which biscuit key was used
         let bk = BiscuitKeyPtr(((biscuit_ct[0] & 0b1000_0000) >> 7) as usize);
 
-        // Calculate addtional data fields
+        // Calculate additional data fields
         let ad = lprf::biscuit_ad()?
             .mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
             .mix(sidi.as_slice())?
@@ -1366,6 +1378,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
             created_at,
             sidm: mysid,
             sidt: peersid,
+            handshake_role: role,
             ck,
             txkm: ktx,
             txkt: krx,
@@ -1591,6 +1604,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         // ICI7
         peer.session()
             .insert(self, core.enter_live(self, HandshakeRole::Initiator)?)?;
+
+        // RHI8
+        hs_mut!().eski.zeroize();
+
         hs_mut!().core.erase();
         hs_mut!().next = HandshakeStateMachine::RespConf;
 
@@ -1628,9 +1645,30 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             // ICR7
             peer.session()
                 .insert(self, core.enter_live(self, HandshakeRole::Responder)?)?;
+            // TODO: This should be part of the protocol specification.
+            // Abort any ongoing handshake from initiator role
+            peer.hs().take(self);
         }
 
         // TODO: Implementing RP should be possible without touching the live session stuff
+        // TODO: I fear that this may lead to race conditions; the acknowledgement may be
+        //       sent on a different session than the incoming packet. This should be mitigated
+        //       by the deliberate back off in SessionPtr::retire_at as in practice only one
+        //       handshake should be going on at a time.
+        //       I think it may not be possible to formulate the protocol in such a way that
+        //       we can be sure that the other party possesses a matching key; maybe we should
+        //       study mathematically whether this even is possible.
+        //       WireGuard solves this by just having multiple sessions so even if there is a
+        //       race condition leading to two concurrent active sessions, data can still be sent.
+        //       It would be nice if Rosenpass could do the same, but in order for that to work,
+        //       WireGuard would have to have support for multiple PSKs (with a timeout) and
+        //       WireGuard; to identify which PSK was used, wireguard would have to do a linear
+        //       search with the responder trying each available PSK.
+        //       In practice, the best thing to do might be to send regular pings to confirm that
+        //       the key is still the same, which adds a bit of overhead.
+        //       Another option would be to monitor WireGuard for failing handshakes and trigger
+        //       a Rosenpass handshake in case a key mismatch due to a race condition is the reason
+        //       for the failing handshake.
 
         // Send ack – Implementing sending the empty acknowledgement here
         // instead of a generic PeerPtr::send(&Server, Option<&[u8]>) -> Either<EmptyData, Data>
@@ -1640,7 +1678,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .session()
             .get_mut(self)
             .as_mut()
-            .context("Cannot send acknoledgement. No session.")?;
+            .context("Cannot send acknowledgement. No session.")?;
         rc.sid_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.sidt.value);
         rc.ctr_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.txnm.to_le_bytes());
         ses.txnm += 1; // Increment nonce before encryption, just in case an error is raised
@@ -1700,27 +1738,94 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 mod test {
     use super::*;
 
-    fn init_crypto_server() -> CryptoServer {
-        // always init libsodium before anything
+    #[test]
+    /// Ensure that the protocol implementation can deal with truncated
+    /// messages and with overlong messages.
+    ///
+    /// This test performs a complete handshake between two randomly generated
+    /// servers; instead of delivering the message correctly at first messages
+    /// of length zero through about 1.2 times the correct message size are delivered.
+    ///
+    /// Producing an error is expected on each of these messages.
+    ///
+    /// Finally the correct message is delivered and the same process
+    /// starts again in the other direction.
+    ///
+    /// Through all this, the handshake should still successfully terminate;
+    /// i.e. an exchanged key must be produced in both servers.
+    fn handles_incorrect_size_messages() {
         crate::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
 
-        // initialize public and private key for the crypto server
-        let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-        StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut()).expect("unable to generate keys");
+        stacker::grow(8 * 1024 * 1024, || {
+            const OVERSIZED_MESSAGE: usize = ((MAX_MESSAGE_LEN as f32) * 1.2) as usize;
+            type MsgBufPlus = Public<OVERSIZED_MESSAGE>;
 
-        CryptoServer::new(sk, pk)
+            const PEER0: PeerPtr = PeerPtr(0);
+
+            let (mut me, mut they) = make_server_pair().unwrap();
+            let (mut msgbuf, mut resbuf) = (MsgBufPlus::zero(), MsgBufPlus::zero());
+
+            // Process the entire handshake
+            let mut msglen = Some(me.initiate_handshake(PEER0, &mut *resbuf).unwrap());
+            loop {
+                if let Some(l) = msglen {
+                    std::mem::swap(&mut me, &mut they);
+                    std::mem::swap(&mut msgbuf, &mut resbuf);
+                    msglen = test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(&mut me, &*msgbuf, l, &mut *resbuf);
+                } else {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            assert_eq!(
+                me.osk(PEER0).unwrap().secret(),
+                they.osk(PEER0).unwrap().secret()
+            );
+        });
     }
 
-    /// The determination of the message type relies on reading the first byte of the message. Only
-    /// after that the length of the message is checked against the specified message type. This
-    /// test ensures that nothing breaks in the case of an empty message.
-    #[test]
-    #[should_panic = "called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: received empty message, ignoring it"]
-    fn handle_empty_message() {
-        let mut crypt = init_crypto_server();
-        let empty_rx_buf = [0u8; 0];
-        let mut tx_buf = [0u8; 0];
+    /// Used in handles_incorrect_size_messages() to first deliver many truncated
+    /// and overlong messages, finally the correct message is delivered and the response
+    /// returned.
+    fn test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(
+        srv: &mut CryptoServer,
+        msgbuf: &[u8],
+        msglen: usize,
+        resbuf: &mut [u8],
+    ) -> Option<usize> {
+        resbuf.fill(0);
 
-        crypt.handle_msg(&empty_rx_buf, &mut tx_buf).unwrap();
+        for l in 0..(((msglen as f32) * 1.2) as usize) {
+            if l == msglen {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            let res = srv.handle_msg(&msgbuf[..l], resbuf);
+            assert!(matches!(res, Err(_))); // handle_msg should raise an error
+            assert!(!resbuf.iter().find(|x| **x != 0).is_some()); // resbuf should not have been changed
+        }
+
+        // Apply the proper handle_msg operation
+        srv.handle_msg(&msgbuf[..msglen], resbuf).unwrap().resp
+    }
+
+    fn keygen() -> Result<(SSk, SPk)> {
+        // TODO: Copied from the benchmark; deduplicate
+        let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
+        StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
+        Ok((sk, pk))
+    }
+
+    fn make_server_pair() -> Result<(CryptoServer, CryptoServer)> {
+        // TODO: Copied from the benchmark; deduplicate
+        let psk = SymKey::random();
+        let ((ska, pka), (skb, pkb)) = (keygen()?, keygen()?);
+        let (mut a, mut b) = (
+            CryptoServer::new(ska, pka.clone()),
+            CryptoServer::new(skb, pkb.clone()),
+        );
+        a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), pkb)?;
+        b.add_peer(Some(psk), pka)?;
+        Ok((a, b))
     }
 }

rosenpass/src/util/io.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+use std::io::Write;
+use crate::util::cpy_min;
+use crate::util::result::{NeverFails, Guaranteed};
+
+/// Errors 
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum BoundedWriteSecretError {
+    OutOfBounds,
+}
+
+/// A version of the Write trait for secret data
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// let buf = [0u8; 8]
+/// assert_eq!(buf.write_secret(b"Hello"), Ok(()));
+/// assert_eq!(&buf, b"Hello\0\0\0");
+///
+/// assert_eq!(buf.write_secret(b"You glorious world"), Err(BoundedWriteSecretError::OutOfBounds));
+/// assert_eq!(&buf, b"Hello\0\0\0");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) trait WriteSecret {
+    type Error;
+
+    /// Atomic write operation: writes `buf` to the underlying container
+    ///
+    /// The implementation must guarantee that the write operation either completes
+    /// successfully, otherwise no data must be written.
+    ///
+    /// The implementation should take care to ensure that any intermediate buffers
+    /// are zeroized.
+    fn write_secret(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::Result<(), Self::Error>;
+}
+
+impl<T: AsRef<[u8]>> WriteSecret for T {
+    type Error = BoundedWriteSecretError;
+    fn write_secret(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::Result<(), Self::Error> {
+        let dst = self.as_ref();
+        if dst.len() >= buf.len() {
+            cpy_min(buf.len(), dst.len());
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(CursorSecretWriteError::OutOfBounds)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Helper for make_write_secret to implement WriteSecret on the fly
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct ClosureWriteSecret<Fn, E>
+    where
+        Fn: FnMut(&[u8]) -> std::Result<(), E> {
+    f: Fn
+}
+
+/// Implement WriteSecret on the fly
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// enum PasswordWriterError {
+///   OutOfBounds
+/// }
+///
+/// let password = [0u8; 12];
+/// let ptr = 0usize;
+/// let password_writer = make_write_secret(mut |buf| {
+///   let new_ptr = ptr + buf.len();
+///   if new_ptr > password.len() {
+///     Err(PasswordWriterError::OutOfBounds)
+///   } else {
+///     (&mut password[ptr..]).copy_from_slice(buf));
+///     ptr = new_ptr;
+///     Ok(())
+///   }
+/// });
+///
+/// assert_eq!(password_writer.write_secret("This is"), Ok(()));
+/// assert_eq!(&password, b"This is\0\0\0\0\0");
+///
+/// assert_eq!(password_writer.write_secret("a bad password"), Err(PasswordWriterError::OutOfBounds));
+/// assert_eq!(&password, b"This is\0\0\0\0\0");
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn make_write_secret<Fn, E>(f: Fn)
+        -> ClosureWriteSecret<Fn, E>
+    where
+        Fn: FnMut(&[u8]) -> std::Result<(), E> {
+    ClosureWriteSecret { f }
+}
+
+impl<Fn, Error> WriteSecret for ClosureWriteSecret<Fn, E> {
+    type Error = E;
+    fn write_secret<W: Write>(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::Result<(), Self::Error> {
+        self.f(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: digest::Update> WriteSecret for T {
+    type Error = NeverFails;
+    fn write_secret<W: Write>(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
+        self.update(buf);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T: std::io::Write> WriteSecret for WriteSecretFromIoWrite<T> {
+    type Error = std::io::Error;
+    fn write_secret<W: Write>(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+        self.0.write_all(buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Helper for counting the number of byts written to a stream
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// let counter = CountAndWriteSecret::new(make_write_secret(|buf| -> std::Result<(), ()> {
+///     Ok(())
+/// }));
+///
+/// assert_eq!(counter.write_secret(b"hello"), Ok(()));
+/// assert_eq!(counter.count(), 5);
+///
+/// let (dummy_writer, count) = counter.into_parts();
+/// assert_eq!(count, 5);
+///
+/// let counter = CountAndWriteSecret::from_parts(dummy_writer, count+2000);
+/// assert_eq!(counter.write_secret(b" world"), Ok(()));
+/// assert_eq!(counter.count(), 2011);
+/// ```
+pub(crate) struct CountAndWriteSecret<W: WriteSecret> {
+    inner: W,
+    count: usize,
+}
+
+impl<W: WriteSecret> CountAndWriteSecret {
+    /// Create a new CountAndWriteSecret, wrapping the `inner` stream
+    pub(crate) fn new(inner: W) {
+        Self::from_parts(inner, 0)
+    }
+
+    /// Construct a new CountAndWriteSecret from an inner stream and a pre-existing count
+    pub(crate) fn from_parts(inner: W, count: usize) {
+        Self { inner, count }
+    }
+
+    /// Extract the inner stream and the current count
+    pub(crate) fn into_parts(self) -> (W, usize) {
+        (self.inner, self.count)
+    }
+
+    /// Retrieve the number of bytes written to the inner stream
+    pub(crate) fn count() -> usize {
+        self.count
+    }
+}
+
+impl<W: WriteSecret> WriteSecret for CountAndWriteSecret {
+    type Error = W::Error;
+
+    fn write_secret(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::Result<(), Self::Error> {
+        let no = self.inner.write(buf)?;
+        self.count += no;
+        Ok(no)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Construct a buffer through multiple .write_secret() calls,
+/// returning the constructed buffer.
+///
+/// # Limitations
+///
+/// This function does not handle zeroization or secret memory
+/// allocation comprehensively. It must only be used as a helper
+/// during unit tests.
+#[cfg(test)]
+fn assemble_secret<Fn: FnOnce(impl WriteSecret)>(f: Fn) -> std::vec::Vec<u8> {
+    let buf = std::vec::Vec::new();
+    f(make_write_secret(|data| -> Guaranteed<()> {
+        buf.extend_from_slice(data);
+        Ok(())
+    }));
+    buf
+}

rosenpass/src/util/math.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+use core::ops::{Rem, Add, Sub};
+
+/// Round lhs up to the next multiple of div
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(10u8, 5u8), 10u8);
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(.3f32, .2f32), .4f32);
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(22u64, 17u64), 32u64);
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn round_up<T>(lhs: T, div: T) -> T
+    where
+        T: Rem + Add {
+    lhs + (lhs % div)
+}
+
+/// Calculates the difference between val and the next highest multiple of div
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(10u8, 5u8), 0u8);
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(.3f32, .2f32), .1f32);
+/// assert_eq!(round_up(22u64, 17u64), 32u64);
+/// ```
+pub(crate) fn gap_towards_multiple<T>(val: T, div: T)
+    where
+        T: Rem + Add + Sub {
+    round_up(val, div) - val
+}

rosenpass/src/util/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+//! Helper functions and macros
+use anyhow::{ensure, Context, Result};
+use base64::{
+    display::Base64Display as B64Display, read::DecoderReader as B64Reader,
+    write::EncoderWriter as B64Writer,
+};
+use std::{
+    borrow::{Borrow, BorrowMut},
+    cmp::min,
+    fs::{File, OpenOptions},
+    io::{Read, Write},
+    path::Path,
+    time::{Duration, Instant},
+};
+
+// TODO: Move everything except module declarations out of this file
+pub(crate) mod types;
+pub(crate) mod math;
+pub(crate) mod result;
+pub(crate) mod io;
+
+use crate::coloring::{Public, Secret};
+
+/// Xors a and b element-wise and writes the result into a.
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// use rosenpass::util::xor_into;
+/// let mut a = String::from("hello").into_bytes();
+/// let b = b"world";
+/// xor_into(&mut a, b);
+/// assert_eq!(&a, b"\x1f\n\x1e\x00\x0b");
+/// ```
+#[inline]
+pub fn xor_into(a: &mut [u8], b: &[u8]) {
+    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
+    for (av, bv) in a.iter_mut().zip(b.iter()) {
+        *av ^= *bv;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Concatenate two byte arrays
+// TODO: Zeroize result?
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! cat {
+    ($len:expr; $($toks:expr),+) => {{
+        let mut buf = [0u8; $len];
+        let mut off = 0;
+        $({
+            let tok = $toks;
+            let tr = ::std::borrow::Borrow::<[u8]>::borrow(tok);
+            (&mut buf[off..(off + tr.len())]).copy_from_slice(tr);
+            off += tr.len();
+        })+
+        assert!(off == buf.len(), "Size mismatch in cat!()");
+        buf
+    }}
+}
+
+// TODO: consistent inout ordering
+pub fn cpy<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
+    dst.borrow_mut().copy_from_slice(src.borrow());
+}
+
+/// Copy from `src` to `dst`. If `src` and `dst` are not of equal length, copy as many bytes as possible.
+pub fn cpy_min<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
+    let src = src.borrow();
+    let dst = dst.borrow_mut();
+    let len = min(src.len(), dst.len());
+    dst[..len].copy_from_slice(&src[..len]);
+}
+
+/// Try block basically…returns a result and allows the use of the question mark operator inside
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! attempt {
+    ($block:expr) => {
+        (|| -> ::anyhow::Result<_> { $block })()
+    };
+}
+
+use base64::engine::general_purpose::GeneralPurpose as Base64Engine;
+const B64ENGINE: Base64Engine = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
+
+pub fn fmt_b64<'a>(payload: &'a [u8]) -> B64Display<'a, 'static, Base64Engine> {
+    B64Display::<'a, 'static>::new(payload, &B64ENGINE)
+}
+
+pub fn b64_writer<W: Write>(w: W) -> B64Writer<'static, Base64Engine, W> {
+    B64Writer::new(w, &B64ENGINE)
+}
+
+pub fn b64_reader<R: Read>(r: R) -> B64Reader<'static, Base64Engine, R> {
+    B64Reader::new(r, &B64ENGINE)
+}
+
+// TODO remove this once std::cmp::max becomes const
+pub const fn max_usize(a: usize, b: usize) -> usize {
+    if a > b {
+        a
+    } else {
+        b
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct Timebase(Instant);
+
+impl Default for Timebase {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self(Instant::now())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Timebase {
+    pub fn now(&self) -> f64 {
+        self.0.elapsed().as_secs_f64()
+    }
+
+    pub fn dur(&self, t: f64) -> Duration {
+        Duration::from_secs_f64(t)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn mutating<T, F>(mut v: T, f: F) -> T
+where
+    F: Fn(&mut T),
+{
+    f(&mut v);
+    v
+}
+
+pub fn sideeffect<T, F>(v: T, f: F) -> T
+where
+    F: Fn(&T),
+{
+    f(&v);
+    v
+}
+
+/// load'n store
+
+/// Open a file writable
+pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(false)
+        .write(true)
+        .create(true)
+        .truncate(true)
+        .open(path)?)
+}
+/// Open a file readable
+pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(true)
+        .write(false)
+        .create(false)
+        .truncate(false)
+        .open(path)?)
+}
+
+pub trait ReadExactToEnd {
+    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> ReadExactToEnd for R {
+    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut dummy = [0u8; 8];
+        self.read_exact(buf)?;
+        ensure!(self.read(&mut dummy)? == 0, "File too long!");
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait LoadValue {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        Self: Sized;
+}
+
+pub trait LoadValueB64 {
+    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        Self: Sized;
+}
+
+trait StoreValue {
+    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+trait StoreSecret {
+    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+impl<T: StoreValue> StoreSecret for T {
+    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        self.store(path)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        let p = path.as_ref();
+        fopen_r(p)?
+            .read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut())
+            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load file {p:?}"))?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
+    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        let p = path.as_ref();
+        // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
+        // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
+        // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
+        // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
+        // data will linger in the Linux page cache anyways with the current
+        // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
+        // not worth it right now.
+        b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
+            .read_exact(v.secret_mut())
+            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}"))?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
+    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
+    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/util/result.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+use std::result::Result;
+
+/// Trait for container types that guarantee successful unwrapping.
+///
+/// The `.guaranteed()` function can be used over unwrap to show that
+/// the function will not panic.
+///
+/// Implementations must not panic.
+pub(crate) trait GuaranteedValue {
+    type Value;
+
+    /// Extract the contained value while being panic-safe, like .unwrap()
+    ///
+    /// # Panic Safety
+    ///
+    /// Implementations of guaranteed() must not panic.
+    fn guaranteed(self) -> Self::Value;
+}
+
+/// An error type to indicate that an error will not occur.
+///
+/// This is a nullary enum; i.e. an instance of this enum can not be created.
+pub(crate) enum NeverFails {}
+
+/// A result type that never contains an error.
+///
+/// This is mostly useful in generic contexts.
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```
+/// use std::num::Wrapping;
+/// use std::result::Result;
+///
+/// trait FailableAddition {
+///   type Error;
+///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Result<Self, Self::Error>;
+/// }
+///
+/// struct OverflowError;
+///
+/// impl<T> FailableAddition for Wrapping<T> {
+///   type Error = NeverFails;
+///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Guaranteed<Self> {
+///     self + other
+///   }
+/// }
+///
+/// impl<T> FailableAddition for u32 {
+///   type Error = NeverFails;
+///   fn failable_addition(&self, other: &Self) -> Guaranteed<Self> {
+///     match self.checked_add(*other) {
+///         Some(v) => Ok(v),
+///         None => Err(OverflowError),
+///     }
+///   }
+/// }
+///
+/// fn failable_multiply<T>(a: &T, b: u32)
+///         -> Result<T, T::Error> {
+///     where
+///         T: FailableAddition<Error> {
+///     let mut accu = a.failable_addition(a)?;
+///     for _ in ..(b-1) {
+///         accu.failable_addition(a)?;
+///     }
+///     Ok(accu)
+/// }
+///
+/// // We can use .guaranteed() with Wrapping<u32>, since the operation uses
+/// // the NeverFails error type.
+/// // We can also use unwrap which just happens to not raise an error.
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping::new(42u32), 3).guaranteed(), 126);
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&Wrapping::new(42u32), 3).unwrap(), 126);
+///
+/// // We can not use .guaranteed() with u32, since there can be an error.
+/// // We can however use unwrap(), which may panic
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&42u32, 3).guaranteed(), 126); // COMPILER ERROR
+/// assert_eq!(failable_multiply(&42u32, 3).unwrap(), 126);
+/// ```
+pub(crate) type Guaranteed<T> = Result<T, NeverFails>;
+
+impl<T> GuaranteedValue for Guaranteed<T> {
+    type Value = T;
+    fn guaranteed(self) -> Self::Value {
+        self.unwrap();
+    }
+}

rosenpass/src/util/types.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/// Named boolean for arbitrary use to distinguish between
+/// the directions left and right
+pub(crate) enum Leftright {
+    Left,
+    Right
+}

rosenpass/tests/integration_test.rs

@@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ fn generate_keys() {
     let tmpdir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR")).join("keygen");
     fs::create_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
 
-    let priv_key_path = tmpdir.join("private-key");
-    let pub_key_path = tmpdir.join("public-key");
+    let secret_key_path = tmpdir.join("secret-key");
+    let public_key_path = tmpdir.join("public-key");
 
     let output = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
-        .args(["keygen", "private-key"])
-        .arg(&priv_key_path)
-        .arg("public-key")
-        .arg(&pub_key_path)
+        .args(["gen-keys", "--secret-key"])
+        .arg(&secret_key_path)
+        .arg("--public-key")
+        .arg(&public_key_path)
         .output()
         .expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
 
     assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout), "");
 
-    assert!(priv_key_path.is_file());
-    assert!(pub_key_path.is_file());
+    assert!(secret_key_path.is_file());
+    assert!(public_key_path.is_file());
 
     // cleanup
     fs::remove_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
@@ -46,22 +46,22 @@ fn check_exchange() {
     let tmpdir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR")).join("exchange");
     fs::create_dir_all(&tmpdir).unwrap();
 
-    let priv_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("private-key-0"), tmpdir.join("private-key-1")];
-    let pub_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("public-key-0"), tmpdir.join("public-key-1")];
+    let secret_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("secret-key-0"), tmpdir.join("secret-key-1")];
+    let public_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("public-key-0"), tmpdir.join("public-key-1")];
     let shared_key_paths = [tmpdir.join("shared-key-0"), tmpdir.join("shared-key-1")];
 
     // generate key pairs
-    for (priv_key_path, pub_key_path) in priv_key_paths.iter().zip(pub_key_paths.iter()) {
+    for (secret_key_path, pub_key_path) in secret_key_paths.iter().zip(public_key_paths.iter()) {
         let output = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
-            .args(["keygen", "private-key"])
-            .arg(&priv_key_path)
-            .arg("public-key")
+            .args(["gen-keys", "--secret-key"])
+            .arg(&secret_key_path)
+            .arg("--public-key")
             .arg(&pub_key_path)
             .output()
             .expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
 
         assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout), "");
-        assert!(priv_key_path.is_file());
+        assert!(secret_key_path.is_file());
         assert!(pub_key_path.is_file());
     }
 
@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ fn check_exchange() {
     let port = find_udp_socket();
     let listen_addr = format!("localhost:{port}");
     let mut server = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
-        .args(["exchange", "private-key"])
-        .arg(&priv_key_paths[0])
+        .args(["exchange", "secret-key"])
+        .arg(&secret_key_paths[0])
         .arg("public-key")
-        .arg(&pub_key_paths[0])
+        .arg(&public_key_paths[0])
         .args(["listen", &listen_addr, "verbose", "peer", "public-key"])
-        .arg(&pub_key_paths[1])
+        .arg(&public_key_paths[1])
         .arg("outfile")
         .arg(&shared_key_paths[0])
         .stdout(Stdio::null())
@@ -82,14 +82,16 @@ fn check_exchange() {
         .spawn()
         .expect("Failed to start {BIN}");
 
+    std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+
     // start second process, the client
     let mut client = test_bin::get_test_bin(BIN)
-        .args(["exchange", "private-key"])
-        .arg(&priv_key_paths[1])
+        .args(["exchange", "secret-key"])
+        .arg(&secret_key_paths[1])
         .arg("public-key")
-        .arg(&pub_key_paths[1])
+        .arg(&public_key_paths[1])
         .args(["verbose", "peer", "public-key"])
-        .arg(&pub_key_paths[0])
+        .arg(&public_key_paths[0])
         .args(["endpoint", &listen_addr])
         .arg("outfile")
         .arg(&shared_key_paths[1])

rp

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ dbg() {
   echo >&2 "$@"
 }
 
+
+detect_git_dir() {
+  # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3618078/pipe-only-stderr-through-a-filter
+  (
+    git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&- \
+      | sed '
+          /not a git repository/d;
+          s/^/WARNING: /'
+  ) 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&-
+}
+
 # Cleanup subsystem (sigterm)
 
 cleanup_init() {
@@ -141,9 +152,9 @@ genkey() {
     umask 077
     mkdir -p $(enquote "${skdir}")
     wg genkey > $(enquote "${skdir}"/wgsk)
-    $(enquote "${binary}") keygen \\
-      private-key $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
-      public-key  $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
+    $(enquote "${binary}") gen-keys \\
+      -s $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
+      -p  $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
 }
 
 pubkey() {
@@ -186,7 +197,7 @@ exchange() {
         lip="${listen%:*}";
         lport="${listen/*:/}";
         if [[ "$lip" = "$lport" ]]; then
-          lip="[0::0]"
+          lip="[::]"
         fi
         shift;;
       -h | -help | --help | help) usage; return 0;;
@@ -198,15 +209,41 @@ exchange() {
     fatal "Needs at least one peer specified"
   fi
 
-  frag "
-    # Create the Wireguard interface
-    ip link add dev $(enquote "${dev}") type wireguard || true"
+  # os dependent setup
+  case "$OSTYPE" in
+    linux-*) # could be linux-gnu or linux-musl
+      frag "
+        # Create the WireGuard interface
+        ip link add dev $(enquote "${dev}") type wireguard || true"
 
-  cleanup "
-    ip link del dev $(enquote "${dev}") || true"
+      cleanup "
+        ip link del dev $(enquote "${dev}") || true"
 
-  frag "
-    ip link set dev $(enquote "${dev}") up"
+      frag "
+        ip link set dev $(enquote "${dev}") up"
+      ;;
+
+    freebsd*)
+      frag "
+        # load the WireGuard kernel module
+        kldload -n if_wg || fatal 'Cannot load if_wg kernel module'"
+
+      frag "
+        # Create the WireGuard interface
+        ifconfig wg create name $(enquote "${dev}") || true"
+
+      cleanup "
+        ifconfig $(enquote "${dev}") destroy || true"
+
+      frag "
+        ifconfig $(enquote "${dev}") up"
+      ;;
+
+    *)
+      fatal "Your system $OSTYPE is not yet supported. We are happy to receive patches to address this :)"
+      ;;
+
+  esac
 
   frag "
     # Deploy the classic wireguard private key
@@ -225,7 +262,7 @@ exchange() {
     frag_append "verbose"
   fi
 
-  frag_append_esc "    private-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
+  frag_append_esc "    secret-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
   frag_append_esc "    public-key  $(enquote "${skdir}/pqpk")"
 
   if test -n "${lport}"; then
@@ -244,7 +281,7 @@ exchange() {
       local arg; arg="$1"; shift
       case "${arg}" in
         peer) set -- "peer" "$@"; break;; # Next peer
-        endpoint) ip="${1%:*}"; port="${1/*:/}"; shift;;
+        endpoint) ip="${1%:*}"; port="${1##*:}"; shift;;
         persistent-keepalive) keepalive="${1}"; shift;;
         allowed-ips) allowedips="${1}"; shift;;
         -h | -help | --help | help) usage; return 0;;
@@ -314,8 +351,10 @@ main() {
   project_name="rosenpass"
   verbose=0
   scriptdir="$(dirname "${script}")"
-  gitdir="$(git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" || true
-  nixdir="$(readlink -f result/bin/rp | grep -Pio '^/nix/store/[^/]+(?=/bin/[^/]+)')" || true
+  gitdir="$(detect_git_dir)" || true
+  if [[ -d /nix ]]; then
+    nixdir="$(readlink -f result/bin/rp | grep -Pio '^/nix/store/[^/]+(?=/bin/[^/]+)')" || true
+  fi
   binary="$(find_rosenpass_binary)"
 
   # Parse command

src/main.rs

@@ -1,658 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
-use log::{error, info};
-use rosenpass::{
-    attempt,
-    coloring::{Public, Secret},
-    pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
-    protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
-    sodium::sodium_init,
-    util::{b64_reader, b64_writer, fmt_b64},
-};
-use std::{
-    fs::{File, OpenOptions},
-    io::{ErrorKind, Read, Write},
-    net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs, UdpSocket},
-    path::Path,
-    process::{exit, Command, Stdio},
-    time::Duration,
-};
-
-/// Open a file writable
-pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
-    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
-        .read(false)
-        .write(true)
-        .create(true)
-        .truncate(true)
-        .open(path)?)
-}
-/// Open a file readable
-pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
-    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
-        .read(true)
-        .write(false)
-        .create(false)
-        .truncate(false)
-        .open(path)?)
-}
-
-pub trait ReadExactToEnd {
-    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()>;
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> ReadExactToEnd for R {
-    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
-        let mut dummy = [0u8; 8];
-        self.read_exact(buf)?;
-        ensure!(self.read(&mut dummy)? == 0, "File too long!");
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-pub trait LoadValue {
-    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
-    where
-        Self: Sized;
-}
-
-pub trait LoadValueB64 {
-    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
-    where
-        Self: Sized;
-}
-
-trait StoreValue {
-    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
-}
-
-trait StoreSecret {
-    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
-}
-
-impl<T: StoreValue> StoreSecret for T {
-    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
-        self.store(path)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
-    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        let p = path.as_ref();
-        fopen_r(p)?
-            .read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut())
-            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load file {p:?}"))?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
-    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        let p = path.as_ref();
-        // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
-        // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
-        // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
-        // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
-        // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
-        // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
-        // not worth it right now.
-        b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
-            .read_exact(v.secret_mut())
-            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}"))?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
-    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
-        std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
-    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
-    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
-        std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-macro_rules! bail_usage {
-    ($args:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
-        error!($($pt),*);
-        cmd_help()?;
-        exit(1);
-    }}
-}
-
-macro_rules! ensure_usage {
-    ($args:expr, $ck:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
-        if !$ck {
-            bail_usage!($args, $($pt),*);
-        }
-    }}
-}
-
-macro_rules! mandatory_opt {
-    ($args:expr, $val:expr, $name:expr) => {{
-        ensure_usage!($args, $val.is_some(), "{0} option is mandatory", $name)
-    }};
-}
-
-pub struct ArgsWalker {
-    pub argv: Vec<String>,
-    pub off: usize,
-}
-
-impl ArgsWalker {
-    pub fn get(&self) -> Option<&str> {
-        self.argv.get(self.off).map(|s| s as &str)
-    }
-
-    pub fn prev(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
-        assert!(self.off > 0);
-        self.off -= 1;
-        self.get()
-    }
-
-    #[allow(clippy::should_implement_trait)]
-    pub fn next(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
-        assert!(self.todo() > 0);
-        self.off += 1;
-        self.get()
-    }
-
-    pub fn opt(&mut self, dst: &mut Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
-        let cmd = &self.argv[self.off - 1];
-        ensure_usage!(&self, self.todo() > 0, "Option {} takes a value", cmd);
-        ensure_usage!(&self, dst.is_none(), "Cannot set {} multiple times.", cmd);
-        *dst = Some(String::from(self.next().unwrap()));
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    fn todo(&self) -> usize {
-        self.argv.len() - self.off
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, Debug)]
-pub struct WireguardOut {
-    // impl KeyOutput
-    dev: String,
-    pk: String,
-    extra_params: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, Debug)]
-pub struct AppPeer {
-    pub outfile: Option<String>,
-    pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
-    pub tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum Verbosity {
-    Quiet,
-    Verbose,
-}
-
-/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct AppServer {
-    pub crypt: CryptoServer,
-    pub sock: UdpSocket,
-    pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
-    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
-}
-
-/// Index based pointer to a Peer
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
-
-impl AppPeerPtr {
-    /// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
-    pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
-        Self(p.0)
-    }
-
-    /// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
-    pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
-        PeerPtr(self.0)
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
-        &srv.peers[self.0]
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
-        &mut srv.peers[self.0]
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum AppPollResult {
-    DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
-    SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
-    SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
-    ReceivedMessage(usize, SocketAddr),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum KeyOutputReason {
-    Exchanged,
-    Stale,
-}
-
-/// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
-pub fn main() {
-    env_logger::init();
-    match rosenpass_main() {
-        Ok(_) => {}
-        Err(e) => {
-            error!("{e}");
-            exit(1);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Entry point to the whole program
-pub fn rosenpass_main() -> Result<()> {
-    sodium_init()?;
-
-    let mut args = ArgsWalker {
-        argv: std::env::args().collect(),
-        off: 0, // skipping executable path
-    };
-
-    // Command parsing
-    match args.next() {
-        Some("help") | Some("-h") | Some("-help") | Some("--help") => cmd_help()?,
-        Some("keygen") => cmd_keygen(args)?,
-        Some("exchange") => cmd_exchange(args)?,
-        Some(cmd) => bail_usage!(&args, "No such command {}", cmd),
-        None => bail_usage!(&args, "Expected a command!"),
-    };
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Print the usage information
-pub fn cmd_help() -> Result<()> {
-    eprint!(include_str!("usage.md"), env!("CARGO_BIN_NAME"));
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Generate a keypair
-pub fn cmd_keygen(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
-    let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
-    let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
-
-    // Arg parsing
-    loop {
-        match args.next() {
-            Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
-            Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
-            Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
-            None => break,
-        };
-    }
-
-    mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
-    mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
-
-    // Cmd
-    let (mut ssk, mut spk) = (SSk::random(), SPk::random());
-    unsafe {
-        StaticKEM::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
-        ssk.store_secret(sf.unwrap())?;
-        spk.store_secret(pf.unwrap())?;
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn cmd_exchange(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
-    // Argument parsing
-    let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
-    let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
-    let mut listen: Option<String> = None;
-    let mut verbosity = Verbosity::Quiet;
-
-    // Global parameters
-    loop {
-        match args.next() {
-            Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
-            Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
-            Some("listen") => args.opt(&mut listen)?,
-            Some("verbose") => {
-                verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
-            }
-            Some("peer") => {
-                args.prev();
-                break;
-            }
-            Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
-            None => break,
-        };
-    }
-
-    mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
-    mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "public-key");
-
-    let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
-        // sk, pk, addr
-        SSk::load(&sf.unwrap())?,
-        SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
-        listen.as_deref().unwrap_or("[0::0]:0"),
-        verbosity,
-    )?);
-
-    // Peer parameters
-    '_parseAllPeers: while args.todo() > 0 {
-        let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
-        let mut outfile: Option<String> = None;
-        let mut outwg: Option<WireguardOut> = None;
-        let mut endpoint: Option<String> = None;
-        let mut pskf: Option<String> = None;
-
-        args.next(); // skip "peer" starter itself
-
-        'parseOnePeer: loop {
-            match args.next() {
-                // Done with this peer
-                Some("peer") => {
-                    args.prev();
-                    break 'parseOnePeer;
-                }
-                None => break 'parseOnePeer,
-                // Options
-                Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
-                Some("endpoint") => args.opt(&mut endpoint)?,
-                Some("preshared-key") => args.opt(&mut pskf)?,
-                Some("outfile") => args.opt(&mut outfile)?,
-                // Wireguard out
-                Some("wireguard") => {
-                    ensure_usage!(
-                        &args,
-                        outwg.is_none(),
-                        "Cannot set wireguard output for the same peer multiple times."
-                    );
-                    ensure_usage!(&args, args.todo() >= 2, "Option wireguard takes to values");
-                    let dev = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
-                    let pk = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
-                    let wg = outwg.insert(WireguardOut {
-                        dev,
-                        pk,
-                        extra_params: Vec::new(),
-                    });
-                    '_parseWgOutExtra: loop {
-                        match args.next() {
-                            Some("peer") => {
-                                args.prev();
-                                break 'parseOnePeer;
-                            }
-                            None => break 'parseOnePeer,
-                            Some(xtra) => wg.extra_params.push(xtra.to_string()),
-                        };
-                    }
-                }
-                // Invalid
-                Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown peer option `{}`", opt),
-            };
-        }
-
-        mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
-        ensure_usage!(
-            &args,
-            outfile.is_some() || outwg.is_some(),
-            "Either of the outfile or wireguard option is mandatory"
-        );
-
-        let tx_addr = endpoint
-            .map(|e| {
-                e.to_socket_addrs()?
-                    .next()
-                    .context("Expected address in endpoint parameter")
-            })
-            .transpose()?;
-
-        srv.add_peer(
-            // psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
-            pskf.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
-            SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
-            outfile,
-            outwg,
-            tx_addr,
-        )?;
-    }
-
-    srv.listen_loop()
-}
-
-impl AppServer {
-    pub fn new<A: ToSocketAddrs>(sk: SSk, pk: SPk, addr: A, verbosity: Verbosity) -> Result<Self> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
-            sock: UdpSocket::bind(addr)?,
-            peers: Vec::new(),
-            verbosity,
-        })
-    }
-
-    pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
-    }
-
-    pub fn add_peer(
-        &mut self,
-        psk: Option<SymKey>,
-        pk: SPk,
-        outfile: Option<String>,
-        outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
-        tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
-    ) -> Result<AppPeerPtr> {
-        let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
-        assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
-        self.peers.push(AppPeer {
-            outfile,
-            outwg,
-            tx_addr,
-        });
-        Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
-    }
-
-    pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
-        const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
-        const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
-        let mut failure_cnt = 0;
-
-        loop {
-            let msgs_processed = 0usize;
-            let err = match self.event_loop() {
-                Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
-                Err(e) => e,
-            };
-
-            // This should not happen…
-            failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
-                0
-            } else {
-                failure_cnt + 1
-            };
-            let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
-            let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
-            error!(
-                "unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?} {}",
-                msgs_processed,
-                err,
-                err.backtrace()
-            );
-            if tries_left > 0 {
-                error!("reinitializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
-                std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            bail!("too many network failures");
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
-        let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
-
-        /// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
-        /// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
-        /// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
-        macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
-            ($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
-                attempt!({
-                    let p = $peer.get_app(self);
-                    if let Some(addr) = p.tx_addr {
-                        let len = $fn()?;
-                        self.sock.send_to(&tx[..len], addr)?;
-                    }
-                    Ok(())
-                })
-            };
-        }
-
-        loop {
-            use rosenpass::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
-            use AppPollResult::*;
-            use KeyOutputReason::*;
-            match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
-                SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
-                    .crypt
-                    .initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
-                SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
-                    .crypt
-                    .retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
-                DeleteKey(peer) => self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?,
-
-                ReceivedMessage(len, addr) => {
-                    match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
-                        Err(ref e) => {
-                            self.verbose().then(|| {
-                                info!(
-                                    "error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?} {}",
-                                    addr,
-                                    e,
-                                    e.backtrace()
-                                );
-                            });
-                        }
-
-                        Ok(HandleMsgResult {
-                            resp,
-                            exchanged_with,
-                            ..
-                        }) => {
-                            if let Some(len) = resp {
-                                self.sock.send_to(&tx[0..len], addr)?;
-                            }
-
-                            if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
-                                let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
-                                ap.get_app_mut(self).tx_addr = Some(addr);
-
-                                // TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
-                                self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
-                            }
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-            };
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn output_key(&self, peer: AppPeerPtr, why: KeyOutputReason, key: &SymKey) -> Result<()> {
-        let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
-        let ap = peer.get_app(self);
-
-        if self.verbose() {
-            let msg = match why {
-                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
-                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
-            };
-            info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
-        }
-
-        if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
-            // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
-            // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
-            // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
-            // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
-            // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
-            // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
-            // not worth it right now.
-            b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
-            let why = match why {
-                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
-                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
-            };
-            println!(
-                "output-key peer {} key-file {} {}",
-                fmt_b64(&*peerid),
-                of,
-                why
-            );
-        }
-
-        if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
-            let child = Command::new("wg")
-                .arg("set")
-                .arg(&owg.dev)
-                .arg("peer")
-                .arg(&owg.pk)
-                .arg("preshared-key")
-                .arg("/dev/stdin")
-                .stdin(Stdio::piped())
-                .args(&owg.extra_params)
-                .spawn()?;
-            b64_writer(child.stdin.unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<AppPollResult> {
-        use rosenpass::protocol::PollResult as C;
-        use AppPollResult as A;
-        loop {
-            return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
-                C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
-                    Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
-                    None => continue,
-                },
-            });
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn try_recv(&self, buf: &mut [u8], timeout: Timing) -> Result<Option<(usize, SocketAddr)>> {
-        if timeout == 0.0 {
-            return Ok(None);
-        }
-        self.sock
-            .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout)))?;
-        match self.sock.recv_from(buf) {
-            Ok(x) => Ok(Some(x)),
-            Err(e) => match e.kind() {
-                ErrorKind::WouldBlock => Ok(None),
-                ErrorKind::TimedOut => Ok(None),
-                _ => Err(anyhow::Error::new(e)),
-            },
-        }
-    }
-}

src/pqkem.rs

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-//! Traits and implementations for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs)
-//!
-//! KEMs are the interface provided by almost all post-quantum
-//! secure key exchange mechanisms.
-//!
-//! Conceptually KEMs are akin to public-key encryption, but instead of encrypting
-//! arbitrary data, KEMs are limited to the transmission of keys, randomly chosen during
-//!
-//! encapsulation.
-//! The [KEM] Trait describes the basic API offered by a Key Encapsulation
-//! Mechanism. Two implementations for it are provided, [StaticKEM] and [EphemeralKEM].
-
-use crate::{RosenpassError, RosenpassMaybeError};
-
-/// Key Encapsulation Mechanism
-///
-/// The KEM interface defines three operations: Key generation, key encapsulation and key
-/// decapsulation.
-pub trait KEM {
-    /// Secrete Key length
-    const SK_LEN: usize;
-    /// Public Key length
-    const PK_LEN: usize;
-    /// Ciphertext length
-    const CT_LEN: usize;
-    /// Shared Secret length
-    const SHK_LEN: usize;
-
-    /// Generate a keypair consisting of secret key (`sk`) and public key (`pk`)
-    ///
-    /// `keygen() -> sk, pk`
-    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
-
-    /// From a public key (`pk`), generate a shared key (`shk`, for local use)
-    /// and a cipher text (`ct`, to be sent to the owner of the `pk`).
-    ///
-    /// `encaps(pk) -> shk, ct`
-    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
-
-    /// From a secret key (`sk`) and a cipher text (`ct`) derive a shared key
-    /// (`shk`)
-    ///
-    /// `decaps(sk, ct) -> shk`
-    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
-}
-
-/// A KEM that is secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA).
-/// In the context of rosenpass this is used for static keys.
-/// Uses [Classic McEliece](https://classic.mceliece.org/) 460896 from liboqs.
-///
-/// Classic McEliece is chosen because of its high security margin and its small
-/// ciphertexts. The public keys are humongous, but (being static keys) the are never transmitted over
-/// the wire so this is not a big problem.
-pub struct StaticKEM;
-
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
-/// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
-/// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
-/// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is checked in the following code before
-/// the unsafe calls, and an early return with an Err occurs if the byte slice
-/// size does not match the required size.
-///
-/// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
-/// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
-/// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
-/// allow bigger buffers.
-impl KEM for StaticKEM {
-    const SK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_secret_key as usize;
-    const PK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_public_key as usize;
-    const CT_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_ciphertext as usize;
-    const SHK_LEN: usize =
-        oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_shared_secret as usize;
-
-    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_keypair(pk.as_mut_ptr(), sk.as_mut_ptr())
-                .to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_encaps(
-                ct.as_mut_ptr(),
-                shk.as_mut_ptr(),
-                pk.as_ptr(),
-            )
-            .to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_decaps(
-                shk.as_mut_ptr(),
-                ct.as_ptr(),
-                sk.as_ptr(),
-            )
-            .to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Implements a KEM that is secure against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).
-/// In the context of rosenpass this is used for ephemeral keys.
-/// Currently the implementation uses
-/// [Kyber 512](https://openquantumsafe.org/liboqs/algorithms/kem/kyber) from liboqs.
-///
-/// This is being used for ephemeral keys; since these are use-once the first post quantum
-/// wireguard paper claimed that CPA security would be sufficient. Nonetheless we choose kyber
-/// which provides CCA security since there are no publicly vetted KEMs out there which provide
-/// only CPA security.
-pub struct EphemeralKEM;
-
-/// # Safety
-///
-/// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
-/// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
-/// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
-/// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is checked in the following code before
-/// the unsafe calls, and an early return with an Err occurs if the byte slice
-/// size does not match the required size.
-///
-/// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
-/// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
-/// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
-/// allow bigger buffers.
-impl KEM for EphemeralKEM {
-    const SK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_secret_key as usize;
-    const PK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_public_key as usize;
-    const CT_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_ciphertext as usize;
-    const SHK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_shared_secret as usize;
-    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_keypair(pk.as_mut_ptr(), sk.as_mut_ptr()).to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_encaps(ct.as_mut_ptr(), shk.as_mut_ptr(), pk.as_ptr())
-                .to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
-        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
-        unsafe {
-            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_decaps(shk.as_mut_ptr(), ct.as_ptr(), sk.as_ptr())
-                .to_rg_error()
-        }
-    }
-}

src/usage.md

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-NAME
-
-  {0} – Perform post-quantum secure key exchanges for wireguard and other services.
-
-SYNOPSIS
-
-  {0} [ COMMAND ] [ OPTIONS ]... [ ARGS ]...
-
-DESCRIPTION
-  {0} performs cryptographic key exchanges that are secure against quantum-computers and outputs the keys.
-  These keys can then be passed to various services such as wireguard or other vpn services
-  as pre-shared-keys to achieve security against attackers with quantum computers.
-
-COMMANDS
-  
-  keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
-    Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later. Send the public-key file to your communication partner
-    and keep the private-key file a secret!
-  
-  exchange private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path> [ OPTIONS ]... PEER...\n"
-    Start a process to exchange keys with the specified peers. You should specify at least one peer.
-
-    OPTIONS
-      listen <ip>[:<port>]
-        Instructs {0} to listen on the specified interface and port. By default {0} will listen on all interfaces and select a random port.
-
-      verbose
-        Extra logging
-
-    PEER := peer public-key <file-path> [endpoint <ip>[:<port>]] [preshared-key <file-path>] [outfile <file-path>] [wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>]
-      Instructs {0} to exchange keys with the given peer and write the resulting PSK into the given output file.
-      You must either specify the outfile or wireguard output option.
-
-      endpoint <ip>[:<port>]
-        Specifies the address where the peer can be reached. This will be automatically updated after the first successful
-        key exchange with the peer. If this is unspecified, the peer must initiate the connection.
-
-      preshared-key <file-path>
-        You may specify a pre-shared key which will be mixed into the final secret.
-
-      outfile <file-path>
-        You may specify a file to write the exchanged keys to. If this option is specified, {0} will
-        write a notification to standard out every time the key is updated.
-
-      wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>
-        This allows you to directly specify a wireguard peer to deploy the pre-shared-key to.
-        You may specify extra parameters you would pass to `wg set` besides the preshared-key parameter which is used by {0}.
-        This makes it possible to add peers entirely from {0}.

src/util.rs

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-//! Helper functions and macros
-
-use base64::{
-    display::Base64Display as B64Display, read::DecoderReader as B64Reader,
-    write::EncoderWriter as B64Writer,
-};
-use std::{
-    borrow::{Borrow, BorrowMut},
-    cmp::min,
-    io::{Read, Write},
-    time::{Duration, Instant},
-};
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn xor_into(a: &mut [u8], b: &[u8]) {
-    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
-    for (av, bv) in a.iter_mut().zip(b.iter()) {
-        *av ^= *bv;
-    }
-}
-
-/// Concatenate two byte arrays
-// TODO: Zeroize result?
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! cat {
-    ($len:expr; $($toks:expr),+) => {{
-        let mut buf = [0u8; $len];
-        let mut off = 0;
-        $({
-            let tok = $toks;
-            let tr = ::std::borrow::Borrow::<[u8]>::borrow(tok);
-            (&mut buf[off..(off + tr.len())]).copy_from_slice(tr);
-            off += tr.len();
-        })+
-        assert!(off == buf.len(), "Size mismatch in cat!()");
-        buf
-    }}
-}
-
-// TODO: consistent inout ordering
-pub fn cpy<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
-    dst.borrow_mut().copy_from_slice(src.borrow());
-}
-
-/// Copy from `src` to `dst`. If `src` and `dst` are not of equal length, copy as many bytes as possible.
-pub fn cpy_min<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
-    let src = src.borrow();
-    let dst = dst.borrow_mut();
-    let len = min(src.len(), dst.len());
-    dst[..len].copy_from_slice(&src[..len]);
-}
-
-/// Try block basically…returns a result and allows the use of the question mark operator inside
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! attempt {
-    ($block:expr) => {
-        (|| -> ::anyhow::Result<_> { $block })()
-    };
-}
-
-const B64TYPE: base64::Config = base64::STANDARD;
-
-pub fn fmt_b64<'a>(payload: &'a [u8]) -> B64Display<'a> {
-    B64Display::<'a>::with_config(payload, B64TYPE)
-}
-
-pub fn b64_writer<W: Write>(w: W) -> B64Writer<W> {
-    B64Writer::new(w, B64TYPE)
-}
-
-pub fn b64_reader<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> B64Reader<'_, R> {
-    B64Reader::new(r, B64TYPE)
-}
-
-// TODO remove this once std::cmp::max becomes const
-pub const fn max_usize(a: usize, b: usize) -> usize {
-    if a > b {
-        a
-    } else {
-        b
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct Timebase(Instant);
-
-impl Default for Timebase {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Self(Instant::now())
-    }
-}
-
-impl Timebase {
-    pub fn now(&self) -> f64 {
-        self.0.elapsed().as_secs_f64()
-    }
-
-    pub fn dur(&self, t: f64) -> Duration {
-        Duration::from_secs_f64(t)
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn mutating<T, F>(mut v: T, f: F) -> T
-where
-    F: Fn(&mut T),
-{
-    f(&mut v);
-    v
-}
-
-pub fn sideeffect<T, F>(v: T, f: F) -> T
-where
-    F: Fn(&T),
-{
-    f(&v);
-    v
-}