[wip] redo of retransmission handling

.ci/gen-workflow-files.nu

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env nu
-
-use log *
-
-# cd to git root
-cd (git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
-
-# check if a subject depends on a potential dependency
-def depends [
-    subject:string # package to examine
-    maybe_dep:string # maybe a dependency of subject
-  ] {
-  not ( nix why-depends --quiet --derivation $subject $maybe_dep | is-empty ) 
-}
-
-# get attribute names of the attribute set
-def get-attr-names [
-    expr: # nix expression to get attrNames of 
-  ] {
-  nix eval --json $expr --apply builtins.attrNames | from json
-}
-
-def job-id [
-  system:string,
-  derivation:string,
-  ] {
-  $"($system)---($derivation)"
-}
-
-# map from nixos system to github runner type
-let systems_map = {
-  # aarch64-darwin
-  # aarch64-linux
-  
-  i686-linux: ubuntu-latest,
-  x86_64-darwin: macos-13,
-  x86_64-linux: ubuntu-latest
-}
-
-let targets = (get-attr-names ".#packages"
-  | par-each {|system| { $system : (get-attr-names $".#packages.($system)") } }
-  | reduce {|it, acc| $acc | merge $it }
-)
-
-mut cachix_workflow = {
-  name: "Nix",
-  permissions: {contents: write},
-  on: {
-    pull_request: null,
-    push: {branches: [main]}
-  },
-  jobs: {},
-}
-
-mut release_workflow = {
-  name: "Release",
-  permissions: {contents: write},
-  on: { push: {tags: ["v*"]} },
-  jobs: {},
-}
-
-let runner_setup = [
-  {
-    uses: "actions/checkout@v3"
-  }
-  {
-    uses: "cachix/install-nix-action@v22",
-    with: { nix_path: "nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable" }
-  }
-  {
-    uses: "cachix/cachix-action@v12",
-    with: {
-      name: rosenpass,
-      authToken: "${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}"
-    }
-  }
-]
-
-for system in ($targets | columns) {
-  if ($systems_map | get -i $system | is-empty) {
-    log info $"skipping ($system), since there are no GH-Actions runners for it"
-    continue
-  }
-
-  # lookup the correct runner for $system
-  let runs_on = [ ($systems_map | get $system) ]
-
-  # add jobs for all derivations
-  let derivations = ($targets | get $system)
-  for derivation in $derivations {
-
-    if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "static") {
-      log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
-      continue
-    }
-
-    if ($system == "i686-linux") and ($derivation | str contains "release-package") {
-      log info $"skipping ($system).($derivation), due to liboqs 0.8 not present in oqs-sys"
-      continue
-    }
-
-    # job_id for GH-Actions
-    let id = ( job-id $system $derivation )
-
-    # name displayed
-    let name = $"($system).($derivation)"
-
-    # collection of dependencies
-    # TODO currently only considers dependencies on the same $system
-    let needs = ($derivations
-      | filter {|it| $it != $derivation and $it != "default" } # filter out self and default
-      | par-each {|it| {
-        name: $it, # the other derivation
-        # does self depend on $it?
-        needed: (depends $".#packages.($system).($derivation)" $".#packages.($system).($it)")
-      } }
-      | filter {|it| $it.needed}
-      | each {|it| job-id $system $it.name}
-    )
-
-    mut new_job = {
-      name: $"Build ($name)",
-      "runs-on": $runs_on,
-      needs: $needs,
-      steps: ($runner_setup | append [
-        {
-          name: Build,
-          run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).($derivation) --print-build-logs"
-        }
-      ])
-    }
-    $cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $id $new_job )
-  }
-
-  # add check job
-  $cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---check" {
-    name: $"Run Nix checks on ($system)",
-    "runs-on": $runs_on,
-    steps: ($runner_setup | append {
-      name: Check,
-      run: "nix flake check . --print-build-logs"
-    })
-  })
-
-  # add release job
-  $release_workflow.jobs = ($release_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---release" {
-    name: $"Build release artifacts for ($system)",
-    "runs-on": $runs_on,
-    steps: ($runner_setup | append [
-      {
-        name: "Build release",
-        run: "nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs"
-      }
-      {
-        name: Release,
-        uses: "softprops/action-gh-release@v1",
-        with: {
-          draft: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}",
-          prerelease: "${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}",
-          files: "result/*"
-        }
-      }
-    ])
-  })
-}
-
-# add whitepaper job with upload
-let system = "x86_64-linux"
-$cachix_workflow.jobs = ($cachix_workflow.jobs | insert $"($system)---whitepaper-upload" {
-  name: $"Upload whitepaper ($system)",
-  "runs-on": ($systems_map | get $system),
-  "if": "${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}",
-  steps: ($runner_setup | append [
-    {
-      name: "Git add git sha and commit",
-      run: "cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin"
-    }
-    {
-      name: Build,
-      run: $"nix build .#packages.($system).whitepaper --print-build-logs"
-    }
-    {
-      name: "Deploy PDF artifacts",
-      uses: "peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3",
-      with: {
-        github_token: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}",
-        publish_dir: result/,
-        publish_branch: papers-pdf,
-        force_orphan: true
-      }
-    }
-  ])
-})
-
-log info "saving nix-cachix workflow"
-$cachix_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/nix.yaml
-$release_workflow | to yaml | save --force .github/workflows/release.yaml
-
-log info "prettify generated yaml"
-prettier -w .github/workflows/

.github/workflows/doc-upload.yml

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-name: Update website docs
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - main
-    paths:
-      - "doc/**"
-
-jobs:
-  update-website:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@v3
-
-      - name: Clone rosenpass-website repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v3
-        with:
-          repository: rosenpass/rosenpass-website
-          ref: main
-          path: rosenpass-website
-          token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }}
-
-      - name: Copy docs to website repo
-        run: |
-          cp -R doc/* rosenpass-website/static/docs/
-
-      - name: Install mandoc
-        run: |
-          sudo apt-get update
-          sudo apt-get install -y mandoc
-
-      - name: Compile man pages to HTML
-        run: |
-          cd rosenpass-website/static/docs/
-          for file in *.1; do
-            mandoc -Thtml "$file" > "${file%.*}.html"
-          done
-
-      - name: Commit changes to website repo
-        uses: EndBug/add-and-commit@v9
-        with:
-          author_name: GitHub Actions
-          author_email: actions@github.com
-          message: Update docs
-          cwd: rosenpass-website/static/docs
-          github_token: ${{ secrets.PRIVACC }

.github/workflows/nix.yaml

@@ -1,346 +1,74 @@
-name: Nix
+name: Nix Related Actions
 permissions:
   contents: write
 on:
-  pull_request: null
+  pull_request:
   push:
-    branches:
-      - main
+    branches: [main]
+
 jobs:
-  i686-linux---default:
-    name: Build i686-linux.default
+  build:
+    name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }} on ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
     runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - i686-linux---rosenpass
+      - nix
+      - ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        nix-system:
+          - x86_64-linux
+          # - aarch64-linux
+        derivation:
+          - rosenpass
+          - rosenpass-static
+          - rosenpass-oci-image
+          - rosenpass-static-oci-image
+          - proof-proverif
+          - whitepaper
+
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
+      - name: Generate gitHeadInfo.gin for the whitepaper
+        if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' }}
+        run: ( cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin )
+      - name: Build ${{ matrix.derivation }}@${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+        run: |
+          # build the package
+          nix build .#packages.${{ matrix.nix-system }}.${{ matrix.derivation }} --print-build-logs
+
+          # copy over the results
+          if [[ -f $(readlink --canonicalize result ) ]]; then
+            mkdir -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+          fi
+          cp --recursive -- $(readlink --canonicalize result) ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+          chmod --recursive ug+rw -- ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+
+          # add version information
+          git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-version
+          git rev-parse HEAD > ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/git-sha
+
+          # override the `rp` script to keep compatible with non-nix systems
+          if [[ -f ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/rp ]]; then
+            cp --force -- rp ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}/bin/
+          fi
+      - name: Upload build results
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
         with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.default --print-build-logs
-  i686-linux---rosenpass:
-    name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
-  i686-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
-    name: Build i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - i686-linux---rosenpass
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.i686-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
-  i686-linux---check:
-    name: Run Nix checks on i686-linux
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Check
-        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-darwin---default:
-    name: Build x86_64-darwin.default
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.default --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-darwin---release-package:
-    name: Build x86_64-darwin.release-package
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
-      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.release-package --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-darwin---rosenpass:
-    name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-darwin---rosenpass-oci-image:
-    name: Build x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-darwin---rosenpass
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-darwin.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-darwin---check:
-    name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-darwin
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Check
-        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---default:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.default
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.default --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---proof-proverif:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.proof-proverif
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-linux---proverif-patched
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proof-proverif --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---proverif-patched:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.proverif-patched
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.proverif-patched --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---release-package:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.release-package
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image
-      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.release-package --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---rosenpass:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-oci-image:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-oci-image --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static-oci-image:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs:
-      - x86_64-linux---rosenpass-static
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.rosenpass-static-oci-image --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---whitepaper:
-    name: Build x86_64-linux.whitepaper
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    needs: []
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---check:
-    name: Run Nix checks on x86_64-linux
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Check
-        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs
-  x86_64-linux---whitepaper-upload:
-    name: Upload whitepaper x86_64-linux
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Git add git sha and commit
-        run: cd papers && ./tex/gitinfo2.sh && git add gitHeadInfo.gin
-      - name: Build
-        run: nix build .#packages.x86_64-linux.whitepaper --print-build-logs
+          name: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+          path: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
       - name: Deploy PDF artifacts
+        if: ${{ matrix.derivation == 'whitepaper' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
         uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3
         with:
           github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          publish_dir: result/
+          publish_dir: ${{ matrix.derivation }}-${{ matrix.nix-system }}
           publish_branch: papers-pdf
           force_orphan: true
+  checks:
+    name: Run Nix checks
+    runs-on: nixos
+    needs: build
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      - name: Run Checks
+        run: nix flake check . --print-build-logs

.github/workflows/qc.yaml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: QC
+name: Quality Control
 on:
   pull_request:
   push:
@@ -17,14 +17,6 @@ jobs:
         with:
           args: --check .
 
-  shellcheck:
-    name: Shellcheck
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - name: Run ShellCheck
-        uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
-
   cargo-audit:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
@@ -70,81 +62,4 @@ jobs:
       - run: rustup component add clippy
       - name: Install libsodium
         run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
-      # `--no-deps` used as a workaround for a rust compiler bug. See:
-      # - https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/62
-      # - https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/108378
-      - run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --no-deps --document-private-items
-
-  cargo-test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: actions/cache@v3
-        with:
-          path: |
-            ~/.cargo/bin/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
-            ~/.cargo/git/db/
-            target/
-          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
-      - name: Install libsodium
-        run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
-        # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
-        # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
-        # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_. Setting it to 8 MiB
-      - run: RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test
-
-  cargo-test-nix-devshell-x86_64-linux:
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: actions/cache@v3
-        with:
-          path: |
-            ~/.cargo/bin/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
-            ~/.cargo/git/db/
-            target/
-          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v21
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - run: nix develop --command cargo test
-
-  cargo-fuzz:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: actions/cache@v3
-        with:
-          path: |
-            ~/.cargo/bin/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/index/
-            ~/.cargo/registry/cache/
-            ~/.cargo/git/db/
-            target/
-          key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
-      - name: Install libsodium
-        run: sudo apt-get install -y libsodium-dev
-      - name: Install nightly toolchain
-        run: |
-          rustup toolchain install nightly
-          rustup default nightly
-      - name: Install cargo-fuzz
-        run: cargo install cargo-fuzz
-      - name: Run fuzzing
-        run: |
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_aead_enc_into -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_blake2b -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_handle_msg -- -max_total_time=5
-          ulimit -s 8192000 && RUST_MIN_STACK=33554432000 && cargo fuzz run fuzz_kyber_encaps -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_mceliece_encaps -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_box_sodium_alloc -- -max_total_time=5
-          cargo fuzz run fuzz_vec_sodium_alloc -- -max_total_time=5
+      - run: RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --document-private-items

.github/workflows/release.yaml

@@ -3,69 +3,28 @@ permissions:
   contents: write
 on:
   push:
-    tags:
-      - v*
+    tags: ["v*"]
+
 jobs:
-  i686-linux---release:
-    name: Build release artifacts for i686-linux
+  release:
+    name: Release for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
     runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
+      - nix
+      - ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        nix-system:
+          - x86_64-linux
+          # - aarch64-linux
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build release
+      - name: Build release-package for ${{ matrix.nix-system }}
         run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
       - name: Release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
         with:
           draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
           prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
-          files: result/*
-  x86_64-darwin---release:
-    name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-darwin
-    runs-on:
-      - macos-13
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build release
-        run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
-      - name: Release
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
-        with:
-          draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
-          prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
-          files: result/*
-  x86_64-linux---release:
-    name: Build release artifacts for x86_64-linux
-    runs-on:
-      - ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
-      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@v22
-        with:
-          nix_path: nixpkgs=channel:nixos-unstable
-      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v12
-        with:
-          name: rosenpass
-          authToken: ${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Build release
-        run: nix build .#release-package --print-build-logs
-      - name: Release
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
-        with:
-          draft: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'rc') }}
-          prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') || contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') }}
-          files: result/*
+          files: |
+            result/*

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# TODO use CI_JOB_TOKEN once https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/6310 is fixed
-pull-from-gh:
-  only: ["schedules"]
-  variables:
-    REMOTE: "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass.git"
-    LOCAL: " git@gitlab.com:rosenpass/rosenpass.git"
-    GIT_STRATEGY: none
-  before_script:
-    - mkdir ~/.ssh/
-    - echo "$SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-    - echo "$REPO_SSH_KEY" > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-    - chmod 600 --recursive ~/.ssh/
-    - git config --global user.email "ci@gitlab.com"
-    - git config --global user.name "CI"
-  script:
-    - git clone --mirror $REMOTE rosenpass
-    - cd rosenpass && git push --mirror $LOCAL

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,60 +1,35 @@
-[workspace]
-resolver = "2"
+[package]
+name = "rosenpass"
+version = "0.1.1"
+authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+description = "Build post-quantum-secure VPNs with WireGuard!"
+homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
+repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
+readme = "readme.md"
 
-members = [
-    "rosenpass",
-    "cipher-traits",
-    "ciphers",
-    "util",
-    "constant-time",
-    "sodium",
-    "oqs",
-    "to",
-    "fuzz",
-    "secret-memory",
-    "lenses",
-]
+[[bench]]
+name = "handshake"
+harness = false
 
-default-members = [
-    "rosenpass"
-]
-
-[workspace.metadata.release]
-# ensure that adding `--package` as argument to `cargo release` still creates version tags in the form of `vx.y.z`
-tag-prefix = ""
-
-[workspace.dependencies]
-rosenpass = { path = "rosenpass" }
-rosenpass-util = { path = "util" }
-rosenpass-constant-time = { path = "constant-time" }
-rosenpass-sodium = { path = "sodium" }
-rosenpass-cipher-traits = { path = "cipher-traits" }
-rosenpass-ciphers = { path = "ciphers" }
-rosenpass-to = { path = "to" }
-rosenpass-secret-memory = { path = "secret-memory" }
-rosenpass-oqs = { path = "oqs" }
-rosenpass-lenses = { path = "lenses" }
-criterion = "0.4.0"
-test_bin = "0.4.0"
-libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
-stacker = "0.1.15"
-doc-comment = "0.3.3"
-base64 = "0.21.5"
-zeroize = "1.7.0"
-memoffset = "0.9.0"
-lazy_static = "1.4.0"
-thiserror = "1.0.50"
-paste = "1.0.14"
-env_logger = "0.10.1"
-toml = "0.7.8"
+[dependencies]
+anyhow = { version = "1.0.52", features = ["backtrace"] }
+base64 = "0.13.0"
+clap = { version = "3.0.0", features = ["yaml"] }
 static_assertions = "1.1.0"
-allocator-api2 = "0.2.16"
-rand = "0.8.5"
-log = { version = "0.4.20" }
-clap = { version = "4.4.10", features = ["derive"] }
-serde = { version = "1.0.193", features = ["derive"] }
-arbitrary = { version = "1.3.2", features = ["derive"] }
-anyhow = { version = "1.0.75", features = ["backtrace", "std"] }
-mio = { version = "0.8.9", features = ["net", "os-poll"] }
-libsodium-sys-stable= { version = "1.20.4", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
-oqs-sys = { version = "0.8", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber']  }
+memoffset = "0.6.5"
+libsodium-sys-stable = { version = "1.19.26", features = ["use-pkg-config"] }
+oqs-sys = { version = "0.7.1", default-features = false, features = ['classic_mceliece', 'kyber'] }
+lazy_static = "1.4.0"
+thiserror = "1.0.38"
+paste = "1.0.11"
+log = { version = "0.4.17", optional = true }
+env_logger = { version = "0.10.0", optional = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+criterion = "0.3.5"
+test_bin = "0.4.0"
+
+[features]
+default = ["log", "env_logger"]

benches/handshake.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
-use rosenpass::pqkem::KEM;
 use rosenpass::{
-    pqkem::StaticKEM,
-    protocol::{CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey},
+    pqkem::{EphemeralKEM, CCAKEM},
+    protocol::{CcaPk, CcaSk, CryptoServer, HandleMsgResult, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SymKey},
     sodium::sodium_init,
 };
 
@@ -39,9 +38,9 @@ fn hs(ini: &mut CryptoServer, res: &mut CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-fn keygen() -> Result<(SSk, SPk)> {
-    let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-    StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
+fn keygen() -> Result<(CcaSk, CcaPk)> {
+    let (mut sk, mut pk) = (CcaSk::zero(), CcaPk::zero());
+    CCAKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
     Ok((sk, pk))
 }
 
@@ -62,12 +61,12 @@ fn criterion_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
     let (mut a, mut b) = make_server_pair().unwrap();
     c.bench_function("cca_secret_alloc", |bench| {
         bench.iter(|| {
-            SSk::zero();
+            CcaSk::zero();
         })
     });
     c.bench_function("cca_public_alloc", |bench| {
         bench.iter(|| {
-            SPk::zero();
+            CcaPk::zero();
         })
     });
     c.bench_function("keygen", |bench| {

cipher-traits/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-cipher-traits"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal traits for cryptographic primitives"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]

cipher-traits/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal libsodium bindings
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing traits for cryptographic primitives.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

cipher-traits/src/kem.rs

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-//! Traits and implementations for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs)
-//!
-//! KEMs are the interface provided by almost all post-quantum
-//! secure key exchange mechanisms.
-//!
-//! Conceptually KEMs are akin to public-key encryption, but instead of encrypting
-//! arbitrary data, KEMs are limited to the transmission of keys, randomly chosen during
-//!
-//! encapsulation.
-//! The [KEM] Trait describes the basic API offered by a Key Encapsulation
-//! Mechanism. Two implementations for it are provided, [StaticKEM] and [EphemeralKEM].
-
-use std::result::Result;
-
-/// Key Encapsulation Mechanism
-///
-/// The KEM interface defines three operations: Key generation, key encapsulation and key
-/// decapsulation.
-pub trait Kem {
-    type Error;
-
-    /// Secrete Key length
-    const SK_LEN: usize;
-    /// Public Key length
-    const PK_LEN: usize;
-    /// Ciphertext length
-    const CT_LEN: usize;
-    /// Shared Secret length
-    const SHK_LEN: usize;
-
-    /// Generate a keypair consisting of secret key (`sk`) and public key (`pk`)
-    ///
-    /// `keygen() -> sk, pk`
-    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error>;
-
-    /// From a public key (`pk`), generate a shared key (`shk`, for local use)
-    /// and a cipher text (`ct`, to be sent to the owner of the `pk`).
-    ///
-    /// `encaps(pk) -> shk, ct`
-    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error>;
-
-    /// From a secret key (`sk`) and a cipher text (`ct`) derive a shared key
-    /// (`shk`)
-    ///
-    /// `decaps(sk, ct) -> shk`
-    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error>;
-}

cipher-traits/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-mod kem;
-pub use kem::Kem;

ciphers/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-ciphers"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal ciphers and other cryptographic primitives used by rosenpass."
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-constant-time = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-oqs = { workspace = true }
-static_assertions = { workspace = true }
-zeroize = { workspace = true }

ciphers/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal cryptographic primitives
-
-Ciphers and other cryptographic primitives used by rosenpass.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

ciphers/src/hash_domain.rs

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::Result;
-use rosenpass_secret_memory::Secret;
-use rosenpass_to::To;
-
-use crate::subtle::incorrect_hmac_blake2b as hash;
-
-pub use hash::KEY_LEN;
-
-// TODO Use a proper Dec interface
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct HashDomain([u8; KEY_LEN]);
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct HashDomainNamespace([u8; KEY_LEN]);
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct SecretHashDomain(Secret<KEY_LEN>);
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct SecretHashDomainNamespace(Secret<KEY_LEN>);
-
-impl HashDomain {
-    pub fn zero() -> Self {
-        Self([0u8; KEY_LEN])
-    }
-
-    pub fn dup(self) -> HashDomainNamespace {
-        HashDomainNamespace(self.0)
-    }
-
-    pub fn turn_secret(self) -> SecretHashDomain {
-        SecretHashDomain(Secret::from_slice(&self.0))
-    }
-
-    // TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that
-    pub fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        Ok(Self(hash::hash(&self.0, v).collect::<[u8; KEY_LEN]>()?))
-    }
-
-    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        SecretHashDomain::invoke_primitive(&self.0, v.secret())
-    }
-
-    pub fn into_value(self) -> [u8; KEY_LEN] {
-        self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl HashDomainNamespace {
-    pub fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<HashDomain> {
-        Ok(HashDomain(
-            hash::hash(&self.0, v).collect::<[u8; KEY_LEN]>()?,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        SecretHashDomain::invoke_primitive(&self.0, v.secret())
-    }
-}
-
-impl SecretHashDomain {
-    pub fn invoke_primitive(k: &[u8], d: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        let mut r = SecretHashDomain(Secret::zero());
-        hash::hash(k, d).to(r.0.secret_mut())?;
-        Ok(r)
-    }
-
-    pub fn zero() -> Self {
-        Self(Secret::zero())
-    }
-
-    pub fn dup(self) -> SecretHashDomainNamespace {
-        SecretHashDomainNamespace(self.0)
-    }
-
-    pub fn danger_from_secret(k: Secret<KEY_LEN>) -> Self {
-        Self(k)
-    }
-
-    pub fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        Self::invoke_primitive(self.0.secret(), v)
-    }
-
-    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        Self::invoke_primitive(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
-    }
-
-    pub fn into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_LEN> {
-        self.0
-    }
-
-    pub fn into_secret_slice(mut self, v: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
-        hash::hash(v, dst).to(self.0.secret_mut())
-    }
-}
-
-impl SecretHashDomainNamespace {
-    pub fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        SecretHashDomain::invoke_primitive(self.0.secret(), v)
-    }
-
-    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretHashDomain> {
-        SecretHashDomain::invoke_primitive(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
-    }
-
-    // TODO: This entire API is not very nice; we need this for biscuits, but
-    // it might be better to extract a special "biscuit"
-    // labeled subkey and reinitialize the chain with this
-    pub fn danger_into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_LEN> {
-        self.0
-    }
-}

ciphers/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-use static_assertions::const_assert;
-
-pub mod subtle;
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
-const_assert!(KEY_LEN == aead::KEY_LEN);
-const_assert!(KEY_LEN == xaead::KEY_LEN);
-const_assert!(KEY_LEN == hash_domain::KEY_LEN);
-
-/// Authenticated encryption with associated data
-pub mod aead {
-    pub use rosenpass_sodium::aead::chacha20poly1305_ietf::{
-        decrypt, encrypt, KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN,
-    };
-}
-
-/// Authenticated encryption with associated data with a constant nonce
-pub mod xaead {
-    pub use rosenpass_sodium::aead::xchacha20poly1305_ietf::{
-        decrypt, encrypt, KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN,
-    };
-}
-
-pub mod hash_domain;
-
-pub mod kem {
-    pub use rosenpass_oqs::ClassicMceliece460896 as StaticKem;
-    pub use rosenpass_oqs::Kyber512 as EphemeralKem;
-}

ciphers/src/subtle/incorrect_hmac_blake2b.rs

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::ensure;
-use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
-use rosenpass_sodium::hash::blake2b;
-use rosenpass_to::{ops::copy_slice, with_destination, To};
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
-pub const KEY_MIN: usize = KEY_LEN;
-pub const KEY_MAX: usize = KEY_LEN;
-pub const OUT_MIN: usize = blake2b::OUT_MIN;
-pub const OUT_MAX: usize = blake2b::OUT_MAX;
-
-/// This is a woefully incorrect implementation of hmac_blake2b.
-/// See <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues/68#issuecomment-1563612222>
-///
-/// It accepts 32 byte keys, exclusively.
-///
-/// This will be replaced, likely by Kekkac at some point soon.
-/// <https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/pull/145>
-#[inline]
-pub fn hash<'a>(key: &'a [u8], data: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], anyhow::Result<()>> + 'a {
-    const IPAD: [u8; KEY_LEN] = [0x36u8; KEY_LEN];
-    const OPAD: [u8; KEY_LEN] = [0x5Cu8; KEY_LEN];
-
-    with_destination(|out: &mut [u8]| {
-        // Not bothering with padding; the implementation
-        // uses appropriately sized keys.
-        ensure!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-
-        type Key = Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]>;
-        let mut tmp_key = Key::default();
-
-        copy_slice(key).to(tmp_key.as_mut());
-        xor(&IPAD).to(tmp_key.as_mut());
-        let mut outer_data = Key::default();
-        blake2b::hash(tmp_key.as_ref(), data).to(outer_data.as_mut())?;
-
-        copy_slice(key).to(tmp_key.as_mut());
-        xor(&OPAD).to(tmp_key.as_mut());
-        blake2b::hash(tmp_key.as_ref(), outer_data.as_ref()).to(out)?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    })
-}

ciphers/src/subtle/mod.rs

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-pub mod incorrect_hmac_blake2b;

config-examples/.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-peer-*-*-key
-peer-*-out

config-examples/peer-a-config.toml

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
-secret_key = "peer-a-secret-key"
-listen = ["[::]:10001"]
-verbosity = "Quiet"
-
-[[peers]]
-public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
-endpoint = "localhost:10002"
-key_out = "peer-a-rp-out-key"
-# exchange_command = [
-#     "wg",
-#     "set",
-#     "wg0",
-#     "peer",
-#     "<PEER_ID>",
-#     "preshared-key",
-#     "/dev/stdin",
-# ]

config-examples/peer-b-config.toml

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-public_key = "peer-b-public-key"
-secret_key = "peer-b-secret-key"
-listen = ["[::]:10002"]
-verbosity = "Quiet"
-
-[[peers]]
-public_key = "peer-a-public-key"
-endpoint = "localhost:10001"
-key_out = "peer-b-rp-out-key"
-# exchange_command = [
-#     "wg",
-#     "set",
-#     "wg0",
-#     "peer",
-#     "<PEER_ID>",
-#     "preshared-key",
-#     "/dev/stdin",
-# ]

constant-time/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-constant-time"
-version = "0.1.0"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal utilities for constant time crypto implementations"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
-
-[dependencies]
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }

constant-time/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass constant time library
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing basic constant-time operations.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

constant-time/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, To};
-
-/// Xors the source into the destination
-///
-/// # Examples
-///
-/// ```
-/// use rosenpass_constant_time::xor;
-/// use rosenpass_to::To;
-/// assert_eq!(
-///     xor(b"world").to_this(|| b"hello".to_vec()),
-///     b"\x1f\n\x1e\x00\x0b");
-/// ```
-///
-/// # Panics
-///
-/// If source and destination are of different sizes.
-#[inline]
-pub fn xor<'a>(src: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], ()> + 'a {
-    with_destination(|dst: &mut [u8]| {
-        assert!(src.len() == dst.len());
-        for (dv, sv) in dst.iter_mut().zip(src.iter()) {
-            *dv ^= *sv;
-        }
-    })
-}

doc/rosenpass.1

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-.Dd $Mdocdate$
-.Dt ROSENPASS 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm rosenpass
-.Nd builds post-quantum-secure VPNs
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm
-.Op COMMAND
-.Op Ar OPTIONS ...
-.Op Ar ARGS ...
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm
-performs cryptographic key exchanges that are secure against quantum-computers
-and then outputs the keys.
-These keys can then be passed to various services, such as wireguard or other
-vpn services, as pre-shared-keys to achieve security against attackers with
-quantum computers.
-.Pp
-This is a research project and quantum computers are not thought to become
-practical in fewer than ten years.
-If you are not specifically tasked with developing post-quantum secure systems,
-you probably do not need this tool.
-.Ss COMMANDS
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ar keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
-Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later.
-Send the public-key file to your communication partner and keep the private-key
-file secret!
-.It Ar exchange private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path> [ OPTIONS ] PEERS
-Start a process to exchange keys with the specified peers.
-You should specify at least one peer.
-.Pp
-Its
-.Ar OPTIONS
-are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ar listen <ip>[:<port>]
-Instructs
-.Nm
-to listen on the specified interface and port.
-By default,
-.Nm
-will listen on all interfaces and select a random port.
-.It Ar verbose
-Extra logging.
-.El
-.El
-.Ss PEER
-Each
-.Ar PEER
-is defined as follows:
-.Qq peer public-key <file-path> [endpoint <ip>[:<port>]] [preshared-key <file-path>] [outfile <file-path>] [wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>]
-.Pp
-Providing a
-.Ar PEER
-instructs
-.Nm
-to exchange keys with the given peer and write the resulting PSK into the given
-output file.
-You must either specify the outfile or wireguard output option.
-.Pp
-The parameters of
-.Ar PEER
-are as follows:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ar endpoint <ip>[:<port>]
-Specifies the address where the peer can be reached.
-This will be automatically updated after the first successful key exchange with
-the peer.
-If this is unspecified, the peer must initiate the connection.
-.It Ar preshared-key <file-path>
-You may specify a pre-shared key which will be mixed into the final secret.
-.It Ar outfile <file-path>
-You may specify a file to write the exchanged keys to.
-If this option is specified,
-.Nm
-will write a notification to standard out every time the key is updated.
-.It Ar wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>
-This allows you to directly specify a wireguard peer to deploy the
-pre-shared-key to.
-You may specify extra parameters you would pass to
-.Qq wg set
-besides the preshared-key parameter which is used by
-.Nm .
-This makes it possible to add peers entirely from
-.Nm .
-.El
-.Sh EXIT STATUS
-.Ex -std
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr rp 1 ,
-.Xr wg 1
-.Rs
-.%A Karolin Varner
-.%A Benjamin Lipp
-.%A Wanja Zaeske
-.%A Lisa Schmidt
-.%D 2023
-.%T Rosenpass
-.%U https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf
-.Re
-.Sh STANDARDS
-This tool is the reference implementation of the Rosenpass protocol, as
-specified within the whitepaper referenced above.
-.Sh AUTHORS
-Rosenpass was created by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske,
-Marei Peischl, Stephan Ajuvo, and Lisa Schmidt.
-.Pp
-This manual page was written by
-.An Emil Engler
-.Sh BUGS
-The bugs are tracked at
-.Lk https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues .

doc/rp.1

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-.Dd $Mdocdate$
-.Dt RP 1
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm rp
-.Nd high-level interface to rosenpass
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm
-.Op Ar explain
-.Op Ar verbose
-.Ar genkey Ar ... | Ar pubkey ... | Ar exchange ...
-.Nm
-.Op ...
-.Ar genkey PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
-.Nm
-.Op ...
-.Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
-.Nm
-.Op ...
-.\" Splitting this across several lines
-.Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
-.Op dev <device>
-.Op listen <ip>:<port>
-.\" Because the peer argument is complicated, it would be heel to represent it
-.\" in mdoc... Using an ugly hack instead, thereby losing semantic.
-[peer PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR [endpoint <ip>:<port>] [persistent-keepalive <interval>]
-[allowed-ips <ip1>/<cidr1>[,<ip2>/<cidr2>] ...]] ...
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-The
-.Nm
-program
-is used to build a VPN with WireGuard and Rosenpass.
-.Pp
-The optional
-.Op explain
-and
-.Op verbose
-options can be used to obtain further help or to enable a detailed view on the
-operations, respectively.
-.Ss COMMANDS
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ar genkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR
-Creates a new directory with appropriate permissions and generates all the
-necessary private keys required for a peer to participate in a rosenpass
-connection.
-.It Ar pubkey Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR
-Creates a fresh directory at
-.Ar PUBLIC_KEYS_DIR ,
-which contains the extracted public keys from the private keys generated by
-.Ar genkey
-and located inside
-.Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR .
-.It Ar exchange Ar PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR [dev <device>] [listen <ip>:<port>] [PEERS]
-Starts the VPN on interface
-.Ar device ,
-listening on the provided IP and port combination, allowing connections from
-.Ar PEERS .
-.El
-.Sh EXIT STATUS
-.Ex -std
-.Sh EXAMPLES
-In this example, we will assume that the server has an interface bound to
-192.168.0.1, that accepts incoming connections on port 9999/UDP for Rosenpass
-and port 10000/UDP for WireGuard.
-.Pp
-To create a VPN connection, start by generating secret keys on both hosts.
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-rp genkey server.rosenpass-secret
-rp genkey client.rosenpass-secret
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Extract the public keys:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-rp pubkey server.rosenpass-secret server.rosenpass-public
-rp pubkey client.rosenpass-secret client.rosenpass-public
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Copy the
-.Qq -public
-directories to the other peers and then start the VPN.
-On the server:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sudo rp exchange server.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass0 listen 192.168.0.1:9999 \\
-    peer client.rosenpass-public allowed-ips fe80::/64
-.Ed
-.Pp
-On the client:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sudo rp exchange client.rosenpass-secret dev rosenpass 0 \\
-    peer server.rosenpass-public endpoint 192.168.0.1:9999 allowed-ips fe80::/64
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Assign IP addresses:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sudo ip a add fe80::1/64 dev rosenpass0 # Server
-sudo ip a add fe80::2/64 dev rosenpass0 # Client
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Test the connection by pinging the server on the client machine:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ping fe80::1%rosenpass0 # Client
-.Ed
-.Pp
-You can watch how rosenpass replaces the WireGuard PSK with the following:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-watch -n 0.2 'wg show all; wg show all preshared-keys'
-.Ed
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr rosenpass 1 ,
-.Xr wg 1
-.Sh AUTHORS
-Rosenpass was created by Karolin Varner, Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske,
-Marei Peischl, Stephan Ajuvo, and Lisa Schmidt.
-.Pp
-This manual page was written by
-.An Emil Engler
-.Sh BUGS
-The bugs are tracked at
-.Lk https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/issues .

flake.lock

@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
         "rust-analyzer-src": "rust-analyzer-src"
       },
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1699770036,
-        "narHash": "sha256-bZmI7ytPAYLpyFNgj5xirDkKuAniOkj1xHdv5aIJ5GM=",
+        "lastModified": 1674240251,
+        "narHash": "sha256-AVMmf/CtcGensTZmMicToDpOwySEGNKYgRPC7lu3m8w=",
         "owner": "nix-community",
         "repo": "fenix",
-        "rev": "81ab0b4f7ae9ebb57daa0edf119c4891806e4d3a",
+        "rev": "d8067f4d1d3d30732703209bec5ca7d62aaececc",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -22,15 +22,12 @@
       }
     },
     "flake-utils": {
-      "inputs": {
-        "systems": "systems"
-      },
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1694529238,
-        "narHash": "sha256-zsNZZGTGnMOf9YpHKJqMSsa0dXbfmxeoJ7xHlrt+xmY=",
+        "lastModified": 1667395993,
+        "narHash": "sha256-nuEHfE/LcWyuSWnS8t12N1wc105Qtau+/OdUAjtQ0rA=",
         "owner": "numtide",
         "repo": "flake-utils",
-        "rev": "ff7b65b44d01cf9ba6a71320833626af21126384",
+        "rev": "5aed5285a952e0b949eb3ba02c12fa4fcfef535f",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -39,33 +36,13 @@
         "type": "github"
       }
     },
-    "naersk": {
-      "inputs": {
-        "nixpkgs": [
-          "nixpkgs"
-        ]
-      },
-      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1698420672,
-        "narHash": "sha256-/TdeHMPRjjdJub7p7+w55vyABrsJlt5QkznPYy55vKA=",
-        "owner": "nix-community",
-        "repo": "naersk",
-        "rev": "aeb58d5e8faead8980a807c840232697982d47b9",
-        "type": "github"
-      },
-      "original": {
-        "owner": "nix-community",
-        "repo": "naersk",
-        "type": "github"
-      }
-    },
     "nixpkgs": {
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1698846319,
-        "narHash": "sha256-4jyW/dqFBVpWFnhl0nvP6EN4lP7/ZqPxYRjl6var0Oc=",
+        "lastModified": 1672968032,
+        "narHash": "sha256-26Jns3GmHem44a06UN5Rj/KOD9qNJThyQrom02Ijur8=",
         "owner": "NixOS",
         "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "34bdaaf1f0b7fb6d9091472edc968ff10a8c2857",
+        "rev": "2dea8991d89b9f1e78d874945f78ca15f6954289",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -73,22 +50,37 @@
         "type": "indirect"
       }
     },
+    "nixpkgs-unstable": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1676496762,
+        "narHash": "sha256-GFAxjaTgh8KJ8q7BYaI4EVGI5K98ooW70fG/83rSb08=",
+        "owner": "NixOS",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "rev": "1bddde315297c092712b0ef03d9def7a474b28ae",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "NixOS",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
     "root": {
       "inputs": {
         "fenix": "fenix",
         "flake-utils": "flake-utils",
-        "naersk": "naersk",
-        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
+        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs",
+        "nixpkgs-unstable": "nixpkgs-unstable"
       }
     },
     "rust-analyzer-src": {
       "flake": false,
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1699715108,
-        "narHash": "sha256-yPozsobJU55gj+szgo4Lpcg1lHvGQYAT6Y4MrC80mWE=",
+        "lastModified": 1674162026,
+        "narHash": "sha256-iY0bxoVE7zAZmp0BB/m5hZW5pWHUfgntDvc1m2zyt/U=",
         "owner": "rust-lang",
         "repo": "rust-analyzer",
-        "rev": "5fcf5289e726785d20d3aa4d13d90a43ed248e83",
+        "rev": "6e52c64031825920983515b9e975e93232739f7f",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -97,21 +89,6 @@
         "repo": "rust-analyzer",
         "type": "github"
       }
-    },
-    "systems": {
-      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1681028828,
-        "narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
-        "owner": "nix-systems",
-        "repo": "default",
-        "rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
-        "type": "github"
-      },
-      "original": {
-        "owner": "nix-systems",
-        "repo": "default",
-        "type": "github"
-      }
     }
   },
   "root": "root",

flake.nix

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
 {
   inputs = {
+    nixpkgs-unstable.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs";
     flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
 
-    # for quicker rust builds
-    naersk.url = "github:nix-community/naersk";
-    naersk.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
-
     # for rust nightly with llvm-tools-preview
     fenix.url = "github:nix-community/fenix";
     fenix.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
@@ -22,16 +19,12 @@
         "aarch64-linux"
 
         # unsuported best-effort
-        "i686-linux"
         "x86_64-darwin"
         "aarch64-darwin"
         # "x86_64-windows"
       ]
         (system:
           let
-            scoped = (scope: scope.result);
-            lib = nixpkgs.lib;
-
             # normal nixpkgs
             pkgs = import nixpkgs {
               inherit system;
@@ -54,41 +47,14 @@
                 )
               ];
             };
-
             # parsed Cargo.toml
-            cargoToml = builtins.fromTOML (builtins.readFile ./rosenpass/Cargo.toml);
-
+            cargoToml = builtins.fromTOML (builtins.readFile ./Cargo.toml);
             # source files relevant for rust
-            src = scoped rec {
-              # File suffices to include
-              extensions = [
-                "lock"
-                "rs"
-                "toml"
+            src = pkgs.lib.sourceByRegex ./. [
+              "Cargo\\.(toml|lock)"
+              "(src|benches)(/.*\\.(rs|md))?"
+              "rp"
             ];
-              # Files to explicitly include
-              files = [
-                "to/README.md"
-              ];
-
-              src = ./.;
-              filter = (path: type: scoped rec {
-                inherit (lib) any id removePrefix hasSuffix;
-                anyof = (any id);
-
-                basename = baseNameOf (toString path);
-                relative = removePrefix (toString src + "/") (toString path);
-
-                result = anyof [
-                  (type == "directory")
-                  (any (ext: hasSuffix ".${ext}" basename) extensions)
-                  (any (file: file == relative) files)
-                ];
-              });
-
-              result = pkgs.lib.sources.cleanSourceWith { inherit src filter; };
-            };
-
             # builds a bin path for all dependencies for the `rp` shellscript
             rpBinPath = p: with p; lib.makeBinPath [
               coreutils
@@ -101,50 +67,19 @@
             # given set of nixpkgs
             rpDerivation = p:
               let
-                # whether we want to build a statically linked binary
-                isStatic = p.targetPlatform.isStatic;
-
-                # the rust target of `p`
-                target = p.rust.toRustTargetSpec p.targetPlatform;
-
-                # convert a string to shout case
-                shout = string: builtins.replaceStrings [ "-" ] [ "_" ] (pkgs.lib.toUpper string);
-
-                # suitable Rust toolchain
-                toolchain = with inputs.fenix.packages.${system}; combine [
-                  stable.cargo
-                  stable.rustc
-                  targets.${target}.stable.rust-std
-                ];
-
-                # naersk with a custom toolchain
-                naersk = pkgs.callPackage inputs.naersk {
-                  cargo = toolchain;
-                  rustc = toolchain;
-                };
-
-                # used to trick the build.rs into believing that CMake was ran **again**
-                fakecmake = pkgs.writeScriptBin "cmake" ''
-                  #! ${pkgs.stdenv.shell} -e
-                  true
-                '';
+                isStatic = p.stdenv.hostPlatform.isStatic;
               in
-              naersk.buildPackage
-                {
+              p.rustPlatform.buildRustPackage {
                 # metadata and source
-                  name = cargoToml.package.name;
+                pname = cargoToml.package.name;
                 version = cargoToml.package.version;
                 inherit src;
-
-                  cargoBuildOptions = x: x ++ [ "-p" "rosenpass" ];
-                  cargoTestOptions = x: x ++ [ "-p" "rosenpass" ];
-
-                  doCheck = true;
+                cargoLock = {
+                  lockFile = src + "/Cargo.lock";
+                };
 
                 nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
-                    p.stdenv.cc
                   cmake # for oqs build in the oqs-sys crate
-                    mandoc # for the built-in manual
                   makeWrapper # for the rp shellscript
                   pkg-config # let libsodium-sys-stable find libsodium
                   removeReferencesTo
@@ -152,63 +87,41 @@
                 ];
                 buildInputs = with p; [ bash libsodium ];
 
-                  override = x: {
+                # otherwise pkg-config tries to link non-existent dynamic libs
+                PKG_CONFIG_ALL_STATIC = true;
+
+                # liboqs requires quite a lot of stack memory, thus we adjust
+                # the default stack size picked for new threads (which is used
+                # by `cargo test`) to be _big enough_
+                RUST_MIN_STACK = 8 * 1024 * 1024; # 8 MiB
+
+                # nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a
+                # crypto extensions, but liboqs depens on these
                 preBuild =
-                      # nix defaults to building for aarch64 _without_ the armv8-a crypto
-                      # extensions, but liboqs depens on these
-                      (lib.optionalString (system == "aarch64-linux") ''
+                  if system == "aarch64-linux" then ''
                     NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -march=armv8-a+crypto"
-                      ''
-                      );
-
-                    # fortify is only compatible with dynamic linking
-                    hardeningDisable = lib.optional isStatic "fortify";
-                  };
-
-                  overrideMain = x: {
-                    # CMake detects that it was served a _foreign_ target dir, and CMake
-                    # would be executed again upon the second build step of naersk.
-                    # By adding our specially optimized CMake version, we reduce the cost
-                    # of recompilation by 99 % while, while avoiding any CMake errors.
-                    nativeBuildInputs = [ (lib.hiPrio fakecmake) ] ++ x.nativeBuildInputs;
-
-                    # make sure that libc is linked, under musl this is not the case per
-                    # default
-                    preBuild = (lib.optionalString isStatic ''
-                      NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE="$NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE -lc"
-                    '');
+                  '' else "";
 
                 preInstall = ''
-                      install -D ${./rp} $out/bin/rp
+                  install -D rp $out/bin/rp
                   wrapProgram $out/bin/rp --prefix PATH : "${ rpBinPath p }"
                 '';
-                  };
 
-                  # We want to build for a specific target...
-                  CARGO_BUILD_TARGET = target;
+                # nix progated the *.dev outputs of buildInputs for static
+                # builds, but that is non-sense for an executables only package
+                postFixup =
+                  if isStatic then ''
+                    remove-references-to -t ${p.bash.dev} -t ${p.libsodium.dev} \
+                      $out/nix-support/propagated-build-inputs
+                  '' else "";
 
-                  # ... which might require a non-default linker:
-                  "CARGO_TARGET_${shout target}_LINKER" =
-                    let
-                      inherit (p.stdenv) cc;
-                    in
-                    "${cc}/bin/${cc.targetPrefix}cc";
-
-                  meta = with pkgs.lib;
-                    {
+                meta = with pkgs.lib; {
                   inherit (cargoToml.package) description homepage;
                   license = with licenses; [ mit asl20 ];
                   maintainers = [ maintainers.wucke13 ];
                   platforms = platforms.all;
                 };
-                } // (lib.mkIf isStatic {
-                # otherwise pkg-config tries to link non-existent dynamic libs
-                # documented here: https://docs.rs/pkg-config/latest/pkg_config/
-                PKG_CONFIG_ALL_STATIC = true;
-
-                # tell rust to build everything statically linked
-                CARGO_BUILD_RUSTFLAGS = "-C target-feature=+crt-static";
-              });
+              };
             # a function to generate a docker image based of rosenpass
             rosenpassOCI = name: pkgs.dockerTools.buildImage rec {
               inherit name;
@@ -264,7 +177,6 @@
             inherit system;
           };
           packages = self.packages.${system};
-          devShells = self.devShells.${system};
         in
         {
           #
@@ -272,11 +184,14 @@
           #
           packages.whitepaper =
             let
+              pkgs = import inputs.nixpkgs-unstable {
+                inherit system;
+              };
               tlsetup = (pkgs.texlive.combine {
                 inherit (pkgs.texlive) scheme-basic acmart amsfonts ccicons
                   csquotes csvsimple doclicense fancyvrb fontspec gobble
                   koma-script ifmtarg latexmk lm markdown mathtools minted noto
-                  nunito pgf soul unicode-math lualatex-math paralist
+                  nunito pgf soul soulutf8 unicode-math lualatex-math
                   gitinfo2 eso-pic biblatex biblatex-trad biblatex-software
                   xkeyval xurl xifthen biber;
               });
@@ -313,7 +228,7 @@
           packages.proof-proverif = pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
             name = "rosenpass-proverif-proof";
             version = "unstable";
-            src = pkgs.lib.sources.sourceByRegex ./. [
+            src = pkgs.lib.sourceByRegex ./. [
               "analyze.sh"
               "marzipan(/marzipan.awk)?"
               "analysis(/.*)?"
@@ -326,37 +241,15 @@
             '';
           };
 
-          #
-          ### A DevContainer attempt
-          #
-          packages.dev-container = pkgs.dockerTools.buildImage rec {
-            name = "rosenpass-dev-container";
-            tag = "latest";
-            copyToRoot = pkgs.buildEnv {
-              name = "image-root";
-              paths = with pkgs; [
-                bash
-                coreutils
-                curl
-                gnutar
-                gzip
-                openssh
-                stdenv.cc
-              ]; #++ lib.lists.filter (p: builtins.hasAttr "version" p)
-                #devShells.default.nativeBuildInputs;
-              pathsToLink = [ "/bin" "/lib" ];
-            };
-            config.Cmd = [ "/bin/bash" ];
-          };
 
           #
           ### Devshells ###
           #
           devShells.default = pkgs.mkShell {
             inherit (packages.proof-proverif) CRYPTOVERIF_LIB;
+            inherit (packages.rosenpass) RUST_MIN_STACK;
             inputsFrom = [ packages.default ];
             nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
-              cmake # override the fakecmake from the main step above
               cargo-release
               clippy
               nodePackages.prettier
@@ -366,6 +259,7 @@
           };
           devShells.coverage = pkgs.mkShell {
             inputsFrom = [ packages.default ];
+            inherit (packages.rosenpass) RUST_MIN_STACK;
             nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [ inputs.fenix.packages.${system}.complete.toolchain cargo-llvm-cov ];
           };
 
@@ -373,7 +267,7 @@
           checks = {
             cargo-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-cargo-fmt"
               { inherit (self.devShells.${system}.default) nativeBuildInputs buildInputs; } ''
-              cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check --all && touch $out
+              cargo fmt --manifest-path=${./.}/Cargo.toml --check > $out
             '';
             nixpkgs-fmt = pkgs.runCommand "check-nixpkgs-fmt"
               { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.nixpkgs-fmt ]; } ''

fuzz/.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-target
-corpus
-artifacts
-coverage

fuzz/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-fuzzing"
-version = "0.0.1"
-publish = false
-edition = "2021"
-
-[package.metadata]
-cargo-fuzz = true
-
-[dependencies]
-arbitrary = { workspace = true }
-libfuzzer-sys = { workspace = true }
-stacker = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-ciphers = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-cipher-traits = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass = { workspace = true }
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_handle_msg"
-path = "fuzz_targets/handle_msg.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_blake2b"
-path = "fuzz_targets/blake2b.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_aead_enc_into"
-path = "fuzz_targets/aead_enc_into.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_mceliece_encaps"
-path = "fuzz_targets/mceliece_encaps.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_kyber_encaps"
-path = "fuzz_targets/kyber_encaps.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_box_sodium_alloc"
-path = "fuzz_targets/box_sodium_alloc.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "fuzz_vec_sodium_alloc"
-path = "fuzz_targets/vec_sodium_alloc.rs"
-test = false
-doc = false

fuzz/fuzz_targets/aead_enc_into.rs

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-extern crate arbitrary;
-extern crate rosenpass;
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-
-use rosenpass_ciphers::aead;
-use rosenpass_sodium::init as sodium_init;
-
-#[derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary, Debug)]
-pub struct Input {
-    pub key: [u8; 32],
-    pub nonce: [u8; 12],
-    pub ad: Box<[u8]>,
-    pub plaintext: Box<[u8]>,
-}
-
-fuzz_target!(|input: Input| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
-    let mut ciphertext: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(input.plaintext.len() + 16);
-    ciphertext.resize(input.plaintext.len() + 16, 0);
-
-    aead::encrypt(
-        ciphertext.as_mut_slice(),
-        &input.key,
-        &input.nonce,
-        &input.ad,
-        &input.plaintext,
-    )
-    .unwrap();
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/blake2b.rs

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-extern crate arbitrary;
-extern crate rosenpass;
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-
-use rosenpass_sodium::{hash::blake2b, init as sodium_init};
-use rosenpass_to::To;
-
-#[derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary, Debug)]
-pub struct Blake2b {
-    pub key: [u8; 32],
-    pub data: Box<[u8]>,
-}
-
-fuzz_target!(|input: Blake2b| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
-    let mut out = [0u8; 32];
-
-    blake2b::hash(&input.key, &input.data).to(&mut out).unwrap();
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/box_sodium_alloc.rs

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-use rosenpass_sodium::{
-    alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Box as SodiumBox},
-    init,
-};
-
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
-    let _ = init();
-    let _ = SodiumBox::new_in(data, SodiumAlloc::new());
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/handle_msg.rs

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-extern crate rosenpass;
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-
-use rosenpass::protocol::CryptoServer;
-use rosenpass_secret_memory::Secret;
-use rosenpass_sodium::init as sodium_init;
-
-fuzz_target!(|rx_buf: &[u8]| {
-    sodium_init().unwrap();
-
-    let sk = Secret::from_slice(&[0; 13568]);
-    let pk = Secret::from_slice(&[0; 524160]);
-
-    let mut cs = CryptoServer::new(sk, pk);
-    let mut tx_buf = [0; 10240];
-
-    // We expect errors while fuzzing therefore we do not check the result.
-    let _ = cs.handle_msg(rx_buf, &mut tx_buf);
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/kyber_encaps.rs

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-extern crate arbitrary;
-extern crate rosenpass;
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::EphemeralKem;
-
-#[derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary, Debug)]
-pub struct Input {
-    pub pk: [u8; 800],
-}
-
-fuzz_target!(|input: Input| {
-    let mut ciphertext = [0u8; 768];
-    let mut shared_secret = [0u8; 32];
-
-    EphemeralKem::encaps(&mut shared_secret, &mut ciphertext, &input.pk).unwrap();
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/mceliece_encaps.rs

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-extern crate rosenpass;
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::StaticKem;
-
-fuzz_target!(|input: [u8; StaticKem::PK_LEN]| {
-    let mut ciphertext = [0u8; 188];
-    let mut shared_secret = [0u8; 32];
-
-    // We expect errors while fuzzing therefore we do not check the result.
-    let _ = StaticKem::encaps(&mut shared_secret, &mut ciphertext, &input);
-});

fuzz/fuzz_targets/vec_sodium_alloc.rs

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#![no_main]
-
-use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
-use rosenpass_sodium::{
-    alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Vec as SodiumVec},
-    init,
-};
-
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
-    let _ = init();
-    let mut vec = SodiumVec::new_in(SodiumAlloc::new());
-    vec.extend_from_slice(data);
-});

lenses/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-lenses"
-version = "0.1.0"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal library for parsing binary data securely"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
-
-[dependencies]
-paste = { workspace = true }
-thiserror = { workspace = true }

lenses/readme.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal binary parsing library
-
-This is an internal library; no guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

lenses/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-use std::result::Result;
-
-/// Common trait shared by all Lenses
-pub trait LenseView {
-    const LEN: usize;
-}
-
-/// Error during lense creation
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub enum LenseError {
-    #[error("buffer size mismatch")]
-    BufferSizeMismatch,
-}
-
-pub type LenseResult<T> = Result<T, LenseError>;
-
-impl LenseError {
-    pub fn ensure_exact_buffer_size(len: usize, required: usize) -> LenseResult<()> {
-        (len == required)
-            .then_some(())
-            .ok_or(LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch)
-    }
-
-    pub fn ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(len: usize, required: usize) -> LenseResult<()> {
-        (len >= required)
-            .then_some(())
-            .ok_or(LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch)
-    }
-}
-
-/// A macro to create data lenses.
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! lense(
-    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
-    (token_muncher_ref @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
-        ::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        $( #[ $attr ] )*
-        ///
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes long
-        pub fn $field(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-            &self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
-        }
-
-        /// The bytes until the
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link Self::$field)]
-        /// field
-        pub fn [< until_ $field >](&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-            &self.0[0 .. $offset]
-        }
-
-        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
-        $(
-        lense!{token_muncher_ref @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
-        )?
-        }
-    };
-
-    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
-    (token_muncher_mut @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
-        ::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        $( #[ $attr ] )*
-        ///
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes long
-        pub fn [< $field _mut >](&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
-            &mut self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
-        }
-
-        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
-        $(
-        lense!{token_muncher_mut @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
-        )?
-        }
-    };
-
-    // switch that yields literals unchanged, but creates docstring links to
-    // constants
-    // TODO the doc string link doesn't work if $x is taken from a generic,
-    (maybe_docstring_link $x:literal) => (stringify!($x));
-    (maybe_docstring_link $x:expr) => (stringify!([$x]));
-
-    // struct name  < optional generics     >    := optional doc string      field name   : field length, ...
-($type:ident $( < $( $generic:ident ),+ > )? := $( $( #[ $attr:meta ] )* $field:ident : $len:expr ),+) => (::paste::paste!{
-
-        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-        /// A data lense to manipulate byte slices.
-        ///
-        //// # Fields
-        ///
-        $(
-        /// - `
-        #[doc = stringify!($field)]
-        /// `:
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
-        /// bytes
-        )+
-        pub struct $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? > (
-            __ContainerType,
-            // The phantom data is required, since all generics declared on a
-            // type need to be used on the type.
-            // https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/error_codes/E0392.html
-            $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData<$generic> ),+ )?
-        );
-
-        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
-            $(
-            /// Size in bytes of the field `
-            #[doc = !($field)]
-            /// `
-            pub const fn [< $field _len >]() -> usize{
-                $len
-            }
-            )+
-
-            /// Verify that `len` exactly holds [Self]
-            pub fn check_size(len: usize) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult<()> {
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_exact_buffer_size(len, $( $len + )+ 0)
-            }
-        }
-
-        // read-only accessor functions
-        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
-        where
-            __ContainerType: std::ops::Index<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
-        {
-            lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-        }
-
-        // mutable accessor functions
-        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a mut __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
-        where
-            __ContainerType: std::ops::IndexMut<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
-        {
-            lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-            lense!{token_muncher_mut @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
-                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-
-            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
-            pub fn all_bytes_mut(&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
-                &mut self.0[0..Self::LEN]
-            }
-        }
-
-        // lense trait, allowing us to know the implementing lenses size
-        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > LenseView for $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
-            /// Number of bytes required to store this type in binary format
-            const LEN: usize = $( $len + )+ 0;
-        }
-
-        /// Extension trait to allow checked creation of a lense over
-        /// some byte slice that contains a
-        #[doc = lense!(maybe_docstring_link $type)]
-        pub trait [< $type Ext >] {
-            type __ContainerType;
-
-            /// Create a lense to the byte slice
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >>;
-
-            /// Create a lense to the byte slice, automatically truncating oversized buffers
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >>;
-        }
-
-        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a [u8] {
-            type __ContainerType = &'a [u8];
-
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
-                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
-            }
-
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(self.len(), required_size)?;
-                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&self[..required_size])
-            }
-        }
-
-        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a mut [u8] {
-            type __ContainerType = &'a mut [u8];
-            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                $type::<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >::check_size(self.len())?;
-                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
-            }
-
-            fn [< $type:snake _ truncating >] $(< $($generic : LenseView),* >)? (self) -> ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseResult< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >> {
-                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
-                ::rosenpass_lenses::LenseError::ensure_sufficient_buffer_size(self.len(), required_size)?;
-                [< $type Ext >]::[< $type:snake >](&mut self[..required_size])
-            }
-        }
-    });
-);

oqs/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-oqs"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal bindings to liboqs"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]
-rosenpass-cipher-traits = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-oqs-sys = { workspace = true }
-paste = { workspace = true }

oqs/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal liboqs bindings
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing bindings to liboqs.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

oqs/src/kem_macro.rs

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-macro_rules! oqs_kem {
-    ($name:ident) => { ::paste::paste!{
-        mod [< $name:snake >] {
-            use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-            use rosenpass_util::result::Guaranteed;
-
-            pub enum [< $name:camel >]  {}
-
-            /// # Panic & Safety
-            ///
-            /// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
-            /// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
-            /// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
-            /// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is ensured through assertions in the
-            /// implementation.
-            ///
-            /// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
-            /// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
-            /// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
-            /// allow bigger buffers.
-            impl Kem for [< $name:camel >] {
-                type Error = ::std::convert::Infallible;
-
-                const SK_LEN: usize =  ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_secret_key >] as usize;
-                const PK_LEN: usize =  ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_public_key >] as usize;
-                const CT_LEN: usize =  ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_ciphertext >] as usize;
-                const SHK_LEN: usize =  ::oqs_sys::kem::[<OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ length_shared_secret >] as usize;
-
-                fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
-                    assert_eq!(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN);
-                    assert_eq!(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN);
-                    unsafe {
-                        oqs_call!(
-                            ::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ keypair >],
-                            pk.as_mut_ptr(),
-                            sk.as_mut_ptr()
-                        );
-                    }
-
-                    Ok(())
-                }
-
-                fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
-                    assert_eq!(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN);
-                    assert_eq!(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN);
-                    assert_eq!(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN);
-                    unsafe {
-                        oqs_call!(
-                            ::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ encaps >],
-                            ct.as_mut_ptr(),
-                            shk.as_mut_ptr(),
-                            pk.as_ptr()
-                        );
-                    }
-
-                    Ok(())
-                }
-
-                fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Guaranteed<()> {
-                    assert_eq!(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN);
-                    assert_eq!(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN);
-                    assert_eq!(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN);
-                    unsafe {
-                        oqs_call!(
-                            ::oqs_sys::kem::[< OQS_KEM _ $name:snake _ decaps >],
-                            shk.as_mut_ptr(),
-                            ct.as_ptr(),
-                            sk.as_ptr()
-                        );
-                    }
-
-                    Ok(())
-                }
-            }
-
-        }
-
-        pub use [< $name:snake >] :: [< $name:camel >];
-    }}
-}

oqs/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-macro_rules! oqs_call {
-    ($name:path, $($args:expr),*) => {{
-        use oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS::*;
-
-        match $name($($args),*) {
-            OQS_SUCCESS => {}, // nop
-            OQS_EXTERNAL_LIB_ERROR_OPENSSL => {
-                panic!("OpenSSL error in liboqs' {}.", stringify!($name));
-            },
-            OQS_ERROR => {
-                panic!("Unknown error in liboqs' {}.", stringify!($name));
-            }
-        }
-    }};
-    ($name:ident) => { oqs_call!($name, ) };
-}
-
-#[macro_use]
-mod kem_macro;
-oqs_kem!(kyber_512);
-oqs_kem!(classic_mceliece_460896);

papers/crossfyre23-submission-abstract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+template: rosenpass
+title: Running a financially \\& institutionally independent post-quantum cryptography research project conference: CrossFyre 2023 submission abstract
+author:
+- Karolin Varner = Independent Researcher
+abstract: |
+       Rosenpass is a post-quantum-secure key exchange protocol with security against state\\babelhyphen{hard}disruption attacks, whose reference implementation provides post-quantum security to WireGuard deployments. The project's aim is not just to put out a research paper, but to solve the problem of providing a post-quantum VPN top to bottom: from defining a provably secure protocol to educating potential users about how to use it. To achieve this, the project team is composed of an interdisciplinary group of experts in fields inside and outside of cryptography. As such, it is quite different from many purely scientific cryptography projects.
+
+       In this presentation, I would like to share some of the learnings from running the project: how including team-members who are not researchers in the research process led us to better cryptography and how disability inclusion led to a more effective working environment. How feminist organizations shaped our communication style and finally, what funding sources we found to support this project.
+
+       Not all aspects of this project are favorable though; in particular, the extra, unpaid workload needed to coordinate this project has been enormous and the emotional drain from navigating conflicts, uncertain funding, and risk-taking is ever present.
+
+       I still think the community built in the process, the personal growth, the educational benefits and the scientific freedom are well worth the downsides; therefore I would like to exemplify the value in starting collaborations with enthusiastic colleagues from a variety of fields outside cryptographers to the CrossFyre attendees and to encourage other cryptographers to build independent projects for themselves.
+tableofcontents: false
+---

papers/graphics/rosenpass-wp-hashing-tree.svg

@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@
                 <g transform="matrix(1,0,0,1,420.66,-1031.32)">
                     <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1431.32,1459.33)">
                     </g>
-                    <text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1334px 1350.47px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> init&quot;</text>
+                    <text x="1179.63px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1207.79px 1224.25px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining init&quot;</text>
                 </g>
             </g>
             <g transform="matrix(0.389246,0,0,0.136584,299.374,1166.87)">
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@
             <g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-597.124,-172.692)">
                 <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1492.94,1459.33)">
                 </g>
-                <text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;chaining k<tspan x="1341.54px 1358px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
+                <text x="1187.16px" y="1459.33px" style="font-family:'Nunito-Medium', 'Nunito';font-weight:500;font-size:31.25px;">&quot;k<tspan x="1215.32px 1231.79px " y="1459.33px 1459.33px ">ey</tspan> chaining e<tspan x="1398.88px " y="1459.33px ">x</tspan>tr<tspan x="1437.88px " y="1459.33px ">a</tspan>ct&quot;</text>
             </g>
             <g transform="matrix(0.99675,0,0,0.996238,-380.054,-779.158)">
                 <g transform="matrix(31.25,0,0,31.25,1463.54,1459.33)">

papers/rwpqc23-slides-content.tex

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+% 
+
+\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
+	  Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
+	}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs
+  \item Contribution: State Disruption Attacks \& cookies as a defense
+  \item Contribution: Symbolic analysis of the Rosenpass protocol
+  \item Contribution: Noise-like specification
+  \item Contribution: New hashing \& domain separation scheme
+  \item Contribution: Reference implementation – Securing WireGuard in practice
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Post-quantum WireGuard: Three encapsulations}
+\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
+\begin{columns}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	  \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
+
+
+		\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
+		\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
+		\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Responder Auth
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
+
+	  \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
+
+	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Initiator Auth
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Forward secrecy
+\end{column}
+
+\end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
+
+\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
+	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder\strut}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
+	  \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+
+  Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send \enquote{(ack)}.
+
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{The Rosenpass protocol}
+  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 – DOS against WireGuard through NTP}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
+  \item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
+  \item This generates a kill packet that abuses replay protection and renders the initiator's key-pair useless
+  \item Attack is possible in the real world!
+  \item Similar attack in post-quantum WireGuard is worse since InitHello is unauthenticated
+  \item Solution: Biscuits
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Security analysis of rosenpass}
+  \begin{itemize}
+	\item CryptoVerif in progress
+	\item Symbolic analysis using ProVerif
+  \item Code is part of the software repository \& build system
+  \item Symbolic analysis is fast (about five minutes), runs in parallel and is
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Proverif in technicolor}
+  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-symbolic-analysis-screenshot.png}
+\end{frame}
+
+
+\begin{frame}{Noise-like specification (easier for engineers)}
+  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-handling-code.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{New Hashing/Domain separation scheme}
+  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-hashing-tree.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Reference implementation in rust, deploying post-quantum-secure WireGuard}
+  \includegraphics[height=.9\textheight]{assets/2023-03-20-rg-tutorial-screenshot.png}
+\end{frame}

papers/rwpqc23-slides.tex

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
+%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
+
+\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
+  {metropolis}
+\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
+
+\usepackage{verbatim}
+
+% strikethrough
+% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
+\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
+
+% bold math
+\usepackage{bm}
+
+\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
+\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
+\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
+\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
+%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
+\sethlcolor{lightblue}
+
+\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
+
+\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
+\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
+
+
+\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
+\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
+\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
+\tikzset{
+	>=Latex[round]
+}
+
+\urlstyle{same}
+
+% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
+\makeatletter
+\newcommand\SoulColor{%
+  \let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
+  \let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
+  \makeatother
+  \SoulColor
+
+\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
+\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
+\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
+
+\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
+% `title separator` is the one on the title page
+% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
+\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
+
+\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
+
+\usepackage{booktabs}
+\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
+\usepackage{fontawesome}
+
+\usepackage{pgfplots}
+\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
+
+%% tikzit
+%\usepackage{tikzit}
+%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
+%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
+%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
+%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
+
+\usepackage{xspace}
+\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
+
+
+\usepackage{stackengine}
+\usepackage{amsmath}
+\usepackage{amsfonts}
+\usepackage{amssymb}
+\usepackage{amsthm}
+\usepackage{tikz}
+\usepackage{xcolor}
+\usepackage{environ}
+\usepackage{array}
+\usepackage[
+  n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
+  probability,
+  notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
+  %keys
+  ]{cryptocode}
+\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
+
+
+\usepackage{mathtools}
+\usepackage{comment}
+\excludecomment{commentEnv}
+\usepackage{array}
+\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
+
+
+\def\makeuppercase#1{
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
+}
+
+
+
+
+\def\makelowercase#1{
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
+}
+
+\newcounter{char}
+\setcounter{char}{1}
+
+\loop
+	\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
+	\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
+	\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
+	\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
+	\stepcounter{char}
+	\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
+\repeat
+
+
+\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
+\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
+\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
+\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
+\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
+
+
+%\usepackage{pgfpages}
+%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right} 
+
+\usepackage{multicol}
+\usepackage{qrcode}
+
+
+
+%% msc message diagrams
+%\usepackage{msc5}
+%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
+%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
+%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
+
+
+\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
+% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
+\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
+\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
+\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
+\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
+%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
+%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
+
+
+\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
+\begin{frame}{#1}
+  \vfill
+  \begin{center}
+    \includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
+  \end{center}
+  \vfill
+\end{frame}
+}
+
+\usepackage{listings}
+\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
+{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
+event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
+if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
+param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
+table, time, type},
+otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
+sensitive=true,
+morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
+morestring=[b]",
+}
+\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
+{morekeywords={},
+otherkeywords={},
+sensitive=true,
+morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
+morestring=[b]",
+}
+\lstset{
+  language=cvoutput,
+  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
+  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
+  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
+}
+\lstset{
+  language=cryptoverif,
+  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
+  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
+  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
+}
+
+\usepackage{bbding}
+\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
+\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
+
+\title{%
+  Rosenpass
+}
+\subtitle{%
+  Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
+}
+\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
+\institute{RWPQC23 | \url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
+\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
+
+\usepackage[autostyle]{csquotes}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\maketitle
+
+\input{rwpqc23-slides-content}
+
+\end{document}

papers/tex/template-rosenpass.tex

@@ -177,11 +177,7 @@ version={4.0},
 		\titlehead{\centerline{\includegraphics[width=4cm]{RosenPass-Logo}}}
 		\title{\inserttitle}
 	}
-	\ifx\csname insertauthor\endcsname\relax
-	\author{}
-	\else
-	\author{\parbox{\linewidth}{\centering\insertauthor}}
-	\fi
+	\author{\csname insertauthor\endcsname}
 	\subject{\csname insertsubject\endcsname}
 	\date{\vspace{-1cm}}
 }

papers/yrcs-talk-content.tex

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+\begin{frame}{Structure of the talk}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item Problem statement: Post-quantum WireGuard % 4m
+  \item Post-quantum WireGuard\footnote{
+	  Andreas Hülsing, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, and Philip R. Zimmermann. “Post-quantum WireGuard”. In: 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021, San Francisco, CA, USA, 24-27 May 2021. Full version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
+	}: How to build an interactive key exchange from KEMs % 8m
+  \item Attack we found: State Disruption Attacks %12m
+  \item Real-World Concerns % 3m
+  \item Biscuits as a defense against State Disruption Attacks
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{What needs to be done to deploy Post-Quantum WireGuard}
+\begin{itemize}
+	\item Updating the WireGuard protocol to support post-quantum security
+	\item Updating the (post quantum) WireGuard protocol to be secure against state disruption attacks
+	\item Reference implementation of the Rosenpass protocol in Rust
+	\item A way to create hybrid post-quantum secure WireGuard VPNs
+	\item Stand-alone key exchange app
+	\item A Sci-Comm project teaching people about post-quantum security
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{WireGuard\footnote{Jason A. Donenfeld. “WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel”. In: 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017, San Diego, California, USA, February 26 - March 1, 2017. Whitepaper: https: //www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf.}}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item VPN protocol in the linux kernel
+  \item Based on Noise IKpsk1 from the Noise Protocol Framework\footnote{Trevor Perrin. The Noise Protocol Framework. 2016. url: http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf}
+  \item Small, fast, open source crypto
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{WireGuard/Noise IKpsk security properties}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \itemtick Session-key secrecy
+  \itemtick Forward-secrecy
+  \itemtick Mutual authentication
+  \itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
+  \itemtick Identity Hiding
+  \itemtick (DoS Mitigation – First packet is authenticated\footnote{Based on the unrealistic assumption of a monotonic counter – We found a practical attack})
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Security of Rosenpass}
+\begin{columns}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+WireGuard
+\begin{itemize}
+  \itemtick Session-key secrecy
+  \itemtick Forward-secrecy
+  \itemtick Mutual authentication
+  \itemtick Session-key Uniqueness
+  \itemtick Identity Hiding
+  \itemtick (DoS Mitigation)
+\end{itemize}
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+Post-Quantum WireGuard
+\begin{itemize}
+  \itemfail Identity Hiding \footnote{Based on a Identity Hiding/ANON-CCA security of McEliece; unclear whether that holds.}
+  \itemfail DoS Mitigation \footnote{PQWG provides DoS mitigation under the assumption of a secret PSK, which quite frankly is cheating.}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+Rosenpass
+\begin{itemize}
+  \itemtick DoS Mitigation
+  \itemtick Hybrid Post-Quantum security\footnote{In deployments using WireGuard + Rosenpass; Rosenpass on its own provides post-quantum security.}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{column}
+
+\end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Building post-quantum WireGuard: NIKE vs KEM}
+
+
+  NIKE:
+
+$(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_1) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
+$(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_2) \leftarrow \texttt{NIKE.KeyGen}$ \\
+$\texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_1, \texttt{pk}_2) = \texttt{NIKE.SharedKey}(\texttt{sk}_2, \texttt{pk}_1)$
+
+  KEM:
+
+$(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{pk}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.KeyGen}$ \\
+$(\texttt{shk}, \texttt{ct}) \leftarrow \texttt{KEM.Encaps}(\texttt{pk})$ \\
+$\texttt{shk} = \texttt{KEM.Decaps}(\texttt{sk}, \texttt{ct})$
+
+\end{frame}
+
+
+
+\begin{frame}{Minimal key exchange using KEMs}
+\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
+	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](pk-y) coordinate[pos=.6](ct-y)coordinate[pos=.8](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	\draw[<-](pk-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{pk} (pk-y-|responder);
+	\draw[->](ct-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {ct} (ct-y-|responder);
+	\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+\end{tikzpicture}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Three encapsulations: Achieving mutual authentication \& forward secrecy}
+\tikzset{shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt}
+\begin{columns}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.2](spkr-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.6](sctr-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	  \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
+
+
+		\draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
+		\draw[->](sctr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {sctr} (sctr-y-|responder);
+		\draw[<-](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Responder Auth
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.6](Hspki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76] (scti-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{spki} (spki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](Hspki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {H(spki)} (Hspki-y-|responder);
+
+	  \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{scti} (scti-y-|responder);
+
+	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Initiator Auth
+\end{column}
+
+\begin{column}{.30\textwidth}
+\begin{tikzpicture}
+	 \draw (-1,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} --
+		coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.76] (ecti-y)
+		coordinate[pos=.92](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	 \draw (1,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{epki} (epki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](ecti-y-|initiator) -- node[above]{ecti} (ecti-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+Forward secrecy
+\end{column}
+
+\end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Combining the three encapsulations in one protocol}
+
+\begin{tikzpicture}[shorten > = 1pt,shorten < = 1pt]
+	\draw (-3,0) node[above](initiator){Initiator\strut} -- coordinate[pos=.2](spki-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.35](spkr-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.6](epki-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.75](scti-y)
+	coordinate[pos=.9](ack-y)+(0,-5);
+	\draw (3,0) node[above](responder){Responder}-- +(0,-5);
+
+	 \draw[->](spki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spki} (spki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](spkr-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {spkr} (spkr-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[->](epki-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {epki, sctr, H(spki)} (epki-y-|responder);
+	 \draw[<-](scti-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {scti,ecti} (scti-y-|responder);
+	  \draw[->](ack-y-|initiator) -- node[above] {(ack)} (ack-y-|responder);
+
+\end{tikzpicture}
+
+  Note that the initiator is not authenticated until they send `(ack)`.
+
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
+  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{In Rosenpasss specifically}
+  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item Use the fact that the initiator is not authenticated until their last message
+  \item Send faux initiations, overwriting – and thus erasing – the responder's handshake state
+  \item Erasing the state aborts protocol execution
+  \item PQWG argues: The first package is authenticated using the PSK, therefor sending faux initiations works
+  \item Attacker could replay a legitimate message, but…
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{State Disruption Attacks on authenticated initial package}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item In Classic WireGuard the initial message (InitHello) is authenticated through static-static Diffie-Hellman
+  \item Replay protection uses monotonic counter
+  \item WireGuard stores the time of the last initiator $t_i$
+  \item When WireGuard receives legitimate initiaton with timestamp $t$, it stores that time $t_i \leftarrow t$a
+  \item All InitHello messages with a stale timestamp ($t \le t_i$) get rejected
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{CVE-2021-46873 – Attacking WireGuard through NTP}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item The replay protection in classic WireGuard assumes a monotonic counter
+  \item But the system time is attacker controlled because NTP is insecure
+  \item This generates a kill packet that can be used to render WireGuard keys useless
+  \item Attack is possible in the real world!
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{State disruption in Post-Quantum WireGuard}
+\begin{itemize}
+  \item This mechanism needs an authenticated InitHello message
+  \item Post-Quantum WireGuard relies on the $\texttt{psk}$ to provide InitHello authentication
+  \item PQWG sets $\texttt{psk} = H(\texttt{spki} \oplus \texttt{spkr})$ to achieve a secret psk.a
+  \item Relying on private public keys is absurd
+  \item[$\Rightarrow$] With InitHello effectively unauthenticated, attacker can just generate their own kill packet
+\end{itemize}
+  Solution: Store the responder state in a biscuit (cookie), so there is no state to override.
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the protocol flow}
+  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-key-exchange-protocol-rgb.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Biscuits in the messages}
+  \includegraphics[height=.80\textheight]{graphics/rosenpass-wp-message-types-rgb.pdf}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Biscuits}
+  \begin{itemize}
+	\item Assumptions such as a monotonic counter are perilous in the real world
+	\item Giving the adversary access to state is dangerous
+	\item In noise protocols the handshake state is very small (32-64 bytes)
+	\item Sending the state to the protocol peer is a viable course of action!
+	\item Formalization of State Disruption Attacks covers many attacks of this style
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Security proof of rosenpass}
+  \begin{itemize}
+	\item CryptoVerif in progress (Benjamin Lipp)
+	\item Really fast symbolic analysis using ProVerif
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Deployment}
+  \begin{itemize}
+	\item Rust implementation in userspace
+	\item Integrates with WireGuard through the PSK feature to provide Hybrid security
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}{Final statements}
+  \begin{itemize}
+	\item Post-quantum crypto can be deployed now
+	\item There are real complexities in protocol design
+	\item DoS-Resistance needs formalization work
+	\item Availability needs love and attention from cryptographers
+	\item Try it out! \url{https://rosenpass.eu/}
+  \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+%* Problem introduction
+%    * Post-quantum-secure authenticated key exchange
+%    * Interactive key exchange
+%    * No DH
+%    * But with KEMs
+%        * KEM is non interactive
+%        * Gives you secrecy
+%        * One-sided auth
+%* PQWG
+%    * Doing one key encapsulation in both directions
+%    * Adding an ephemeral one for forward secrecy
+%* State interruption attack
+%    * Assumption of monotonic counter is not realistic/broken/…
+%    * static keys become essentially useless
+%    * Leads to state disruption
+%    * Case: WG ohne replay protection (motivation for monotonic counter)
+%    * Case: WG mit replay protection
+%* Biscuits
+%    * No state
+%    * Provably avoids state disruption
+%    * State machine WG/PQWG: ini
+%*

papers/yrcs-talk.tex

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+\documentclass[10pt,aspectratio=169]{beamer}
+%\documentclass[10pt]{beamer}
+
+\usetheme[sectionpage=none] % TODO solve the arithmetic error problem later (on section pages)
+  {metropolis}
+\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
+
+\usepackage{verbatim}
+
+% strikethrough
+% - normalem: do not redefine emph to do underline
+\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
+
+% bold math
+\usepackage{bm}
+
+\usepackage{xcolor,soul}
+\definecolor{lightblue}{rgb}{.90,.95,1}
+\definecolor{lightred}{rgb}{1,.80,.80}
+\definecolor{lightgreen}{rgb}{.80,1.,.80}
+%\definecolor{lightred}{red!40}
+\sethlcolor{lightblue}
+
+\definecolor{rosenpass-pink}{RGB}{247, 4, 132}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-orange}{RGB}{255, 166, 48}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-gray}{RGB}{64, 63, 76}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-lightblue}{RGB}{211, 243, 238}
+\definecolor{rosenpass-blue}{RGB}{114, 161, 229}
+
+\setbeamercolor{progress bar}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
+\setbeamercolor{title separator}{fg=rosenpass-pink,bg=blue}
+
+
+\renewcommand<>{\hl}[1]{\only#2{\beameroriginal{\hl}}{#1}}
+\usepackage[beamer]{hf-tikz}
+\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
+\tikzset{
+	>=Latex[round]
+}
+
+\urlstyle{same}
+
+% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/41683/why-is-it-that-coloring-in-soul-in-beamer-is-not-visible
+\makeatletter
+\newcommand\SoulColor{%
+  \let\set@color\beamerorig@set@color
+  \let\reset@color\beamerorig@reset@color}
+  \makeatother
+  \SoulColor
+
+\setlength{\fboxsep}{0pt}
+\newcommand{\mathcolorbox}[2]{\colorbox{#1}{$\displaystyle #2$}}
+\newcommand{\ah}[1]{\colorbox{lightblue}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\bh}[1]{\colorbox{lightred}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\ch}[1]{\colorbox{lightgreen}{$\displaystyle #1$}}
+\newcommand{\hlfancy}[2]{\sethlcolor{#1}\hl{#2}}
+
+\setbeamercolor{frametitle}{parent=subtitle}
+% `title separator` is the one on the title page
+% `progress bar in head/foot` is the line on each frame
+\setbeamercolor{progress bar in head/foot}{bg=normal text.bg,fg=normal text.bg}
+
+\usepackage{appendixnumberbeamer}
+
+\usepackage{booktabs}
+\usepackage[scale=2]{ccicons}
+\usepackage{fontawesome}
+
+\usepackage{pgfplots}
+\usepgfplotslibrary{dateplot}
+
+%% tikzit
+%\usepackage{tikzit}
+%\input{blipp.tikzstyles}
+%\usetikzlibrary{trees}
+%\usetikzlibrary{tikzmark}
+%\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta}
+
+\usepackage{xspace}
+\newcommand{\themename}{\textbf{\textsc{metropolis}}\xspace}
+
+
+\usepackage{stackengine}
+\usepackage{amsmath}
+\usepackage{amsfonts}
+\usepackage{amssymb}
+\usepackage{amsthm}
+\usepackage{tikz}
+\usepackage{xcolor}
+\usepackage{environ}
+\usepackage{array}
+\usepackage[
+  n,advantage,operators,sets,adversary,landau,
+  probability,
+  notions,logic,ff,mm,primitives,events,complexity,asymptotics
+  %keys
+  ]{cryptocode}
+\usetikzlibrary{positioning,shapes,arrows,matrix, calc,external,fit,decorations.pathreplacing,arrows.meta,patterns,tikzmark}
+
+
+\usepackage{mathtools}
+\usepackage{comment}
+\excludecomment{commentEnv}
+\usepackage{array}
+\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\let\newline\\\arraybackslash\hspace{0pt}}m{#1}}
+
+
+\def\makeuppercase#1{
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname cal#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname adv#1\endcsname{\mathcal{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bb#1\endcsname{\mathbb{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
+}
+
+
+
+
+\def\makelowercase#1{
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname frak#1\endcsname{\mathfrak{#1}}
+\expandafter\newcommand\csname bf#1\endcsname{\textbf{#1}}
+}
+
+\newcounter{char}
+\setcounter{char}{1}
+
+\loop
+	\edef\letter{\alph{char}}
+	\edef\Letter{\Alph{char}}
+	\expandafter\makelowercase\letter
+	\expandafter\makeuppercase\Letter
+	\stepcounter{char}
+	\unless\ifnum\thechar>26
+\repeat
+
+
+\newcommand{\quotes}[1]{``#1''}
+\newcommand{\filename}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
+\newcommand{\cryptoverif}{Crypto\-Verif}
+\newcommand{\cv}{\cryptoverif}
+\newcommand{\bottom}{\ensuremath{\perp}}
+
+
+%\usepackage{pgfpages}
+%\setbeameroption{show notes on second screen=right} 
+
+\usepackage{multicol}
+\usepackage{qrcode}
+
+
+
+%% msc message diagrams
+%\usepackage{msc5}
+%\newcommand{\laction}[2]{$\begin{array}{c}\mbox{\textrm{#1}}\\#2\end{array}$}
+%\newcommand{\poormanshead}[1]{\textcolor{darkgray}{#1}}
+%\newcommand{\poormansline}[2]{\textcolor{gray}{\phantom{-- }\texttt{-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --\phantom{ --}}}\poormanshead{#1}\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{\phantom{-- }#2}}}
+
+
+\definecolor{light-gray}{gray}{0.5}
+% https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/questions/133078/what-colors-to-choose-for-colorblind-people
+\definecolor{keyOne}{rgb}{.9,.6,0} % orange
+\definecolor{keyTwo}{rgb}{.35,.7,.9} % sky blue
+\definecolor{keyThree}{rgb}{0,.6,.5} % bluish green
+\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.4,0} % vermilion
+%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{.8,.6,.7} % reddish purple
+%\definecolor{keyFour}{rgb}{0,.45,.7} % blue
+
+
+\newcommand{\screenshotframe}[2]{%
+\begin{frame}{#1}
+  \vfill
+  \begin{center}
+    \includegraphics[width=.95\textwidth,height=.95\textheight,keepaspectratio]{#2}
+  \end{center}
+  \vfill
+\end{frame}
+}
+
+\usepackage{listings}
+\lstdefinelanguage{cryptoverif}
+{morekeywords={collision, const, crypto, define, defined, do, else, end, equation, equiv,
+event, event_abort, expand, find, forall, foreach, fun, get, implementation, in,
+if, inj, insert, length, let, letfun, max, maxlength, newOracle, orfind, otheruses,
+param, proba, public_vars, process, proof, query, return, secret, secret1, set, suchthat, success, simplify, then,
+table, time, type},
+otherkeywords={<-, <-R, &&},
+sensitive=true,
+morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
+morestring=[b]",
+}
+\lstdefinelanguage{cvoutput}
+{morekeywords={},
+otherkeywords={},
+sensitive=true,
+morecomment=[s]{(*}{*)},
+morestring=[b]",
+}
+\lstset{
+  language=cvoutput,
+  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
+  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
+  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
+}
+\lstset{
+  language=cryptoverif,
+  basicstyle=\ttfamily,
+  commentstyle=\color{black!55},
+  keywordstyle=\bfseries\color{green!40!black}
+}
+
+\usepackage{bbding}
+\newcommand*\itemtick{\item[\Checkmark]}
+\newcommand*\itemfail{\item[\XSolidBrush]}
+
+\title{%
+  Rosenpass
+}
+\subtitle{%
+  Securing \& Deploying Post-Quantum WireGuard
+}
+\author{\textbf{Karolin Varner}, with Benjamin Lipp, Wanja Zaeske, Lisa Schmidt}
+\institute{\url{https://rosenpass.eu/whitepaper.pdf}}
+\titlegraphic{\hfill\includegraphics[height=2.5cm]{tex/RosenPass-Logo.pdf}}
+
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\maketitle
+
+\input{yrcs-talk-content}
+
+\end{document}

readme.md

@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ This repository contains
 
 ## Getting started
 
-First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help functions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
+First, [install rosenpass](#Getting-Rosenpass). Then, check out the help funtions of `rp` & `rosenpass`:
 
 ```sh
 rp help
 rosenpass help
 ```
 
-Follow [quick start instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
+Follow [quickstart instructions](https://rosenpass.eu/#start) to get a VPN up and running.
 
 ## Software architecture
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ We are working on a cryptographic proof of security, but we already provide a sy
 (manual) $ ./analyze.sh
 ```
 
-The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some meta programming to avoid repetition.
+The analysis is implemented according to modern software engineering principles: Using the C preprocessor, we where able to split the analysis into multiple files and uses some metaprogramming to avoid repetition.
 The code uses a variety of optimizations to speed up analysis such as using secret functions to model trusted/malicious setup. We split the model into two separate entry points which can be analyzed in parallel. Each is much faster than both models combined.
 A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expected in color: A red cross if a query fails and a green check if it succeeds.
 
@@ -62,22 +62,15 @@ A wrapper script provides instant feedback about which queries execute as expect
 [^libsodium]: https://doc.libsodium.org/
 [^wg]: https://www.wireguard.com/
 [^pqwg]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/379
-[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeats the purpose of a key exchange protocol
+[^pqwg-statedis]: Unless supplied with a pre-shared-key, but this defeates the purpose of a key exchange protocol
 [^wg-statedis]: https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2021-August/006916.htmlA
 
 # Getting Rosenpass
 
-Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distributions, maybe also for the distribution of your choice?
+Rosenpass is packaged for more and more distros, maybe also for the distro of your choice?
 
 [![Packaging status](https://repology.org/badge/vertical-allrepos/rosenpass.svg)](https://repology.org/project/rosenpass/versions)
 
-# Mirrors
-
-Don't want to use GitHub or only have an IPv6 connection? Rosenpass has set up two mirrors for this:
-
-- [NotABug](https://notabug.org/rosenpass/rosenpass)
-- [GitLab](https://gitlab.com/rosenpass/rosenpass/)
-
 # Supported by
 
 Funded through <a href="https://nlnet.nl/">NLNet</a> with financial support for the European Commission's <a href="https://nlnet.nl/assure">NGI Assure</a> program.

rosenpass/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass"
-version = "0.2.1"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Build post-quantum-secure VPNs with WireGuard!"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[[bench]]
-name = "handshake"
-harness = false
-
-[dependencies]
-rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-constant-time = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-ciphers = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-cipher-traits = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-secret-memory = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-lenses = { workspace = true }
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-static_assertions = { workspace = true }
-memoffset = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
-thiserror = { workspace = true }
-paste = { workspace = true }
-log = { workspace = true }
-env_logger = { workspace = true }
-serde = { workspace = true }
-toml = { workspace = true }
-clap = { workspace = true }
-mio = { workspace = true }
-rand = { workspace = true }
-
-[build-dependencies]
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-criterion = { workspace = true }
-test_bin = { workspace = true }
-stacker = { workspace = true }

rosenpass/build.rs

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::bail;
-use anyhow::Result;
-use std::env;
-use std::fs::File;
-use std::io::Write;
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-use std::process::Command;
-
-/// Invokes a troff compiler to compile a manual page
-fn render_man(compiler: &str, man: &str) -> Result<String> {
-    let out = Command::new(compiler).args(["-Tascii", man]).output()?;
-    if !out.status.success() {
-        bail!("{} returned an error", compiler);
-    }
-
-    Ok(String::from_utf8(out.stdout)?)
-}
-
-/// Generates the manual page
-fn generate_man() -> String {
-    // This function is purposely stupid and redundant
-
-    let man = render_man("mandoc", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
-    if let Ok(man) = man {
-        return man;
-    }
-
-    let man = render_man("groff", "./doc/rosenpass.1");
-    if let Ok(man) = man {
-        return man;
-    }
-
-    // TODO: Link to online manual here
-    "Cannot render manual page\n".into()
-}
-
-fn man() {
-    let out_dir = PathBuf::from(env::var("OUT_DIR").unwrap());
-    let man = generate_man();
-    let path = out_dir.join("rosenpass.1.ascii");
-
-    let mut file = File::create(&path).unwrap();
-    file.write_all(man.as_bytes()).unwrap();
-
-    println!("cargo:rustc-env=ROSENPASS_MAN={}", path.display());
-}
-
-fn main() {
-    // For now, rerun the build script on every time, as the build script
-    // is not very expensive right now.
-    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=./");
-    man();
-}

rosenpass/readme.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../readme.md

rosenpass/src/app_server.rs

@@ -1,739 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::bail;
-
-use anyhow::Result;
-use log::{debug, error, info, warn};
-use mio::Interest;
-use mio::Token;
-use rosenpass_util::file::fopen_w;
-
-use std::cell::Cell;
-use std::io::Write;
-
-use std::io::ErrorKind;
-use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
-use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use std::net::SocketAddrV4;
-use std::net::SocketAddrV6;
-use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-use std::process::Command;
-use std::process::Stdio;
-use std::slice;
-use std::thread;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use crate::{
-    config::Verbosity,
-    protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
-};
-use rosenpass_util::attempt;
-use rosenpass_util::b64::{b64_writer, fmt_b64};
-
-const IPV4_ANY_ADDR: Ipv4Addr = Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0);
-const IPV6_ANY_ADDR: Ipv6Addr = Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-
-fn ipv4_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
-    // addr, port
-    SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(IPV4_ANY_ADDR, 0))
-}
-
-fn ipv6_any_binding() -> SocketAddr {
-    // addr, port, flowinfo, scope_id
-    SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(IPV6_ANY_ADDR, 0, 0, 0))
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, Debug)]
-pub struct AppPeer {
-    pub outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
-    pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>, // TODO make this a generic command
-    pub initial_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
-    pub current_endpoint: Option<Endpoint>,
-}
-
-impl AppPeer {
-    pub fn endpoint(&self) -> Option<&Endpoint> {
-        self.current_endpoint
-            .as_ref()
-            .or(self.initial_endpoint.as_ref())
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, Debug)]
-pub struct WireguardOut {
-    // impl KeyOutput
-    pub dev: String,
-    pub pk: String,
-    pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
-///
-/// Responsible for file IO, network IO
-// TODO add user control via unix domain socket and stdin/stdout
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct AppServer {
-    pub crypt: CryptoServer,
-    pub sockets: Vec<mio::net::UdpSocket>,
-    pub events: mio::Events,
-    pub mio_poll: mio::Poll,
-    pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
-    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
-    pub all_sockets_drained: bool,
-}
-
-/// A socket pointer is an index assigned to a socket;
-/// right now the index is just the sockets index in AppServer::sockets.
-///
-/// Holding this as a reference instead of an &mut UdpSocket is useful
-/// to deal with the borrow checker, because otherwise we could not refer
-/// to a socket and another member of AppServer at the same time.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct SocketPtr(pub usize);
-
-impl SocketPtr {
-    pub fn get<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a mio::net::UdpSocket {
-        &srv.sockets[self.0]
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut mio::net::UdpSocket {
-        &mut srv.sockets[self.0]
-    }
-
-    pub fn send_to(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8], addr: SocketAddr) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        self.get(srv).send_to(buf, addr)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-/// Index based pointer to a Peer
-#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
-pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
-
-impl AppPeerPtr {
-    /// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
-    pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
-        Self(p.0)
-    }
-
-    /// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
-    pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
-        PeerPtr(self.0)
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
-        &srv.peers[self.0]
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
-        &mut srv.peers[self.0]
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum AppPollResult {
-    DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
-    SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
-    SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
-    ReceivedMessage(usize, Endpoint),
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum KeyOutputReason {
-    Exchanged,
-    Stale,
-}
-
-/// Represents a communication partner rosenpass may be sending packets to
-///
-/// Generally at the start of Rosenpass either no address or a Hostname is known;
-/// later when we actually start to receive RespHello packages, we know the specific Address
-/// and socket to use with a peer
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum Endpoint {
-    /// Rosenpass supports multiple sockets, so we include the information
-    /// which socket an address can be reached on. This probably does not
-    /// make much of a difference in most setups where two sockets are just
-    /// used to enable dual stack operation; it does make a difference in
-    /// more complex use cases.
-    ///
-    /// For instance it enables using multiple interfaces with overlapping
-    /// ip spaces, such as listening on a private IP network and a public IP
-    /// at the same time. It also would reply on the same port RespHello was
-    /// sent to when listening on multiple ports on the same interface. This
-    /// may be required for some arcane firewall setups.
-    SocketBoundAddress {
-        /// The socket the address can be reached under; this is generally
-        /// determined when we actually receive an RespHello message
-        socket: SocketPtr,
-        /// Just the address
-        addr: SocketAddr,
-    },
-    // A host name or IP address; storing the hostname here instead of an
-    // ip address makes sure that we look up the host name whenever we try
-    // to make a connection; this may be beneficial in some setups where a host-name
-    // at first can not be resolved but becomes resolvable later.
-    Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint),
-}
-
-impl Endpoint {
-    /// Start discovery from some addresses
-    pub fn discovery_from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
-        Endpoint::Discovery(HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::from_addresses(addresses))
-    }
-
-    /// Start endpoint discovery from a hostname
-    pub fn discovery_from_hostname(hostname: String) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        let host = HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint::lookup(hostname)?;
-        Ok(Endpoint::Discovery(host))
-    }
-
-    // Restart discovery; joining two sources of (potential) addresses
-    //
-    // This is used when the connection to an endpoint is lost in order
-    // to include the addresses specified on the command line and the
-    // address last used in the discovery process
-    pub fn discovery_from_multiple_sources(
-        a: Option<&Endpoint>,
-        b: Option<&Endpoint>,
-    ) -> Option<Self> {
-        let sources = match (a, b) {
-            (Some(e), None) | (None, Some(e)) => e.addresses().iter().chain(&[]),
-            (Some(e1), Some(e2)) => e1.addresses().iter().chain(e2.addresses()),
-            (None, None) => return None,
-        };
-        let lower_size_bound = sources.size_hint().0;
-        let mut dedup = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
-        let mut addrs = Vec::with_capacity(lower_size_bound);
-        for a in sources {
-            if dedup.insert(a) {
-                addrs.push(*a);
-            }
-        }
-        Some(Self::discovery_from_addresses(addrs))
-    }
-
-    pub fn send(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        use Endpoint::*;
-        match self {
-            SocketBoundAddress { socket, addr } => socket.send_to(srv, buf, *addr),
-            Discovery(host) => host.send_scouting(srv, buf),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddr] {
-        use Endpoint::*;
-        match self {
-            SocketBoundAddress { addr, .. } => slice::from_ref(addr),
-            Discovery(host) => host.addresses(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Handles host-path discovery
-///
-/// When rosenpass is started, we either know no peer address
-/// or we know a hostname. How to contact this hostname may not
-/// be entirely clear for two reasons:
-///
-/// 1. We have multiple sockets; only a subset of those may be able to contact the host
-/// 2. DNS resolution can return multiple addresses
-///
-/// We could just use the first working socket and the first address returned, but this
-/// may be error prone: Some of the sockets may appear to be able to contact the host,
-/// but the packets will be dropped. Some of the addresses may appear to be reachable
-/// but the packets could be lost.
-///
-/// In contrast to TCP, UDP has no mechanism to ensure packets actually arrive.
-///
-/// To robustly handle host path discovery, we try each socket-ip-combination in a round
-/// robin fashion; the struct stores the offset of the last used combination internally and
-/// and will continue with the next combination on every call.
-///
-/// Retransmission handling will continue normally; i.e. increasing the distance between
-/// retransmissions on every retransmission, until it is long enough to bore a human. Therefor
-/// it is important to avoid having a large number of sockets drop packets not just for efficiency
-/// but to avoid latency issues too.
-///
-// TODO: We might consider adjusting the retransmission handling to account for host-path discovery
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
-    scouting_state: Cell<(usize, usize)>, // addr_off, sock_off
-    addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>,
-}
-
-impl HostPathDiscoveryEndpoint {
-    pub fn from_addresses(addresses: Vec<SocketAddr>) -> Self {
-        let scouting_state = Cell::new((0, 0));
-        Self {
-            addresses,
-            scouting_state,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Lookup a hostname
-    pub fn lookup(hostname: String) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            addresses: ToSocketAddrs::to_socket_addrs(&hostname)?.collect(),
-            scouting_state: Cell::new((0, 0)),
-        })
-    }
-
-    pub fn addresses(&self) -> &Vec<SocketAddr> {
-        &self.addresses
-    }
-
-    fn insert_next_scout_offset(&self, srv: &AppServer, addr_no: usize, sock_no: usize) {
-        self.scouting_state.set((
-            (addr_no + 1) % self.addresses.len(),
-            (sock_no + 1) % srv.sockets.len(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    /// Attempt to reach the host
-    ///
-    /// Will round-robin-try different socket-ip-combinations on each call.
-    pub fn send_scouting(&self, srv: &AppServer, buf: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let (addr_off, sock_off) = self.scouting_state.get();
-
-        let mut addrs = (self.addresses)
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .cycle()
-            .skip(addr_off)
-            .take(self.addresses.len());
-        let mut sockets = (srv.sockets)
-            .iter()
-            .enumerate()
-            .cycle()
-            .skip(sock_off)
-            .take(srv.sockets.len());
-
-        for (addr_no, addr) in addrs.by_ref() {
-            for (sock_no, sock) in sockets.by_ref() {
-                let res = sock.send_to(buf, *addr);
-                let err = match res {
-                    Ok(_) => {
-                        self.insert_next_scout_offset(srv, addr_no, sock_no);
-                        return Ok(());
-                    }
-                    Err(e) => e,
-                };
-
-                // TODO: replace this by
-                // e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable
-                // once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/86442 lands
-                let ignore = err
-                    .to_string()
-                    .starts_with("Address family not supported by protocol");
-                if !ignore {
-                    warn!("Socket #{} refusing to send to {}: ", sock_no, addr);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        bail!("Unable to send message: All sockets returned errors.")
-    }
-}
-
-impl AppServer {
-    pub fn new(
-        sk: SSk,
-        pk: SPk,
-        addrs: Vec<SocketAddr>,
-        verbosity: Verbosity,
-    ) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        // setup mio
-        let mio_poll = mio::Poll::new()?;
-        let events = mio::Events::with_capacity(8);
-
-        // bind each SocketAddr to a socket
-        let maybe_sockets: Result<Vec<_>, _> =
-            addrs.into_iter().map(mio::net::UdpSocket::bind).collect();
-        let mut sockets = maybe_sockets?;
-
-        // When no socket is specified, rosenpass should open one port on all
-        // available interfaces best-effort. Here are the cases how this can possibly go:
-        //
-        // Some operating systems (such as Linux [^linux] and FreeBSD [^freebsd])
-        // using IPv6 sockets to handle IPv4 connections; on these systems
-        // binding to the `[::]:0` address will typically open a dual-stack
-        // socket. Some other systems such as OpenBSD [^openbsd] do not support this feature.
-        //
-        // Dual-stack systems provide a flag to enable or disable this
-        // behavior – the IPV6_V6ONLY flag. OpenBSD supports this flag
-        // read-only. MIO[^mio] provides a way to read this flag but not
-        // to write it.
-        //
-        // - One dual-stack IPv6 socket, if the operating supports dual-stack sockets and
-        //   correctly reports this
-        // - One IPv6 socket and one IPv4 socket if the operating does not support dual stack
-        //   sockets or disables them by default assuming this is also correctly reported
-        // - One IPv6 socket and no IPv4 socket if IPv6 socket is not dual-stack and opening
-        //   the IPv6 socket fails
-        // - One IPv4 socket and no IPv6 socket if opening the IPv6 socket fails
-        // - One dual-stack IPv6 socket and a redundant IPv4 socket if dual-stack sockets are
-        //   supported but the operating system does not correctly report this (specifically,
-        //   if the only_v6() call raises an error)
-        // - Rosenpass exits if no socket could be opened
-        //
-        // [^freebsd]: https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=ip6&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+6.0-RELEASE
-        // [^openbsd]: https://man.openbsd.org/ip6.4
-        // [^linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/ipv6.7.html
-        // [^mio]: https://docs.rs/mio/0.8.6/mio/net/struct.UdpSocket.html#method.only_v6
-        if sockets.is_empty() {
-            macro_rules! try_register_socket {
-                ($title:expr, $binding:expr) => {{
-                    let r = mio::net::UdpSocket::bind($binding);
-                    match r {
-                        Ok(sock) => {
-                            sockets.push(sock);
-                            Some(sockets.len() - 1)
-                        }
-                        Err(e) => {
-                            warn!("Could not bind to {} socket: {}", $title, e);
-                            None
-                        }
-                    }
-                }};
-            }
-
-            let v6 = try_register_socket!("IPv6", ipv6_any_binding());
-
-            let need_v4 = match v6.map(|no| sockets[no].only_v6()) {
-                Some(Ok(v)) => v,
-                None => true,
-                Some(Err(e)) => {
-                    warn!("Unable to detect whether the IPv6 socket supports dual-stack operation: {}", e);
-                    true
-                }
-            };
-
-            if need_v4 {
-                try_register_socket!("IPv4", ipv4_any_binding());
-            }
-        }
-
-        if sockets.is_empty() {
-            bail!("No sockets to listen on!")
-        }
-
-        // register all sockets to mio
-        for (i, socket) in sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-            mio_poll
-                .registry()
-                .register(socket, Token(i), Interest::READABLE)?;
-        }
-
-        // TODO use mio::net::UnixStream together with std::os::unix::net::UnixStream for Linux
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
-            peers: Vec::new(),
-            verbosity,
-            sockets,
-            events,
-            mio_poll,
-            all_sockets_drained: false,
-        })
-    }
-
-    pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
-    }
-
-    pub fn add_peer(
-        &mut self,
-        psk: Option<SymKey>,
-        pk: SPk,
-        outfile: Option<PathBuf>,
-        outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
-        hostname: Option<String>,
-    ) -> anyhow::Result<AppPeerPtr> {
-        let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
-        assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
-        let initial_endpoint = hostname
-            .map(Endpoint::discovery_from_hostname)
-            .transpose()?;
-        let current_endpoint = None;
-        self.peers.push(AppPeer {
-            outfile,
-            outwg,
-            initial_endpoint,
-            current_endpoint,
-        });
-        Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
-    }
-
-    pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
-        const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
-        let mut failure_cnt = 0;
-
-        loop {
-            let msgs_processed = 0usize;
-            let err = match self.event_loop() {
-                Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
-                Err(e) => e,
-            };
-
-            // This should not happen…
-            failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
-                0
-            } else {
-                failure_cnt + 1
-            };
-            let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
-            let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
-            error!(
-                "unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?} {}",
-                msgs_processed,
-                err,
-                err.backtrace()
-            );
-            if tries_left > 0 {
-                error!("re-initializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
-                std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            bail!("too many network failures");
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
-
-        /// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
-        /// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
-        /// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
-        macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
-            ($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
-                attempt!({
-                    let p = $peer;
-                    if p.get_app(self).endpoint().is_some() {
-                        let len = $fn()?;
-                        let ep: &Endpoint = p.get_app(self).endpoint().unwrap();
-                        ep.send(self, &tx[..len])?;
-                    }
-                    Ok(())
-                })
-            };
-        }
-
-        loop {
-            use crate::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
-            use AppPollResult::*;
-            use KeyOutputReason::*;
-            match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
-                #[allow(clippy::redundant_closure_call)]
-                SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
-                    .crypt
-                    .initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
-                #[allow(clippy::redundant_closure_call)]
-                SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
-                    .crypt
-                    .retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
-                DeleteKey(peer) => {
-                    self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?;
-
-                    // There was a loss of connection apparently; restart host discovery
-                    // starting from the last used address but including all the initially
-                    // specified addresses
-                    // TODO: We could do this preemptively, before any connection loss actually occurs.
-                    let p = peer.get_app_mut(self);
-                    p.current_endpoint = Endpoint::discovery_from_multiple_sources(
-                        p.current_endpoint.as_ref(),
-                        p.initial_endpoint.as_ref(),
-                    );
-                }
-
-                ReceivedMessage(len, endpoint) => {
-                    match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
-                        Err(ref e) => {
-                            self.verbose().then(|| {
-                                info!(
-                                    "error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?} {}",
-                                    endpoint,
-                                    e,
-                                    e.backtrace()
-                                );
-                            });
-                        }
-
-                        Ok(HandleMsgResult {
-                            resp,
-                            exchanged_with,
-                            ..
-                        }) => {
-                            if let Some(len) = resp {
-                                endpoint.send(self, &tx[0..len])?;
-                            }
-
-                            if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
-                                let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
-                                ap.get_app_mut(self).current_endpoint = Some(endpoint);
-
-                                // TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
-                                self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
-                            }
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-            };
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn output_key(
-        &self,
-        peer: AppPeerPtr,
-        why: KeyOutputReason,
-        key: &SymKey,
-    ) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
-        let ap = peer.get_app(self);
-
-        if self.verbose() {
-            let msg = match why {
-                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
-                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
-            };
-            info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
-        }
-
-        if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
-            // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
-            // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
-            // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
-            // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
-            // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
-            // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
-            // not worth it right now.
-            b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
-            let why = match why {
-                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
-                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
-            };
-
-            // this is intentionally writing to stdout instead of stderr, because
-            // it is meant to allow external detection of a successful key-exchange
-            println!(
-                "output-key peer {} key-file {of:?} {why}",
-                fmt_b64(&*peerid)
-            );
-        }
-
-        if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
-            let mut child = Command::new("wg")
-                .arg("set")
-                .arg(&owg.dev)
-                .arg("peer")
-                .arg(&owg.pk)
-                .arg("preshared-key")
-                .arg("/dev/stdin")
-                .stdin(Stdio::piped())
-                .args(&owg.extra_params)
-                .spawn()?;
-            b64_writer(child.stdin.take().unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
-
-            thread::spawn(move || {
-                let status = child.wait();
-
-                if let Ok(status) = status {
-                    if status.success() {
-                        debug!("successfully passed psk to wg")
-                    } else {
-                        error!("could not pass psk to wg {:?}", status)
-                    }
-                } else {
-                    error!("wait failed: {:?}", status)
-                }
-            });
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> anyhow::Result<AppPollResult> {
-        use crate::protocol::PollResult as C;
-        use AppPollResult as A;
-        loop {
-            return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
-                C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
-                C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
-                    Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
-                    None => continue,
-                },
-            });
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Tries to receive a new message
-    ///
-    /// - might wait for an duration up to `timeout`
-    /// - returns immediately if an error occurs
-    /// - returns immediately if a new message is received
-    pub fn try_recv(
-        &mut self,
-        buf: &mut [u8],
-        timeout: Timing,
-    ) -> anyhow::Result<Option<(usize, Endpoint)>> {
-        let timeout = Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout);
-
-        // if there is no time to wait on IO, well, then, lets not waste any time!
-        if timeout.is_zero() {
-            return Ok(None);
-        }
-
-        // NOTE when using mio::Poll, there are some particularities (taken from
-        // https://docs.rs/mio/latest/mio/struct.Poll.html):
-        //
-        // - poll() might return readiness, even if nothing is ready
-        // - in this case, a WouldBlock error is returned from actual IO operations
-        // - after receiving readiness for a source, it must be drained until a WouldBlock
-        //   is received
-        //
-        // This would usually require us to maintain the drainage status of each socket;
-        // a socket would only become drained when it returned WouldBlock and only
-        // non-drained when receiving a readiness event from mio for it. Then, only the
-        // ready sockets should be worked on, ideally without requiring an O(n) search
-        // through all sockets for checking their drained status. However, our use-case
-        // is primarily heaving one or two sockets (if IPv4 and IPv6 IF_ANY listen is
-        // desired on a non-dual-stack OS), thus just checking every socket after any
-        // readiness event seems to be good enough™ for now.
-
-        // only poll if we drained all sockets before
-        if self.all_sockets_drained {
-            self.mio_poll.poll(&mut self.events, Some(timeout))?;
-        }
-
-        let mut would_block_count = 0;
-        for (sock_no, socket) in self.sockets.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-            match socket.recv_from(buf) {
-                Ok((n, addr)) => {
-                    // at least one socket was not drained...
-                    self.all_sockets_drained = false;
-                    return Ok(Some((
-                        n,
-                        Endpoint::SocketBoundAddress {
-                            socket: SocketPtr(sock_no),
-                            addr,
-                        },
-                    )));
-                }
-                Err(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
-                    would_block_count += 1;
-                }
-                // TODO if one socket continuously returns an error, then we never poll, thus we never wait for a timeout, thus we have a spin-lock
-                Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
-            }
-        }
-
-        // if each socket returned WouldBlock, then we drained them all at least once indeed
-        self.all_sockets_drained = would_block_count == self.sockets.len();
-
-        Ok(None)
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/cli.rs

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-use anyhow::{bail, ensure};
-use clap::Parser;
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::StaticKem;
-use rosenpass_secret_memory::file::StoreSecret;
-use rosenpass_util::file::{LoadValue, LoadValueB64};
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-
-use crate::app_server;
-use crate::app_server::AppServer;
-use crate::protocol::{SPk, SSk, SymKey};
-
-use super::config;
-
-#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
-#[command(author, version, about, long_about)]
-pub enum Cli {
-    /// Start Rosenpass in server mode and carry on with the key exchange
-    ///
-    /// This will parse the configuration file and perform the key exchange
-    /// with the specified peers. If a peer's endpoint is specified, this
-    /// Rosenpass instance will try to initiate a key exchange with the peer,
-    /// otherwise only initiation attempts from the peer will be responded to.
-    ExchangeConfig { config_file: PathBuf },
-
-    /// Start in daemon mode, performing key exchanges
-    ///
-    /// The configuration is read from the command line. The `peer` token
-    /// always separates multiple peers, e. g. if the token `peer` appears
-    /// in the WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS it is not put into the WireGuard arguments
-    /// but instead a new peer is created.
-    /* Explanation: `first_arg` and `rest_of_args` are combined into one
-     * `Vec<String>`. They are only used to trick clap into displaying some
-     * guidance on the CLI usage.
-     */
-    #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
-    #[allow(rustdoc::invalid_html_tags)]
-    Exchange {
-        /// public-key <PATH> secret-key <PATH> [listen <ADDR>:<PORT>]... [verbose]
-        #[clap(value_name = "OWN_CONFIG")]
-        first_arg: String,
-
-        /// peer public-key <PATH> [ENDPOINT] [PSK] [OUTFILE] [WG]
-        ///
-        /// ENDPOINT := endpoint <HOST/IP>:<PORT>
-        ///
-        /// PSK := preshared-key <PATH>
-        ///
-        /// OUTFILE := outfile <PATH>
-        ///
-        /// WG := wireguard <WIREGUARD_DEV> <WIREGUARD_PEER> [WIREGUARD_EXTRA_ARGS]...
-        #[clap(value_name = "PEERS")]
-        rest_of_args: Vec<String>,
-
-        /// Save the parsed configuration to a file before starting the daemon
-        #[clap(short, long)]
-        config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
-    },
-
-    /// Generate a demo config file
-    GenConfig {
-        config_file: PathBuf,
-
-        /// Forcefully overwrite existing config file
-        #[clap(short, long)]
-        force: bool,
-    },
-
-    /// Generate the keys mentioned in a configFile
-    ///
-    /// Generates secret- & public-key to their destination. If a config file
-    /// is provided then the key file destination is taken from there.
-    /// Otherwise the
-    GenKeys {
-        config_file: Option<PathBuf>,
-
-        /// where to write public-key to
-        #[clap(short, long)]
-        public_key: Option<PathBuf>,
-
-        /// where to write secret-key to
-        #[clap(short, long)]
-        secret_key: Option<PathBuf>,
-
-        /// Forcefully overwrite public- & secret-key file
-        #[clap(short, long)]
-        force: bool,
-    },
-
-    /// Validate a configuration
-    Validate { config_files: Vec<PathBuf> },
-
-    /// Show the rosenpass manpage
-    // TODO make this the default, but only after the manpage has been adjusted once the CLI stabilizes
-    Man,
-}
-
-impl Cli {
-    pub fn run() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let cli = Self::parse();
-
-        use Cli::*;
-        match cli {
-            Man => {
-                let man_cmd = std::process::Command::new("man")
-                    .args(["1", "rosenpass"])
-                    .status();
-
-                if !(man_cmd.is_ok() && man_cmd.unwrap().success()) {
-                    println!(include_str!(env!("ROSENPASS_MAN")));
-                }
-            }
-            GenConfig { config_file, force } => {
-                ensure!(
-                    force || !config_file.exists(),
-                    "config file {config_file:?} already exists"
-                );
-
-                config::Rosenpass::example_config().store(config_file)?;
-            }
-
-            GenKeys {
-                config_file,
-                public_key,
-                secret_key,
-                force,
-            } => {
-                // figure out where the key file is specified, in the config file or directly as flag?
-                let (pkf, skf) = match (config_file, public_key, secret_key) {
-                    (Some(config_file), _, _) => {
-                        ensure!(
-                            config_file.exists(),
-                            "config file {config_file:?} does not exist"
-                        );
-
-                        let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
-
-                        (config.public_key, config.secret_key)
-                    }
-                    (_, Some(pkf), Some(skf)) => (pkf, skf),
-                    _ => {
-                        bail!("either a config-file or both public-key and secret-key file are required")
-                    }
-                };
-
-                // check that we are not overriding something unintentionally
-                let mut problems = vec![];
-                if !force && pkf.is_file() {
-                    problems.push(format!(
-                        "public-key file {pkf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it"
-                    ));
-                }
-                if !force && skf.is_file() {
-                    problems.push(format!(
-                        "secret-key file {skf:?} exist, refusing to overwrite it"
-                    ));
-                }
-                if !problems.is_empty() {
-                    bail!(problems.join("\n"));
-                }
-
-                // generate the keys and store them in files
-                let mut ssk = crate::protocol::SSk::random();
-                let mut spk = crate::protocol::SPk::random();
-                StaticKem::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
-
-                ssk.store_secret(skf)?;
-                spk.store_secret(pkf)?;
-            }
-
-            ExchangeConfig { config_file } => {
-                ensure!(
-                    config_file.exists(),
-                    "config file '{config_file:?}' does not exist"
-                );
-
-                let config = config::Rosenpass::load(config_file)?;
-                config.validate()?;
-                Self::event_loop(config)?;
-            }
-
-            Exchange {
-                first_arg,
-                mut rest_of_args,
-                config_file,
-            } => {
-                rest_of_args.insert(0, first_arg);
-                let args = rest_of_args;
-                let mut config = config::Rosenpass::parse_args(args)?;
-
-                if let Some(p) = config_file {
-                    config.store(&p)?;
-                    config.config_file_path = p;
-                }
-                config.validate()?;
-                Self::event_loop(config)?;
-            }
-
-            Validate { config_files } => {
-                for file in config_files {
-                    match config::Rosenpass::load(&file) {
-                        Ok(config) => {
-                            eprintln!("{file:?} is valid TOML and conforms to the expected schema");
-                            match config.validate() {
-                                Ok(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} is passed all logical checks"),
-                                Err(_) => eprintln!("{file:?} contains logical errors"),
-                            }
-                        }
-                        Err(e) => eprintln!("{file:?} is not valid: {e}"),
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    fn event_loop(config: config::Rosenpass) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        // load own keys
-        let sk = SSk::load(&config.secret_key)?;
-        let pk = SPk::load(&config.public_key)?;
-
-        // start an application server
-        let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
-            sk,
-            pk,
-            config.listen,
-            config.verbosity,
-        )?);
-
-        for cfg_peer in config.peers {
-            srv.add_peer(
-                // psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
-                cfg_peer.pre_shared_key.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
-                SPk::load(&cfg_peer.public_key)?,
-                cfg_peer.key_out,
-                cfg_peer.wg.map(|cfg| app_server::WireguardOut {
-                    dev: cfg.device,
-                    pk: cfg.peer,
-                    extra_params: cfg.extra_params,
-                }),
-                cfg_peer.endpoint.clone(),
-            )?;
-        }
-
-        srv.event_loop()
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/config.rs

@@ -1,444 +0,0 @@
-use std::{
-    collections::HashSet,
-    fs,
-    io::Write,
-    net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs},
-    path::{Path, PathBuf},
-};
-
-use anyhow::{bail, ensure};
-use rosenpass_util::file::fopen_w;
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct Rosenpass {
-    pub public_key: PathBuf,
-
-    pub secret_key: PathBuf,
-
-    pub listen: Vec<SocketAddr>,
-
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
-    pub peers: Vec<RosenpassPeer>,
-
-    #[serde(skip)]
-    pub config_file_path: PathBuf,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub enum Verbosity {
-    Quiet,
-    Verbose,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct RosenpassPeer {
-    pub public_key: PathBuf,
-    pub endpoint: Option<String>,
-    pub pre_shared_key: Option<PathBuf>,
-
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub key_out: Option<PathBuf>,
-
-    // TODO make this field only available on binary builds, not on library builds
-    #[serde(flatten)]
-    pub wg: Option<WireGuard>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct WireGuard {
-    pub device: String,
-    pub peer: String,
-
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub extra_params: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-impl Rosenpass {
-    /// Load a config file from a file path
-    ///
-    /// no validation is conducted
-    pub fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(p: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        let mut config: Self = toml::from_str(&fs::read_to_string(&p)?)?;
-
-        config.config_file_path = p.as_ref().to_owned();
-        Ok(config)
-    }
-
-    /// Write a config to a file
-    pub fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, p: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let serialized_config =
-            toml::to_string_pretty(&self).expect("unable to serialize the default config");
-        fs::write(p, serialized_config)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Commit the configuration to where it came from, overwriting the original file
-    pub fn commit(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let mut f = fopen_w(&self.config_file_path)?;
-        f.write_all(toml::to_string_pretty(&self)?.as_bytes())?;
-
-        self.store(&self.config_file_path)
-    }
-
-    /// Validate a configuration
-    pub fn validate(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        // check the public-key file exists
-        ensure!(
-            self.public_key.is_file(),
-            "public-key file {:?} does not exist",
-            self.public_key
-        );
-
-        // check the secret-key file exists
-        ensure!(
-            self.secret_key.is_file(),
-            "secret-key file {:?} does not exist",
-            self.secret_key
-        );
-
-        for (i, peer) in self.peers.iter().enumerate() {
-            // check peer's public-key file exists
-            ensure!(
-                peer.public_key.is_file(),
-                "peer {i} public-key file {:?} does not exist",
-                peer.public_key
-            );
-
-            // check endpoint is usable
-            if let Some(addr) = peer.endpoint.as_ref() {
-                ensure!(
-                    addr.to_socket_addrs().is_ok(),
-                    "peer {i} endpoint {} can not be parsed to a socket address",
-                    addr
-                );
-            }
-
-            // TODO warn if neither out_key nor exchange_command is defined
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Creates a new configuration
-    pub fn new<P1: AsRef<Path>, P2: AsRef<Path>>(public_key: P1, secret_key: P2) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            public_key: PathBuf::from(public_key.as_ref()),
-            secret_key: PathBuf::from(secret_key.as_ref()),
-            listen: vec![],
-            verbosity: Verbosity::Quiet,
-            peers: vec![],
-            config_file_path: PathBuf::new(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Add IPv4 __and__ IPv6 IF_ANY address to the listen interfaces
-    pub fn add_if_any(&mut self, port: u16) {
-        let ipv4_any = SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0), port));
-        let ipv6_any = SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(
-            Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
-            port,
-            0,
-            0,
-        ));
-        self.listen.push(ipv4_any);
-        self.listen.push(ipv6_any);
-    }
-
-    /// from chaotic args
-    /// Quest: the grammar is undecideable, what do we do here?
-    pub fn parse_args(args: Vec<String>) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        let mut config = Self::new("", "");
-
-        #[derive(Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
-        enum State {
-            Own,
-            OwnPublicKey,
-            OwnSecretKey,
-            OwnListen,
-            Peer,
-            PeerPsk,
-            PeerPublicKey,
-            PeerEndpoint,
-            PeerOutfile,
-            PeerWireguardDev,
-            PeerWireguardPeer,
-            PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
-        }
-
-        let mut already_set = HashSet::new();
-
-        // TODO idea: use config.peers.len() to give index of peer with conflicting argument
-        use State::*;
-        let mut state = Own;
-        let mut current_peer = None;
-        let p_exists = "a peer should exist by now";
-        let wg_exists = "a peer wireguard should exist by now";
-        for arg in args {
-            state = match (state, arg.as_str(), &mut current_peer) {
-                (Own, "public-key", None) => OwnPublicKey,
-                (Own, "secret-key", None) => OwnSecretKey,
-                (Own, "private-key", None) => {
-                    log::warn!(
-                        "the private-key argument is deprecated, please use secret-key instead"
-                    );
-                    OwnSecretKey
-                }
-                (Own, "listen", None) => OwnListen,
-                (Own, "verbose", None) => {
-                    config.verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
-                    Own
-                }
-                (Own, "peer", None) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.contains(&OwnPublicKey),
-                        "public-key file must be set"
-                    );
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.contains(&OwnSecretKey),
-                        "secret-key file must be set"
-                    );
-
-                    already_set.clear();
-                    current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
-
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (OwnPublicKey, pk, None) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(OwnPublicKey),
-                        "public-key was already set"
-                    );
-                    config.public_key = pk.into();
-                    Own
-                }
-                (OwnSecretKey, sk, None) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(OwnSecretKey),
-                        "secret-key was already set"
-                    );
-                    config.secret_key = sk.into();
-                    Own
-                }
-                (OwnListen, l, None) => {
-                    already_set.insert(OwnListen); // multiple listen directives are allowed
-                    for socket_addr in l.to_socket_addrs()? {
-                        config.listen.push(socket_addr);
-                    }
-
-                    Own
-                }
-                (Peer | PeerWireguardExtraArgs, "peer", maybe_peer @ Some(_)) => {
-                    // TODO check current peer
-                    // commit current peer, create a new one
-                    config.peers.push(maybe_peer.take().expect(p_exists));
-
-                    already_set.clear();
-                    current_peer = Some(RosenpassPeer::default());
-
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (Peer, "public-key", Some(_)) => PeerPublicKey,
-                (Peer, "endpoint", Some(_)) => PeerEndpoint,
-                (Peer, "preshared-key", Some(_)) => PeerPsk,
-                (Peer, "outfile", Some(_)) => PeerOutfile,
-                (Peer, "wireguard", Some(_)) => PeerWireguardDev,
-                (PeerPublicKey, pk, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(PeerPublicKey),
-                        "public-key was already set"
-                    );
-                    peer.public_key = pk.into();
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (PeerEndpoint, e, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint), "endpoint was already set");
-                    peer.endpoint = Some(e.to_owned());
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (PeerPsk, psk, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(already_set.insert(PeerEndpoint), "peer psk was already set");
-                    peer.pre_shared_key = Some(psk.into());
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (PeerOutfile, of, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(PeerOutfile),
-                        "peer outfile was already set"
-                    );
-                    peer.key_out = Some(of.into());
-                    Peer
-                }
-                (PeerWireguardDev, dev, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(PeerWireguardDev),
-                        "peer wireguard-dev was already set"
-                    );
-                    assert!(peer.wg.is_none());
-                    peer.wg = Some(WireGuard {
-                        device: dev.to_string(),
-                        ..Default::default()
-                    });
-
-                    PeerWireguardPeer
-                }
-                (PeerWireguardPeer, p, Some(peer)) => {
-                    ensure!(
-                        already_set.insert(PeerWireguardPeer),
-                        "peer wireguard-peer was already set"
-                    );
-                    peer.wg.as_mut().expect(wg_exists).peer = p.to_string();
-                    PeerWireguardExtraArgs
-                }
-                (PeerWireguardExtraArgs, arg, Some(peer)) => {
-                    peer.wg
-                        .as_mut()
-                        .expect(wg_exists)
-                        .extra_params
-                        .push(arg.to_string());
-                    PeerWireguardExtraArgs
-                }
-
-                // error cases
-                (Own, x, None) => {
-                    bail!("unrecognised argument {x}");
-                }
-                (Own | OwnPublicKey | OwnSecretKey | OwnListen, _, Some(_)) => {
-                    panic!("current_peer is not None while in Own* state, this must never happen")
-                }
-
-                (State::Peer, arg, Some(_)) => {
-                    bail!("unrecongnised argument {arg}");
-                }
-                (
-                    Peer
-                    | PeerEndpoint
-                    | PeerOutfile
-                    | PeerPublicKey
-                    | PeerPsk
-                    | PeerWireguardDev
-                    | PeerWireguardPeer
-                    | PeerWireguardExtraArgs,
-                    _,
-                    None,
-                ) => {
-                    panic!("got peer options but no peer was created")
-                }
-            };
-        }
-
-        if let Some(p) = current_peer {
-            // TODO ensure peer is propagated with sufficient information
-            config.peers.push(p);
-        }
-
-        Ok(config)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Rosenpass {
-    /// Generate an example configuration
-    pub fn example_config() -> Self {
-        let peer = RosenpassPeer {
-            public_key: "/path/to/rp-peer-public-key".into(),
-            endpoint: Some("my-peer.test:9999".into()),
-            key_out: Some("/path/to/rp-key-out.txt".into()),
-            pre_shared_key: Some("additional pre shared key".into()),
-            wg: Some(WireGuard {
-                device: "wirgeguard device e.g. wg0".into(),
-                peer: "wireguard public key".into(),
-                extra_params: vec!["passed to".into(), "wg set".into()],
-            }),
-        };
-
-        Self {
-            public_key: "/path/to/rp-public-key".into(),
-            secret_key: "/path/to/rp-secret-key".into(),
-            peers: vec![peer],
-            ..Self::new("", "")
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Default for Verbosity {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Self::Quiet
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use std::net::IpAddr;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    fn split_str(s: &str) -> Vec<String> {
-        s.split(" ").map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_simple_cli_parse() {
-        let args = split_str(
-            "public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
-                listen 0.0.0.0:9999 peer public-key /peer/public-key endpoint \
-                peer.test:9999 outfile /peer/rp-out",
-        );
-
-        let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
-        assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
-        assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
-        assert_eq!(
-            &config.listen,
-            &vec![SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0)), 9999)]
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            config.peers,
-            vec![RosenpassPeer {
-                public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer/public-key"),
-                endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
-                pre_shared_key: None,
-                key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer/rp-out")),
-                ..Default::default()
-            }]
-        )
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_cli_parse_multiple_peers() {
-        let args = split_str(
-            "public-key /my/public-key secret-key /my/secret-key verbose \
-                peer public-key /peer-a/public-key endpoint \
-                peer.test:9999 outfile /peer-a/rp-out \
-                peer public-key /peer-b/public-key outfile /peer-b/rp-out",
-        );
-
-        let config = Rosenpass::parse_args(args).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(config.public_key, PathBuf::from("/my/public-key"));
-        assert_eq!(config.secret_key, PathBuf::from("/my/secret-key"));
-        assert_eq!(config.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose);
-        assert!(&config.listen.is_empty());
-        assert_eq!(
-            config.peers,
-            vec![
-                RosenpassPeer {
-                    public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-a/public-key"),
-                    endpoint: Some("peer.test:9999".into()),
-                    pre_shared_key: None,
-                    key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-a/rp-out")),
-                    ..Default::default()
-                },
-                RosenpassPeer {
-                    public_key: PathBuf::from("/peer-b/public-key"),
-                    endpoint: None,
-                    pre_shared_key: None,
-                    key_out: Some(PathBuf::from("/peer-b/rp-out")),
-                    ..Default::default()
-                }
-            ]
-        )
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/hash_domains.rs

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-//! Pseudo Random Functions (PRFs) with a tree-like label scheme which
-//! ensures their uniqueness
-
-use anyhow::Result;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::{hash_domain::HashDomain, KEY_LEN};
-
-// TODO Use labels that can serve as identifiers
-macro_rules! hash_domain_ns {
-    ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
-        pub fn $name() -> Result<HashDomain> {
-            let t = $base()?;
-            $( let t = t.mix($lbl.as_bytes())?; )*
-            Ok(t)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-macro_rules! hash_domain {
-    ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
-        pub fn $name() -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN]> {
-            let t = $base()?;
-            $( let t = t.mix($lbl.as_bytes())?; )*
-            Ok(t.into_value())
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn protocol() -> Result<HashDomain> {
-    HashDomain::zero().mix("Rosenpass v1 mceliece460896 Kyber512 ChaChaPoly1305 BLAKE2s".as_bytes())
-}
-
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, mac, "mac");
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, cookie, "cookie");
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, peerid, "peer id");
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, biscuit_ad, "biscuit additional data");
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, ckinit, "chaining key init");
-hash_domain_ns!(protocol, _ckextract, "chaining key extract");
-
-hash_domain!(_ckextract, mix, "mix");
-hash_domain!(_ckextract, hs_enc, "handshake encryption");
-hash_domain!(_ckextract, ini_enc, "initiator handshake encryption");
-hash_domain!(_ckextract, res_enc, "responder handshake encryption");
-
-hash_domain_ns!(_ckextract, _user, "user");
-hash_domain_ns!(_user, _rp, "rosenpass.eu");
-hash_domain!(_rp, osk, "wireguard psk");

rosenpass/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-use rosenpass_lenses::LenseError;
-
-pub mod app_server;
-pub mod cli;
-pub mod config;
-pub mod hash_domains;
-pub mod msgs;
-pub mod protocol;
-
-#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
-pub enum RosenpassError {
-    #[error("buffer size mismatch")]
-    BufferSizeMismatch,
-    #[error("invalid message type")]
-    InvalidMessageType(u8),
-}
-
-impl From<LenseError> for RosenpassError {
-    fn from(value: LenseError) -> Self {
-        match value {
-            LenseError::BufferSizeMismatch => RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch,
-        }
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/main.rs

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-use log::error;
-use rosenpass::cli::Cli;
-use rosenpass_util::attempt;
-use std::process::exit;
-
-/// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
-pub fn main() {
-    env_logger::init();
-
-    let res = attempt!({
-        rosenpass_sodium::init()?;
-        Cli::run()
-    });
-
-    match res {
-        Ok(_) => {}
-        Err(e) => {
-            error!("{e}");
-            exit(1);
-        }
-    }
-}

rosenpass/src/msgs.rs

@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-//! Data structures representing the messages going over the wire
-//!
-//! This module contains de-/serialization of the protocol's messages. Thats kind
-//! of a lie, since no actual ser/de happens. Instead, the structures offer views
-//! into mutable byte slices (`&mut [u8]`), allowing to modify the fields of an
-//! always serialized instance of the data in question. This is closely related
-//! to the concept of lenses in function programming; more on that here:
-//! [https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf](https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf)
-//!
-//! # Example
-//!
-//! The following example uses the [`lense` macro](rosenpass_lenses::lense) to create a lense that
-//! might be useful when dealing with UDP headers.
-//!
-//! ```
-//! use rosenpass_lenses::{lense, LenseView};
-//! use rosenpass::RosenpassError;
-//! # fn main() -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
-//!
-//! lense! {UdpDatagramHeader :=
-//!     source_port: 2,
-//!     dest_port: 2,
-//!     length: 2,
-//!     checksum: 2
-//! }
-//!
-//! let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
-//!
-//! // read-only lense, no check of size:
-//! let lense = UdpDatagramHeader(&buf);
-//! assert_eq!(lense.checksum(), &[0, 0]);
-//!
-//! // mutable lense, runtime check of size
-//! let mut lense = buf.as_mut().udp_datagram_header()?;
-//! lense.source_port_mut().copy_from_slice(&53u16.to_be_bytes()); // some DNS, anyone?
-//!
-//! // the original buffer is still available
-//! assert_eq!(buf, [0, 53, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
-//!
-//! // read-only lense, runtime check of size
-//! let lense = buf.as_ref().udp_datagram_header()?;
-//! assert_eq!(lense.source_port(), &[0, 53]);
-//! # Ok(())
-//! # }
-//! ```
-
-use super::RosenpassError;
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::{EphemeralKem, StaticKem};
-use rosenpass_ciphers::{aead, xaead, KEY_LEN};
-use rosenpass_lenses::{lense, LenseView};
-
-// Macro magic ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-
-lense! { Envelope<M> :=
-    /// [MsgType] of this message
-    msg_type: 1,
-    /// Reserved for future use
-    reserved: 3,
-    /// The actual Paylod
-    payload: M::LEN,
-    /// Message Authentication Code (mac) over all bytes until (exclusive)
-    /// `mac` itself
-    mac: 16,
-    /// Currently unused, TODO: do something with this
-    cookie: 16
-}
-
-lense! { InitHello :=
-    /// Randomly generated connection id
-    sidi: 4,
-    /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Public Key
-    epki: EphemeralKem::PK_LEN,
-    /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
-    sctr: StaticKem::CT_LEN,
-    /// Encryped: 16 byte hash of McEliece initiator static key
-    pidic: aead::TAG_LEN + 32,
-    /// Encrypted TAI64N Time Stamp (against replay attacks)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
-}
-
-lense! { RespHello :=
-    /// Randomly generated connection id
-    sidr: 4,
-    /// Copied from InitHello
-    sidi: 4,
-    /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Ciphertext
-    ecti: EphemeralKem::CT_LEN,
-    /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
-    scti: StaticKem::CT_LEN,
-    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN,
-    /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
-    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN
-}
-
-lense! { InitConf :=
-    /// Copied from InitHello
-    sidi: 4,
-    /// Copied from RespHello
-    sidr: 4,
-    /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
-    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
-    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
-}
-
-lense! { EmptyData :=
-    /// Copied from RespHello
-    sid: 4,
-    /// Nonce
-    ctr: 8,
-    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
-    auth: aead::TAG_LEN
-}
-
-lense! { Biscuit :=
-    /// H(spki) – Ident ifies the initiator
-    pidi: KEY_LEN,
-    /// The biscuit number (replay protection)
-    biscuit_no: 12,
-    /// Chaining key
-    ck: KEY_LEN
-}
-
-lense! { DataMsg :=
-    dummy: 4
-}
-
-lense! { CookieReply :=
-    dummy: 4
-}
-
-// Traits /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-
-pub trait WireMsg: std::fmt::Debug {
-    const MSG_TYPE: MsgType;
-    const MSG_TYPE_U8: u8 = Self::MSG_TYPE as u8;
-    const BYTES: usize;
-}
-
-// Constants //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-
-pub const SESSION_ID_LEN: usize = 4;
-pub const BISCUIT_ID_LEN: usize = 12;
-
-pub const WIRE_ENVELOPE_LEN: usize = 1 + 3 + 16 + 16; // TODO verify this
-
-/// Size required to fit any message in binary form
-pub const MAX_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = 2500; // TODO fix this
-
-/// Recognized message types
-#[repr(u8)]
-#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Clone, Copy)]
-pub enum MsgType {
-    InitHello = 0x81,
-    RespHello = 0x82,
-    InitConf = 0x83,
-    EmptyData = 0x84,
-    DataMsg = 0x85,
-    CookieReply = 0x86,
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<u8> for MsgType {
-    type Error = RosenpassError;
-
-    fn try_from(value: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Ok(match value {
-            0x81 => MsgType::InitHello,
-            0x82 => MsgType::RespHello,
-            0x83 => MsgType::InitConf,
-            0x84 => MsgType::EmptyData,
-            0x85 => MsgType::DataMsg,
-            0x86 => MsgType::CookieReply,
-            _ => return Err(RosenpassError::InvalidMessageType(value)),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-/// length in bytes of an unencrypted Biscuit (plain text)
-pub const BISCUIT_PT_LEN: usize = Biscuit::<()>::LEN;
-
-/// Length in bytes of an encrypted Biscuit (cipher text)
-pub const BISCUIT_CT_LEN: usize = BISCUIT_PT_LEN + xaead::NONCE_LEN + xaead::TAG_LEN;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test_constants {
-    use crate::msgs::{BISCUIT_CT_LEN, BISCUIT_PT_LEN};
-    use rosenpass_ciphers::{xaead, KEY_LEN};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn sodium_keysize() {
-        assert_eq!(KEY_LEN, 32);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn biscuit_pt_len() {
-        assert_eq!(BISCUIT_PT_LEN, 2 * KEY_LEN + 12);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn biscuit_ct_len() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
-            BISCUIT_PT_LEN + xaead::NONCE_LEN + xaead::TAG_LEN
-        );
-    }
-}

rp

@@ -43,17 +43,6 @@ dbg() {
   echo >&2 "$@"
 }
 
-
-detect_git_dir() {
-  # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3618078/pipe-only-stderr-through-a-filter
-  (
-    git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&- \
-      | sed '
-          /not a git repository/d;
-          s/^/WARNING: /'
-  ) 3>&1 1>&2 2>&3 3>&-
-}
-
 # Cleanup subsystem (sigterm)
 
 cleanup_init() {
@@ -152,9 +141,9 @@ genkey() {
     umask 077
     mkdir -p $(enquote "${skdir}")
     wg genkey > $(enquote "${skdir}"/wgsk)
-    $(enquote "${binary}") gen-keys \\
-      -s $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
-      -p  $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
+    $(enquote "${binary}") keygen \\
+      private-key $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqsk) \\
+      public-key  $(enquote "${skdir}"/pqpk)"
 }
 
 pubkey() {
@@ -197,7 +186,7 @@ exchange() {
         lip="${listen%:*}";
         lport="${listen/*:/}";
         if [[ "$lip" = "$lport" ]]; then
-          lip="[::]"
+          lip="[0::0]"
         fi
         shift;;
       -h | -help | --help | help) usage; return 0;;
@@ -209,11 +198,8 @@ exchange() {
     fatal "Needs at least one peer specified"
   fi
 
-  # os dependent setup
-  case "$OSTYPE" in
-    linux-*) # could be linux-gnu or linux-musl
   frag "
-        # Create the WireGuard interface
+    # Create the Wireguard interface
     ip link add dev $(enquote "${dev}") type wireguard || true"
 
   cleanup "
@@ -221,29 +207,6 @@ exchange() {
 
   frag "
     ip link set dev $(enquote "${dev}") up"
-      ;;
-
-    freebsd*)
-      frag "
-        # load the WireGuard kernel module
-        kldload -n if_wg || fatal 'Cannot load if_wg kernel module'"
-
-      frag "
-        # Create the WireGuard interface
-        ifconfig wg create name $(enquote "${dev}") || true"
-
-      cleanup "
-        ifconfig $(enquote "${dev}") destroy || true"
-
-      frag "
-        ifconfig $(enquote "${dev}") up"
-      ;;
-
-    *)
-      fatal "Your system $OSTYPE is not yet supported. We are happy to receive patches to address this :)"
-      ;;
-
-  esac
 
   frag "
     # Deploy the classic wireguard private key
@@ -262,7 +225,7 @@ exchange() {
     frag_append "verbose"
   fi
 
-  frag_append_esc "    secret-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
+  frag_append_esc "    private-key $(enquote "${skdir}/pqsk")"
   frag_append_esc "    public-key  $(enquote "${skdir}/pqpk")"
 
   if test -n "${lport}"; then
@@ -281,7 +244,7 @@ exchange() {
       local arg; arg="$1"; shift
       case "${arg}" in
         peer) set -- "peer" "$@"; break;; # Next peer
-        endpoint) ip="${1%:*}"; port="${1##*:}"; shift;;
+        endpoint) ip="${1%:*}"; port="${1/*:/}"; shift;;
         persistent-keepalive) keepalive="${1}"; shift;;
         allowed-ips) allowedips="${1}"; shift;;
         -h | -help | --help | help) usage; return 0;;
@@ -351,10 +314,8 @@ main() {
   project_name="rosenpass"
   verbose=0
   scriptdir="$(dirname "${script}")"
-  gitdir="$(detect_git_dir)" || true
-  if [[ -d /nix ]]; then
+  gitdir="$(git -C "${scriptdir}" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" || true
   nixdir="$(readlink -f result/bin/rp | grep -Pio '^/nix/store/[^/]+(?=/bin/[^/]+)')" || true
-  fi
   binary="$(find_rosenpass_binary)"
 
   # Parse command

secret-memory/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-secret-memory"
-version = "0.1.0"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal utilities for storing secrets in memory"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-sodium = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
-lazy_static = { workspace = true }
-zeroize = { workspace = true }
-rand = { workspace = true }

secret-memory/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass secure memory library
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing utilities for securely storing secret data in memory.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

secret-memory/src/debug.rs

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-use std::fmt;
-
-/// Writes the contents of an `&[u8]` as hexadecimal symbols to a [std::fmt::Formatter]
-pub fn debug_crypto_array(v: &[u8], fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-    fmt.write_str("[{}]=")?;
-    if v.len() > 64 {
-        for byte in &v[..32] {
-            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
-        }
-        fmt.write_str("…")?;
-        for byte in &v[v.len() - 32..] {
-            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
-        }
-    } else {
-        for byte in v {
-            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}

secret-memory/src/file.rs

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-use std::path::Path;
-
-pub trait StoreSecret {
-    type Error;
-
-    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<(), Self::Error>;
-}

secret-memory/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-pub mod debug;
-pub mod file;
-pub mod rand;
-
-mod public;
-pub use crate::public::Public;
-
-mod secret;
-pub use crate::secret::Secret;

secret-memory/src/public.rs

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-use crate::debug::debug_crypto_array;
-use rand::{Fill as Randomize, Rng};
-use rosenpass_to::{ops::copy_slice, To};
-use rosenpass_util::file::{fopen_r, LoadValue, ReadExactToEnd, StoreValue};
-use rosenpass_util::functional::mutating;
-use std::borrow::{Borrow, BorrowMut};
-use std::fmt;
-use std::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
-use std::path::Path;
-
-/// Contains information in the form of a byte array that may be known to the
-/// public
-// TODO: We should get rid of the Public type; just use a normal value
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
-#[repr(transparent)]
-pub struct Public<const N: usize> {
-    pub value: [u8; N],
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Public<N> {
-    /// Create a new [Public] from a byte slice
-    pub fn from_slice(value: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        copy_slice(value).to_this(|| Self::zero())
-    }
-
-    /// Create a new [Public] from a byte array
-    pub fn new(value: [u8; N]) -> Self {
-        Self { value }
-    }
-
-    /// Create a zero initialized [Public]
-    pub fn zero() -> Self {
-        Self { value: [0u8; N] }
-    }
-
-    /// Create a random initialized [Public]
-    pub fn random() -> Self {
-        mutating(Self::zero(), |r| r.randomize())
-    }
-
-    /// Randomize all bytes in an existing [Public]
-    pub fn randomize(&mut self) {
-        self.try_fill(&mut crate::rand::rng()).unwrap()
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Randomize for Public<N> {
-    fn try_fill<R: Rng + ?Sized>(&mut self, rng: &mut R) -> Result<(), rand::Error> {
-        self.value.try_fill(rng)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> fmt::Debug for Public<N> {
-    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-        debug_crypto_array(&self.value, fmt)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Deref for Public<N> {
-    type Target = [u8; N];
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &[u8; N] {
-        &self.value
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> DerefMut for Public<N> {
-    fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8; N] {
-        &mut self.value
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Borrow<[u8; N]> for Public<N> {
-    fn borrow(&self) -> &[u8; N] {
-        &self.value
-    }
-}
-impl<const N: usize> BorrowMut<[u8; N]> for Public<N> {
-    fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8; N] {
-        &mut self.value
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Borrow<[u8]> for Public<N> {
-    fn borrow(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.value
-    }
-}
-impl<const N: usize> BorrowMut<[u8]> for Public<N> {
-    fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
-        &mut self.value
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
-    type Error = anyhow::Error;
-
-    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
-    type Error = anyhow::Error;
-
-    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}

secret-memory/src/rand.rs

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-pub type Rng = rand::rngs::ThreadRng;
-
-pub fn rng() -> Rng {
-    rand::thread_rng()
-}

secret-memory/src/secret.rs

@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
-use crate::file::StoreSecret;
-use anyhow::Context;
-use lazy_static::lazy_static;
-use rand::{Fill as Randomize, Rng};
-use rosenpass_sodium::alloc::{Alloc as SodiumAlloc, Box as SodiumBox, Vec as SodiumVec};
-use rosenpass_util::{
-    b64::b64_reader,
-    file::{fopen_r, LoadValue, LoadValueB64, ReadExactToEnd},
-    functional::mutating,
-};
-use std::{collections::HashMap, convert::TryInto, fmt, path::Path, sync::Mutex};
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
-
-// This might become a problem in library usage; it's effectively a memory
-// leak which probably isn't a problem right now because most memory will
-// be reused…
-lazy_static! {
-    static ref SECRET_CACHE: Mutex<SecretMemoryPool> = Mutex::new(SecretMemoryPool::new());
-}
-
-/// Pool that stores secret memory allocations
-///
-/// Allocation of secret memory is expensive. Thus, this struct provides a
-/// pool of secret memory, readily available to yield protected, slices of
-/// memory.
-///
-/// Further information about the protection in place can be found in in the
-/// [libsodium documentation](https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations)
-#[derive(Debug)] // TODO check on Debug derive, is that clever
-struct SecretMemoryPool {
-    pool: HashMap<usize, Vec<SodiumBox<[u8]>>>,
-}
-
-impl SecretMemoryPool {
-    /// Create a new [SecretMemoryPool]
-    #[allow(clippy::new_without_default)]
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self {
-            pool: HashMap::new(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Return secret back to the pool for future re-use
-    pub fn release<const N: usize>(&mut self, mut sec: SodiumBox<[u8; N]>) {
-        sec.zeroize();
-
-        // This conversion sequence is weird but at least it guarantees
-        // that the heap allocation is preserved according to the docs
-        let sec: SodiumVec<u8> = sec.into();
-        let sec: SodiumBox<[u8]> = sec.into();
-
-        self.pool.entry(N).or_default().push(sec);
-    }
-
-    /// Take protected memory from the pool, allocating new one if no suitable
-    /// chunk is found in the inventory.
-    ///
-    /// The secret is guaranteed to be full of nullbytes
-    pub fn take<const N: usize>(&mut self) -> SodiumBox<[u8; N]> {
-        let entry = self.pool.entry(N).or_default();
-        match entry.pop() {
-            None => SodiumBox::new_in([0u8; N], SodiumAlloc::default()),
-            Some(sec) => sec.try_into().unwrap(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Storeage for a secret backed by [rosenpass_sodium::alloc::Alloc]
-pub struct Secret<const N: usize> {
-    storage: Option<SodiumBox<[u8; N]>>,
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Secret<N> {
-    pub fn from_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        let mut new_self = Self::zero();
-        new_self.secret_mut().copy_from_slice(slice);
-        new_self
-    }
-
-    /// Returns a new [Secret] that is zero initialized
-    pub fn zero() -> Self {
-        // Using [SecretMemoryPool] here because this operation is expensive,
-        // yet it is used in hot loops
-        Self {
-            storage: Some(SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().take()),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Returns a new [Secret] that is randomized
-    pub fn random() -> Self {
-        mutating(Self::zero(), |r| r.randomize())
-    }
-
-    /// Sets all data an existing secret to random bytes
-    pub fn randomize(&mut self) {
-        self.try_fill(&mut crate::rand::rng()).unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Borrows the data
-    pub fn secret(&self) -> &[u8; N] {
-        self.storage.as_ref().unwrap()
-    }
-
-    /// Borrows the data mutably
-    pub fn secret_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8; N] {
-        self.storage.as_mut().unwrap()
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> ZeroizeOnDrop for Secret<N> {}
-impl<const N: usize> Zeroize for Secret<N> {
-    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
-        self.secret_mut().zeroize();
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Randomize for Secret<N> {
-    fn try_fill<R: Rng + ?Sized>(&mut self, rng: &mut R) -> Result<(), rand::Error> {
-        // Zeroize self first just to make sure the barriers from the zeroize create take
-        // effect to prevent the compiler from optimizing this away.
-        // We should at some point replace this with our own barriers.
-        self.zeroize();
-        self.secret_mut().try_fill(rng)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Drop for Secret<N> {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        self.storage
-            .take()
-            .map(|sec| SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().release(sec));
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> Clone for Secret<N> {
-    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
-        Self::from_slice(self.secret())
-    }
-}
-
-/// The Debug implementation of [Secret] does not reveal the secret data,
-/// instead a placeholder `<SECRET>` is used
-impl<const N: usize> fmt::Debug for Secret<N> {
-    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-        fmt.write_str("<SECRET>")
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
-    type Error = anyhow::Error;
-
-    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        let p = path.as_ref();
-        fopen_r(p)?
-            .read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut())
-            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load file {p:?}"))?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
-    type Error = anyhow::Error;
-
-    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
-        use std::io::Read;
-
-        let mut v = Self::random();
-        let p = path.as_ref();
-        // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
-        // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
-        // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
-        // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
-        // data will linger in the Linux page cache anyways with the current
-        // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
-        // not worth it right now.
-        b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
-            .read_exact(v.secret_mut())
-            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}"))?;
-        Ok(v)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
-    type Error = anyhow::Error;
-
-    fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// check that we can alloc using the magic pool
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_memory_pool_take() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
-        const N: usize = 0x100;
-        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
-        assert_eq!(secret.as_ref(), &[0; N]);
-    }
-
-    /// check that a secrete lives, even if its [SecretMemoryPool] is deleted
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_memory_pool_drop() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
-        const N: usize = 0x100;
-        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
-        std::mem::drop(pool);
-        assert_eq!(secret.as_ref(), &[0; N]);
-    }
-
-    /// check that a secrete can be reborn, freshly initialized with zero
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_memory_pool_release() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
-        const N: usize = 1;
-        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
-        let mut secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
-        let old_secret_ptr = secret.as_ref().as_ptr();
-
-        secret.as_mut()[0] = 0x13;
-        pool.release(secret);
-
-        // now check that we get the same ptr
-        let new_secret: SodiumBox<[u8; N]> = pool.take();
-        assert_eq!(old_secret_ptr, new_secret.as_ref().as_ptr());
-
-        // and that the secret was zeroized
-        assert_eq!(new_secret.as_ref(), &[0; N]);
-    }
-}

sodium/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "rosenpass-sodium"
-authors = ["Karolin Varner <karo@cupdev.net>", "wucke13 <wucke13@gmail.com>"]
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
-description = "Rosenpass internal bindings to libsodium"
-homepage = "https://rosenpass.eu/"
-repository = "https://github.com/rosenpass/rosenpass"
-readme = "readme.md"
-
-[dependencies]
-rosenpass-util = { workspace = true }
-rosenpass-to = { workspace = true }
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-libsodium-sys-stable = { workspace = true }
-log = { workspace = true }
-allocator-api2 = { workspace = true }

sodium/readme.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Rosenpass internal libsodium bindings
-
-Rosenpass internal library providing bindings to libsodium.
-
-This is an internal library; not guarantee is made about its API at this point in time.

sodium/src/aead/chacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::{null, null_mut};
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize;
-pub const TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_ABYTES as usize;
-pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn encrypt(
-    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    assert!(nonce.len() == NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
-        ciphertext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut clen,
-        plaintext.as_ptr(),
-        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        null(), // nsec is not used
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(clen as usize == ciphertext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn decrypt(
-    plaintext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    ciphertext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    assert!(nonce.len() == NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
-        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
-        null_mut(), // nsec is not used
-        ciphertext.as_ptr(),
-        ciphertext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}

sodium/src/aead/mod.rs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-pub mod chacha20poly1305_ietf;
-pub mod xchacha20poly1305_ietf;

sodium/src/aead/xchacha20poly1305_ietf.rs

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::{null, null_mut};
-
-pub const KEY_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize;
-pub const TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES as usize;
-pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn encrypt(
-    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
-    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
-    n.copy_from_slice(nonce);
-    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
-        ct.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut clen,
-        plaintext.as_ptr(),
-        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        null(), // nsec is not used
-        nonce.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(clen as usize == ct.len());
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn decrypt(
-    plaintext: &mut [u8],
-    key: &[u8],
-    ad: &[u8],
-    ciphertext: &[u8],
-) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-    assert!(key.len() == KEY_LEN);
-    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at(NONCE_LEN);
-    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
-    sodium_call!(
-        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
-        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
-        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
-        null_mut(), // nsec is not used
-        ct.as_ptr(),
-        ct.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        ad.as_ptr(),
-        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
-        n.as_ptr(),
-        key.as_ptr()
-    )?;
-    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
-    Ok(())
-}

sodium/src/alloc/allocator.rs

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-use allocator_api2::alloc::{AllocError, Allocator, Layout};
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::fmt;
-use std::os::raw::c_void;
-use std::ptr::NonNull;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-struct AllocatorContents;
-
-/// Memory allocation using sodium_malloc/sodium_free
-#[derive(Clone, Default)]
-pub struct Alloc {
-    _dummy_private_data: AllocatorContents,
-}
-
-impl Alloc {
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Alloc {
-            _dummy_private_data: AllocatorContents,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-unsafe impl Allocator for Alloc {
-    fn allocate(&self, layout: Layout) -> Result<NonNull<[u8]>, AllocError> {
-        // Call sodium allocator
-        let ptr = unsafe { libsodium::sodium_malloc(layout.size()) };
-
-        // Ensure the right allocation is used
-        let off = ptr.align_offset(layout.align());
-        if off != 0 {
-            log::error!("Allocation {layout:?} was requested but libsodium returned allocation \
-                with offset {off} from the requested alignment. Libsodium always allocates values \
-                at the end of a memory page for security reasons, custom alignments are not supported. \
-                You could try allocating an oversized value.");
-            return Err(AllocError);
-        }
-
-        // Convert to a pointer size
-        let ptr = core::ptr::slice_from_raw_parts_mut(ptr as *mut u8, layout.size());
-
-        // Conversion to a *const u8, then to a &[u8]
-        match NonNull::new(ptr) {
-            None => {
-                log::error!(
-                    "Allocation {layout:?} was requested but libsodium returned a null pointer"
-                );
-                Err(AllocError)
-            }
-            Some(ret) => Ok(ret),
-        }
-    }
-
-    unsafe fn deallocate(&self, ptr: NonNull<u8>, _layout: Layout) {
-        unsafe {
-            libsodium::sodium_free(ptr.as_ptr() as *mut c_void);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for Alloc {
-    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-        fmt.write_str("<libsodium based Rust allocator>")
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use super::*;
-
-    /// checks that the can malloc with libsodium
-    #[test]
-    fn sodium_allocation() {
-        crate::init().unwrap();
-        let alloc = Alloc::new();
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<0>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<7>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<8>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<64>(&alloc);
-        sodium_allocation_impl::<999>(&alloc);
-    }
-
-    fn sodium_allocation_impl<const N: usize>(alloc: &Alloc) {
-        crate::init().unwrap();
-        let layout = Layout::new::<[u8; N]>();
-        let mem = alloc.allocate(layout).unwrap();
-
-        // https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations
-        // promises us that allocated memory is initialized with the magic byte 0xDB
-        assert_eq!(unsafe { mem.as_ref() }, &[0xDBu8; N]);
-
-        let mem = NonNull::new(mem.as_ptr() as *mut u8).unwrap();
-        unsafe { alloc.deallocate(mem, layout) };
-    }
-}

sodium/src/alloc/mod.rs

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-//! Access to sodium_malloc/sodium_free
-
-mod allocator;
-pub use allocator::Alloc;
-
-/// A box backed by sodium_malloc
-pub type Box<T> = allocator_api2::boxed::Box<T, Alloc>;
-
-/// A vector backed by sodium_malloc
-pub type Vec<T> = allocator_api2::vec::Vec<T, Alloc>;

sodium/src/hash/blake2b.rs

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use rosenpass_to::{with_destination, To};
-use std::ffi::c_ulonglong;
-use std::ptr::null;
-
-pub const KEY_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_KEYBYTES_MIN as usize;
-pub const KEY_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_KEYBYTES_MAX as usize;
-pub const OUT_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_BYTES_MIN as usize;
-pub const OUT_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_blake2b_BYTES_MAX as usize;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn hash<'a>(key: &'a [u8], data: &'a [u8]) -> impl To<[u8], anyhow::Result<()>> + 'a {
-    with_destination(|out: &mut [u8]| {
-        assert!(key.is_empty() || (KEY_MIN <= key.len() && key.len() <= KEY_MAX));
-        assert!(OUT_MIN <= out.len() && out.len() <= OUT_MAX);
-        let kptr = match key.len() {
-            // NULL key
-            0 => null(),
-            _ => key.as_ptr(),
-        };
-        sodium_call!(
-            crypto_generichash_blake2b,
-            out.as_mut_ptr(),
-            out.len(),
-            data.as_ptr(),
-            data.len() as c_ulonglong,
-            kptr,
-            key.len()
-        )
-    })
-}

sodium/src/hash/mod.rs

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-pub mod blake2b;

sodium/src/helpers.rs

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-use std::os::raw::c_void;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn memcmp(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
-    a.len() == b.len()
-        && unsafe {
-            let r = libsodium::sodium_memcmp(
-                a.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
-                b.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
-                a.len(),
-            );
-            r == 0
-        }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> i32 {
-    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
-    unsafe { libsodium::sodium_compare(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr(), a.len()) }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn increment(v: &mut [u8]) {
-    unsafe {
-        libsodium::sodium_increment(v.as_mut_ptr(), v.len());
-    }
-}

sodium/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
-
-macro_rules! sodium_call {
-    ($name:ident, $($args:expr),*) => { ::rosenpass_util::attempt!({
-        anyhow::ensure!(unsafe{libsodium::$name($($args),*)} > -1,
-            "Error in libsodium's {}.", stringify!($name));
-        Ok(())
-    })};
-    ($name:ident) => { sodium_call!($name, ) };
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn init() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-    log::trace!("initializing libsodium");
-    sodium_call!(sodium_init)
-}
-
-pub mod aead;
-pub mod alloc;
-pub mod hash;
-pub mod helpers;

src/coloring.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+//! Types types for dealing with (secret-) values
+//!
+//! These types use type level coloring to make accidential leackage of secrets extra hard. Both [Secret] and [Public] own their data, but the memory backing
+//! [Secret] is special:
+//! - as it is heap allocated, we can actively zeroize the memory before freeing it.
+//! - guard pages before and after each allocation trap accidential sequential reads that creep towards our secrets
+//! - the memory is mlocked, e.g. it is never swapped
+
+use crate::{
+    sodium::{rng, zeroize},
+    util::{cpy, mutating},
+};
+use lazy_static::lazy_static;
+use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
+use std::{
+    collections::HashMap,
+    convert::TryInto,
+    fmt,
+    ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
+    os::raw::c_void,
+    ptr::null_mut,
+    sync::Mutex,
+};
+
+// This might become a problem in library usage; it's effectively a memory
+// leak which probably isn't a problem right now because most memory will
+// be reused…
+lazy_static! {
+    static ref SECRET_CACHE: Mutex<SecretMemoryPool> = Mutex::new(SecretMemoryPool::new());
+}
+
+/// Pool that stores secret memory allocations
+///
+/// Allocation of secret memory is expensive. Thus, this struct provides a
+/// pool of secret memory, readily available to yield protected, slices of
+/// memory.
+///
+/// Further information about the protection in place can be found in in the
+/// [libsodium documentation](https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations)
+#[derive(Debug)] // TODO check on Debug derive, is that clever
+pub struct SecretMemoryPool {
+    pool: HashMap<usize, Vec<*mut c_void>>,
+}
+
+impl SecretMemoryPool {
+    /// Create a new [SecretMemoryPool]
+    #[allow(clippy::new_without_default)]
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        let pool = HashMap::new();
+
+        Self { pool }
+    }
+
+    /// Return secrete back to the pool for future re-use
+    ///
+    /// This consumes the [Secret], but its memory is re-used.
+    pub fn release<const N: usize>(&mut self, mut s: Secret<N>) {
+        unsafe {
+            self.release_by_ref(&mut s);
+        }
+        std::mem::forget(s);
+    }
+
+    /// Return secret back to the pool for future re-use, by slice
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// After calling this function on a [Secret], the secret must never be
+    /// used again for anything.
+    unsafe fn release_by_ref<const N: usize>(&mut self, s: &mut Secret<N>) {
+        s.zeroize();
+        let Secret { ptr: secret } = s;
+        // don't call Secret::drop, that could cause a double free
+        self.pool.entry(N).or_default().push(*secret);
+    }
+
+    /// Take protected memory from the pool, allocating new one if no suitable
+    /// chunk is found in the inventory.
+    ///
+    /// The secret is guaranteed to be full of nullbytes
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// This function contains an unsafe call to [libsodium::sodium_malloc].
+    /// This call has no known safety invariants, thus nothing can go wrong™.
+    /// However, just like normal `malloc()` this can return a null ptr. Thus
+    /// the returned pointer is checked for null; causing the program to panic
+    /// if it is null.
+    pub fn take<const N: usize>(&mut self) -> Secret<N> {
+        let entry = self.pool.entry(N).or_default();
+        let secret = entry.pop().unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            let ptr = unsafe { libsodium::sodium_malloc(N) };
+            assert!(
+                !ptr.is_null(),
+                "libsodium::sodium_mallloc() returned a null ptr"
+            );
+            ptr
+        });
+
+        let mut s = Secret { ptr: secret };
+        s.zeroize();
+        s
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for SecretMemoryPool {
+    /// # Safety
+    ///
+    /// The drop implementation frees the contained elements using
+    /// [libsodium::sodium_free]. This is safe as long as every `*mut c_void`
+    /// contained was initialized with a call to [libsodium::sodium_malloc]
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        for ptr in self.pool.drain().flat_map(|(_, x)| x.into_iter()) {
+            unsafe {
+                libsodium::sodium_free(ptr);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// No safety implications are known, since the `*mut c_void` in
+/// is essentially used like a `&mut u8` [SecretMemoryPool].
+unsafe impl Send for SecretMemoryPool {}
+
+/// Store for a secret
+///
+/// Uses memory allocated with [libsodium::sodium_malloc],
+/// esentially can do the same things as `[u8; N].as_mut_ptr()`.
+pub struct Secret<const N: usize> {
+    ptr: *mut c_void,
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> Clone for Secret<N> {
+    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+        let mut new = Self::zero();
+        new.secret_mut().clone_from_slice(self.secret());
+        new
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> Drop for Secret<N> {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.zeroize();
+        // the invariant that the [Secret] is not used after the
+        // `release_by_ref` call is guaranteed, since this is a drop implementation
+        unsafe { SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().release_by_ref(self) };
+        self.ptr = null_mut();
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> Secret<N> {
+    pub fn from_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        let mut new_self = Self::zero();
+        new_self.secret_mut().copy_from_slice(slice);
+        new_self
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a new [Secret] that is zero initialized
+    pub fn zero() -> Self {
+        // Using [SecretMemoryPool] here because this operation is expensive,
+        // yet it is used in hot loops
+        let s = SECRET_CACHE.lock().unwrap().take();
+        assert_eq!(s.secret(), &[0u8; N]);
+        s
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a new [Secret] that is randomized
+    pub fn random() -> Self {
+        mutating(Self::zero(), |r| r.randomize())
+    }
+
+    /// Sets all data of an existing secret to null bytes
+    pub fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        zeroize(self.secret_mut());
+    }
+
+    /// Sets all data an existing secret to random bytes
+    pub fn randomize(&mut self) {
+        rng(self.secret_mut());
+    }
+
+    /// Borrows the data
+    pub fn secret(&self) -> &[u8; N] {
+        // - calling `from_raw_parts` is safe, because `ptr` is initalized with
+        //   as `N` byte allocation from the creation of `Secret` onwards. `ptr`
+        //   stays valid over the full lifetime of `Secret`
+        //
+        // - calling uwnrap is safe, because we can guarantee that the slice has
+        //   exactly the required size `N` to create an array of `N` elements.
+        let ptr = self.ptr as *const u8;
+        let slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(ptr, N) };
+        slice.try_into().unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Borrows the data mutably
+    pub fn secret_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8; N] {
+        // the same safety argument as for `secret()` holds
+        let ptr = self.ptr as *mut u8;
+        let slice = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(ptr, N) };
+        slice.try_into().unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+/// The Debug implementation of [Secret] does not reveal the secret data,
+/// instead a placeholder `<SECRET>` is used
+impl<const N: usize> fmt::Debug for Secret<N> {
+    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+        fmt.write_str("<SECRET>")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Contains information in the form of a byte array that may be known to the
+/// public
+// TODO: We should get rid of the Public type; just use a normal value
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+#[repr(transparent)]
+pub struct Public<const N: usize> {
+    pub value: [u8; N],
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> Public<N> {
+    /// Create a new [Public] from a byte slice
+    pub fn from_slice(value: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        mutating(Self::zero(), |r| cpy(value, &mut r.value))
+    }
+
+    /// Create a new [Public] from a byte array
+    pub fn new(value: [u8; N]) -> Self {
+        Self { value }
+    }
+
+    /// Create a zero initialized [Public]
+    pub fn zero() -> Self {
+        Self { value: [0u8; N] }
+    }
+
+    /// Create a random initialized [Public]
+    pub fn random() -> Self {
+        mutating(Self::zero(), |r| r.randomize())
+    }
+
+    /// Randomize all bytes in an existing [Public]
+    pub fn randomize(&mut self) {
+        rng(&mut self.value);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Writes the contents of an `&[u8]` as hexadecimal symbols to a [std::fmt::Formatter]
+pub fn debug_crypto_array(v: &[u8], fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+    fmt.write_str("[{}]=")?;
+    if v.len() > 64 {
+        for byte in &v[..32] {
+            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
+        }
+        fmt.write_str("…")?;
+        for byte in &v[v.len() - 32..] {
+            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
+        }
+    } else {
+        for byte in v {
+            std::fmt::LowerHex::fmt(byte, fmt)?;
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> fmt::Debug for Public<N> {
+    fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+        debug_crypto_array(&self.value, fmt)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> Deref for Public<N> {
+    type Target = [u8; N];
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &[u8; N] {
+        &self.value
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> DerefMut for Public<N> {
+    fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8; N] {
+        &mut self.value
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/memory_management#guarded-heap-allocations
+    /// promises us that allocated memory is initialized with this magic byte
+    const SODIUM_MAGIC_BYTE: u8 = 0xdb;
+
+    /// must be called before any interaction with libsodium
+    fn init() {
+        unsafe { libsodium_sys::sodium_init() };
+    }
+
+    /// checks that whe can malloc with libsodium
+    #[test]
+    fn sodium_malloc() {
+        init();
+        const N: usize = 8;
+        let ptr = unsafe { libsodium_sys::sodium_malloc(N) };
+        let mem = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(ptr as *mut u8, N) };
+        assert_eq!(mem, &[SODIUM_MAGIC_BYTE; N])
+    }
+
+    /// checks that whe can free with libsodium
+    #[test]
+    fn sodium_free() {
+        init();
+        const N: usize = 8;
+        let ptr = unsafe { libsodium_sys::sodium_malloc(N) };
+        unsafe { libsodium_sys::sodium_free(ptr) }
+    }
+
+    /// check that we can alloc using the magic pool
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_memory_pool_take() {
+        init();
+        const N: usize = 0x100;
+        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
+        let secret: Secret<N> = pool.take();
+        assert_eq!(secret.secret(), &[0; N]);
+    }
+
+    /// check that a secrete lives, even if its [SecretMemoryPool] is deleted
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_memory_pool_drop() {
+        init();
+        const N: usize = 0x100;
+        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
+        let secret: Secret<N> = pool.take();
+        std::mem::drop(pool);
+        assert_eq!(secret.secret(), &[0; N]);
+    }
+
+    /// check that a secrete can be reborn, freshly initialized with zero
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_memory_pool_release() {
+        init();
+        const N: usize = 1;
+        let mut pool = SecretMemoryPool::new();
+        let mut secret: Secret<N> = pool.take();
+        let old_secret_ptr = secret.ptr;
+
+        secret.secret_mut()[0] = 0x13;
+        pool.release(secret);
+
+        // now check that we get the same ptr
+        let new_secret: Secret<N> = pool.take();
+        assert_eq!(old_secret_ptr, new_secret.ptr);
+
+        // and that the secret was zeroized
+        assert_eq!(new_secret.secret(), &[0; N]);
+    }
+}

src/labeled_prf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+//! Pseudo Random Functions (PRFs) with a tree-like label scheme which
+//! ensures their uniqueness
+
+use {
+    crate::{prftree::PrfTree, sodium::KEY_SIZE},
+    anyhow::Result,
+};
+
+pub fn protocol() -> Result<PrfTree> {
+    PrfTree::zero().mix("Rosenpass v1 mceliece460896 Kyber512 ChaChaPoly1305 BLAKE2s".as_bytes())
+}
+
+// TODO Use labels that can serve as idents
+macro_rules! prflabel {
+    ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
+        pub fn $name() -> Result<PrfTree> {
+            let t = $base()?;
+            $( let t = t.mix($lbl.as_bytes())?; )*
+            Ok(t)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+prflabel!(protocol, mac,        "mac");
+prflabel!(protocol, cookie,     "cookie");
+prflabel!(protocol, peerid,     "peer id");
+prflabel!(protocol, biscuit_ad, "biscuit additional data");
+prflabel!(protocol, ckinit,     "chaining key init");
+prflabel!(protocol, _ckextract,  "chaining key extract");
+
+macro_rules! prflabel_leaf {
+    ($base:ident, $name:ident, $($lbl:expr),* ) => {
+        pub fn $name() -> Result<[u8; KEY_SIZE]> {
+            let t = $base()?;
+            $( let t = t.mix($lbl.as_bytes())?; )*
+            Ok(t.into_value())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, mix,        "mix");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, hs_enc,     "handshake encryption");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, ini_enc,    "initiator handshake encryption");
+prflabel_leaf!(_ckextract, res_enc,    "responder handshake encryption");
+
+prflabel!(_ckextract, _user, "user");
+prflabel!(_user, _rp, "rosenpass.eu");
+prflabel_leaf!(_rp, osk, "wireguard psk");

src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#[macro_use]
+pub mod util;
+#[macro_use]
+pub mod sodium;
+pub mod coloring;
+#[rustfmt::skip]
+pub mod labeled_prf;
+pub mod msgs;
+pub mod pqkem;
+pub mod prftree;
+pub mod protocol;
+
+#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
+pub enum RosenpassError {
+    #[error("error in OQS")]
+    Oqs,
+    #[error("error from external library while calling OQS")]
+    OqsExternalLib,
+    #[error("buffer size mismatch, required {required_size} but only found {actual_size}")]
+    BufferSizeMismatch {
+        required_size: usize,
+        actual_size: usize,
+    },
+    #[error("invalid message type")]
+    InvalidMessageType(u8),
+}
+
+impl RosenpassError {
+    /// Helper function to check a buffer size
+    fn check_buffer_size(required_size: usize, actual_size: usize) -> Result<(), Self> {
+        if required_size != actual_size {
+            Err(Self::BufferSizeMismatch {
+                required_size,
+                actual_size,
+            })
+        } else {
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Extension trait to attach function calls to foreign types.
+trait RosenpassMaybeError {
+    /// Checks whether something is an error or not
+    fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
+}
+
+impl RosenpassMaybeError for oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS {
+    fn to_rg_error(&self) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        use oqs_sys::common::OQS_STATUS;
+        match self {
+            OQS_STATUS::OQS_SUCCESS => Ok(()),
+            OQS_STATUS::OQS_ERROR => Err(RosenpassError::Oqs),
+            OQS_STATUS::OQS_EXTERNAL_LIB_ERROR_OPENSSL => Err(RosenpassError::OqsExternalLib),
+        }
+    }
+}

src/lprf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+//! The rosenpass protocol relies on a special type
+//! of hash function for most of its hashing or
+//! message authentication needs: an incrementable
+//! pseudo random function.
+//!
+//! This is a generalization of a PRF operating
+//! on a sequence of inputs instead of a single input.
+//!
+//! Like a Dec function the Iprf features efficient 
+//! incrementability.
+//!
+//! You can also think of an Iprf as a Dec function with
+//! a fixed size output.
+//!
+//! The idea behind a Iprf is that it can be efficiently
+//! constructed from an Dec function as well as a PRF.
+//!
+//! TODO Base the construction on a proper Dec function
+
+pub struct Iprf([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
+pub struct IprfBranch([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
+pub struct SecretIprf(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
+pub struct SecretIprfBranch(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
+
+pub fn prf_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) {
+    // TODO: The error handling with sodium is a scurge
+    hmac_into(out, key, data).unwrap()
+}
+
+pub fn prf(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE]{
+    mutating([0u8; KEY_SIZE], |r| prf_into(r, key, data))
+}
+
+impl Iprf {
+    fn zero() -> Self {
+        Self([0u8; KEY_SIZE])
+    }
+
+    fn dup(self) -> IprfBranch {
+        IprfBranch(self.0)
+    }
+
+    // TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that 
+    fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        Self(prf(&self.0, v))
+    }
+    
+    fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
+        SecretIprf::prf_invoc(&self.0, v.secret())
+    }
+
+    fn into_value(self) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE] {
+        self.0
+    }
+
+    fn extract(self, v: &[u8], dst: &mut [u8]) {
+        prf_into(&self.0, v, dst)
+    }
+}
+
+impl IprfBranch {
+    fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Iprf {
+        Iprf(prf(self.0, v))
+    }
+
+    fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
+        SecretIprf::prf_incov(self.0, v.secret())
+    }
+}
+
+impl SecretIprf {
+    fn prf_invoc(k: &[u8], d: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
+        mutating(SecretIprf(Secret::zero()), |r|
+            prf_into(k, d, r.secret_mut()))
+    }
+
+    fn from_key(k: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
+        Self(k)
+    }
+
+    fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
+        Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
+    }
+
+    fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
+        Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
+    }
+
+    fn into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_SIZE> {
+        self.0
+    }
+
+    fn into_secret_slice(self, v: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) {
+        prf_into(self.0.secret(), v, dst)
+    }
+}
+
+impl SecretIprfBranch {
+    fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> SecretIprf {
+        SecretIprf::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
+    }
+
+    fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> SecretIprf {
+        SecretIprf::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
+    }
+}

src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
+use log::{error, info};
+use rosenpass::{
+    attempt,
+    coloring::{Public, Secret},
+    pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
+    protocol::{CryptoServer, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, SPk, SSk, SymKey, Timing},
+    sodium::sodium_init,
+    util::{b64_reader, b64_writer, fmt_b64},
+};
+use std::{
+    fs::{File, OpenOptions},
+    io::{ErrorKind, Read, Write},
+    net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs, UdpSocket},
+    path::Path,
+    process::{exit, Command, Stdio},
+    time::Duration,
+};
+
+/// Open a file writable
+pub fn fopen_w<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(false)
+        .write(true)
+        .create(true)
+        .truncate(true)
+        .open(path)?)
+}
+/// Open a file readable
+pub fn fopen_r<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<File> {
+    Ok(OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(true)
+        .write(false)
+        .create(false)
+        .truncate(false)
+        .open(path)?)
+}
+
+pub trait ReadExactToEnd {
+    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> ReadExactToEnd for R {
+    fn read_exact_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut dummy = [0u8; 8];
+        self.read_exact(buf)?;
+        ensure!(self.read(&mut dummy)? == 0, "File too long!");
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+pub trait LoadValue {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        Self: Sized;
+}
+
+pub trait LoadValueB64 {
+    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self>
+    where
+        Self: Sized;
+}
+
+trait StoreValue {
+    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+trait StoreSecret {
+    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()>;
+}
+
+impl<T: StoreValue> StoreSecret for T {
+    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        self.store(path)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Secret<N> {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        let p = path.as_ref();
+        fopen_r(p)?
+            .read_exact_to_end(v.secret_mut())
+            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load file {p:?}"))?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValueB64 for Secret<N> {
+    fn load_b64<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        let p = path.as_ref();
+        // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
+        // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
+        // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
+        // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
+        // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
+        // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
+        // not worth it right now.
+        b64_reader(&mut fopen_r(p)?)
+            .read_exact(v.secret_mut())
+            .with_context(|| format!("Could not load base64 file {p:?}"))?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> StoreSecret for Secret<N> {
+    unsafe fn store_secret<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        std::fs::write(path, self.secret())?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> LoadValue for Public<N> {
+    fn load<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut v = Self::random();
+        fopen_r(path)?.read_exact_to_end(&mut *v)?;
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<const N: usize> StoreValue for Public<N> {
+    fn store<P: AsRef<Path>>(&self, path: P) -> Result<()> {
+        std::fs::write(path, **self)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+macro_rules! bail_usage {
+    ($args:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
+        error!($($pt),*);
+        cmd_help()?;
+        exit(1);
+    }}
+}
+
+macro_rules! ensure_usage {
+    ($args:expr, $ck:expr, $($pt:expr),*) => {{
+        if !$ck {
+            bail_usage!($args, $($pt),*);
+        }
+    }}
+}
+
+macro_rules! mandatory_opt {
+    ($args:expr, $val:expr, $name:expr) => {{
+        ensure_usage!($args, $val.is_some(), "{0} option is mandatory", $name)
+    }};
+}
+
+pub struct ArgsWalker {
+    pub argv: Vec<String>,
+    pub off: usize,
+}
+
+impl ArgsWalker {
+    pub fn get(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        self.argv.get(self.off).map(|s| s as &str)
+    }
+
+    pub fn prev(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
+        assert!(self.off > 0);
+        self.off -= 1;
+        self.get()
+    }
+
+    #[allow(clippy::should_implement_trait)]
+    pub fn next(&mut self) -> Option<&str> {
+        assert!(self.todo() > 0);
+        self.off += 1;
+        self.get()
+    }
+
+    pub fn opt(&mut self, dst: &mut Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
+        let cmd = &self.argv[self.off - 1];
+        ensure_usage!(&self, self.todo() > 0, "Option {} takes a value", cmd);
+        ensure_usage!(&self, dst.is_none(), "Cannot set {} multiple times.", cmd);
+        *dst = Some(String::from(self.next().unwrap()));
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn todo(&self) -> usize {
+        self.argv.len() - self.off
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Default, Debug)]
+pub struct WireguardOut {
+    // impl KeyOutput
+    dev: String,
+    pk: String,
+    extra_params: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Default, Debug)]
+pub struct AppPeer {
+    pub outfile: Option<String>,
+    pub outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
+    pub tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum Verbosity {
+    Quiet,
+    Verbose,
+}
+
+/// Holds the state of the application, namely the external IO
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct AppServer {
+    pub crypt: CryptoServer,
+    pub sock: UdpSocket,
+    pub peers: Vec<AppPeer>,
+    pub verbosity: Verbosity,
+}
+
+/// Index based pointer to a Peer
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct AppPeerPtr(pub usize);
+
+impl AppPeerPtr {
+    /// Takes an index based handle and returns the actual peer
+    pub fn lift(p: PeerPtr) -> Self {
+        Self(p.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns an index based handle to one Peer
+    pub fn lower(&self) -> PeerPtr {
+        PeerPtr(self.0)
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_app<'a>(&self, srv: &'a AppServer) -> &'a AppPeer {
+        &srv.peers[self.0]
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_app_mut<'a>(&self, srv: &'a mut AppServer) -> &'a mut AppPeer {
+        &mut srv.peers[self.0]
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum AppPollResult {
+    DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr),
+    SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr),
+    SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr),
+    ReceivedMessage(usize, SocketAddr),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum KeyOutputReason {
+    Exchanged,
+    Stale,
+}
+
+/// Catches errors, prints them through the logger, then exits
+pub fn main() {
+    env_logger::init();
+    match rosenpass_main() {
+        Ok(_) => {}
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("{e}");
+            exit(1);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Entry point to the whole program
+pub fn rosenpass_main() -> Result<()> {
+    sodium_init()?;
+
+    let mut args = ArgsWalker {
+        argv: std::env::args().collect(),
+        off: 0, // skipping executable path
+    };
+
+    // Command parsing
+    match args.next() {
+        Some("help") | Some("-h") | Some("-help") | Some("--help") => cmd_help()?,
+        Some("keygen") => cmd_keygen(args)?,
+        Some("exchange") => cmd_exchange(args)?,
+        Some(cmd) => bail_usage!(&args, "No such command {}", cmd),
+        None => bail_usage!(&args, "Expected a command!"),
+    };
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Print the usage information
+pub fn cmd_help() -> Result<()> {
+    eprint!(include_str!("usage.md"), env!("CARGO_BIN_NAME"));
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Generate a keypair
+pub fn cmd_keygen(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
+    let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
+
+    // Arg parsing
+    loop {
+        match args.next() {
+            Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
+            Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
+            Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
+            None => break,
+        };
+    }
+
+    mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
+    mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
+
+    // Cmd
+    let (mut ssk, mut spk) = (SSk::random(), SPk::random());
+    unsafe {
+        StaticKEM::keygen(ssk.secret_mut(), spk.secret_mut())?;
+        ssk.store_secret(sf.unwrap())?;
+        spk.store_secret(pf.unwrap())?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn cmd_exchange(mut args: ArgsWalker) -> Result<()> {
+    // Argument parsing
+    let mut sf: Option<String> = None;
+    let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
+    let mut listen: Option<String> = None;
+    let mut verbosity = Verbosity::Quiet;
+
+    // Global parameters
+    loop {
+        match args.next() {
+            Some("private-key") => args.opt(&mut sf)?,
+            Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
+            Some("listen") => args.opt(&mut listen)?,
+            Some("verbose") => {
+                verbosity = Verbosity::Verbose;
+            }
+            Some("peer") => {
+                args.prev();
+                break;
+            }
+            Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown option `{}`", opt),
+            None => break,
+        };
+    }
+
+    mandatory_opt!(&args, sf, "private-key");
+    mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "public-key");
+
+    let mut srv = std::boxed::Box::<AppServer>::new(AppServer::new(
+        // sk, pk, addr
+        SSk::load(&sf.unwrap())?,
+        SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
+        listen.as_deref().unwrap_or("[0::0]:0"),
+        verbosity,
+    )?);
+
+    // Peer parameters
+    '_parseAllPeers: while args.todo() > 0 {
+        let mut pf: Option<String> = None;
+        let mut outfile: Option<String> = None;
+        let mut outwg: Option<WireguardOut> = None;
+        let mut endpoint: Option<String> = None;
+        let mut pskf: Option<String> = None;
+
+        args.next(); // skip "peer" starter itself
+
+        'parseOnePeer: loop {
+            match args.next() {
+                // Done with this peer
+                Some("peer") => {
+                    args.prev();
+                    break 'parseOnePeer;
+                }
+                None => break 'parseOnePeer,
+                // Options
+                Some("public-key") => args.opt(&mut pf)?,
+                Some("endpoint") => args.opt(&mut endpoint)?,
+                Some("preshared-key") => args.opt(&mut pskf)?,
+                Some("outfile") => args.opt(&mut outfile)?,
+                // Wireguard out
+                Some("wireguard") => {
+                    ensure_usage!(
+                        &args,
+                        outwg.is_none(),
+                        "Cannot set wireguard output for the same peer multiple times."
+                    );
+                    ensure_usage!(&args, args.todo() >= 2, "Option wireguard takes to values");
+                    let dev = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
+                    let pk = String::from(args.next().unwrap());
+                    let wg = outwg.insert(WireguardOut {
+                        dev,
+                        pk,
+                        extra_params: Vec::new(),
+                    });
+                    '_parseWgOutExtra: loop {
+                        match args.next() {
+                            Some("peer") => {
+                                args.prev();
+                                break 'parseOnePeer;
+                            }
+                            None => break 'parseOnePeer,
+                            Some(xtra) => wg.extra_params.push(xtra.to_string()),
+                        };
+                    }
+                }
+                // Invalid
+                Some(opt) => bail_usage!(&args, "Unknown peer option `{}`", opt),
+            };
+        }
+
+        mandatory_opt!(&args, pf, "private-key");
+        ensure_usage!(
+            &args,
+            outfile.is_some() || outwg.is_some(),
+            "Either of the outfile or wireguard option is mandatory"
+        );
+
+        let tx_addr = endpoint
+            .map(|e| {
+                e.to_socket_addrs()?
+                    .next()
+                    .context("Expected address in endpoint parameter")
+            })
+            .transpose()?;
+
+        srv.add_peer(
+            // psk, pk, outfile, outwg, tx_addr
+            pskf.map(SymKey::load_b64).transpose()?,
+            SPk::load(&pf.unwrap())?,
+            outfile,
+            outwg,
+            tx_addr,
+        )?;
+    }
+
+    srv.listen_loop()
+}
+
+impl AppServer {
+    pub fn new<A: ToSocketAddrs>(sk: SSk, pk: SPk, addr: A, verbosity: Verbosity) -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypt: CryptoServer::new(sk, pk),
+            sock: UdpSocket::bind(addr)?,
+            peers: Vec::new(),
+            verbosity,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.verbosity, Verbosity::Verbose)
+    }
+
+    pub fn add_peer(
+        &mut self,
+        psk: Option<SymKey>,
+        pk: SPk,
+        outfile: Option<String>,
+        outwg: Option<WireguardOut>,
+        tx_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    ) -> Result<AppPeerPtr> {
+        let PeerPtr(pn) = self.crypt.add_peer(psk, pk)?;
+        assert!(pn == self.peers.len());
+        self.peers.push(AppPeer {
+            outfile,
+            outwg,
+            tx_addr,
+        });
+        Ok(AppPeerPtr(pn))
+    }
+
+    pub fn listen_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        const INIT_SLEEP: f64 = 0.01;
+        const MAX_FAILURES: i32 = 10;
+        let mut failure_cnt = 0;
+
+        loop {
+            let msgs_processed = 0usize;
+            let err = match self.event_loop() {
+                Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
+                Err(e) => e,
+            };
+
+            // This should not happen…
+            failure_cnt = if msgs_processed > 0 {
+                0
+            } else {
+                failure_cnt + 1
+            };
+            let sleep = INIT_SLEEP * 2.0f64.powf(f64::from(failure_cnt - 1));
+            let tries_left = MAX_FAILURES - (failure_cnt - 1);
+            error!(
+                "unexpected error after processing {} messages: {:?} {}",
+                msgs_processed,
+                err,
+                err.backtrace()
+            );
+            if tries_left > 0 {
+                error!("reinitializing networking in {sleep}! {tries_left} tries left.");
+                std::thread::sleep(self.crypt.timebase.dur(sleep));
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            bail!("too many network failures");
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn event_loop(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        let (mut rx, mut tx) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
+
+        /// if socket address for peer is known, call closure
+        /// assumes that closure leaves a message in `tx`
+        /// assumes that closure returns the length of message in bytes
+        macro_rules! tx_maybe_with {
+            ($peer:expr, $fn:expr) => {
+                attempt!({
+                    let p = $peer.get_app(self);
+                    if let Some(addr) = p.tx_addr {
+                        let len = $fn()?;
+                        self.sock.send_to(&tx[..len], addr)?;
+                    }
+                    Ok(())
+                })
+            };
+        }
+
+        loop {
+            use rosenpass::protocol::HandleMsgResult;
+            use AppPollResult::*;
+            use KeyOutputReason::*;
+            match self.poll(&mut *rx)? {
+                SendInitiation(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
+                    .crypt
+                    .initiate_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
+                SendRetransmission(peer) => tx_maybe_with!(peer, || self
+                    .crypt
+                    .retransmit_handshake(peer.lower(), &mut *tx))?,
+                DeleteKey(peer) => self.output_key(peer, Stale, &SymKey::random())?,
+
+                ReceivedMessage(len, addr) => {
+                    match self.crypt.handle_msg(&rx[..len], &mut *tx) {
+                        Err(ref e) => {
+                            self.verbose().then(|| {
+                                info!(
+                                    "error processing incoming message from {:?}: {:?} {}",
+                                    addr,
+                                    e,
+                                    e.backtrace()
+                                );
+                            });
+                        }
+
+                        Ok(HandleMsgResult {
+                            resp,
+                            exchanged_with,
+                            ..
+                        }) => {
+                            if let Some(len) = resp {
+                                self.sock.send_to(&tx[0..len], addr)?;
+                            }
+
+                            if let Some(p) = exchanged_with {
+                                let ap = AppPeerPtr::lift(p);
+                                ap.get_app_mut(self).tx_addr = Some(addr);
+
+                                // TODO: Maybe we should rather call the key "rosenpass output"?
+                                self.output_key(ap, Exchanged, &self.crypt.osk(p)?)?;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            };
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn output_key(&self, peer: AppPeerPtr, why: KeyOutputReason, key: &SymKey) -> Result<()> {
+        let peerid = peer.lower().get(&self.crypt).pidt()?;
+        let ap = peer.get_app(self);
+
+        if self.verbose() {
+            let msg = match why {
+                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "Exchanged key with peer",
+                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "Erasing outdated key from peer",
+            };
+            info!("{} {}", msg, fmt_b64(&*peerid));
+        }
+
+        if let Some(of) = ap.outfile.as_ref() {
+            // This might leave some fragments of the secret on the stack;
+            // in practice this is likely not a problem because the stack likely
+            // will be overwritten by something else soon but this is not exactly
+            // guaranteed. It would be possible to remedy this, but since the secret
+            // data will linger in the linux page cache anyways with the current
+            // implementation, going to great length to erase the secret here is
+            // not worth it right now.
+            b64_writer(fopen_w(of)?).write_all(key.secret())?;
+            let why = match why {
+                KeyOutputReason::Exchanged => "exchanged",
+                KeyOutputReason::Stale => "stale",
+            };
+            println!(
+                "output-key peer {} key-file {} {}",
+                fmt_b64(&*peerid),
+                of,
+                why
+            );
+        }
+
+        if let Some(owg) = ap.outwg.as_ref() {
+            let child = Command::new("wg")
+                .arg("set")
+                .arg(&owg.dev)
+                .arg("peer")
+                .arg(&owg.pk)
+                .arg("preshared-key")
+                .arg("/dev/stdin")
+                .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+                .args(&owg.extra_params)
+                .spawn()?;
+            b64_writer(child.stdin.unwrap()).write_all(key.secret())?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn poll(&mut self, rx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<AppPollResult> {
+        use rosenpass::protocol::PollResult as C;
+        use AppPollResult as A;
+        loop {
+            return Ok(match self.crypt.poll()? {
+                C::DeleteKey(PeerPtr(no)) => A::DeleteKey(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::SendInitiation(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendInitiation(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::SendRetransmission(PeerPtr(no)) => A::SendRetransmission(AppPeerPtr(no)),
+                C::Sleep(timeout) => match self.try_recv(rx_buf, timeout)? {
+                    Some((len, addr)) => A::ReceivedMessage(len, addr),
+                    None => continue,
+                },
+            });
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn try_recv(&self, buf: &mut [u8], timeout: Timing) -> Result<Option<(usize, SocketAddr)>> {
+        if timeout == 0.0 {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+        self.sock
+            .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs_f64(timeout)))?;
+        match self.sock.recv_from(buf) {
+            Ok(x) => Ok(Some(x)),
+            Err(e) => match e.kind() {
+                ErrorKind::WouldBlock => Ok(None),
+                ErrorKind::TimedOut => Ok(None),
+                _ => Err(anyhow::Error::new(e)),
+            },
+        }
+    }
+}

src/msgs.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+//! Data structures representing the messages going over the wire
+//!
+//! This module contains de-/serialization of the protocol's messages. Thats kind
+//! of a lie, since no actual ser/de happens. Instead, the structures offer views
+//! into mutable byte slices (`&mut [u8]`), allowing to modify the fields of an
+//! always serialized instance of the data in question. This is closely related
+//! to the concept of lenses in function programming; more on that here:
+//! [https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf](https://sinusoid.es/misc/lager/lenses.pdf)
+//!
+//! # Example
+//!
+//! The following example uses the [`data_lense` macro](crate::data_lense) to create a lense that
+//! might be useful when dealing with UDP headers.
+//!
+//! ```
+//! use rosenpass::{data_lense, RosenpassError, msgs::LenseView};
+//! # fn main() -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+//!
+//! data_lense! {UdpDatagramHeader :=
+//!     source_port: 2,
+//!     dest_port: 2,
+//!     length: 2,
+//!     checksum: 2
+//! }
+//!
+//! let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
+//!
+//! // read-only lense, no check of size:
+//! let lense = UdpDatagramHeader(&buf);
+//! assert_eq!(lense.checksum(), &[0, 0]);
+//!
+//! // mutable lense, runtime check of size
+//! let mut lense = buf.as_mut().udp_datagram_header()?;
+//! lense.source_port_mut().copy_from_slice(&53u16.to_be_bytes()); // some DNS, anyone?
+//!
+//! // the original buffer is still available
+//! assert_eq!(buf, [0, 53, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
+//!
+//! // read-only lense, runtime check of size
+//! let lense = buf.as_ref().udp_datagram_header()?;
+//! assert_eq!(lense.source_port(), &[0, 53]);
+//! # Ok(())
+//! # }
+//! ```
+
+use super::RosenpassError;
+use crate::{pqkem::*, sodium};
+
+// Macro magic ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+/// A macro to create data lenses. Refer to the [`msgs` mod](crate::msgs) for
+/// an example and further elaboration
+// TODO implement TryFrom<[u8]> and From<[u8; Self::len()]>
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! data_lense(
+    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
+    (token_muncher_ref @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
+        ::paste::paste!{
+
+        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
+        $( #[ $attr ] )*
+        ///
+        #[doc = data_lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
+        /// bytes long
+        pub fn $field(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
+            &self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
+        }
+
+        /// The bytes until the
+        #[doc = data_lense!(maybe_docstring_link Self::$field)]
+        /// field
+        pub fn [< until_ $field >](&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
+            &self.0[0 .. $offset]
+        }
+
+        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
+        $(
+        data_lense!{token_muncher_ref @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
+        )?
+        }
+    };
+
+    // prefix          @ offset       ; optional meta    ; field name   : field length, ...
+    (token_muncher_mut @ $offset:expr ; $( $attr:meta )* ; $field:ident : $len:expr $(, $( $tail:tt )+ )?) =>  {
+        ::paste::paste!{
+
+        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
+        $( #[ $attr ] )*
+        ///
+        #[doc = data_lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
+        /// bytes long
+        pub fn [< $field _mut >](&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
+            &mut self.0[$offset .. $offset + $len]
+        }
+
+        // if the tail exits, consume it as well
+        $(
+        data_lense!{token_muncher_mut @ $offset + $len ; $( $tail )+ }
+        )?
+        }
+    };
+
+    // switch that yields literals unchanged, but creates docstring links to
+    // constants
+    // TODO the doc string link doesn't work if $x is taken from a generic,
+    (maybe_docstring_link $x:literal) => (stringify!($x));
+    (maybe_docstring_link $x:expr) => (stringify!([$x]));
+
+    // struct name  < optional generics     >    := optional doc string      field name   : field length, ...
+    ($type:ident $( < $( $generic:ident ),+ > )? := $( $( #[ $attr:meta ] )* $field:ident : $len:expr ),+) => (::paste::paste!{
+
+        #[allow(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]
+        /// A data lense to manipulate byte slices.
+        ///
+        //// # Fields
+        ///
+        $(
+        /// - `
+        #[doc = stringify!($field)]
+        /// `:
+        #[doc = data_lense!(maybe_docstring_link $len)]
+        /// bytes
+        )+
+        pub struct $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? > (
+            __ContainerType,
+            // The phantom data is required, since all generics declared on a
+            // type need to be used on the type.
+            // https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/error_codes/E0392.html
+            $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData<$generic> ),+ )?
+        );
+
+        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
+            $(
+            /// Size in bytes of the field `
+            #[doc = !($field)]
+            /// `
+            pub const fn [< $field _len >]() -> usize{
+                $len
+            }
+            )+
+
+            /// Verify that `len` is sufficiently long to hold [Self]
+            pub fn check_size(len: usize) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>{
+                let required_size = $( $len + )+ 0;
+                let actual_size = len;
+                if required_size < actual_size {
+                    Err(RosenpassError::BufferSizeMismatch {
+                        required_size,
+                        actual_size,
+                    })
+                }else{
+                    Ok(())
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // read-only accessor functions
+        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
+        where
+            __ContainerType: std::ops::Index<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
+        {
+            data_lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
+
+            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
+            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
+                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
+            }
+        }
+
+        // mutable accessor functions
+        impl<'a, __ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )?> $type<&'a mut __ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )?>
+        where
+            __ContainerType: std::ops::IndexMut<std::ops::Range<usize>> + ?Sized,
+        {
+            data_lense!{token_muncher_ref @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
+            data_lense!{token_muncher_mut @ 0 ; $( $( $attr )* ; $field : $len ),+ }
+
+            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
+            pub fn all_bytes(&self) -> &__ContainerType::Output {
+                &self.0[0..Self::LEN]
+            }
+
+            /// View into all bytes belonging to this Lense
+            pub fn all_bytes_mut(&mut self) -> &mut __ContainerType::Output {
+                &mut self.0[0..Self::LEN]
+            }
+        }
+
+        // lense trait, allowing us to know the implementing lenses size
+        impl<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic: LenseView ),+ )? > LenseView for $type<__ContainerType $(, $( $generic ),+ )? >{
+            /// Number of bytes required to store this type in binary format
+            const LEN: usize = $( $len + )+ 0;
+        }
+
+        /// Extension trait to allow checked creation of a lense over
+        /// some byte slice that contains a
+        #[doc = data_lense!(maybe_docstring_link $type)]
+        pub trait [< $type Ext >] {
+            type __ContainerType;
+
+            /// Create a lense to the byte slice
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError>;
+        }
+
+        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a [u8] {
+            type __ContainerType = &'a [u8];
+
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl<'a> [< $type Ext >] for &'a mut [u8] {
+            type __ContainerType = &'a mut [u8];
+
+            fn [< $type:snake >] $(< $($generic),* >)? (self) -> Result< $type<Self::__ContainerType, $( $($generic),+ )? >, RosenpassError> {
+                Ok($type ( self, $( $( ::core::marker::PhantomData::<$generic>  ),+ )? ))
+            }
+        }
+    });
+);
+
+/// Common trait shared by all Lenses
+pub trait LenseView {
+    const LEN: usize;
+}
+
+data_lense! { Envelope<M> :=
+    /// [MsgType] of this message
+    msg_type: 1,
+    /// Reserved for future use
+    reserved: 3,
+    /// The actual Paylod
+    payload: M::LEN,
+    /// Message Authentication Code (mac) over all bytes until (exclusive)
+    /// `mac` itself
+    mac: sodium::MAC_SIZE,
+    /// Currently unused, TODO: do something with this
+    cookie: sodium::MAC_SIZE
+}
+
+data_lense! { InitHello :=
+    /// Randomly generated connection id
+    sidi: 4,
+    /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Public Key
+    epki: EphemeralKEM::PK_LEN,
+    /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
+    sctr: StaticKEM::CT_LEN,
+    /// Encryped: 16 byte hash of McEliece initiator static key
+    pidic: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN + 32,
+    /// Encrypted TAI64N Time Stamp (against replay attacks)
+    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN
+}
+
+data_lense! { RespHello :=
+    /// Randomly generated connection id
+    sidr: 4,
+    /// Copied from InitHello
+    sidi: 4,
+    /// Kyber 512 Ephemeral Ciphertext
+    ecti: EphemeralKEM::CT_LEN,
+    /// Classic McEliece Ciphertext
+    scti: StaticKEM::CT_LEN,
+    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
+    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN,
+    /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
+    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN
+}
+
+data_lense! { InitConf :=
+    /// Copied from InitHello
+    sidi: 4,
+    /// Copied from RespHello
+    sidr: 4,
+    /// Responders handshake state in encrypted form
+    biscuit: BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
+    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
+    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN
+}
+
+data_lense! { EmptyData :=
+    /// Copied from RespHello
+    sid: 4,
+    /// Nonce
+    ctr: 8,
+    /// Empty encrypted message (just an auth tag)
+    auth: sodium::AEAD_TAG_LEN
+}
+
+data_lense! { Biscuit :=
+    /// H(spki) – Ident ifies the initiator
+    pidi: sodium::KEY_SIZE,
+    /// The biscuit number (replay protection)
+    biscuit_no: 12,
+    /// Chaining key
+    ck: sodium::KEY_SIZE
+}
+
+data_lense! { DataMsg :=
+    dummy: 4
+}
+
+data_lense! { CookieReply :=
+    dummy: 4
+}
+
+// Traits /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+pub trait WireMsg: std::fmt::Debug {
+    const MSG_TYPE: MsgType;
+    const MSG_TYPE_U8: u8 = Self::MSG_TYPE as u8;
+    const BYTES: usize;
+}
+
+// Constants //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+pub const SESSION_ID_LEN: usize = 4;
+pub const BISCUIT_ID_LEN: usize = 12;
+
+pub const WIRE_ENVELOPE_LEN: usize = 1 + 3 + 16 + 16; // TODO verify this
+
+/// Size required to fit any message in binary form
+pub const MAX_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = 2500; // TODO fix this
+
+/// Recognized message types
+#[repr(u8)]
+#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub enum MsgType {
+    InitHello = 0x81,
+    RespHello = 0x82,
+    InitConf = 0x83,
+    EmptyData = 0x84,
+    DataMsg = 0x85,
+    CookieReply = 0x86,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u8> for MsgType {
+    type Error = RosenpassError;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(match value {
+            0x81 => MsgType::InitHello,
+            0x82 => MsgType::RespHello,
+            0x83 => MsgType::InitConf,
+            0x84 => MsgType::EmptyData,
+            0x85 => MsgType::DataMsg,
+            0x86 => MsgType::CookieReply,
+            _ => return Err(RosenpassError::InvalidMessageType(value)),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// length in bytes of an unencrypted Biscuit (plain text)
+pub const BISCUIT_PT_LEN: usize = Biscuit::<()>::LEN;
+
+/// Length in bytes of an encrypted Biscuit (cipher text)
+pub const BISCUIT_CT_LEN: usize = BISCUIT_PT_LEN + sodium::XAEAD_NONCE_LEN + sodium::XAEAD_TAG_LEN;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test_constants {
+    use crate::{
+        msgs::{BISCUIT_CT_LEN, BISCUIT_PT_LEN},
+        sodium,
+    };
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sodium_keysize() {
+        assert_eq!(sodium::KEY_SIZE, 32);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn biscuit_pt_len() {
+        assert_eq!(BISCUIT_PT_LEN, 2 * sodium::KEY_SIZE + 12);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn biscuit_ct_len() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            BISCUIT_CT_LEN,
+            BISCUIT_PT_LEN + sodium::XAEAD_NONCE_LEN + sodium::XAEAD_TAG_LEN
+        );
+    }
+}

src/pqkem.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+//! Traits and implementations for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs)
+//!
+//! KEMs are the interface provided by almost all post-quantum
+//! secure key exchange mechanisms.
+//!
+//! Conceptually KEMs are akin to public-key encryption, but instead of encrypting
+//! arbitrary data, KEMs are limited to the transmission of keys, randomly chosen during
+//!
+//! encapsulation.
+//! The [KEM] Trait describes the basic API offered by a Key Encapsulation
+//! Mechanism. Two implementations for it are provided, [StaticKEM] and [EphemeralKEM].
+
+use crate::{RosenpassError, RosenpassMaybeError};
+
+/// Key Encapsulation Mechanism
+///
+/// The KEM interface defines three operations: Key generation, key encapsulation and key
+/// decapsulation.
+pub trait KEM {
+    /// Secrete Key length
+    const SK_LEN: usize;
+    /// Public Key length
+    const PK_LEN: usize;
+    /// Ciphertext length
+    const CT_LEN: usize;
+    /// Shared Secret length
+    const SHK_LEN: usize;
+
+    /// Generate a keypair consisting of secret key (`sk`) and public key (`pk`)
+    ///
+    /// `keygen() -> sk, pk`
+    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
+
+    /// From a public key (`pk`), generate a shared key (`shk`, for local use)
+    /// and a cipher text (`ct`, to be sent to the owner of the `pk`).
+    ///
+    /// `encaps(pk) -> shk, ct`
+    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
+
+    /// From a secret key (`sk`) and a cipher text (`ct`) derive a shared key
+    /// (`shk`)
+    ///
+    /// `decaps(sk, ct) -> shk`
+    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError>;
+}
+
+/// A KEM that is secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA).
+/// In the context of rosenpass this is used for static keys.
+/// Uses [Classic McEliece](https://classic.mceliece.org/) 460896 from liboqs.
+///
+/// Classic McEliece is chosen because of its high security margin and its small
+/// ciphertexts. The public keys are humongous, but (being static keys) the are never transmitted over
+/// the wire so this is not a big problem.
+pub struct StaticKEM;
+
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
+/// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
+/// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
+/// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is checked in the following code before
+/// the unsafe calls, and an early return with an Err occurs if the byte slice
+/// size does not match the required size.
+///
+/// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
+/// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
+/// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
+/// allow bigger buffers.
+impl KEM for StaticKEM {
+    const SK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_secret_key as usize;
+    const PK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_public_key as usize;
+    const CT_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_ciphertext as usize;
+    const SHK_LEN: usize =
+        oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_length_shared_secret as usize;
+
+    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_keypair(pk.as_mut_ptr(), sk.as_mut_ptr())
+                .to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_encaps(
+                ct.as_mut_ptr(),
+                shk.as_mut_ptr(),
+                pk.as_ptr(),
+            )
+            .to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_classic_mceliece_460896_decaps(
+                shk.as_mut_ptr(),
+                ct.as_ptr(),
+                sk.as_ptr(),
+            )
+            .to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Implements a KEM that is secure against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).
+/// In the context of rosenpass this is used for ephemeral keys.
+/// Currently the implementation uses
+/// [Kyber 512](https://openquantumsafe.org/liboqs/algorithms/kem/kyber) from liboqs.
+///
+/// This is being used for ephemeral keys; since these are use-once the first post quantum
+/// wireguard paper claimed that CPA security would be sufficient. Nonetheless we choose kyber
+/// which provides CCA security since there are no publicly vetted KEMs out there which provide
+/// only CPA security.
+pub struct EphemeralKEM;
+
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// This Trait impl calls unsafe [oqs_sys] functions, that write to byte
+/// slices only identified using raw pointers. It must be ensured that the raw
+/// pointers point into byte slices of sufficient length, to avoid UB through
+/// overwriting of arbitrary data. This is checked in the following code before
+/// the unsafe calls, and an early return with an Err occurs if the byte slice
+/// size does not match the required size.
+///
+/// __Note__: This requirement is stricter than necessary, it would suffice
+/// to only check that the buffers are big enough, allowing them to be even
+/// bigger. However, from a correctness point of view it does not make sense to
+/// allow bigger buffers.
+impl KEM for EphemeralKEM {
+    const SK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_secret_key as usize;
+    const PK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_public_key as usize;
+    const CT_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_ciphertext as usize;
+    const SHK_LEN: usize = oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_length_shared_secret as usize;
+    fn keygen(sk: &mut [u8], pk: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_keypair(pk.as_mut_ptr(), sk.as_mut_ptr()).to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+    fn encaps(shk: &mut [u8], ct: &mut [u8], pk: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(pk.len(), Self::PK_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_encaps(ct.as_mut_ptr(), shk.as_mut_ptr(), pk.as_ptr())
+                .to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+    fn decaps(shk: &mut [u8], sk: &[u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<(), RosenpassError> {
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(shk.len(), Self::SHK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(sk.len(), Self::SK_LEN)?;
+        RosenpassError::check_buffer_size(ct.len(), Self::CT_LEN)?;
+        unsafe {
+            oqs_sys::kem::OQS_KEM_kyber_512_decaps(shk.as_mut_ptr(), ct.as_ptr(), sk.as_ptr())
+                .to_rg_error()
+        }
+    }
+}

src/prftree.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+//! Implementation of the tree-like structure used for the label derivation in [labeled_prf](crate::labeled_prf)
+use {
+    crate::{
+        coloring::Secret,
+        sodium::{hmac, hmac_into, KEY_SIZE},
+    },
+    anyhow::Result,
+};
+
+// TODO Use a proper Dec interface
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct PrfTree([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct PrfTreeBranch([u8; KEY_SIZE]);
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct SecretPrfTree(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct SecretPrfTreeBranch(Secret<KEY_SIZE>);
+
+impl PrfTree {
+    pub fn zero() -> Self {
+        Self([0u8; KEY_SIZE])
+    }
+
+    pub fn dup(self) -> PrfTreeBranch {
+        PrfTreeBranch(self.0)
+    }
+
+    pub fn into_secret_prf_tree(self) -> SecretPrfTree {
+        SecretPrfTree(Secret::from_slice(&self.0))
+    }
+
+    // TODO: Protocol! Use domain separation to ensure that
+    pub fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self(hmac(&self.0, v)?))
+    }
+
+    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        SecretPrfTree::prf_invoc(&self.0, v.secret())
+    }
+
+    pub fn into_value(self) -> [u8; KEY_SIZE] {
+        self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl PrfTreeBranch {
+    pub fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<PrfTree> {
+        Ok(PrfTree(hmac(&self.0, v)?))
+    }
+
+    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        SecretPrfTree::prf_invoc(&self.0, v.secret())
+    }
+}
+
+impl SecretPrfTree {
+    pub fn prf_invoc(k: &[u8], d: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        let mut r = SecretPrfTree(Secret::zero());
+        hmac_into(r.0.secret_mut(), k, d)?;
+        Ok(r)
+    }
+
+    pub fn zero() -> Self {
+        Self(Secret::zero())
+    }
+
+    pub fn dup(self) -> SecretPrfTreeBranch {
+        SecretPrfTreeBranch(self.0)
+    }
+
+    pub fn danger_from_secret(k: Secret<KEY_SIZE>) -> Self {
+        Self(k)
+    }
+
+    pub fn mix(self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
+    }
+
+    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        Self::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
+    }
+
+    pub fn into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_SIZE> {
+        self.0
+    }
+
+    pub fn into_secret_slice(mut self, v: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        hmac_into(self.0.secret_mut(), v, dst)
+    }
+}
+
+impl SecretPrfTreeBranch {
+    pub fn mix(&self, v: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        SecretPrfTree::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v)
+    }
+
+    pub fn mix_secret<const N: usize>(&self, v: Secret<N>) -> Result<SecretPrfTree> {
+        SecretPrfTree::prf_invoc(self.0.secret(), v.secret())
+    }
+
+    // TODO: This entire API is not very nice; we need this for biscuits, but
+    // it might be better to extract a special "biscuit"
+    // labeled subkey and reinitialize the chain with this
+    pub fn danger_into_secret(self) -> Secret<KEY_SIZE> {
+        self.0
+    }
+}

src/protocol.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //! will eventually yield a [PollResult]. Said [PollResult] contains
 //! prescriptive activities to be carried out. [CryptoServer::osk] can than
 //! be used to extract the shared key for two peers, once a key-exchange was
-//! successful.
+//! succesfull.
 //!
 //! TODO explain briefly the role of epki
 //!
@@ -19,23 +19,22 @@
 //! [CryptoServer].
 //!
 //! ```
-//! use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-//! use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::StaticKem;
 //! use rosenpass::{
+//!     pqkem::{StaticKEM, KEM},
 //!     protocol::{SSk, SPk, MsgBuf, PeerPtr, CryptoServer, SymKey},
 //! };
-//! # fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+//! # fn main() -> Result<(), rosenpass::RosenpassError> {
 //!
-//! // always initialize libsodium before anything
-//! rosenpass_sodium::init()?;
+//! // always init libsodium before anything
+//! rosenpass::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
 //!
-//! // initialize secret and public key for peer a ...
+//! // initialize public and private key for peer a ...
 //! let (mut peer_a_sk, mut peer_a_pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-//! StaticKem::keygen(peer_a_sk.secret_mut(), peer_a_pk.secret_mut())?;
+//! StaticKEM::keygen(peer_a_sk.secret_mut(), peer_a_pk.secret_mut())?;
 //!
 //! // ... and for peer b
 //! let (mut peer_b_sk, mut peer_b_pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-//! StaticKem::keygen(peer_b_sk.secret_mut(), peer_b_pk.secret_mut())?;
+//! StaticKEM::keygen(peer_b_sk.secret_mut(), peer_b_pk.secret_mut())?;
 //!
 //! // initialize server and a pre-shared key
 //! let psk = SymKey::random();
@@ -43,45 +42,44 @@
 //! let mut b = CryptoServer::new(peer_b_sk, peer_b_pk.clone());
 //!
 //! // introduce peers to each other
-//! a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), peer_b_pk)?;
-//! b.add_peer(Some(psk), peer_a_pk)?;
+//! a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), peer_b_pk).unwrap();
+//! b.add_peer(Some(psk), peer_a_pk).unwrap();
 //!
 //! // declare buffers for message exchange
 //! let (mut a_buf, mut b_buf) = (MsgBuf::zero(), MsgBuf::zero());
 //!
 //! // let a initiate a handshake
-//! let mut maybe_len = Some(a.initiate_handshake(PeerPtr(0), a_buf.as_mut_slice())?);
+//! let length = a.initiate_handshake(PeerPtr(0), a_buf.as_mut_slice());
 //!
-//! // let a and b communicate
-//! while let Some(len) = maybe_len {
-//!    maybe_len = b.handle_msg(&a_buf[..len], &mut b_buf[..])?.resp;
-//!    std::mem::swap(&mut a, &mut b);
-//!    std::mem::swap(&mut a_buf, &mut b_buf);
+//! // let b respond to a and a respond to b, in two rounds
+//! for _ in 0..2 {
+//!    b.handle_msg(&a_buf[..], &mut b_buf[..]);
+//!    a.handle_msg(&b_buf[..], &mut a_buf[..]);
 //! }
 //!
 //! // all done! Extract the shared keys and ensure they are identical
-//! let a_key = a.osk(PeerPtr(0))?;
-//! let b_key = b.osk(PeerPtr(0))?;
-//! assert_eq!(a_key.secret(), b_key.secret(),
+//! let a_key = a.osk(PeerPtr(0));
+//! let b_key = b.osk(PeerPtr(0));
+//! assert_eq!(a_key.unwrap().secret(), b_key.unwrap().secret(),
 //!     "the key exchanged failed to establish a shared secret");
 //! # Ok(())
 //! # }
 //! ```
 
-use crate::{hash_domains, msgs::*};
+use crate::{
+    coloring::*,
+    labeled_prf as lprf,
+    msgs::*,
+    pqkem::*,
+    prftree::{SecretPrfTree, SecretPrfTreeBranch},
+    sodium::*,
+    util::*,
+};
 use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
-use rosenpass_cipher_traits::Kem;
-use rosenpass_ciphers::hash_domain::{SecretHashDomain, SecretHashDomainNamespace};
-use rosenpass_ciphers::kem::{EphemeralKem, StaticKem};
-use rosenpass_ciphers::{aead, xaead, KEY_LEN};
-use rosenpass_lenses::LenseView;
-use rosenpass_secret_memory::{Public, Secret};
-use rosenpass_util::{cat, mem::cpy_min, ord::max_usize, time::Timebase};
 use std::collections::hash_map::{
     Entry::{Occupied, Vacant},
     HashMap,
 };
-use std::convert::Infallible;
 
 // CONSTANTS & SETTINGS //////////////////////////
 
@@ -92,6 +90,7 @@ pub const RTX_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = max_usize(
 );
 
 /// A type for time, e.g. for backoff before re-tries
+// TODO replace by core::time::Duration
 pub type Timing = f64;
 
 /// Before Common Era (or more practically: Definitely so old it needs refreshing)
@@ -106,8 +105,7 @@ pub const UNENDING: Timing = 3600.0 * 8.0;
 
 // From the wireguard paper; rekey every two minutes,
 // discard the key if no rekey is achieved within three
-pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER: Timing = 120.0;
-pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR: Timing = 130.0;
+pub const REKEY_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 120.0;
 pub const REJECT_AFTER_TIME: Timing = 180.0;
 
 // Seconds until the biscuit key is changed; we issue biscuits
@@ -117,7 +115,7 @@ pub const BISCUIT_EPOCH: Timing = 300.0;
 
 // Retransmission pub constants; will retransmit for up to _ABORT ms; starting with a delay of
 // _DELAY_BEG ms and increasing the delay exponentially by a factor of
-// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An additional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
+// _DELAY_GROWTH up to _DELAY_END. An .secretadditional jitter factor of ±_DELAY_JITTER
 // is added.
 pub const RETRANSMIT_ABORT: Timing = 120.0;
 pub const RETRANSMIT_DELAY_GROWTH: Timing = 2.0;
@@ -140,19 +138,19 @@ pub fn has_happened(ev: Timing, now: Timing) -> bool {
 
 // DATA STRUCTURES & BASIC TRAITS & ACCESSORS ////
 
-pub type SPk = Secret<{ StaticKem::PK_LEN }>; // Just Secret<> instead of Public<> so it gets allocated on the heap
-pub type SSk = Secret<{ StaticKem::SK_LEN }>;
-pub type EPk = Public<{ EphemeralKem::PK_LEN }>;
-pub type ESk = Secret<{ EphemeralKem::SK_LEN }>;
+pub type SPk = Secret<{ StaticKEM::PK_LEN }>; // Just Secret<> instead of Public<> so it gets allocated on the heap
+pub type SSk = Secret<{ StaticKEM::SK_LEN }>;
+pub type EPk = Public<{ EphemeralKEM::PK_LEN }>;
+pub type ESk = Secret<{ EphemeralKEM::SK_LEN }>;
 
-pub type SymKey = Secret<KEY_LEN>;
-pub type SymHash = Public<KEY_LEN>;
+pub type SymKey = Secret<KEY_SIZE>;
+pub type SymHash = Public<KEY_SIZE>;
 
-pub type PeerId = Public<KEY_LEN>;
+pub type PeerId = Public<KEY_SIZE>;
 pub type SessionId = Public<SESSION_ID_LEN>;
 pub type BiscuitId = Public<BISCUIT_ID_LEN>;
 
-pub type XAEADNonce = Public<{ xaead::NONCE_LEN }>;
+pub type XAEADNonce = Public<XAEAD_NONCE_LEN>;
 
 pub type MsgBuf = Public<MAX_MESSAGE_LEN>;
 
@@ -190,7 +188,7 @@ pub struct CryptoServer {
 /// A Biscuit is like a fancy cookie. To avoid state disruption attacks,
 /// the responder doesn't store state. Instead the state is stored in a
 /// Biscuit, that is encrypted using the [BiscuitKey] which is only known to
-/// the Responder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
+/// the Respnder. Thus secrecy of the Responder state is not violated, still
 /// the responder can avoid storing this state.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct BiscuitKey {
@@ -212,6 +210,7 @@ pub struct Peer {
     pub session: Option<Session>,
     pub handshake: Option<InitiatorHandshake>,
     pub initiation_requested: bool,
+    pub th: TransmissionHandler,
 }
 
 impl Peer {
@@ -223,6 +222,7 @@ impl Peer {
             session: None,
             initiation_requested: false,
             handshake: None,
+            th: TransmissionHandler::default(),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -234,10 +234,10 @@ pub struct HandshakeState {
     /// Session ID of Responder
     pub sidr: SessionId,
     /// Chaining Key
-    pub ck: SecretHashDomainNamespace, // TODO: We should probably add an abstr
+    pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
 }
 
-#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Copy, Clone)]
+#[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
 pub enum HandshakeRole {
     Initiator,
     Responder,
@@ -252,13 +252,18 @@ impl HandshakeRole {
     }
 }
 
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
 pub enum HandshakeStateMachine {
-    #[default]
     RespHello,
     RespConf,
 }
 
+impl Default for HandshakeStateMachine {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        HandshakeStateMachine::RespHello
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct InitiatorHandshake {
     pub created_at: Timing,
@@ -278,35 +283,64 @@ pub struct InitiatorHandshake {
     pub tx_buf: MsgBuf,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct TransmissionHandler {
+    // when to attempt the first transmission
+    tx_at: Timing,
+
+    // average interval between transmission and subsequent retransmissions
+    tx_interval: Timing,
+
+    // how often to attemp (re-) transmission
+    tx_count: u8,
+
+    // length of message in `tx_buf`
+    tx_len: usize,
+
+    // buffer for the message
+    tx_buf: MsgBuf,
+}
+
+impl Default for TransmissionHandler {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            tx_at: 0.0,
+            tx_interval: 1.0,
+            tx_count: 0,
+            tx_len: 0,
+            tx_buf: Public::zero(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct Session {
     // Metadata
     pub created_at: Timing,
     pub sidm: SessionId,
     pub sidt: SessionId,
-    pub handshake_role: HandshakeRole,
     // Crypto
-    pub ck: SecretHashDomainNamespace,
+    pub ck: SecretPrfTreeBranch,
     /// Key for Transmission ("transmission key mine")
     pub txkm: SymKey,
-    /// Key for Reception ("transmission key theirs")
+    /// Key for Receival ("transmission key theirs")
     pub txkt: SymKey,
     /// Nonce for Transmission ("transmission nonce mine")
     pub txnm: u64,
-    /// Nonce for Reception ("transmission nonce theirs")
+    /// Nonce for Receival ("transmission nonce theirs")
     pub txnt: u64,
 }
 
 /// Lifecycle of a Secret
 ///
-/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highest/biggest
+/// The order implies the readiness for usage of a secret, the highes/biggest
 /// variant ([Lifecycle::Young]) is the most preferable one in a class of
 /// equal-role secrets.
 #[derive(Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug)]
 enum Lifecycle {
     /// Not even generated
     Void = 0,
-    /// Secret must be zeroized, disposal advised
+    /// Secret must be zeroized, disposal adviced
     Dead,
     /// Soon to be dead: the secret might be used for receiving
     /// data, but must not be used for future sending
@@ -459,10 +493,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     }
 
     #[rustfmt::skip]
-    pub fn pidm(&self) -> Result<PeerId> {
+    pub fn pidm(spkm: &[u8]) -> Result<PeerId> {
         Ok(Public::new(
-            hash_domains::peerid()?
-                .mix(self.spkm.secret())?
+            lprf::peerid()?
+                .mix(spkm)?
                 .into_value()))
     }
 
@@ -483,6 +517,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             session: None,
             handshake: None,
             initiation_requested: false,
+            th: TransmissionHandler::default(),
         };
         let peerid = peer.pidt()?;
         let peerno = self.peers.len();
@@ -497,7 +532,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         Ok(PeerPtr(peerno))
     }
 
-    /// Register a new session (during a successful handshake, persisting longer
+    /// Register a new session (during a sucesfull handshake, persisting longer
     /// than the handshake). Might return an error on session id collision
     pub fn register_session(&mut self, id: SessionId, peer: PeerPtr) -> Result<()> {
         match self.index.entry(IndexKey::Sid(id)) {
@@ -585,13 +620,14 @@ impl Peer {
             session: None,
             handshake: None,
             initiation_requested: false,
+            th: TransmissionHandler::default(),
         }
     }
 
     #[rustfmt::skip]
     pub fn pidt(&self) -> Result<PeerId> {
         Ok(Public::new(
-            hash_domains::peerid()?
+            lprf::peerid()?
                 .mix(self.spkt.secret())?
                 .into_value()))
     }
@@ -603,8 +639,7 @@ impl Session {
             created_at: 0.0,
             sidm: SessionId::zero(),
             sidt: SessionId::zero(),
-            handshake_role: HandshakeRole::Initiator,
-            ck: SecretHashDomain::zero().dup(),
+            ck: SecretPrfTree::zero().dup(),
             txkm: SymKey::zero(),
             txkt: SymKey::zero(),
             txnm: 0,
@@ -616,7 +651,7 @@ impl Session {
 // BISCUIT KEY ///////////////////////////////////
 
 /// Biscuit Keys are always randomized, so that even if through a bug some
-/// secrete is encrypted with an initialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
+/// secrete is encrypted with an unitialized [BiscuitKey], nobody instead of
 /// everybody may read the secret.
 impl BiscuitKey {
     // new creates a random value, that might be counterintuitive for a Default
@@ -662,20 +697,7 @@ impl Mortal for SessionPtr {
     }
 
     fn retire_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
-        // If we were the initiator, wait an extra ten seconds to avoid
-        // both parties starting the handshake at the same time. In most situations
-        // this should provide ample time for the other party to perform a
-        // complete handshake before this peer starts another handshake.
-        // This also has the peers going back and forth taking the initiator role
-        // and responder role.
-        use HandshakeRole::*;
-        self.get(srv).as_ref().map(|p| {
-            let wait = match p.handshake_role {
-                Initiator => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_INITIATOR,
-                Responder => REKEY_AFTER_TIME_RESPONDER,
-            };
-            p.created_at + wait
-        })
+        self.created_at(srv).map(|t| t + REKEY_AFTER_TIME)
     }
 
     fn die_at(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Option<Timing> {
@@ -735,10 +757,18 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// Initiate a new handshake, put it to the `tx_buf` __and__ to the
     /// retransmission storage
     // NOTE retransmission? yes if initiator, no if responder
-    // TODO remove unnecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
+    // TODO remove unecessary copying between global tx_buf and per-peer buf
     // TODO move retransmission storage to io server
     pub fn initiate_handshake(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize> {
-        let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitHello<()>>()?; // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
+        let mut msg = tx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<()>>()?;
+        // Envelope::<InitHello>::default(); // TODO
+        // let mut msg = peer
+        //     .get_mut(self)
+        //     .th
+        //     .tx_buf
+        //     .as_mut_slice()
+        //     .envelope::<InitHello<()>>()?;
+
         self.handle_initiation(peer, msg.payload_mut().init_hello()?)?;
         let len = self.seal_and_commit_msg(peer, MsgType::InitHello, msg)?;
         peer.hs()
@@ -760,7 +790,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     ///
     /// The response is only dependent on the incoming message, thus this
     /// function is called regardless of whether the the the calling context is
-    /// an initiator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
+    /// an iniator, a responder or both. The flow of is as follows:
     ///
     /// 1. check incoming message for valid [MsgType]
     /// 2. check that the seal is intact, e.g. that the message is
@@ -770,11 +800,11 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// 4. if the protocol foresees a response to this message, generate one
     /// 5. seal the response with cryptographic authentication
     /// 6. if the response is a ResponseHello, store the sealed response for
-    ///    further retransmission
-    /// 7. return some peer pointer if the exchange completed with this message
+    ///    further retransmision
+    /// 7. return some peerpointer if the exchange completed with this message
     /// 8. return the length of the response generated
     ///
-    /// This is the sequence of a successful handshake:
+    /// This is the sequence of a succesful handshake:
     ///
     /// | time | Initiator   | direction | Responder   |
     /// | ---  | ---:        | :---:     | :---        |
@@ -784,7 +814,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// | t3   |             | <-        | `EmptyData` |
     pub fn handle_msg(&mut self, rx_buf: &[u8], tx_buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<HandleMsgResult> {
         let seal_broken = "Message seal broken!";
-        // length of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
+        // lengt of the response. We assume no response, so None for now
         let mut len = 0;
         let mut exchanged = false;
 
@@ -794,8 +824,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             Ok(MsgType::InitHello) => {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitHello<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
-
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_init_hello(
                     msg_in.payload().init_hello()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().resp_hello()?,
@@ -807,7 +836,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<RespHello<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_resp_hello(
                     msg_in.payload().resp_hello()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().init_conf()?,
@@ -822,7 +851,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
                 let msg_in = rx_buf.envelope::<InitConf<&[u8]>>()?;
                 ensure!(msg_in.check_seal(self)?, seal_broken);
 
-                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope_truncating::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
+                let mut msg_out = tx_buf.envelope::<EmptyData<&mut [u8]>>()?;
                 let peer = self.handle_init_conf(
                     msg_in.payload().init_conf()?,
                     msg_out.payload_mut().empty_data()?,
@@ -929,6 +958,9 @@ pub enum PollResult {
     DeleteKey(PeerPtr),
     SendInitiation(PeerPtr),
     SendRetransmission(PeerPtr),
+    // Transmit(PeerPtr),
+    // /// implicitly respond to peerptr with msg in scratch_buf
+    // Respond
 }
 
 impl Default for PollResult {
@@ -1155,7 +1187,7 @@ impl IniHsPtr {
                         .min(ih.tx_count as f64),
                 )
                 * RETRANSMIT_DELAY_JITTER
-                * (rand::random::<f64>() + 1.0); // TODO: Replace with the rand crate
+                * (rand_f64() + 1.0);
         ih.tx_count += 1;
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -1175,7 +1207,7 @@ where
 {
     /// Calculate the message authentication code (`mac`)
     pub fn seal(&mut self, peer: PeerPtr, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Result<()> {
-        let mac = hash_domains::mac()?
+        let mac = lprf::mac()?
             .mix(peer.get(srv).spkt.secret())?
             .mix(self.until_mac())?;
         self.mac_mut()
@@ -1190,13 +1222,8 @@ where
 {
     /// Check the message authentication code
     pub fn check_seal(&self, srv: &CryptoServer) -> Result<bool> {
-        let expected = hash_domains::mac()?
-            .mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
-            .mix(self.until_mac())?;
-        Ok(rosenpass_sodium::helpers::memcmp(
-            self.mac(),
-            &expected.into_value()[..16],
-        ))
+        let expected = lprf::mac()?.mix(srv.spkm.secret())?.mix(self.until_mac())?;
+        Ok(sodium_memcmp(self.mac(), &expected.into_value()[..16]))
     }
 }
 
@@ -1222,38 +1249,38 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         Self {
             sidi: SessionId::zero(),
             sidr: SessionId::zero(),
-            ck: SecretHashDomain::zero().dup(),
+            ck: SecretPrfTree::zero().dup(),
         }
     }
 
     pub fn erase(&mut self) {
-        self.ck = SecretHashDomain::zero().dup();
+        self.ck = SecretPrfTree::zero().dup();
     }
 
     pub fn init(&mut self, spkr: &[u8]) -> Result<&mut Self> {
-        self.ck = hash_domains::ckinit()?.turn_secret().mix(spkr)?.dup();
+        self.ck = lprf::ckinit()?.mix(spkr)?.into_secret_prf_tree().dup();
         Ok(self)
     }
 
     pub fn mix(&mut self, a: &[u8]) -> Result<&mut Self> {
-        self.ck = self.ck.mix(&hash_domains::mix()?)?.mix(a)?.dup();
+        self.ck = self.ck.mix(&lprf::mix()?)?.mix(a)?.dup();
         Ok(self)
     }
 
     pub fn encrypt_and_mix(&mut self, ct: &mut [u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Result<&mut Self> {
-        let k = self.ck.mix(&hash_domains::hs_enc()?)?.into_secret();
-        aead::encrypt(ct, k.secret(), &[0u8; aead::NONCE_LEN], &[], pt)?;
+        let k = self.ck.mix(&lprf::hs_enc()?)?.into_secret();
+        aead_enc_into(ct, k.secret(), &NONCE0, &NOTHING, pt)?;
         self.mix(ct)
     }
 
     pub fn decrypt_and_mix(&mut self, pt: &mut [u8], ct: &[u8]) -> Result<&mut Self> {
-        let k = self.ck.mix(&hash_domains::hs_enc()?)?.into_secret();
-        aead::decrypt(pt, k.secret(), &[0u8; aead::NONCE_LEN], &[], ct)?;
+        let k = self.ck.mix(&lprf::hs_enc()?)?.into_secret();
+        aead_dec_into(pt, k.secret(), &NONCE0, &NOTHING, ct)?;
         self.mix(ct)
     }
 
     // I loathe "error: constant expression depends on a generic parameter"
-    pub fn encaps_and_mix<T: Kem<Error = Infallible>, const SHK_LEN: usize>(
+    pub fn encaps_and_mix<T: KEM, const SHK_LEN: usize>(
         &mut self,
         ct: &mut [u8],
         pk: &[u8],
@@ -1263,7 +1290,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         self.mix(pk)?.mix(shk.secret())?.mix(ct)
     }
 
-    pub fn decaps_and_mix<T: Kem<Error = Infallible>, const SHK_LEN: usize>(
+    pub fn decaps_and_mix<T: KEM, const SHK_LEN: usize>(
         &mut self,
         sk: &[u8],
         pk: &[u8],
@@ -1293,17 +1320,17 @@ impl HandshakeState {
             .copy_from_slice(self.ck.clone().danger_into_secret().secret());
 
         // calculate ad contents
-        let ad = hash_domains::biscuit_ad()?
+        let ad = lprf::biscuit_ad()?
             .mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
             .mix(self.sidi.as_slice())?
             .mix(self.sidr.as_slice())?
             .into_value();
 
         // consume biscuit no
-        rosenpass_sodium::helpers::increment(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
+        sodium_bigint_inc(&mut *srv.biscuit_ctr);
 
         // The first bit of the nonce indicates which biscuit key was used
-        // TODO: This is premature optimization. Remove!
+        // TODO: This is premature optimiaztion. Remove!
         let bk = srv.active_biscuit_key();
         let mut n = XAEADNonce::random();
         n[0] &= 0b0111_1111;
@@ -1311,7 +1338,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
 
         let k = bk.get(srv).key.secret();
         let pt = biscuit.all_bytes();
-        xaead::encrypt(biscuit_ct, k, &*n, &ad, pt)?;
+        xaead_enc_into(biscuit_ct, k, &*n, &ad, pt)?;
 
         self.mix(biscuit_ct)
     }
@@ -1327,8 +1354,8 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         // The first bit of the biscuit indicates which biscuit key was used
         let bk = BiscuitKeyPtr(((biscuit_ct[0] & 0b1000_0000) >> 7) as usize);
 
-        // Calculate additional data fields
-        let ad = hash_domains::biscuit_ad()?
+        // Calculate addtional data fields
+        let ad = lprf::biscuit_ad()?
             .mix(srv.spkm.secret())?
             .mix(sidi.as_slice())?
             .mix(sidr.as_slice())?
@@ -1337,7 +1364,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         // Allocate and decrypt the biscuit data
         let mut biscuit = Secret::<BISCUIT_PT_LEN>::zero(); // pt buf
         let mut biscuit = (&mut biscuit.secret_mut()[..]).biscuit()?; // slice
-        xaead::decrypt(
+        xaead_dec_into(
             biscuit.all_bytes_mut(),
             bk.get(srv).key.secret(),
             &ad,
@@ -1346,7 +1373,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
 
         // Reconstruct the biscuit fields
         let no = BiscuitId::from_slice(biscuit.biscuit_no());
-        let ck = SecretHashDomain::danger_from_secret(Secret::from_slice(biscuit.ck())).dup();
+        let ck = SecretPrfTree::danger_from_secret(Secret::from_slice(biscuit.ck())).dup();
         let pid = PeerId::from_slice(biscuit.pidi());
 
         // Reconstruct the handshake state
@@ -1363,8 +1390,7 @@ impl HandshakeState {
         // indicates retransmission
         // TODO: Handle retransmissions without involving the crypto code
         ensure!(
-            rosenpass_sodium::helpers::compare(biscuit.biscuit_no(), &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used)
-                >= 0,
+            sodium_bigint_cmp(biscuit.biscuit_no(), &*peer.get(srv).biscuit_used) >= 0,
             "Rejecting biscuit: Outdated biscuit number"
         );
 
@@ -1373,8 +1399,8 @@ impl HandshakeState {
 
     pub fn enter_live(self, srv: &CryptoServer, role: HandshakeRole) -> Result<Session> {
         let HandshakeState { ck, sidi, sidr } = self;
-        let tki = ck.mix(&hash_domains::ini_enc()?)?.into_secret();
-        let tkr = ck.mix(&hash_domains::res_enc()?)?.into_secret();
+        let tki = ck.mix(&lprf::ini_enc()?)?.into_secret();
+        let tkr = ck.mix(&lprf::res_enc()?)?.into_secret();
         let created_at = srv.timebase.now();
         let (ntx, nrx) = (0, 0);
         let (mysid, peersid, ktx, krx) = match role {
@@ -1385,7 +1411,6 @@ impl HandshakeState {
             created_at,
             sidm: mysid,
             sidt: peersid,
-            handshake_role: role,
             ck,
             txkm: ktx,
             txkt: krx,
@@ -1405,7 +1430,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .get(self)
             .as_ref()
             .with_context(|| format!("No current session for peer {:?}", peer))?;
-        Ok(session.ck.mix(&hash_domains::osk()?)?.into_secret())
+        Ok(session.ck.mix(&lprf::osk()?)?.into_secret())
     }
 }
 
@@ -1414,20 +1439,25 @@ impl CryptoServer {
     /// established primitives
     pub fn handle_initiation(
         &mut self,
-        peer: PeerPtr,
-        mut ih: InitHello<&mut [u8]>,
+        peer_ptr: PeerPtr,
+        _ih: InitHello<&mut [u8]>,
     ) -> Result<PeerPtr> {
         let mut hs = InitiatorHandshake::zero_with_timestamp(self);
+        let peer = &mut self.peers[peer_ptr.0];
+        let mut tx_buf = peer.th.tx_buf;
+        let mut msg = tx_buf.as_mut_slice().envelope::<InitHello<()>>()?;
+        peer.th.tx_len = msg.all_bytes().len();
+        let mut ih = msg.payload_mut().init_hello()?;
 
         // IHI1
-        hs.core.init(peer.get(self).spkt.secret())?;
+        hs.core.init(peer.spkt.secret())?;
 
         // IHI2
         hs.core.sidi.randomize();
         ih.sidi_mut().copy_from_slice(&hs.core.sidi.value);
 
         // IHI3
-        EphemeralKem::keygen(hs.eski.secret_mut(), &mut *hs.epki)?;
+        EphemeralKEM::keygen(hs.eski.secret_mut(), &mut *hs.epki)?;
         ih.epki_mut().copy_from_slice(&hs.epki.value);
 
         // IHI4
@@ -1435,27 +1465,25 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 
         // IHI5
         hs.core
-            .encaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
+            .encaps_and_mix::<StaticKEM, { StaticKEM::SHK_LEN }>(
                 ih.sctr_mut(),
-                peer.get(self).spkt.secret(),
+                peer.spkt.secret(),
             )?;
 
         // IHI6
         hs.core
-            .encrypt_and_mix(ih.pidic_mut(), self.pidm()?.as_ref())?;
+            .encrypt_and_mix(ih.pidic_mut(), Self::pidm(self.spkm.secret())?.as_ref())?;
 
         // IHI7
-        hs.core
-            .mix(self.spkm.secret())?
-            .mix(peer.get(self).psk.secret())?;
+        hs.core.mix(self.spkm.secret())?.mix(peer.psk.secret())?;
 
         // IHI8
-        hs.core.encrypt_and_mix(ih.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        hs.core.encrypt_and_mix(ih.auth_mut(), &NOTHING)?;
 
         // Update the handshake hash last (not changing any state on prior error
-        peer.hs().insert(self, hs)?;
+        peer.handshake.insert(hs);
 
-        Ok(peer)
+        Ok(peer_ptr)
     }
 
     pub fn handle_init_hello(
@@ -1474,7 +1502,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         core.mix(ih.sidi())?.mix(ih.epki())?;
 
         // IHR5
-        core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
+        core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKEM, { StaticKEM::SHK_LEN }>(
             self.sskm.secret(),
             self.spkm.secret(),
             ih.sctr(),
@@ -1495,6 +1523,8 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         // IHR8
         core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], ih.auth())?;
 
+        // TODO access this peers transmission_handler, bind it as `rh`
+
         // RHR1
         core.sidr.randomize();
         rh.sidi_mut().copy_from_slice(core.sidi.as_ref());
@@ -1504,10 +1534,10 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         core.mix(rh.sidr())?.mix(rh.sidi())?;
 
         // RHR4
-        core.encaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKem, { EphemeralKem::SHK_LEN }>(rh.ecti_mut(), ih.epki())?;
+        core.encaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKEM, { EphemeralKEM::SHK_LEN }>(rh.ecti_mut(), ih.epki())?;
 
         // RHR5
-        core.encaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
+        core.encaps_and_mix::<StaticKEM, { StaticKEM::SHK_LEN }>(
             rh.scti_mut(),
             peer.get(self).spkt.secret(),
         )?;
@@ -1516,7 +1546,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         core.store_biscuit(self, peer, rh.biscuit_mut())?;
 
         // RHR7
-        core.encrypt_and_mix(rh.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        core.encrypt_and_mix(rh.auth_mut(), &NOTHING)?;
 
         Ok(peer)
     }
@@ -1572,14 +1602,14 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         core.mix(rh.sidr())?.mix(rh.sidi())?;
 
         // RHI4
-        core.decaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKem, { EphemeralKem::SHK_LEN }>(
+        core.decaps_and_mix::<EphemeralKEM, { EphemeralKEM::SHK_LEN }>(
             hs!().eski.secret(),
             &*hs!().epki,
             rh.ecti(),
         )?;
 
         // RHI5
-        core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKem, { StaticKem::SHK_LEN }>(
+        core.decaps_and_mix::<StaticKEM, { StaticKEM::SHK_LEN }>(
             self.sskm.secret(),
             self.spkm.secret(),
             rh.scti(),
@@ -1602,7 +1632,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         ic.biscuit_mut().copy_from_slice(rh.biscuit());
 
         // ICI4
-        core.encrypt_and_mix(ic.auth_mut(), &[])?;
+        core.encrypt_and_mix(ic.auth_mut(), &NOTHING)?;
 
         // Split() – We move the secrets into the session; we do not
         // delete the InitiatorHandshake, just clear it's secrets because
@@ -1632,7 +1662,7 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         )?;
 
         // ICR2
-        core.encrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; aead::TAG_LEN], &[])?;
+        core.encrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; AEAD_TAG_LEN], &NOTHING)?;
 
         // ICR3
         core.mix(ic.sidi())?.mix(ic.sidr())?;
@@ -1641,37 +1671,16 @@ impl CryptoServer {
         core.decrypt_and_mix(&mut [0u8; 0], ic.auth())?;
 
         // ICR5
-        if rosenpass_sodium::helpers::compare(&*biscuit_no, &*peer.get(self).biscuit_used) > 0 {
+        if sodium_bigint_cmp(&*biscuit_no, &*peer.get(self).biscuit_used) > 0 {
             // ICR6
             peer.get_mut(self).biscuit_used = biscuit_no;
 
             // ICR7
             peer.session()
                 .insert(self, core.enter_live(self, HandshakeRole::Responder)?)?;
-            // TODO: This should be part of the protocol specification.
-            // Abort any ongoing handshake from initiator role
-            peer.hs().take(self);
         }
 
         // TODO: Implementing RP should be possible without touching the live session stuff
-        // TODO: I fear that this may lead to race conditions; the acknowledgement may be
-        //       sent on a different session than the incoming packet. This should be mitigated
-        //       by the deliberate back off in SessionPtr::retire_at as in practice only one
-        //       handshake should be going on at a time.
-        //       I think it may not be possible to formulate the protocol in such a way that
-        //       we can be sure that the other party possesses a matching key; maybe we should
-        //       study mathematically whether this even is possible.
-        //       WireGuard solves this by just having multiple sessions so even if there is a
-        //       race condition leading to two concurrent active sessions, data can still be sent.
-        //       It would be nice if Rosenpass could do the same, but in order for that to work,
-        //       WireGuard would have to have support for multiple PSKs (with a timeout) and
-        //       WireGuard; to identify which PSK was used, wireguard would have to do a linear
-        //       search with the responder trying each available PSK.
-        //       In practice, the best thing to do might be to send regular pings to confirm that
-        //       the key is still the same, which adds a bit of overhead.
-        //       Another option would be to monitor WireGuard for failing handshakes and trigger
-        //       a Rosenpass handshake in case a key mismatch due to a race condition is the reason
-        //       for the failing handshake.
 
         // Send ack – Implementing sending the empty acknowledgement here
         // instead of a generic PeerPtr::send(&Server, Option<&[u8]>) -> Either<EmptyData, Data>
@@ -1681,14 +1690,14 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             .session()
             .get_mut(self)
             .as_mut()
-            .context("Cannot send acknowledgement. No session.")?;
+            .context("Cannot send acknoledgement. No session.")?;
         rc.sid_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.sidt.value);
         rc.ctr_mut().copy_from_slice(&ses.txnm.to_le_bytes());
         ses.txnm += 1; // Increment nonce before encryption, just in case an error is raised
 
-        let n = cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]);
+        let n = cat!(AEAD_NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]);
         let k = ses.txkm.secret();
-        aead::encrypt(rc.auth_mut(), k, &n, &[], &[])?; // ct, k, n, ad, pt
+        aead_enc_into(rc.auth_mut(), k, &n, &NOTHING, &NOTHING)?; // ct, k, n, ad, pt
 
         Ok(peer)
     }
@@ -1720,12 +1729,12 @@ impl CryptoServer {
             let n = u64::from_le_bytes(rc.ctr().try_into().unwrap());
             ensure!(n >= s.txnt, "Stale nonce");
             s.txnt = n;
-            aead::decrypt(
+            aead_dec_into(
                 // pt, k, n, ad, ct
                 &mut [0u8; 0],
                 s.txkt.secret(),
-                &cat!(aead::NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]),
-                &[],
+                &cat!(AEAD_NONCE_LEN; rc.ctr(), &[0u8; 4]),
+                &NOTHING,
                 rc.auth(),
             )?;
         }
@@ -1741,94 +1750,27 @@ impl CryptoServer {
 mod test {
     use super::*;
 
-    #[test]
-    /// Ensure that the protocol implementation can deal with truncated
-    /// messages and with overlong messages.
-    ///
-    /// This test performs a complete handshake between two randomly generated
-    /// servers; instead of delivering the message correctly at first messages
-    /// of length zero through about 1.2 times the correct message size are delivered.
-    ///
-    /// Producing an error is expected on each of these messages.
-    ///
-    /// Finally the correct message is delivered and the same process
-    /// starts again in the other direction.
-    ///
-    /// Through all this, the handshake should still successfully terminate;
-    /// i.e. an exchanged key must be produced in both servers.
-    fn handles_incorrect_size_messages() {
-        rosenpass_sodium::init().unwrap();
+    fn init_crypto_server() -> CryptoServer {
+        // always init libsodium before anything
+        crate::sodium::sodium_init().unwrap();
 
-        stacker::grow(8 * 1024 * 1024, || {
-            const OVERSIZED_MESSAGE: usize = ((MAX_MESSAGE_LEN as f32) * 1.2) as usize;
-            type MsgBufPlus = Public<OVERSIZED_MESSAGE>;
-
-            const PEER0: PeerPtr = PeerPtr(0);
-
-            let (mut me, mut they) = make_server_pair().unwrap();
-            let (mut msgbuf, mut resbuf) = (MsgBufPlus::zero(), MsgBufPlus::zero());
-
-            // Process the entire handshake
-            let mut msglen = Some(me.initiate_handshake(PEER0, &mut *resbuf).unwrap());
-            loop {
-                if let Some(l) = msglen {
-                    std::mem::swap(&mut me, &mut they);
-                    std::mem::swap(&mut msgbuf, &mut resbuf);
-                    msglen = test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(&mut me, &*msgbuf, l, &mut *resbuf);
-                } else {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-
-            assert_eq!(
-                me.osk(PEER0).unwrap().secret(),
-                they.osk(PEER0).unwrap().secret()
-            );
-        });
-    }
-
-    /// Used in handles_incorrect_size_messages() to first deliver many truncated
-    /// and overlong messages, finally the correct message is delivered and the response
-    /// returned.
-    fn test_incorrect_sizes_for_msg(
-        srv: &mut CryptoServer,
-        msgbuf: &[u8],
-        msglen: usize,
-        resbuf: &mut [u8],
-    ) -> Option<usize> {
-        resbuf.fill(0);
-
-        for l in 0..(((msglen as f32) * 1.2) as usize) {
-            if l == msglen {
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            let res = srv.handle_msg(&msgbuf[..l], resbuf);
-            assert!(matches!(res, Err(_))); // handle_msg should raise an error
-            assert!(!resbuf.iter().find(|x| **x != 0).is_some()); // resbuf should not have been changed
-        }
-
-        // Apply the proper handle_msg operation
-        srv.handle_msg(&msgbuf[..msglen], resbuf).unwrap().resp
-    }
-
-    fn keygen() -> Result<(SSk, SPk)> {
-        // TODO: Copied from the benchmark; deduplicate
+        // initialize public and private key for the crypto server
         let (mut sk, mut pk) = (SSk::zero(), SPk::zero());
-        StaticKem::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut())?;
-        Ok((sk, pk))
+        StaticKEM::keygen(sk.secret_mut(), pk.secret_mut()).expect("unable to generate keys");
+
+        CryptoServer::new(sk, pk)
     }
 
-    fn make_server_pair() -> Result<(CryptoServer, CryptoServer)> {
-        // TODO: Copied from the benchmark; deduplicate
-        let psk = SymKey::random();
-        let ((ska, pka), (skb, pkb)) = (keygen()?, keygen()?);
-        let (mut a, mut b) = (
-            CryptoServer::new(ska, pka.clone()),
-            CryptoServer::new(skb, pkb.clone()),
-        );
-        a.add_peer(Some(psk.clone()), pkb)?;
-        b.add_peer(Some(psk), pka)?;
-        Ok((a, b))
+    /// The determination of the message type relies on reading the first byte of the message. Only
+    /// after that the length of the message is checked against the specified message type. This
+    /// test ensures that nothing breaks in the case of an empty message.
+    #[test]
+    #[should_panic = "called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: received empty message, ignoring it"]
+    fn handle_empty_message() {
+        let mut crypt = init_crypto_server();
+        let empty_rx_buf = [0u8; 0];
+        let mut tx_buf = [0u8; 0];
+
+        crypt.handle_msg(&empty_rx_buf, &mut tx_buf).unwrap();
     }
 }

src/sodium.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+//! Bindings and helpers for accessing libsodium functions
+
+use crate::util::*;
+use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
+use libsodium_sys as libsodium;
+use log::trace;
+use static_assertions::const_assert_eq;
+use std::os::raw::{c_ulonglong, c_void};
+use std::ptr::{null as nullptr, null_mut as nullptr_mut};
+
+pub const AEAD_TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_ABYTES as usize;
+pub const AEAD_NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
+pub const XAEAD_TAG_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES as usize;
+pub const XAEAD_NONCE_LEN: usize = libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize;
+pub const NONCE0: [u8; libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize] =
+    [0u8; libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize];
+pub const NOTHING: [u8; 0] = [0u8; 0];
+pub const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
+pub const MAC_SIZE: usize = 16;
+
+const_assert_eq!(
+    KEY_SIZE,
+    libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize
+);
+const_assert_eq!(KEY_SIZE, libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES as usize);
+
+macro_rules! sodium_call {
+    ($name:ident, $($args:expr),*) => { attempt!({
+        ensure!(unsafe{libsodium::$name($($args),*)} > -1,
+            "Error in libsodium's {}.", stringify!($name));
+        Ok(())
+    })};
+    ($name:ident) => { sodium_call!($name, ) };
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn sodium_init() -> Result<()> {
+    trace!("initializing libsodium");
+    sodium_call!(sodium_init)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn sodium_memcmp(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    a.len() == b.len()
+        && unsafe {
+            let r = libsodium::sodium_memcmp(
+                a.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
+                b.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
+                a.len(),
+            );
+            r == 0
+        }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn sodium_bigint_cmp(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> i32 {
+    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
+    unsafe { libsodium::sodium_compare(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr(), a.len()) }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn sodium_bigint_inc(v: &mut [u8]) {
+    unsafe {
+        libsodium::sodium_increment(v.as_mut_ptr(), v.len());
+    }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn rng(buf: &mut [u8]) {
+    unsafe { libsodium::randombytes_buf(buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void, buf.len()) };
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn zeroize(buf: &mut [u8]) {
+    unsafe { libsodium::sodium_memzero(buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void, buf.len()) };
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn aead_enc_into(
+    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + AEAD_TAG_LEN);
+    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
+    assert!(nonce.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize);
+    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
+    sodium_call!(
+        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
+        ciphertext.as_mut_ptr(),
+        &mut clen,
+        plaintext.as_ptr(),
+        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        ad.as_ptr(),
+        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        nullptr(), // nsec is not used
+        nonce.as_ptr(),
+        key.as_ptr()
+    )?;
+    assert!(clen as usize == ciphertext.len());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn aead_dec_into(
+    plaintext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + AEAD_TAG_LEN);
+    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
+    assert!(nonce.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_IETF_NPUBBYTES as usize);
+    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
+    sodium_call!(
+        crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
+        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
+        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
+        nullptr_mut(), // nsec is not used
+        ciphertext.as_ptr(),
+        ciphertext.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        ad.as_ptr(),
+        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        nonce.as_ptr(),
+        key.as_ptr()
+    )?;
+    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn xaead_enc_into(
+    ciphertext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + XAEAD_NONCE_LEN + XAEAD_TAG_LEN);
+    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
+    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at_mut(XAEAD_NONCE_LEN);
+    n.copy_from_slice(nonce);
+    let mut clen: u64 = 0;
+    sodium_call!(
+        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt,
+        ct.as_mut_ptr(),
+        &mut clen,
+        plaintext.as_ptr(),
+        plaintext.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        ad.as_ptr(),
+        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        nullptr(), // nsec is not used
+        nonce.as_ptr(),
+        key.as_ptr()
+    )?;
+    assert!(clen as usize == ct.len());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn xaead_dec_into(
+    plaintext: &mut [u8],
+    key: &[u8],
+    ad: &[u8],
+    ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(ciphertext.len() == plaintext.len() + XAEAD_NONCE_LEN + XAEAD_TAG_LEN);
+    assert!(key.len() == libsodium::crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_IETF_KEYBYTES as usize);
+    let (n, ct) = ciphertext.split_at(XAEAD_NONCE_LEN);
+    let mut mlen: u64 = 0;
+    sodium_call!(
+        crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt,
+        plaintext.as_mut_ptr(),
+        &mut mlen as *mut c_ulonglong,
+        nullptr_mut(), // nsec is not used
+        ct.as_ptr(),
+        ct.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        ad.as_ptr(),
+        ad.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        n.as_ptr(),
+        key.as_ptr()
+    )?;
+    assert!(mlen as usize == plaintext.len());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn blake2b_flexible(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    const KEY_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_KEYBYTES_MIN as usize;
+    const KEY_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_KEYBYTES_MAX as usize;
+    const OUT_MIN: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES_MIN as usize;
+    const OUT_MAX: usize = libsodium::crypto_generichash_BYTES_MAX as usize;
+    assert!(key.is_empty() || (KEY_MIN <= key.len() && key.len() <= KEY_MAX));
+    assert!(OUT_MIN <= out.len() && out.len() <= OUT_MAX);
+    let kptr = match key.len() {
+        // NULL key
+        0 => nullptr(),
+        _ => key.as_ptr(),
+    };
+    sodium_call!(
+        crypto_generichash_blake2b,
+        out.as_mut_ptr(),
+        out.len(),
+        data.as_ptr(),
+        data.len() as c_ulonglong,
+        kptr,
+        key.len()
+    )
+}
+
+// TODO: Use proper streaming hash; for mix_hash too.
+#[inline]
+pub fn hash_into(out: &mut [u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(out.len() == KEY_SIZE);
+    blake2b_flexible(out, &NOTHING, data)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn hash(data: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; KEY_SIZE]> {
+    let mut r = [0u8; KEY_SIZE];
+    hash_into(&mut r, data)?;
+    Ok(r)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn mac_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    assert!(out.len() == KEY_SIZE);
+    assert!(key.len() == KEY_SIZE);
+    blake2b_flexible(out, key, data)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn mac(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; KEY_SIZE]> {
+    let mut r = [0u8; KEY_SIZE];
+    mac_into(&mut r, key, data)?;
+    Ok(r)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn mac16(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 16]> {
+    assert!(key.len() == KEY_SIZE);
+    let mut out = [0u8; 16];
+    blake2b_flexible(&mut out, key, data)?;
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn hmac_into(out: &mut [u8], key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    // Not bothering with padding; the implementation
+    // uses appropriately sized keys.
+    ensure!(key.len() == KEY_SIZE);
+
+    const IPAD: [u8; KEY_SIZE] = [0x36u8; KEY_SIZE];
+    let mut temp_key = [0u8; KEY_SIZE];
+    temp_key.copy_from_slice(key);
+    xor_into(&mut temp_key, &IPAD);
+    let outer_data = mac(&temp_key, data)?;
+
+    const OPAD: [u8; KEY_SIZE] = [0x5Cu8; KEY_SIZE];
+    temp_key.copy_from_slice(key);
+    xor_into(&mut temp_key, &OPAD);
+    mac_into(out, &temp_key, &outer_data)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn hmac(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; KEY_SIZE]> {
+    let mut r = [0u8; KEY_SIZE];
+    hmac_into(&mut r, key, data)?;
+    Ok(r)
+}
+
+// Choose a fully random u64
+pub fn rand_u64() -> u64 {
+    let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
+    rng(&mut buf);
+    u64::from_le_bytes(buf)
+}
+
+// Choose a random f64 in [0; 1] inclusive; quick and dirty
+pub fn rand_f64() -> f64 {
+    (rand_u64() as f64) / (u64::MAX as f64)
+}

src/usage.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+NAME
+
+  {0} – Perform post-quantum secure key exchanges for wireguard and other services.
+
+SYNOPSIS
+
+  {0} [ COMMAND ] [ OPTIONS ]... [ ARGS ]...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+  {0} performs cryptographic key exchanges that are secure against quantum-computers and outputs the keys.
+  These keys can then be passed to various services such as wireguard or other vpn services
+  as pre-shared-keys to achieve security against attackers with quantum computers.
+
+COMMANDS
+  
+  keygen private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path>
+    Generate a keypair to use in the exchange command later. Send the public-key file to your communication partner
+    and keep the private-key file a secret!
+  
+  exchange private-key <file-path> public-key <file-path> [ OPTIONS ]... PEER...\n"
+    Start a process to exchange keys with the specified peers. You should specify at least one peer.
+
+    OPTIONS
+      listen <ip>[:<port>]
+        Instructs {0} to listen on the specified interface and port. By default {0} will listen on all interfaces and select a random port.
+
+      verbose
+        Extra logging
+
+    PEER := peer public-key <file-path> [endpoint <ip>[:<port>]] [preshared-key <file-path>] [outfile <file-path>] [wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>]
+      Instructs {0} to exchange keys with the given peer and write the resulting PSK into the given output file.
+      You must either specify the outfile or wireguard output option.
+
+      endpoint <ip>[:<port>]
+        Specifies the address where the peer can be reached. This will be automatically updated after the first successful
+        key exchange with the peer. If this is unspecified, the peer must initiate the connection.
+
+      preshared-key <file-path>
+        You may specify a pre-shared key which will be mixed into the final secret.
+
+      outfile <file-path>
+        You may specify a file to write the exchanged keys to. If this option is specified, {0} will
+        write a notification to standard out every time the key is updated.
+
+      wireguard <dev> <peer> <extra_params>
+        This allows you to directly specify a wireguard peer to deploy the pre-shared-key to.
+        You may specify extra parameters you would pass to `wg set` besides the preshared-key parameter which is used by {0}.
+        This makes it possible to add peers entirely from {0}.

src/util.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+//! Helper functions and macros
+
+use base64::{
+    display::Base64Display as B64Display, read::DecoderReader as B64Reader,
+    write::EncoderWriter as B64Writer,
+};
+use std::{
+    borrow::{Borrow, BorrowMut},
+    cmp::min,
+    io::{Read, Write},
+    time::{Duration, Instant},
+};
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn xor_into(a: &mut [u8], b: &[u8]) {
+    assert!(a.len() == b.len());
+    for (av, bv) in a.iter_mut().zip(b.iter()) {
+        *av ^= *bv;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Concatenate two byte arrays
+// TODO: Zeroize result?
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! cat {
+    ($len:expr; $($toks:expr),+) => {{
+        let mut buf = [0u8; $len];
+        let mut off = 0;
+        $({
+            let tok = $toks;
+            let tr = ::std::borrow::Borrow::<[u8]>::borrow(tok);
+            (&mut buf[off..(off + tr.len())]).copy_from_slice(tr);
+            off += tr.len();
+        })+
+        assert!(off == buf.len(), "Size mismatch in cat!()");
+        buf
+    }}
+}
+
+// TODO: consistent inout ordering
+pub fn cpy<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
+    dst.borrow_mut().copy_from_slice(src.borrow());
+}
+
+/// Copy from `src` to `dst`. If `src` and `dst` are not of equal length, copy as many bytes as possible.
+pub fn cpy_min<T: BorrowMut<[u8]> + ?Sized, F: Borrow<[u8]> + ?Sized>(src: &F, dst: &mut T) {
+    let src = src.borrow();
+    let dst = dst.borrow_mut();
+    let len = min(src.len(), dst.len());
+    dst[..len].copy_from_slice(&src[..len]);
+}
+
+/// Try block basically…returns a result and allows the use of the question mark operator inside
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! attempt {
+    ($block:expr) => {
+        (|| -> ::anyhow::Result<_> { $block })()
+    };
+}
+
+const B64TYPE: base64::Config = base64::STANDARD;
+
+pub fn fmt_b64<'a>(payload: &'a [u8]) -> B64Display<'a> {
+    B64Display::<'a>::with_config(payload, B64TYPE)
+}
+
+pub fn b64_writer<W: Write>(w: W) -> B64Writer<W> {
+    B64Writer::new(w, B64TYPE)
+}
+
+pub fn b64_reader<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> B64Reader<'_, R> {
+    B64Reader::new(r, B64TYPE)
+}
+
+// TODO remove this once std::cmp::max becomes const
+pub const fn max_usize(a: usize, b: usize) -> usize {
+    if a > b {
+        a
+    } else {
+        b
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct Timebase(Instant);
+
+impl Default for Timebase {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self(Instant::now())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Timebase {
+    pub fn now(&self) -> f64 {
+        self.0.elapsed().as_secs_f64()
+    }
+
+    pub fn dur(&self, t: f64) -> Duration {
+        Duration::from_secs_f64(t)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn mutating<T, F>(mut v: T, f: F) -> T
+where
+    F: Fn(&mut T),
+{
+    f(&mut v);
+    v
+}
+
+pub fn sideeffect<T, F>(v: T, f: F) -> T
+where
+    F: Fn(&T),
+{
+    f(&v);
+    v
+}